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# Tactical and strategical studies

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# TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL STUDIES

## CORPS AND ARMY

U.S

PREPARED BY

THE GENERAL SERVICE SCHOOLS

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

1922

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# *Introduction*


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1. SEQUEL TO COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL TEXT.—This volume is a sequel to *Tactical Principles and Decisions*. It comprises a series of studies, for the General Staff School, on the tactical and strategical handling of corps and an army.

2. PURPOSE.—The purpose of the studies contained herein is to place before the student certain strategical and tactical principles applicable to larger combat units, to illustrate their application by solutions of concrete problems, and to study decisions of higher commanders, the mechanism of the tactical handling of larger units, and the technique of preparing and promulgating army and corps combat orders. With the foregoing in view, a continuous operation of an independent army is presented, embracing successive situations illustrative of concentrations, advances, attacks, defenses, withdrawals, etc. Although the studies are made from an army viewpoint, the corps, the divisions, and auxiliary troops are given detailed consideration as elements of the army team.

3. FORM OF PRESENTATION.—The studies are presented in the form of situations; solutions, including decisions, combat orders and discussions; brief discussions of the main principles involved in each situation; and topics suggested for study. While the foregoing form is adapted especially to the method of instruction used at these schools, it is also believed to be suitable for officers of the service at large.

4. METHOD OF STUDY.—The full benefit of the course will not be derived if the student limits his work to read-



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ing. He should study each situation thoroughly; evolve his own solution; analyze, in comparison, the solution and principles presented in the text; and then study the technique of the orders. The topics suggested for study may be made the subject of additional research.

5. SCOPE.—These studies are intended primarily for the training of commanders. The details of staff and supply work are purposely limited. However, sound conclusions on the strategical and tactical handling of an army can hardly be reached if the supply phase is ignored. In each situation, sufficient supply data are given to insure an appreciation of the importance of that factor in all tactical problems of larger units.

6. SOURCES.—Practically all of these studies were given in conference to the Staff Class, 1920-21, valuable suggestions being made by the members. The studies have been amended to agree with new *Tables of Organization.* The authors of these studies had considerable experience in The World War, as practically all served in important positions on the staff of the First Army, A.E.F. Special credit is due to General H. A. Drum, who prepared the outline for the book and a large number of the chapters and supervised the preparation of the whole.

7. CHEMICAL WARFARE.—With respect to the methods discussed in this volume as to the use of toxic gases, it should be noted that the text was written prior to the meeting of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1922, and the adoption by this conference of the treaty provisions prohibiting the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases," as between the signatory powers, and all other nations which might, from time to time, adhere thereto. The fact that not all nations are signatories, and the possibility of the unfair use of chemical materials by an unscrupulous enemy, make it essential that the manner of meeting chemical attacks and of effectively dealing with them should be studied. In considering the use of gases in the present text, both in the general discussion and in the illustrative problems, it should be kept in



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mind, however, that this use, in actual operations, would in no wise be engaged in by the United States, except in case of hostilities with an enemy who does not observe the treaty.

R. H. ALLEN,
*Assistant Commandant.*

APPROVED:

H. E. ELY,
*Commandant.*



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## *Statement of Maps Required*

1. The following maps are required for *Tactical and Strategical Studies*, Corps and Army.

*a*. General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, 1 inch = 10 miles.

*b*. The following U. S. Geological Survey Maps, 1:62500: Newville, Carlisle, New Cumberland, Middletown, Lancaster, Chambersburg, Fairfield, Gettysburg, Hanover (new), York, McCalls Ferry, Hagerstown, Emmitsburg, Taneytown, Westminster, Parkton, Belair, Antietam, Ijamsville, Mt. Airy, Ellicott, Baltimore, Gunpowder, Seneca, Rockville, Laurel, Relay.

*c*. Sheets No. 1 and 2, special map to accompany *Tactical and Strategical Principles*, 1:62500. This is a print of the essential area of the U. S. Geological Survey Maps.

*d*. Certain special maps which have been prepared to explain the text and are inserted in the text at the end of each chapter.

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## *Composition of Third Army*

### *Army Headquarters*

#### ARMY TROOPS

| ARTILLERY | AIR SERVICE | ARMY CAVALRY |
|---|---|---|
| AA Hq | —AAS Hq. | 1st Cav Div |
| 901st, 902d and 903d Regts (155-mm Gun) | —1 Atk Wg<br>—2 Pur Gps<br>—1 Atk Gp | 2d Cav Div<br>-------- |
| 904th, 905th and 906th Regts (8-inch How) | —1 Obsn Gp<br>—1 Bomb Gp | ARMY TANKS<br>10th Hv Tk Bn |
| 1st Brig A-AA | —2 Bln Gps | 1st & 2d L Tk Bns |
| 310th Am Tn | —Com Secs<br>—Adrm Cos<br>Etc. | |

**The army engineers, medical service, train, and special troops are as prescribed for a type army.**

#### CORPS

I CORPS II CORPS III CORPS IV CORPS

NOTE.—In addition to its organic headquarters and corps troops, each corps comprises such divisions as may be assigned to it, and, for these operations, is reinforced by 1 cavalry regiment and 1 chemical ammunition train.

#### DIVISIONS

1st Div—2d Div—3d Div—4th Div—11th Div—20th Div—22d Div—23d Div—25th Div—30th Div.



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CHAPTER I

# *A Plan of Campaign*


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## SECTION I

## *The Situation and Requirements*


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1. GENERAL SITUATION.—*a.* Reds (overseas and northern part of America) and Blues (The U.S.) declared war in April, 1921. The Blues, invading Red territory, have concentrated their immediately available forces in the northeast.

*b.* During the last part of May, 1921, the Reds gained naval supremacy and reduced the defenses of Chesapeake Bay. During June, Red military forces seized Washington and Baltimore, meeting only slight resistance from local military units. Blues immediately withdrew troops from the northeastern campaign to concentrate an army in southern Pennsylvania with the object of destroying the new Red forces. Railroad congestion delayed the Blue concentration.

2. FIRST SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE).—*a.* By the morning of June 8, 1921, a temporary headquarters of the Third Blue Army was established at Harrisburg where the commander (General A) received the following letter of instructions:



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF

In reply refer to
004.61

ALBANY, N. Y.
7 June 21, 7:00 P.M.

Subject: OPERATIONS THIRD ARMY.

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, THIRD ARMY.

The Commander-in-Chief directs the following information and instructions be communicated for necessary action:

1. The following is a summary of the latest available information of the enemy:
   *a.* The Reds, having gained control of the sea and landed on the west shores of CHESAPEAKE BAY, hold WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE. These two localities are being organized as bases for extensive operations, the more elaborate preparations being made at BALTIMORE.
   *b.* At noon June 7 it is estimated that the Reds had landed two infantry divisions and some cavalry. Red's shipping and the port facilities of CHESAPEAKE BAY are capable of handling 300,000 men per month. In view of our successful invasion of the northeast, the Reds may be expected to ship all available troops to CHESAPEAKE BAY bases.
   *c.* The Reds, having captured or dispersed all Blue contingents in the vicinity of WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE, have their advance forces on the general line GUNPOWDER FALLS—REISTERSTOWN—COOKSVILLE — ROCKVILLE — MANASSAS and the RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER. A few air units have been seen along the SUSQUEHANNA south of HARRISBURG, east of SOUTH MOUNTAINS, and south of the POTOMAC. No Reds have been reported on eastern shores of CHESAPEAKE BAY.
   *d.* The Red naval forces hold HAMPTON ROADS and vicinity.
   *e.* The situation has not developed sufficiently to judge with accuracy Red's intentions. However, three courses seem open to him:
      (1) An advance northeast along the coast, capturing NEW YORK and contiguous cities,

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thereby making accessible bases for a larger army.

(2) An advance north to cut our railroad connections with the west, thereby isolating the territory and our army to the northeast and capturing the coal regions of PENNSYLVANIA.

(3) An advance northwest and west to control the resources upon which our army and the east subsist.

2. The following is a summary of our own situation:

(a) The capital has been established temporarily at PITTSBURG. Public and political influences are exerting pressure for special measures to protect the capital and other important centers.

(b) Our navy is refitting in south ATLANTIC bases and will not be able to operate extensively within the next two months.

(c) Our military forces will operate as follows:

(1) The First and Second Armies will continue the operations to the northeast. However, their strength will be reduced materially to form the Third Army. It is estimated that their campaign should terminate about August 1, when the Second Army will be available to join the Third and Fifth Armies. In the meantime, a small force will be held available to resist hostile landings north of CHESAPEAKE BAY.

(2) The Third Army will be formed as indicated hereinafter.

(3) The Fourth Army will continue its operations on the northern and western frontiers.

(4) The Fifth Army, now being organized in the middle west, will be concentrated east of the OHIO RIVER and operate in conjunction with the Third Army. The organization of this army is dependent on shipment of supplies from our factories in the east. Its mobilization will be complete about the end of August, unless the shipments indicated above are prevented through the destruction of the railroads in northern PENNSYLVANIA by the enemy.

3.* The Third Army will comprise the units, and be at your disposal on the dates, as indicated in the attached con-

*For this table see paragraph 4.

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centration table. While the Commander-in-Chief expects to replace all losses of the Third Army, he will not be able to increase its strength by additional units, except army artillery, for some time. Request for additional army artillery should be limited to urgent needs.

4. The territory west of SUSQUEHANNA RIVER is assigned to the Third Army. Due to heavy railroad traffic (east and west) the Third Army will have to be supplied from depots located in eastern PENNSYLVANIA and OHIO and by the railroads centering at HARRISBURG and CUMBERLAND. LEBANON and CUMBERLAND have been designated as regulating stations for the Third Army during concentration.
5. The primary mission of the Third Army is to destroy, without delay, the Red forces about CHESAPEAKE BAY, with secondary missions of preventing any Red advance to the east of the SUSQUEHANNA RIVER, the interruption of the east and west railroads passing through central and northern PENNSYLVANIA, and the protection of the capital.

By command of General A:

XYZ
Chief of Staff.

*b.* By evening of June 9, the commander of the Third Army has the following information:

(1) It has been determined, with fair accuracy, by Blue secret service, that hostile landings during June will average, per week, the equivalent of two to three infantry divisions with a regular proportion of corps, army, and other troops, and that most of the Red troops are located about Baltimore and Washington. Nothing has been learned of Red's intentions.

(2) Red troop concentrations have been reported as follows:

(a) Area of Towson
(b) Area of Owings Mills
(c) Ellicott City
(d) Laurel and Annapolis Junction
(e) Kensington
(f) Alexandria

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(g) In addition to the foregoing, Baltimore, Annapolis and Washington are occupied. A Red naval detachment, with a small destroyer, has seized the Susquehanna bridges at Havre de Grace. The enemy has captured sufficient rolling stock to supply 400,000 men.

(3) No destruction of railroads has taken place.

3. REQUIREMENTS.

*a. First Requirement.*—The plan of campaign recommended for the Third Army, with reasons in brief.

*b. Second Requirement.*—General plan of supply for Third Army.

NOTES

*a.* The Red units are assumed to be the same in strength and organization as the Blue.

*b.* Roads as shown on Geol. Surv. 1:62500 map are considered to be as follows:

(1) All turnpikes are two-way metal roads over which all classes of transportation can be used at any time.

(2) All other roads are dirt, and suitable, subject to weather conditions, for animal, light tractor, and motor transportation.

*c.* Commercial telegraph and telephone lines exist along all railroads and turnpikes indicated on the General Map.

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## 4. APPENDIX TO GHQ LETTER.

TABLE OF TROOPS AND RAILROAD CONCENTRATION, THIRD ARMY
(See G3 Situation Map, 8 June 21)

| *Units* | *Point of Transfer to Third Army* | *Means of Transportation—RR* | *First Unit Arrives* | *Last Unit Arrives* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CAVALRY<br>1st Div<br>2d Div | YORK<br>YORK | P & R & PA<br>P & R | 11 June 6:00 AM<br>12 June 6:00 AM | 12 June 4:00 PM<br>13 June 4:00 PM | Via MARIETTA<br>Via COLUMBIA |
| 1st Div | YORK | P & R & PA | 14 June 1:00 AM | 17 June 6:00 AM | Via MARIETTA |
| I CORPS<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs | YORK | P & R | 14 June 4:00 AM | 18 June 2:00 PM | Via COLUMBIA |
| THIRD ARMY HQ | HARRISBURG and DAUPHINS | P & R | 8 June 1:00 AM | 8 June 11:00 PM | |
| ARMY AIR SERVICE<br>Air Hq<br>1 Atk Wing<br>2 Pur Gps<br>1 Atk Gp<br>1 Obs Gp<br>1 Bomb Gp<br>2 Bln Gps<br>Misc Units | HARRISBURG and DAUPHINS | P & R | 9 June 6:00 AM | 12 June 1:00 PM | |
| ARMY ARTY<br>Hq<br>1st Brig A-AA<br>901st, 902d & 903d Arty (155 guns)<br>310th Am Tn | HARRISBURG DAUPHINS | P & R<br><br><br>Overland | With Army Hq<br>12 June 6:00 AM<br>19 June 6:00 AM<br><br>19 June 7:00 AM | With Army Hq<br>12 June 8:00 PM<br>19 June 7:00 PM<br><br>19 June 11:00 PM | |
| 22d Div | HARRISBURG and DAUPHINS | P & R | 13 June 1:00 AM | 17 June 8:00 PM | |
| 3d Div | HARRISBURG and DAUPHINS | P & R | 14 June 12:30 AM | 17 June 7:00 PM | |
| II CORPS:<br>CHQ<br>Corps Troops | HARRISBURG and DAUPHINS | P & R | 14 June 6:00 AM | 17 June 9:00 PM | |
| 23d Div | LEBANON | do | 16 June 8:00 AM | 19 June 9:00 PM | |
| ARMY TN | HARRISBURG | Overland | 13 June 6:00 AM | 13 June 11:00 AM | Capacity 1 Div less animal and motor transportation. |
| 25th Div | MCCONNELSBURG | Marches from detraining points on RR to the west | 13 June 4:00 PM | 14 June 3:00 PM | |
| 20th Div | CHARLESTOWN | B & O | 14 June 1:00 AM | 18 June 7:00 AM | |
| 30th Div | CHARLESTOWN | N & W | 17 June 1:00 AM | 20 June 6:00 AM | |
| III CORPS<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs | CHARLESTOWN | B & O and N & W | 15 June 1:00 AM | 17 June 11:00 PM | |

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TABLE OF TROOPS AND RAILROAD CONCENTRATION, THIRD ARMY—*Continued*

| *Units* | *Point of Transfer to Third Army* | *Means of Transportation—RR* | *First Unit Arrives* | *Last Unit Arrives* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Div | HAGERSTOWN | B & O | 14 June 1:00 AM | 17 June 1:00 AM | |
| 2d Div | HAGERSTOWN | W. M. | 14 June 1:00 AM | 17 June 12:00 Noon | |
| IV CORPS: CHQ Corps Trs | HAGERSTOWN | B & O and W. M. | 15 June 10:00 AM | 17 June 4:00 PM | |
| 11th Div | HAGERSTOWN | B & O and W. M. | 17 June 1:00 AM | 19 June 7:00 AM | |
| ARMY ARTY: 904th, 905th and 906th Arty (8" How) | HAGERSTOWN | B & O and W. M. | 18 June 4:00 PM | 19 June 5:00 PM | |
| ARMY TANKS: 10th Hv Bn 1st and 2d Lt Bns | HAGERSTOWN | B & O | 20 June AM | 20 June PM | |

5. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.—*a. Regulating Stations for Third Army.*

(1) *Lebanon.*

(a) From June 8 until further orders.

(b) Capacity all supplies and ammunition and evacuation for entire army.

(c) Railroad troop movement trains available after June 20 on call Third Army sufficient to move one division (less motor transportation). Transportation delivering troops to transfer points may be used to transport said troops to destination in Third Army area.

(2) *Cumberland.*

(a) From June 13 until further orders.

(b) Capacity all supplies and ammunition and evacuation for entire army.

(c) No railroad troop transportation available unless transferred from Lebanon. Transportation delivering troops to transfer points may be used to transport said troops to destination in Third Army area.

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*b. Railroad Capacity.*

(1) All single track railroads in the area between the Susquehanna and Potomac are, in the main, single tracked, with a capacity of one train per half hour if used in one direction, and one train per hour if used in both directions. Assume requirements for railroad transportation as follows:

(a) 1 infantry division requires 70 standard type trains.

(b) 1 cavalry division requires 38 standard type trains.

(c) 1 corps headquarters and corps troops requires 70 standard type trains.

(All motor transportation moves overland under corps orders.)

(2) All railroad stations will be considered available for railheads with a capacity equal to one division. Where sidings are shown on Geological Survey Map, add to capacity the equivalent of one division per each track of siding.

*c. Organization Notes.*

(1) No cavalry attached to divisions.

(2) Each corps is reinforced by one regiment of cavalry and one chemical ammunition train.

(3) Army troops, such as military police, special engineers, depot troops, army signal troops, etc., are not given, as they have little bearing on tactical studies.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Plan of Campaign with Reasons | 6 |
| Plan of Supply | 7 |

---

6. PLAN OF CAMPAIGN WITH REASONS.—*a. The Plan.*—(1) The army will be concentrated at once and take the

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offensive without delay. The offensive will be based on the main part of the army advancing southeast of the front Hanover—Keymar, while a smaller force engages and contains the Reds by advancing east and southeast from Frederick.

(2) The army will be concentrated in the Monocacy Valley under cover of Parrs Ridge, screened by the cavalry divisions and air forces. The concentration will be made in two groups. The main group, comprising three corps of seven divisions, will be concentrated on the front Hanover—Keymar, in readiness to advance in the direction of Baltimore. The second group, comprising one corps of three divisions, will be concentrated on the front Frederick—Point of Rocks, in readiness to advance east.

(3) While the second (south) group prevents a Red concentration to the north and contains as many Reds as possible, the main (north) group will strike the decisive blow.

(4) With the foregoing in mind, the south group will engage the enemy east of Parrs Ridge and, if forced to retire, will contain the enemy by holding that ridge and eventually the Monocacy River. In addition, this force will protect the army's south flank. The northern group operates directly under army headquarters. After securing Parrs Ridge, it advances southeast to engage the Red main forces. The gap between the two groups will be covered by cavalry.

*b. Reasons in Brief.*—The vital considerations leading to the decision given above may be summarized as follows:

(1) It is estimated that Red main forces may be landed approximately as follows:

| Date | Divisions | Corps | Cavalry Divisions |
|---|---|---|---|
| By June 7 | 2 | 1 | |
| By June 14 | 4 | 2 | ½ |
| By June 21 | 7 | 3 | 1 |
| By June 28 | 10 | 4 | |
| By July 5 | 13 | | |

(2) Considering the size of the Blue population in Washington, Baltimore, and vicinity, and the necessity for

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immediate protection of their bases, it seems improbable that Reds will advance far into the interior, with any large force, prior to June 17. By that time there will be some three or four divisions available for such an operation. These units located on the front Baltimore—Washington, will have to be concentrated before undertaking any deep advance. Such a concentration will involve two or three days, or until about June 19th.

(3) The Red bases at Baltimore and Washington are so vital that the Red plan of campaign will provide for their security. They cannot afford to move southwest and expose Baltimore. In order to employ their army as a unit, the Reds will have to advance, at least initially, to a suitable position to the west or northwest. Otherwise the Washington Reds will have to swing north along Parrs Ridge pivoting on Baltimore. Irrespective of the strategical object of their campaign (New York City, the railroads passing through Pennsylvania, or the Blue supply lines to the west and northwest), the initial Red advance, of necessity, will have to be in the general directions stated.

(4) With the foregoing in mind, upon learning of the Blue concentrations, the Reds, without doubt, will endeavor to concentrate for the advance indicated. To insure the safety of bases and room for employment of their army, Reds also will endeavor early to secure Parrs Ridge and the territory south of Deer Creek. However, initial weakness will necessitate Reds at first holding the line indicated with covering forces, backed up by such troops as may be available for quick concentration against any Blue advance in force. Even an arrangement based on the foregoing is hardly feasible for the Reds prior to June 19th or 20th.

(5) In view of the direction from which Blue troops will arrive, and the railroads joining the Susquehanna and Potomac Rivers, there are several areas available for the Third Army's concentration, especially west of South and Catoctin Mountains, and the Valley of the Monocacy.

(6) The former is distant, will result in the loss of the important NC—PA railroad system, and places a serious obstacle in front of the army. For defensive purposes,

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this concentration has many advantages. For offensive purposes a concentration in the Monocacy Valley is essential.

(7) The only weakness of a concentration in the Valley of the Monocacy is the closeness of that area to the Red bases. There is a danger that Reds may advance some troops which may interrupt the concentration. However, the foregoing seems extremely unlikely in view of the following:

TABLE SHOWING POSSIBLE ARRIVALS FIRST BLUE UNITS

| *Units* | *Localities* | *Dates* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions | Mt. Airy | June 12 PM | |
| | Westminster | June 12 PM | |
| | Ebbvale | June 12 PM | |
| 20th Division | Frederick | June 16 PM | (combat units) |
| 2d Division | Keymar | June 16 PM | |
| 3d Division | SE Littlestown | June 16 PM | |
| 1st Division | SE Hanover | June 16 PM | |

(8) The foregoing indicates the practicability of the concentration stated. The army may complete its initial concentration in the area stated by the evening of June 20, thus giving ample time to secure Parrs Ridge and to prepare for an advance before any Red advance in force.

(9) The concentration indicated not only places the Third Army in a position to carry out the main missions assigned by GHQ, but also to strike offensively against Baltimore, a decisive Red element. In addition, such a concentration utilizes to the fullest extent the available railroads, covers the Blue lines of supply and retreat, and is partially screened by Parrs Ridge.

(10) The Third Army cannot afford to lose the opportunity to strike offensively while the Reds are comparatively weak. The longer the Blue offensive is delayed, the less are its chances of success, because of increasing Red strength.

(11) While the concentration of the Third Army in two groups may appear as undue dispersion of its striking power, the relative strength and tactics of the situation warrant it. The south Blue group should play an important role in the Third Army's tactical plan. This

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group, as a flank detachment, not only should deceive the Reds as to the location of the main Blue concentration, but also should attract so many Reds as to insure the decisiveness of the blow of the northern Blue group. If the campaign does not develop in accordance with the foregoing conception, the Blue south group has sufficient strength to strike a decisive blow against the flank of the Reds engaged with the Blue northern group.

(12) In addition to the foregoing, a study of both the Blue and Red railroad situations will show material advantages to the Third Blue Army by operating with its main forces in the northern group.

7. GENERAL PLAN OF SUPPLY.—*a.* The Third Army is favorably situated with regard to lateral railroad lines but not so favorably situated with reference to lines perpendicular to the front. For the purpose of regulating the movement of troop trains, both Cumberland and Lebanon may be used, provided certain railroad lines are assigned to each station.

*b.* For the purpose of regulating the flow of supplies to the Third Army, one regulating station only must be considered. Cumberland is the more favorably situated at this stage of the campaign. If the course of events later threaten this point by movement directed against the right flank of the Third Army, it will be necessary then to shift the regulating station to the other flank, Lebanon being reserved for this purpose.

*c.* The main army depots, evacuation hospitals, etc., will be concentrated in Cumberland Valley along the railroad connecting Hagerstown, Chambersburg, Shippensburg and Carlisle. This arrangement insures safety, some permanency, and easy accessibility either to Cumberland or Lebanon. However, the mountain range to the east limits traffic to the front to some extent. This weakness can be overcome by locating advance ammunition depots, or other advance depots, and evacuation hospitals in the Monocacy Valley. These advance depots may be fed either directly from the regulating station, by utilizing railroads east of

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the South and Catoctin Mountains, or by short hauls over these mountains from the main army depots.

*d.* The automatic supply will be made direct from the regulating station to the railheads, using the railroads east of the South and Catoctin Mountains as long as practicable. The railheads for the various units are indicated later.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Elements in Study of Plan | 8 |
| Scope of Conclusions Drawn from Study | 9 |
| Scope of the Plan | 10 |
| The Essential Features of a Plan | 11 |
| Discussion of Plan Adopted | 12 |

---

8. ELEMENTS IN STUDY OF PLAN.—In discussions of plans involving large forces, there are utilized the terms "project of operations," "plan of campaign," and "plan of an operation." The first relates to a national project prepared by the War Department for the execution of a war with a specific enemy, and may involve several campaigns. The second relates to the general conduct of forces in a single theater of operations and is the plan prepared by the commander thereof for the accomplishment of the mission assigned. It includes successive tactical operations. The third relates to a tactical phase of a campaign which generally involves several tactical operations before the mission assigned is accomplished. In all of these, identical elements require consideration, although the degree of consideration and objective vary for each. The main elements may be summarized as follows:

*a.* Military geography (from enemy's and own viewpoint) including such topics as meteorology, geology, topography, economy, industry, agriculture, transportation, climate, form of government, disposition of population, political issues, national traits and characteristics.

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*b.* Enemy strength, fighting coefficient, and plans for concentration and course of action.

*c.* Enemy decisive elements which should be the objective, i.e., army, a locality, industry, etc.

*d.* Probable attitude of neutral countries and its effect on plans.

*e.* Own strength, disposition of population, finance, weaknesses, etc.

*f.* Own facilities for concentration.

*g.* Comparison of own with enemy's ability to mobilize and concentrate.

*h.* Own supply facilities.

9. SCOPE OF CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM STUDY.—Conclusions deduced from such studies should cover in general:

*a.* An objective—national, strategical or tactical, depending on viewpoint. In case of a project of operations and a plan of campaign, the objective is either the enemy's army or an important locality, whereas, in the case of a tactical operation, it is always the enemy's armed forces.

*b.* Offensive or defensive course of action.

*c.* Decisive and secondary strokes by which to accomplish the objective.

*d.* Concentrations, how made, and in what areas.

*e.* Lines of advance from concentration areas or defensive zones, with a general consideration of the organization and grouping of the forces therefor.

*f.* In case of an advance, an estimate as to the general locality where the decisive battle will occur.

*g.* Supply arrangements.

10. SCOPE OF THE PLAN.—As a result of the studies indicated, a plan of campaign should determine definitely the following main points:

*a.* The objective.

*b.* The course of action to accomplish the objective—offensive, defensive or a combined offensive-defensive.

*c.* If offensive action is to be taken, what the hostile decisive element is, army or locality.

*d.* If offensive action is to be taken, statement of the decisive and secondary strokes to be executed, including direction and strength of each.

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*e.* If defensive action is to be taken, the location of defensive areas and mission of each, and general grouping of the forces therefor.

*f.* The method and location of the concentration of the forces and their security during the concentration.

*g.* Supply arrangements.

*h.* Lines of retreat, including supply arrangements therefor.

11. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A PLAN.—With the information available in modern war to commanders of field forces, definite conclusions as to general courses of hostile action can be made with considerable accuracy. There is little excuse for a commander to remain inactive "awaiting developments." Once a course of action (offensive or defensive) has been accepted, decisive action in accordance therewith must follow. Decisive action results from "clear cut" comprehensive plans based on a full utilization of all available strength. The forces should be organized and grouped with this in mind. Economy of forces should be so practised that there is available a force of sufficient strength and power with which to strike a decisive blow at an opportune moment. Depending on circumstances, this opportunity may be foreseen in initial plans or it may have to be created by subsequent action. Therefore, a plan of campaign should be based on utilizing relatively small forces to cause the enemy to dissipate his strength, while one's major forces are concentrated in a decisive blow.

12. DISCUSSION OF PLAN ADOPTED.—*a.* The plan adopted in the solution is based on the foregoing principle. Aside from geographical considerations, the army is organized into a main group (northern), to strike the decisive blow, and a secondary group (southern), to contain and force the enemy to dissipate his strength.

*b.* The plan has these advantages:

(1) It promises an early decisive blow.

(2) The decisive blow is so directed that the enemy will have difficulty in concentrating against it, as he must meet, also, the secondary Blue group.

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(3) It makes full use of the available railroads.

(4) It blocks any plans the Reds are likely to undertake.

(5) In case of failure, the results could not be a decisive defeat of the Third Army.

(6) It retains use of both regulating stations.

*c.* The following are the important disadvantages associated with the plan:

(1) Full coordination of effort may not be secured, on account of the necessity for rapid execution.

(2) The forces are dispersed into two commands, rather widely separated.

(3) The defeat of the southern group, without a decisive success by the northern group, may throw the Third Army back against the Susquehanna with serious consequences.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 13

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13. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Analyze a plan of campaign based on the main army group operating due east from Frederick, while a secondary group operates southeast from Hanover—Littlestown.

*b.* Analyze a plan of campaign based on the whole Third Army operating due east from Frederick or due southeast from Hanover—Keymar or due south from Hanover—Dallastown.

*c.* Suggest any other combinations as a basis of a plan of campaign.

*d.* Examine and point out the main influences the following elements have on any plan of campaign:

(1) Rivers—Susquehanna, Potomac, Monocacy and Patapsco.

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(2) The railroad lines in the whole area.

(3) The mountain ranges and the rolling country in the whole area.

(4) The industrial and economic considerations in relation to the large cities and the density of population in the whole area.

*e.* (1) What advantages would there be if Blue took the defensive?

(2) What plan of campaign would you suggest based on a defensive attitude of the Third Army?

## *Maps*

G3 Situation Map, Third Army, 8 June 21. Showing enemy situation, and points of transfer of troops to Third Army.

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## CHAPTER II

# *A Plan of Concentration*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| Section I | —Situation and Requirements | 1- 2 |
| Section II | —A Solution | 3- 4 |
| Section III | —Discussion of the Concentration | 5-10 |
| Section IV | —Topics Suggested for Study | 10 |

Maps—following page 27.


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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Second Special Situation (Blue) | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


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1. SECOND SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE).—Assume that the plan of campaign set forth in Chapter I is accepted and that no material change in the situation occurs.

2. REQUIRED.—The plan of organization and concentration of the Third Blue Army and the field orders therefor.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Field Order | 3 |
| Organization and Concentration Table, Third Army | 4 |


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3. THE FIELD ORDER.—The plan of organization and concentration of the Third Army is set forth in the following orders:



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Third Army,
HARRISBURG, PA.,
9 June 21, 10:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 1.

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, 1" = 10 miles; Geol. Surv., 1:62500; Operation Maps No. 1A and 1B, Third Army, accompanying FO No. 1.

1. Red forces, comprising several divisions and auxiliary troops, including some cavalry and air units, have landed on west shore CHESAPEAKE BAY seizing BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON. Red troop concentrations reported at TOWSON, OWINGS MILLS, ELLICOTT CITY, LAUREL, ANNAPOLIS JC., KENSINGTON and ALEXANDRIA. Red advance detachments reported on general line GUNPOWDER FALLS — REISTERSTOWN — COOKSVILLE — ROCKVILLE—MANNASSAS and the RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER. A Red naval detachment holds HAVRE DE GRACE bridges. Reports indicate Reds establishing main bases at BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON (see G2 Report).

2. This army will be organized and concentrated as per attached table for the purpose of attacking the Reds indicated above.

3. (a) (1) The army air service, starting its reconnaissance as early as possible, will determine Red troop concentrations and movements between SUSQUEHANNA and POTOMAC RIVERS. Information is especially desired covering troop movements in the vicinity of WASHINGTON.

(2) The army bombing group will interrupt hostile landings and railroad movements between WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE.

(3) Hostile aerial observation west of PARRS RIDGE and north of EBBVALE—PARKTON road will be prevented, especially during the concentration of the army.

(4) Army air service units will operate from destinations given in attached tables.

(b) The 2d Cav Div, reinforced by one brig, 1st Cav Div, seizing at once the general line PARRS RIDGE (from LIBERTY TURNPIKE inclusive)—EBBVALE—PARKTON road, will screen the concentration of the I, II and IV Corps. The front PARKTON—SUSQUEHANNA RIVER will be covered by patrols. Upon relief by corps cavalry on the above line, the 2d Cav Div, reinforced, operating north of the PA-

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TAPSCO RIVER, will locate hostile main forces in the vicinity of BALTIMORE.

1st Cav Div (less 1 brig) seizing at once the general line PARRS RIDGE (from LIBERTY TURNPIKE exclusive) to the POTOMAC RIVER, will screen the concentration of the III Corps. Determine location and movements of Reds in vicinity of WASHINGTON. This division is temporarily attached to III Corps.

(c) III Corps will concentrate without delay west of PARRS RIDGE southeast of FREDERICK, prepared to advance east and southeast. 20th Div will support the 1st Cav Div until receipt of orders from III Corps. Maintain contact with IV Corps and reconnoiter south of POTOMAC RIVER.

(d) IV Corps (less 4th Div) will concentrate without delay in the area TANEYTOWN—WESTMINSTER—UNION BRIDGE, prepared to advance east and southeast. Until receipt of orders from Corps Commander, 2d Div will support the 2d Cav Div on front WESTMINSTER (inclusive)—LIBERTY TURNPIKE (inclusive). Corps cavalry will relieve the 2d Cavalry Div on the above front promptly. Maintain contact with III Corps.

(e) II Corps (less 25th Div) will concentrate between LITTLESTOWN and SILVER RUN prepared to advance southeast. Corps cavalry will relieve the 2d Cav Div on the front WESTMINSTER (exclusive)—MANCHESTER (exclusive) promptly.

(f) I Corps will concentrate without delay north of DUG HILL RIDGE, prepared to advance southeast. 23d Div will be held in the vicinity of HANOVER JC at army's disposal. Corps cavalry will relieve the 2d Cav Div promptly on the front MANCHESTER (inclusive)—PARKTON. Until receipt of orders from Corps Commander, 1st Div will support the 2d Cav Div on the front WESTMINSTER (exclusive)—GUNPOWDER FALLS.

(g) Army reserve divisions (4th and 25th) will await orders at destinations.

(h) Army artillery groupment will await orders at destinations. The 1st Brig AA-A will protect airdromes located at destinations.

(i) Army tanks and truck trains will await orders at destinations.

(j) Intelligence: See Annex No 1 (omitted).

4. See Administrative Order No 2 (omitted).

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
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5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication. See Annex No 5 (See Chapter XXVI).

(b) Command Posts:

Third Army:

(1) Forward Echelon, after 11:00 AM, 11 June, EMMITSBURG.

(2) Rear Echelon, 11:00 AM, 11 June, CHAMBERSBURG.

2d Cav Div—after 12:00 noon, 13 June, UNION MILLS.

1st Cav Div—after 6:00 PM, 13 June, NEWMARKET.

III Corps—after 8:00 AM, 16 June, FREDERICK.

IV Corps—after 8:00 PM, 16 June, TANEYTOWN.

II Corps—after 8:00 PM, 16 June, LITTLESTOWN.

I Corps—after 11:00 PM, 15 June, HANOVER.

4th Div—after 8:00 AM, 17 June, FAIRPLAY.

25th Div—after 10:00 PM, 14 June, GETTYSBURG.

By command of Gen A,

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

Copies for GHQ.
Each Corps.
2d Cav Div.
1st Cav Div.
4th Div.
25th Div.
Army Staff.

4. ORGANIZATION AND CONCENTRATION TABLE, THIRD ARMY.

See table facing page 20.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of the Concentration*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Problem | 5 |
| Principles Relating to Concentrations | 6 |
| This Concentration Based on Preconceived Maneuver | 7 |
| Factors Resulting in Choice of Monocacy Valley | 8 |
| The Road Net | 9 |
| Frontages | 10 |

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5. THE PROBLEM.—The practicability of an adopted concentration is an essential consideration in preparing a plan of campaign. This chapter treats especially of the details of the concentration and associated problems. Having accepted a plan of campaign based on concentrating in the Monocacy Valley and utilizing the forces in the two groups indicated, the problem for consideration is to determine the best plan of organizing and placing these forces to meet the ends in view.

6. PRINCIPLES RELATING TO CONCENTRATIONS. — The following principles in relation to concentrations should be considered in this connection:

*a.* The plan of concentration should be based on the plan of campaign.

*b.* From a general viewpoint, there are two classes of concentrations:

(1) A concentration based on a tactical maneuver previously planned. The execution of the tactical maneuver is already fixed in direction and in means. Complete preparations are made. The guiding thought is an early seizure of the initiative, thus forcing the direction of the struggle from the first, and thereby subordinating the enemy to one's will. In this plan of concentration, success demands rapidity of movements, superiority, and a decisive blow in a correct direction. It is, therefore, essential that plans be based on rather complete and accurate information. Early decisive results must be sought, as subsequent changes are impracticable.

(2) A concentration based on conceiving the tactical maneuver after the concentration is completed or while it is in progress. Thus, while the maneuver decision awaits developments, the troops are concentrated in such relative positions as to be readily grouped for any possible maneuver. Of course, the concentration should be covered and forces employed to develop the enemy. This form of concentration is advantageous when the enemy is distant and information is lacking.

*c.* The concentration should be so located that it can be carried out without interruptions from the enemy.

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*d.* Sufficient time should be available so troops may be placed in relative positions suitable for the next step in the campaign, i.e., an advance, deployment, etc.

*e.* If there is a possibility of a serious hostile attack, the concentration should not be made piecemeal.

*f.* The concentration should be secured and covered by ground and aerial forces.

*g.* The concentration should be covered, as far as practicable, by natural terrain features which, while affording cover, should not impede an advance or offensive action.

*h.* The concentration should be so arranged and executed that the enemy is kept in ignorance of it, or at least, of the location of the bulk of the forces.

*i.* The concentration should cover the base of supplies and routes thereto, and the lines of retreat.

*j.* The concentration should provide for the desired organization of the subordinate commands, and for grouping them for decisive and secondary strokes.

*k.* Concentrations usually consist of railroad movements to nearby detraining points, followed by a march to a concentration area, during which the units are arranged in suitable groups. The first troops to arrive generally take over the covering and screening functions.

*l.* The order of arrival of troops in the concentration area depends on the conditions of each situation. However, there should always arrive, in advance, a covering and reconnoitering force. Commanders should arrive with leading elements of their commands.

*m.* The distance of the concentration from the enemy is influenced by several elements in addition to transportation facilities and terrain features. In the main, the following points require careful consideration:

(1) The relative preparedness and strength of opposing forces.

(2) The probable hostile course of action (offensive or defensive), when the enemy can start and complete initial movements, etc.

(3) Whether one's own course of action is to be initially offensive or defensive.

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(4) The time required to complete one's concentration and especially to cover the same by security forces.

*n.* Piecemeal concentrations should be avoided and all plans should be based on a coordinated and concentrated action by the whole force in a decisive blow.

7. THIS CONCENTRATION BASED ON PRECONCEIVED MANEUVER.—In the case under consideration, the concentration is based on a preconceived maneuver, which contemplates an early offensive with the decisive blow by the north group. Knowledge of the enemy coupled with the restrictions under which he must operate, makes practicable the adoption of this plan. If the tactical maneuver was to be based on further developments, a concentration west of South and Catoctin Mountains, would have many advantages.

8. FACTORS RESULTING IN CHOICE OF MONOCACY VALLEY.—The railhead and terrain situations favor a concentration in either the Monocacy Valley or west of the mountains. The important consideration is to decide whether a concentration in the Valley of the Monocacy can be completed before any serious hostile advance. The following data are interesting in this connection:

*a.* (1) Possible time of completing concentration of Third Army:

| *Date* | *Location* | *Organization* |
|---|---|---|
| 10-12 June AM | Air Service | Fairfield—Waynesboro |
| 10-11 June PM | Army Hq | Emmitsburg—Chambersburg |
| 13 June AM | 1st Cav Div | Mt. Airy |
| 13 June PM | 2d Cav Div | Westminster—Parkton |
| | *I Corps* | |
| 15-16 June PM | Corps Hq & Troops | Hanover |
| 14-17 June AM | 1st Div | SE Hanover |
| 17-20 June AM | 23d Div | Porters—Hanover Jc |
| | *II Corps* | |
| 15-19 June PM | Corps Hq and Troops | Littlestown |
| 14-18 June PM | 3d Div | SE Littlestown |
| 14-19 June AM | 25th Div (Reserve) | Gettysburg |

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| *Date* | *Location* | *Organization* |
|---|---|---|
| | *IV Corps* | |
| 16-18 June PM | Corps Hq & Troops | Taneytown |
| 14-17 June PM | 2d Div | Keymar |
| 15-18 June PM | 22d Div | SE Taneytown |
| 16-20 June PM | 4th Div (Reserve) | Fairplay |
| | *III Corps* | |
| 15-17 June PM | Corps Hq & Troops | Frederick |
| 14-18 June Noon | 20th Div | Frederick |
| 17-20 June Noon | 30th Div | Point of Rocks |
| 16-18 June AM | 11th Div | Jefferson & Middleton |

(2) It will be noted that the troops assigned to the Third Army arrive in three main groups: i.e., northern group comprising a York group, and a Harrisburg and Dauphin group; a central group around McConnellsburg; and a southern group comprising a Hagerstown group and a Charlestown group.

*b.* The railroads connecting the concentration area with the groups are based on the main lateral lines passing through York and Hanover and through Frederick and the two railroad lines approaching the front from the rear areas, i.e., the P. & R. from Carlisle to Gettysburg and the W.M. crossing the mountains at Highfield. The foregoing conditions have important influences and permit the concentration to be arranged in the following steps:

1st—Arrival of the reconnoitering and screening forces on the whole front, i.e., air forces and 1st and 2d Cavalry Division.

2d—Arrival of security forces to support the cavalry in case of a hostile advance by holding Parrs Ridge, i.e., the 20th Division east of Frederick—the 2d Division east of Keymar and the 1st Division southeast of Hanover.

3d—Arrival of corps headquarters and divisions to complete the front line, but echeloned to the rear of the security forces.

4th—Arrival of the army reserve divisions echeloned well to the rear.

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5th—The arrival of forces from the north, south and west is so arranged that the full capacity of railroad lines may be employed, as empties can be shipped through without back hauls.

9. THE ROAD NET.—The road situation in the area east of Parrs Ridge is based on the following road centers: Rockville, Mt. Airy, Libertytown, Westminster, Ebbvale and Parkton. It will be observed that the corps are so concentrated as to take full advantage of the roads. This is especially true of the northern group which blocks the main roads and will be able to use them in the advance.

10. FRONTAGES.—The total front of the concentration is extensive and produces a weakness due to the gap between the northern and southern group. However, the maneuver of the plan of campaign is conceived on such a basis for the concentration, but, as the forces advance, this weakness disappears. Within the two groups the front is narrow, although the III Corps mission will involve it in extensive fronts. However, this has the advantage of space for maneuver, which should be the basis of its mode of action.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study---------- 11

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11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Details of concentration: (1) Practicability of the movements ordered; (2) the action and conduct 1st Cavalry Division (less one brigade) in its screening and covering functions; (3) the same for the 2d Cavalry Division (reinforced); (4) the actions and the orders of the 2d Division in supporting the 2d Cavalry Division; (5) employment of the air service during the concentration; (6) the relative location, from a tactical viewpoint, of the divisions and corps in the north-

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ern group; (7) grouping and location of army artillery; (8) grouping and location of army air service units and the echelons of Third Army Headquarters.

*b.* The Third Army Field Order No. 1:—Study its form, composition, completeness and the practicability of the directions contained therein.

*c.* Prepare the field orders which the IV Corps would issue pursuant to the army order.

*d.* How would the supply of the Third Army be arranged to meet the conditions of the concentration.

*e.* What Red action may be expected during the concentration, and how may the Blues meet the same.

## *Maps*

Operation Map No 1A, Third Army, 9 June 21 (To accompany FO No 1).

Operation Map No 1B, Third Army, 9 June 21 (To accompany FO No 1).

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# CHAPTER III

# *The Concentration of the III Corps*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Section III.—Situation and Requirement (June 16) | 6-7 |
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Maps following page 46.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement (June 10)*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Third Special Situation (June 10) | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. THIRD SPECIAL SITUATION (June 10).—*a.* Map: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, Geological Survey, 1:62500.

*b.* Major General D, commanding the III Corps, at temporary headquarters, Charlestown, West Virginia, received Field Orders No. 1, Third Army on the morning of June 10.

2. REQUIREMENT.—Plan of organization and concentration of the III Corps and orders issued until the time command post opens at Frederick.

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General Orders | 3 |
| Field Order | 4 |
| Concentration Table | 5 |




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3. GENERAL ORDERS.—A general order covering the organization was issued on the afternoon of June 10 from which the following extracts are taken:

*a.* (Announces Corps Staff [omitted].)

*b.* List of troops under command of the III Corps as follows:

(1) 11th Division.
1st Balloon Company, 301st Balloon Group, attached.

(2) 20th Division.
Troop A, 903d Cavalry, attached.
301st Field Arillery, attached.
2d Balloon Company, 301st Balloon Group, attached.
1st Battalion, 903d Chemical Ammunition Train (less 4th Company), attached.

(3) 30th Division.
Troop B, 903d Cavalry, attached.
302d Field Artillery, attached.
3d Balloon Company, 301st Balloon Group, attached.
2d Battalion, 903d Chemical Ammunition Train (less 4th Company) attached.
1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Cavalry Brigade), attached.

(4) Corps Troops.
Special Corps Troops:—normal organizations.
Artillery:
301st Field Artillery brigade.
301st Field Artillery (155 how) (attached to 20th Division).
302d Field Artillery (155 how) (attached to 30th Division).
303d Field Artillery (155 how).
304th Field Artillery (155 guns).
301st Observation Battalion (Flash).
301st Ammunition Train.
Anti-Aircraft Artillery:
305th Artillery (A-A).
Air Service:
301st Observation Squadron.
302d Observation Squadron.
301st Balloon Group (see 20th, 30th, and 11th Divisions).

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Engineers:
301st Engineers.
302d, 303d, and 304th Engineer Battalions (aux).
Medical Service:
301st Medical Regiment.
Trains:
301st Corps Train.
Attached Troops:
903d Cavalry (see 20th and 30th Divisions).
903d Chemical Ammunition Train (see 20th, 30th Divisions).

*c.* Two general distribution lists of Field and Administrative Orders are prescribed as follows:

| A | B | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | Commanding General. |
| 2-3 | | Aides. |
| 4 | 2 | Chief of Staff. |
| 5-7 | 3-5 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G1. |
| 8-10 | 6-8 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G2. |
| 11-13 | 9-11 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G3. |
| 14-16 | 12-14 | Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. |
| 17 | 15 | War Diary. |
| 18-20 | 16-18 | Corps Chief of Artillery. |
| 21 | 19 | Corps Signal Officer. |
| 22-26 | 20 | Corps Engineer Officer. |
| 27-29 | 21 | Corps Air Service Commander. |
| 30 | 22 | Corps Surgeon. |
| 31 | 23 | Corps Chemical Warfare Officer. |
| 32 | 24 | Corps Provost Marshal. |
| 33-34 | 25-26 | Corps Adjutant. |
| 35 | | Corps Inspector. |
| 36 | | Corps Judge Advocate. |
| 37 | | Corps Quartermaster. |
| 38 | | Corps Motor Transport Officer. |
| 39 | | Corps Finance Officer. |
| 40 | | Corps Remount Officer. |
| 41 | | Corps Veterinarian. |
| 42 | 27 | Commanding General, 11th Division. |
| 43 | 28 | Commanding General, 20th Division. |
| 44 | 29 | Commanding General, 30th Division. |
| 45 | 30 | Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division. |
| 46 | 31 | Commanding Officer, 903d Cavalry. |
| 47-50 | 32 | Commanding General, 301st Field Artillery Brigade. |
| 51 | 33 | Commanding Officer, 305th Artillery (A-A). |
| 52 | 34 | Commanding Officer, 301st Field Signal Battalion. |
| 53 | | Commanding Officer, 301st Medical Regiment. |
| 54 | | Commanding Officer, 903d Chemical Ammunition Train. |

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| A | B | |
|---|---|---|
| 55-57 | 35 | Commanding Officer, 301st Corps Trains. |
| 58 | 36 | Commanding Officer, 301st Military Police Battalion. |
| 59-60 | 37-38 | Commanding General, Third Army. |
| 61 | 39 | Commanding General, corps on left. |
| 62 | 40 | Commanding General, corps on right (if any). |
| 63-100 | 41-100 | Spare. |

4. FIELD ORDER. — The following order was issued covering the concentration:

III Corps,
CHARLESTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA,
10 June 21, 11:30 PM.

FIELD ORDERS
No 1.

**Maps:** General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam. Geological Survey, 1:62500. Operation Map, III Corps, to accompany FO No 1.

1. (a) Red forces comprising several divisions and auxiliary troops, including cavalry and air units, have landed on the west shore of CHESAPEAKE BAY, and have seized WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE. Red concentrations reported at ALEXANDRIA, KENSINGTON, ANNAPOLIS JC, LAUREL, ELLICOTT CITY, OWINGS MILLS, and TOWSON. Red advance detachments reported on general line—RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER, MANASSAS, ROCKVILLE, COOKSVILLE, REISTERSTOWN, and GUNPOWDER FALLS. A Red naval detachment holds the HAVRE DE GRACE bridges. Reports indicate Reds establishing bases at WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE.

See Operation Map.

(b) Our Third Army concentrates in the area west of PARRS RIDGE—DUG HILL RIDGE and prepares to attack.

Corps from right to left: III-IV-II-I.

The 2d Cav Div (reinforced by 1st Brig, 1st Cav Div) seizes PARRS RIDGE, DUG HILL RIDGE north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE (inclusive) and from the vicinity of WESTMINSTER, screens the concentration of the IV, II and I Corps. Upon being relieved by corps cavalry the division operates toward BALTIMORE north of the PATAPSCO RIVER.

The 2d Div, IV Corps, commences detraining at KEYMAR June 14 AM.

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2. This corps will concentrate west of PARRS RIDGE southeast of FREDERICK as ordered in attached concentration table and will prepare to advance south and southeast.
3. (a) The 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig), reinforced by the 903d Cav, will advance to the vicinity of MOUNT AIRY and will seize the general line of PARRS RIDGE from the POTOMAC RIVER to LIBERTY TURNPIKE (both exclusive).
   It will screen the concentration of the III Corps.
   It will determine locations and movements of Reds in the vicinity of WASHINGTON.
   It will reconnoiter south of the POTOMAC RIVER in the direction of LEESBURG and MANASSAS.
   It will maintain contact with the 2d Cav Div.
   (b) The 30th Div will prepare to advance in the direction of HYATTSTOWN.
   It will reconnoiter to the south as far as the POTOMAC RIVER.
   It will maintain contact with the 1st Cav Division.
   (c) The 20th Div will prepare to advance in the direction of MOUNT AIRY.
   It will support the 1st Cav Div.
   It will maintain contact with the 2d Div, IV Corps.
   (d) The 11th Div in reserve, will prepare to follow the 20th Div.
   (e) The Corps Air Service will determine Red troop movements and concentrations in the vicinity of the RAPPAHANNOCK RIVER, MANASSAS, GREAT FALLS, ROCKVILLE, COOKSVILLE and ELDERSBURG.
   (f) The 305th Artillery (A-A), operating from the vicinity of FREDERICK, will protect airdromes, detraining points and railheads, during the concentration.
   (g) Other corps troops will await orders at destination.
   (x) Railway trains will be promptly unloaded and troops marched clear of detraining points. Next FO will issue at FREDERICK.
4. See Adm O No 1 (omitted).
5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication: See Annex No 1 (omitted).
   (b) Command Posts:
   III Corps: CHARLESTOWN until 8:00 AM June 16, then FREDERICK.
   30th Div: POINT OF ROCKS after 2:30 AM, June 17.
   NEW MARKET after 8:00 PM, June 15.

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11th Div: JEFFERSON after 8:00 PM, June 17.
1st Cav Div: FREDERICK 9:00 AM June 11.
NEW MARKET after 3:00 PM June 13.

By command of Major General D,
Y,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A
and
CG 2d Cav Div.

5. CONCENTRATION TABLE—TO ACCOMPANY F.O. NO. 1, III CORPS.

See table, facing page 32.

## SECTION III

## *Situation and Requirement (June 16)*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Third Special Situation (June 16) | 6 |
| Requirement | 7 |

6. THIRD SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The concentration proceeded according to orders. Corps headquarters was opened at Frederick at 8:00 AM June 16.

*b.* The commanding general 1st Cavalry Division reported in brief as follows:

Only weak cavalry forces appear to be along the Frederick Turnpike south of the Patapsco River. The bulk of the enemy cavalry is operating south of the Patuxent River from the vicinity of Rockville. A Red infantry detachment was encountered last night at Mountview. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, attached to the 2d Cavalry Division, is operating north of the Patapsco River from the vicinity of Westminster. Contact with its patrols has been made at Sykesville. The division commander proposed to operate from Hyattstown south of the Patuxent River with the bulk of his forces leaving the corps cavalry to cover the Baltimore—Frederick Turnpike. He requested a railhead at Mount Airy in addition to a railhead at Frederick.

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*c.* The commanding general 20th Division requested a railhead in the vicinity of New Market and suggested Monrovia. He reported that advanced units of 2d Division had reached New Windsor.

*d.* The army G2 report was received. From this it was found that the enemy continued to land troops at the expected rate, and that Red infantry detachments had been reported as far west as the north branch of the Patapsco River. At least one Red cavalry brigade is operating west from Reisterstown. The information already given in the army field order was confirmed.

7. REQUIREMENT.—Action taken by General D on June 16 and orders therefor.

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Action | 8 |
| Orders | 9 |

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8. ACTION.—General D continues with his concentration west of Parrs Ridge. He approves the action proposed by the commanding general 1st Cavalry Division. He arranges for new railheads as requested.

9. ORDERS.—He issues the following field order:

III Corps,
FREDERICK, MD.
16 June 21, 11:30 P.M.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 2. }

Map: General Map Gettysburg-Antietam. Geol. Surv. 1:62500.
Operation Map III Corps to accompany FO No 2.

1. (a) Reds continue landing in CHESAPEAKE BAY. Red infantry detachments have been seen as far west as NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER. A red cavalry brigade is operating west from vicinity of REISTERSTOWN. Weak Red cavalry is operating

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north of PATUXENT RIVER along FREDERICK TURNPIKE. Bulk of Red cavalry, on our corps front, is reported south of the PATUXENT RIVER. A red infantry detachment was encountered last night at MOUNTVIEW. Red cavalry has not penetrated our cavalry screen. (See G2 report ) (omitted).

(b) The army concentration proceeds as planned. Advanced units of 2d Div have reached NEW WINDSOR. The 1st Brig, 1st Cav Div, operates from WESTMINSTER north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER. Our cavalry holds the line of PARRS RIDGE.

2. This corps will continue its concentration west of PARRS RIDGE in accordance with Field Orders No 1.

3. (a) The cavalry, while executing the mission assigned in Field Order No 1, will operate, with the bulk of its forces, from the vicinity of HYATTSTOWN, in the area south of PATUXENT RIVER.

It will determine location of Red infantry north and south of MOUNTVIEW.

It will clear areas assigned to 20th and 30th Divs in time for those movements.

(b) The 30th Div will concentrate on June 19-20 in the area HYATTSTOWN—URBANA—THURSTON.

All units will be east of the MONOCACY by 9:00 AM June 20.

It will maintain contact with the 1st Cav Div.

After 8:00 AM June 19, it will support the 1st Cav Div south of the line DAMASCUS—PATUXENT RIVER (both incl).

It will reconnoiter to the south as far as the POTOMAC RIVER. Roads south of line BUCKEYSTOWN, HOPELAND, URBANA, GREEN VALLEY, BROWNINGSVILLE (all inclusive) are available for movement.

(c) The 20th Div will continue to execute the mission assigned in Field Order No 1. It will advance on June 17 to the area KEMPTON—WOODVILLE—NEW LONDON—NEW MARKET.

After 8:00 AM June 19, it will support that portion of the 1st Cav Div north of the line DAMASCUS—PATUXENT RIVER (both excl).

(d) The 11th Div will concentrate on June 20 southwest of FREDERICK in the area BUCKEYSTOWN (exclusive), LIMEKILN (inclusive), FREDERICK (exclusive), BRADDOCK (exclusive), JEFFERSON (exclusive), and ADAMSTOWN (exclusive).

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(e) The Corps AS will continue to execute the mission assigned in Field Order No 1.

(f) The 305th FA (A-A) Regt will continue to protect airdrome, detraining points, and railheads. See Annex No 1, Anti-aircraft (omitted).

Co A A-A MG Bn will join 30th Division by 12:00 noon June 21.

Co B, A-A MG Bn will join 20th Division by 8:00 AM June 18.

(g) Other corps troops. No change.

4. See Adm O No 2. (Omitted.)

Railheads:

Corps Troops: FREDERICK.

30th Div: FREDERICK via URBANA after 6:00 AM June 20.

20th Div: MONROVIA after 6:00 AM June 17.

11th Div. FREDERICK after 6:00 PM June 20.

1st Cav Div: After 6:00 PM June 16, MOUNT AIRY and FREDERICK via URBANA.

5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication: See Annex No 2 (omitted).

(b) Axes of Signal Communication:

III Corps and 20th Div: BALTIMORE—FREDERICK TURNPIKE.

1st Cav Div: WASHINGTON ROAD.

30th Div: POINT OF ROCKS—BUCKEYSTOWN—URBANA—WASHINGTON ROAD.

11th Div: JEFFERSON TURNPIKE.

(c) Command Posts:

III Corps: FREDERICK.

30th Div: HYATTSTOWN after 8:00 AM June 19.

20th Div: NEW MARKET.

11th Div: JEFFERSON TURNPIKE 1 mile southwest of FREDERICK after 6:00 PM June 19.

1st Cav Div: HYATTSTOWN after 6:00 PM June 16.

By command of Major General D:

Y,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A
and
CG 2d Cav Div.

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## SECTION V

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Problem | 10 |
| Considerations in Solving the Problem | 11 |
| Location and Disposition of Troops | 12 |
| Organization for the Advance | 13 |
| Practicability of Making Movements, Protection, and Developing of Hostile Forces | 14 |
| Order of Arrival of Various Units | 15 |
| Logistics | 16 |

10. THE PROBLEM.—*a.* In the problem the army has ordered the train movement which places the units assigned to the corps in the general area, Frederick—Point of Rocks —Middletown, and has ordered the 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade), attached to the III Corps, to seize Parrs Ridge from Liberty Turnpike to the Potomac, screen the concentration of the III Corps and determine the location and movement of the Reds in the vicinity of Washington. The 20th Division is ordered to support the 1st Cavalry until receipt of orders from III Corps. The III Corps is ordered to concentrate without delay west of Parrs Ridge, southeast of Frederick, prepared to advance east and southeast, and to maintain contact with IV Corps and reconnoiter south of Potomac River.

*b.* The mission of the III Corps in the army advance has not been stated in the army order. The location of the Corps with respect to the remainder of the Third Army and the hostile forces at Baltimore—Washington indicates that its mission will probably be a semi-independent one, perhaps to develop and hold out of action the Reds about Washington, while the main blow is struck farther north. While waiting more definite information as to its mission in the advance, the III Corps must carry out the detailed instructions issued in the army orders for the III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, and organize and concentrate the corps, without delay, west of Parrs Ridge and southeast of Frederick, prepared to advance east and southeast.

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11. CONSIDERATIONS IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM.—*a.* A great many of the important factors to be considered in a concentration by an independent force have already been decided by the army and the general principles to be considered in connection therewith have been discussed in Chapters I and II. The problem presented to the corps is one of execution.

*b.* Important points to be considered by the III Corps are the following:

(1) Detailed location and disposition of troops desired for the concentration in order to carry out the army orders.

(2) Organization of units for the advance.

(3) Movement of troops from the points where turned over to the corps to the locations desired for the concentration (including the practicability of movements desired, the order of arrival of various units, and the logistics of the movements).

(4) Protection for the detraining of troops and the concentration, and locating and developing the hostile main forces.

12. LOCATION AND DISPOSITION OF TROOPS.—*a.* The detailed location and disposition of troops desired for the concentration must be decided upon before the other factors may be properly determined.

*b.* (1) The army order requires the corps to take up a position in readiness west of Parrs Ridge and southeast of Frederick prepared to advance east and southeast.

(2) To carry out the above mission Parrs Ridge must be seized and held. The mission which may be assigned the corps in a later army order may require the corps to advance with a strategic advance guard or to advance on a broad front. The information as to hostile troops is indefinite, which, if the corps were acting alone, would, in general, demand a strategical advance guard. However, the hostile advance line is only eight to ten miles beyond Parrs Ridge and the corps is now acting as part of a larger unit, hence it may be required to advance on a broad front. The corps, therefore, should be prepared to advance

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promptly on a broad front if the mission assigned for the advance demands it.

(3) As the hostile advance lines are only eight to ten miles east of Parrs Ridge, front line units of the corps should be within supporting distance of each other, and rear divisions and the combat corps troops should be well closed up when the advance begins.

*c.* Considering the above points, together with the detraining points of the various troops, and the hostile dispositions, the following detailed location and disposition of troops when the concentration is completed seems desirable.

(1) 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade), reinforced by corps cavalry, holding Parrs Ridge and developing the enemy.

(2) 20th Division, in area Kempton—Woodville—New London—New Market, supporting cavalry on front Damascus, north.

(3) 30th Division, in area Hyattstown—Urbana—Thurston, supporting cavalry on front Damascus, south.

(4) 11th Division, west of Monocacy south of Frederick.

III Corps troops around Frederick.

13. ORGANIZATION FOR THE ADVANCE.—*a.* The dispositions given in the foregoing paragraph will permit a prompt advance to the east or southeast, or both, in a closed formation with all units within supporting distance, and either with a strategic advance guard, or on a broad front. It insures Parrs Ridge being held, provided troops can reach the above positions before the enemy seizes Parrs Ridge.

*b.* With the above dispositions, and since the opening stages of the combat will take place in mobile situations, it seems desirable to attach to the 20th and 30th Divisions, both of which may be in the advance, each, the following: 1 troop of cavalry, 1 regiment of 155 howitzers, 1 balloon company and 1 chemical ammunition battalion (less 4th company). A balloon company may also be attached to the reserve division. It seems desirable to retain the third 155

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howitzer regiment and the remainder of the chemical ammunition train for the present under the corps. The corps cavalry should assist the 1st Cavalry Division.

14. PRACTICABILITY OF MAKING MOVEMENTS DESIRED, PROTECTION AND DEVELOPING HOSTILE FORCES.—*a.* With the foregoing desired dispositions and organizations for the concentration decided upon, it must be determined whether the concentration desired is practicable, and, if so, detailed arrangements must be made for its execution. The practicability of carrying out the concentration desired will depend upon the action which may be taken by the enemy and ability to make the movements desired.

*b.* It is now June 10th. The enemy has now available two or three divisions and some cavalry. His advance line extends through Cooksville—Rockville. He is defending two bases, Baltimore and Washington. By the 12th the enemy may have another division available, and by the 21st a total of seven divisions and a cavalry division.

*c.* The times and places of arrival of units of the III Corps in vicinity of the desired concentration area are as follows:

June 11-12, 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) Frederick.
June 14-18, 20th Div, Frederick.
June 15-17, CHQ and Trs, Frederick.
June 17-19, 30th Div, Point of Rocks—Brunswick.
June 18-19, 11th Div, Hagerstown—Knoxville.

*d.* The distance of Parrs Ridge from the two Red bases, Baltimore and Washington, is 25 miles or more. To hold Parrs Ridge the Reds would have to hold a line between the Potomac and the source of Gunpowder Falls, some 50 miles in extent, and they would have some 50 miles of exposed flanks. It will be some time, therefore, before the Reds will have sufficient strength to seize and hold Parrs Ridge and at the same time cover their two bases. However, on account of the great importance of Parrs Ridge in any operations which the Reds may undertake, they may attempt to seize and hold a foothold thereon while awaiting reinforcements. On account of the excellent protection

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which the Potomac River would offer for the flank of such a covering detachment, the most probable location of such a foothold seems to be in the southern part, opposite the III Corps. It is easily possible for the Reds to seize and attempt to hold such a foothold before the advance elements of the III Corps arrive.

Although such action on the part of the Reds is not very probable, its possibility should be taken into consideration. If the Reds seize Parrs Ridge opposite the III Corps, they will interfere with carrying out the desired plan of concentration explained above. The Red cavalry may interfere with the detraining of troops, and if troops be ordered to march promptly from detraining point to positions desired for the concentration, piecemeal action may result. To meet this situation, the initial orders for the concentration may provide for the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced by the III Corps cavalry, to seize promptly and hold Parrs Ridge and develop the enemy; the 20th Division to move immediately upon detraining to a position east of the Monocacy covering Frederick and supporting the cavalry; the 30th Division to assemble upon detraining just west of the Monocacy, covering Point of Rocks and Brunswick; the 11th Division to assemble upon detraining, in the area Middleton—Jefferson; and the III Corps troops in the area about Frederick. After Parrs Ridge has been seized and made secure, or the troops are prepared to move as a body, orders may be issued for the movement to the desired position for the concentration.

As indicated by Field Orders No. 2 the movements of the troops to the desired positions are practicable.

15. ORDER OF ARRIVAL OF VARIOUS UNITS.—*a.* The order in which the cavalry, the divisions, and the corps troops as a whole arrive in the concentration area has been fixed by the army commander. This order has been so fixed that covering detachments for protecting the concentration and detraining points arrive first.

*b.* The order in which the various corps troops should arrive should be given consideration. Those required for reconnaissance, for protection of the concentration, for pre-

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paring the way for the detraining and movements, for regulating traffic, and for establishing communications, may in the present situation arrive first. These may be followed by the combat elements and then the noncombat elements.

16. LOGISTICS.—In any concentration the logistics (details of movements and supply) require careful consideration. The corps is a large unit so far as road space and train transportation is concerned. The following considerations affect the problem under discussion.

*a.* In train movements, to allow for return of empties, trains should not as a rule be run closer than 1 hour interval on single track roads, and closer than ½ hour intervals on double track road. A minimum of three hours should be allowed for unloading a train of troops of all arms. The length of a standard train is 1400 feet. For trains run at one hour interval, a single detraining point must have a siding capacity available for unloading three trains, or total siding of 1500 yards, or there must be three detraining points each of which is sufficient for one train only. Similarly for trains run at one-half hour interval, a siding capacity for a single detraining point should be sufficient for unloading six trains at one time, or a total of 3000 yards.

*b.* In the present problem, the 20th Division, the 30th Division, and the III Corps troops, are all moved over a single road, the Baltimore and Ohio through Charlestown. As this road is a double track road, movements at half hour interval are employed during part of the movement, but the movements are so regulated and detraining points so selected that there is not less than one hour between the arrival of trains at a single detraining point, and, when practicable, a greater interval. This avoids undue congestion at the detraining points.

*c.* Instructions should insure that trains will be promptly unloaded and troops marched clear of detraining points. Where necessary routes from detraining points to assembly area of unit should be prescribed.

*d.* Railheads for all units should be provided, and, where necessary, routes thereto prescribed.

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*e.* In the advance of the corps, especially in a closed up formation, special precaution should be taken to see that forward units promptly clear roads and areas to be occupied by rear units. This may be accomplished by prescribing that the forward unit clear a prescribed line or area by a specified time.

*f.* Arrangements should be made for attached units to join the unit to which attached.

*g.* Table of road spaces and standard type trains.

See table, page 44.

## SECTION VI

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ..... 17

17. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The detailed location and disposition of troops desired for the concentration of the III Corps to carry out the army's field order.

(1) What will be the probable form of advance—with strategic advance guard or on a broad front?

(2) What should be the location and disposition to carry out a prompt advance, as may be ordered later by the army?

(3) Suggest other dispositions than those given in the solution.

*b.* With the dispositions given in the solution, what should be the organization of the units for the advance?

(1) Cavalry, artillery, air service, chemical ammunition train?

(2) When and how should orders for the organization be issued?

(3) Use of standard distributions for field orders.

*c.* The practicability of carrying out the concentration adopted by the approved solution, so far as hostile action is concerned.

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*g.* (h) *Road Spaces and Standard Type RR Trains Required for Units of the III Corps.*

| | ROAD SPACE | | | | | | RR Trains |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Foot Troops and Animal Trans.* | | *Motor Sections* | | *Total* | | *Standard Type* |
| | *Yards* | *Miles* | *Yards* | *Miles* | *Yards* | *Miles* | *No.* |
| 1 Infantry Division (with trains | 33285 | 18.9 | 15680 | ..... | 48965 | 27.8 | 72 |
| 1 Division Train | 2250 | 1.4 | 5360 | 3.0 | 7910 | 4.5 | 8(4 M-4A) |
| 1 Division Field Train | 9290 | 5.3 | 7470 | 4.2 | 16760 | 9.5 | |
| 1 Division Ammunition Tn | 555 | .3 | 1090 | .6 | 1645 | .9 | |
| 1 Division Ammunition Tn | 555 | .3 | 1090 | .6 | 1645 | .9 | |
| 1 Division Artillery (less F Tn and Am Tn) | 9035 | 5.1 | 330 | .2 | 9365 | 5.3 | |
| 1 Division Infantry (less F Tn) | 12010 | 6.8 | 210 | .1 | 12220 | 6.9 | |
| 3 Infantry Divisions (total) | 99855 | 56.8 | 47040 | 26.7 | 146895 | 83.4 | 216 |
| Corps Troops (total) | ..... | 6.5 | ..... | 48.1 | ..... | 55.5 | 107 |
| Special Troops (total) | 1565 | .9 | 3480 | 2.0 | 5045 | 2.9 | ..... |
| Hq Company | 120 | .1 | 340 | .1 | 360 | .2 | 1 |
| Military Police Bn | 530 | .3 | 460 | .3 | 990 | .6 | 1 |
| Signal Bn | ..... | ..... | 1910 | 1.1 | 1910 | 1.1 | 2 |
| Ord Co Hv Maint | 150 | .1 | ..... | ..... | 150 | .1 | 2 |
| Ord Co Am | 80 | ..... | 300 | .2 | 380 | .2 | (With Am Tn) |
| Field Remount Depot | 185 | .1 | 50 | ..... | 235 | .1 | 1 |
| Service Bn | 500 | .3 | 520 | .3 | 1020 | .6 | 2 |
| Anti Aircraft Regiment | ..... | ..... | 6540 | 3.7 | 6540 | 3.7 | 6 |
| Artillery Brigade (total) | ..... | ..... | 40375 | 22.4 | 40375 | 22.4 | 42 |
| 1 regiment 155 guns | ..... | ..... | 8315 | 4.7 | 8315 | 4.7 | 8 |
| 1 regiment 155 how | ..... | ..... | 8405 | 4.8 | 8405 | 4.8 | 9 |
| 1 am Tn | ..... | ..... | 5675 | 3.2 | 5675 | 2.3 | 6 |
| Engineer Regiment | 1530 | .9 | 420 | .2 | 1950 | 1.1 | 4 |
| 3 Aux Engr Bn | 1620 | .9 | 1200 | .7 | 2820 | 1.6 | 6 |
| Medical Regiment | 900 | .5 | 4150 | 2.4 | 5050 | 2.9 | 5 |
| Air Service (total) | ..... | ..... | 4920 | 2.8 | 4920 | 2.8 | 6 |
| Balloon Co | ..... | ..... | 440 | .2 | 440 | .2 | ..... |
| Corps Train (total) | 5820 | 3.3 | 26060 | 14.8 | 31880 | 18.1 | 29 |
| Motor Transport | ..... | ..... | 25900 | 14.7 | 25900 | 14.7 | 22 |
| Wagon Train | 5800 | 3.3 | ..... | ..... | 5800 | 3.3 | 7 |
| Attached Units: | ..... | 7.3 | ..... | 6.0 | ..... | 13.8 | 30 |
| Cav Div (less 1st Brig) | 10490 | 6.0 | 170 | .1 | 10660 | 6.1 | 20 |
| Part Cav Div Tns and F Tns | 4350 | 2.5 | 170 | .1 | 4520 | 2.6 | ..... |
| Cav Regt (with F Tns) | 2260 | 1.3 | ..... | ..... | 2260 | 1.3 | 5 |
| Chemical Am Tn (total) | ..... | ..... | 10320 | 5.9 | 10320 | 5.9 | 9 |
| Bn Chem Am Tn | ..... | ..... | 3390 | 1.9 | 3390 | 1.9 | ..... |
| Total Corps with 3d Div | ..... | 63.3 | ..... | 74.8 | ..... | 138.9 | 323 |
| Total Corps and attached units | ..... | 70.6 | ..... | 80.8 | ..... | 152.7 | 351 |

NOTES:

(1) Foot troops, and other branches in column with foot troops, move at the rate of 2½ miles per hour.

(2) Cavalry when alone moves at rate of 4 to 6 miles per hour.

(3) Animal drawn artillery when alone moves at rate of 4 to 6 miles per hour.

(4) Tractor drawn artillery when alone moves at rate of 3 to 5 miles per hour.

(5) Other motor sections when alone move at an average rate to 4 to 8 miles per hour and at a maximum rate of 8 to 12 miles per hour.

(6) Capacity of corps motor transport is 1080 truck tons. For troop movements, a division requires 1166 truck tons for elements not provided with transportation.

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(1) Will the enemy probably interfere? Will it be possible for the enemy to interfere with the concentration?

(2) What steps should be taken to avoid piecemeal action and to prevent the enemy from interfering with the detraining and the concentration?

(3) Should a single order or two or more orders be issued for the concentration?

*d.* The practicability of carrying out the concentration given in the solution so far as movements of troops to the desired locations are concerned.

(1) Time and place of arrival of troops.

(2) Routes available for movements.

(3) Time of arrival of various units at assembly camps and at desired locations for concentration.

*e.* The order and time of arrival of troops in the concentration area.

(1) Cavalry, divisions, and corps troops as a whole.

(2) Various units of corps troops.

*f.* The details of the movements and supply.

(1) Road spaces and standard trains required for various units of the corps.

(2) Train movements, detraining points for the III Corps troops, 20th Division and 30th Division.

(3) Train movements for the 11th Division.

(4) Movement of motor sections overland from Charlestown.

(5) Arrangements for units attached to divisions to join divisions to which attached.

(6) Railheads for various units.

(7) Means of preventing forward units from interfering with movements of rear units.

*g.* Arrangements for covering the concentration and ascertaining hostile developments.

(1) Mission of the cavalry.

(2) Mission of the air service.

(3) Missions of the 20th Division and the 30th Division.

*h.* Forms, brevity, clearness and completeness of orders.

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(1) Extract from General Orders organizing the corps.
(2) General distribution list for field orders.
(3) Field Orders No. 1.
(4) Field Orders No. 2.

## *Maps*

Operations Map, III Corps (to accompany FO No 1) } following this page.
Operations Map, III Corps (to accompany FO No 2) }

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## CHAPTER IV

# *The Army Advances*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| Section I | —Situation and Requirements | 1- 2 |
| Section II | —A Solution | 3- 4 |
| Section III | —Discussion of Principles | 5-10 |
| Section IV | —Topics Suggested for Study | 11 |

Maps following page 62.


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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Fourth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


---

1. FOURTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The concentration of the Third Blue Army proceeded according to schedule. While Red air units and cavalry, reinforced by detachments of all arms, advanced towards the line of Parrs Ridge and Parkton, the Blue air service and cavalry were able to maintain the covering screen intact. It was evident that, although the Reds knew in a general way of the Blue concentration, they were ignorant as to the location of the Blue mass.

*b.* At 4:00 PM, 22 June 21, the Blue Army stands as follows:

See table page 48.

*c.* The following is a summary of the information known to the Third Army Commander at 4:00 PM, 22 June 21:

(See G3 Situation Map, Third Army, 22 June 21, attached.)



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# LOCATION TABLE—THIRD ARMY

## 22 June 21, 4:00 PM

| *Unit* | *Present Location* | *Railhead* | *Supply Routes to Railhead* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2d CAV DIV Hq and 4th Brig and Auxiliaries | WESTMINSTER | | Roads east of PARRS RIDGE | Covering front—WORTHINGTON VALLEY—PATAPSCO RIVER in contact with Red detachments of cavalry, infantry and artillery—located along WORTHINGTON VALLEY and NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO. |
| 3d Brig | Astride WESTMINSTER TURNPIKE | | | |
| 1st Brig 1st Cav Div | Astride LIBERTY TURNPIKE | | | |
| I CORPS CHQ and Corps Trs (less cav) | HANOVER | HANOVER | | |
| Corps Cav | On Corps front | GLENVILLE | Any roads | Holding front MANCHESTER—PARKTON with Hq at HOFFMANSVILLE. |
| 1st Div | EBBVALE | SELLS STA | Via BANDANNA | |
| 23d Div | PORTERS and VALLEY JC | VALLEY JC | | |
| II CORPS CHQ and Corps Troops (less cav) | LITTLESTOWN | LITTLESTOWN | | |
| Corps Cav | On Corps front | LITTLESTOWN | Via UNION MILLS | Holding front—CRANBERRY STA—MANCHESTER, Hq at CRANBERRY. |
| 3d Div | UNION MILLS | LITTLESTOWN | Via UNION MILLS | Army Reserve. |
| 25th Div | GERMANTOWN | GETTYSBURG | BALTIMORE TURNPIKE | |
| IV CORPS CHQ and Corps Troops (less cav) | UNIONTOWN | TANEYTOWN | TANEYTOWN TURNPIKE | |
| Corps Cav | On Corps front | WESTMINSTER | Via SPRING MILLS | Holding front—CRANBERRY STA—TAYLORSVILLE.—Hq at MARSTON. |
| 22d Div | FOUNTAIN VALLEY | TANEYTOWN | TANEYTOWN TURNPIKE | |
| 2d Div | NEW WINDSOR | UNION BRIDGE | Any | |
| 4th Div | West of TANEYTOWN | FAIRFIELD | Via FAIRPLAY | Army Reserve |
| III CORPS CHQ and Corps Troops (less cav) | FREDERICK | FREDERICK | | |
| 1st Cav Div (less 1 brig) | On Corps front | MOUNT AIRY and FREDERICK | | Reinforced by Corps Cav holding front TAYLORSVILLE—MOUNT AIRY—CLABURG—POOLESVILLE. |
| 20th Div | NEW MARKET | MONROVIA | | Hq at HYATTSTOWN. |
| 30th Div | HYATTSTOWN | FREDERICK | Via URBANA | |
| 11th Div | South of FREDERICK | FREDERICK | | |
| AHQ and Trs not covered above | Same as given in Concentration Table | | | |
| AA | | | | |
| Gp A | GETTYSBURG | | | 3 regts. |
| Gp B | EMMITSBURG | | | 3 regts. |
| AIR SERVICE Atk Obsn Pur and Bomb | FAIRFIELD | | | |
| | WAYNESBORO | | | |
| Army Tn | GETTYSBURG | | | |
| Army Tanks | CAVETOWN | | | |

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(1) Notwithstanding energetic bombardment by Blue air service, hostile landings have continued with little interruption. Railroad traffic between Baltimore and Washington has been maintained at maximum rate. No Red troops have appeared on the east shores of Chesapeake Bay or south of the Rappahannock River. Three Red gun boats have appeared at the mouth of the Susquehanna.

(2) The 2d Cav Div (reinforced), after relief by corps cavalry and concentrating southeast of Westminster, has defeated a Red cavalry brigade which retreated to the east of the North Branch Patapsco River. The division's advance has been halted by Red infantry and artillery detachments along the North Branch Patapsco River to Glenn Falls and the Worthington Valley. A few Blue patrols have succeeded in penetrating the above line but have failed to pass the general line Henryton—Holbrook—Reisterstown—southern part of Worthington Valley. These patrols found entrenchments in places along this line.

(3) Cavalry patrols from corps and army cavalry are operating farther to the east. Those advancing in the vicinity of Gunpowder Falls have been unable to pass Western Run and Little Gunpowder Falls as hostile infantry (west of Gunpowder Falls) and cavalry (east of Gunpowder Falls) have always blocked them.

(4) Between Little Gunpowder Falls and the Susquehanna River, a patrol has reached Chesapeake Bay without encountering Reds.

(5) The Blue cavalry, operating south of the Patapsco River, has encountered Red infantry detachments on the line Henryton—Mountview—south of Ivory—Patuxent River (opposite Brighton), and has been unable to penetrate this line. Between Patuxent and Potomac Rivers, Red cavalry has been operating from the vicinity of Gaithersburg. Considerable difficulty is being experienced in preventing this Red cavalry from penetrating the Blue screen. A small Red detachment of all arms is reported on the south side of the Potomac near Great Falls.

(6) The Blue air service has not located any large troop concentrations other than those mentioned in the

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first situation. Photographic reconnaissances have disclosed groups of freshly constructed intrenchments as follows:

(a) South of the Patapsco River:

West of Dayton, south of Ivory, west of Mountview, south of Henryton.

About Ellicott City and Laurel.

(b) Between Patapsco River and Gunpowder Falls:

Hill 645 northeast of Henryton, ridges about Holbrook, area of Reisterstown, and ridge southeast of Glyndon.

Areas about Granite, Hernwood, Harrisonville, Belltown and The Caves. A few trenches on ridge south of Green Spring Valley.

(7) To date, hostile air service, although very active, has not succeeded in penetrating the Blue screen. Red balloons have appeared frequently in rear of the general lines given above.

(8) From prisoners and meager reports of spies, the following has been learned:

(a) Confirmed indentifications:

5th Red Army Hq—Baltimore.

VIII, IX, and X Army Corps.

15th, 16th and 17th Divisions about Baltimore.

19th, 20th and 22d Divisions about Washington.

1st Cav Div about Baltimore and Washington.

(b) Unconfirmed identifications:

40th, 42d, and 50th Divisions and 3d Cavalry Division.

Washington, Annapolis, and Baltimore are garrisoned by marines and naval forces.

(9) All railroads east and south of the general line Parrs Ridge—Parkton have been interrupted by Reds.

(10) For the last few days the weather has been clear and hot.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—Decision of the Blue Army Commander with brief reasons therefor.

*b. Second Requirement.*—The field orders of the Third Army putting the Army Commander's decision into effect.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Decision and Reasons in Brief | 3 |
| Field Orders | 4 |

3. DECISION AND REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a. Decision.*—The army will advance to attack, concealing its movements as much as possible. The north group will advance, in the general direction of the Baltimore and Reisterstown Turnpike, prepared to strike its decisive blow between the above turnpike and Gunpowder Falls. The south group will advance east, keeping south of Patapsco River, engaging the Reds where found and preventing any Red advance north of Patapsco River and west of Parrs Ridge. The 1st Cavalry Division (less one brigade) will remain with the south group. The First Cavalry Brigade will cover the south flank of the IV Corps. The 2d Cavalry Division reinforced by the I and II Corps Cavalry will cover the east flank and be prepared to join in the attack.

*b. Reasons.*—(1) Nothing has developed in the situation to prompt a change in the original plan of campaign. It is evident that Reds have fortified, to some extent, a line from Patuxent River, passing near the junction of the Patapsco and North Branch Patapsco Rivers, to the east of Reisterstown. The front from Patapsco River to the east of Reisterstown seems to be strengthened by a second position, indicating Red anxiety in that area. Notwithstanding the entrenchments indicated, there is no positive information to indicate that the Reds will not act offensively. In view of the lack of fortifications about Washington and to the north and northeast of Baltimore, a Red offensive launched from either flank of the known defenses may be expected. The energetic action of the Red cavalry about Gaithersburg points to such intentions in that vicinity. It would be difficult for the Reds to launch several divisions

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in an offensive from the north and northeast of Baltimore, due to necessity of moving these divisions from Washington and to the limited area. It is, therefore, believed that less Red strength will be encountered on the Red eastern flank.

(2) From the known Red dispositions and fortified areas, it is evident that he is in doubt as to the details of the Blue concentration, and, therefore, of the direction of the main Blue advance. The action of the south Blue group should at least create further doubts in his mind, and assist materially in securing a surprise blow by the Blue left.

(3) The ridge from about Reisterstown to Gunpowder Falls commands Baltimore from an observation and artillery-fire-direction viewpoint. Once this ridge line is in Blue possession, the rest of the Red defenses north of Patapsco River may be taken in reverse. At the same time, this position will not be subjected to serious naval fire. If Blues can assemble secretly for their decisive blow against this area, success seems probable.

(4) The effect of Red offensives may be estimated as follows:

(a) An offensive northwest from Baltimore towards Westminster will meet the main Blue strength, and present a good opportunity for the decisive blow by the Blue left.

(b) An offensive from the northeast of Baltimore will entail a wide detour, will meet the Blue strength and will open the way for a Blue penetration about Reisterstown and possibly a decisive blow by Blue right.

(c) An offensive from south of the Patapsco River is the most probable and has the best chances of success.

(5) If the Reds disastrously defeat the Blue south group, and cross the Patapsco River east of Mt. Airy, the Blue situation would be difficult. However, success comes as a result of boldness based on reasonable chances. The Blue south group may be badly handled but should be able to forestall any such disaster. In fact, this Blue group should be able to hold from the main fight to the north such Red strength as will insure the defeat of the Reds about Baltimore. If this estimate is correct, the total Red strength will not equal that of the Third Blue Army before June 28th.

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The increasing Red strength prompts decisive action by the Blue Third Army at the earliest practicable date. However, the points indicated above, as well as others pointed out later, prompt the retention of an army reserve division on the south flank of the IV Corps.

4. FIELD ORDERS.—*a. Warning Orders.*

Third Army,
EMMITSBURG,
22 June 21, 5:00 PM.

To CGs, I, II, III and IV Corps,
2d Cav Div and 1st Brig 1st Cav Div.

Army advances as directed in orders issuing at 10:00 PM tonight. Daylight movements east of PARRS RIDGE—PARKTON are restricted to cavalry. 2d Cav Div withdraws tomorrow as follows: 1st Brig, 1st Cav Div, to cover the front LIBERTY TURNPIKE—PATAPSCO RIVER both inclusive; 2d Cav Div, reinforced by I Corps Cav, to cover the front BUTLER—RUTLEDGE and east flank of army. Army corps will cover their immediate fronts by the cavalry at their disposal. 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) remains with III Corps.

1st Div passes to II Corps, and 25th Div to I Corps, at 7:00 PM today. Under control of I Corps, animal drawn transportation, 25th Div, will march without delay, and with due precaution for concealment, via SELLS STA and BANDANNA, to be concealed near LINEBORO prior to daylight 24 June. Acknowledge.

X,
Chief of Staff.

By Telegraph.

*b. Formal Field Orders for the Advance.*

Third Army,
EMMITSBURG,
22 June 21, 10:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS
No 5.

Maps: Geol. Surv., 1:62500, and Operation Map, Third Army to accompany FO No 5.

1. The Red Fifth Army, comprising three corps and about one cavalry and seven infantry divisions, holds BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON. Our cavalry and air forces, having defeated like Red units, have uncovered hostile intrenchments on general lines: (a) DAYTON—HENRY-

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TON—hill 645 (northeast of HENRYTON)—HOLBROOK—REISTERSTOWN—ridge east of GLYNDON; (b) GRANITE — HERNWOOD — HARRISONVILLE — BELLTOWN — THE CAVES—south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. Red troop concentrations continue at points indicated in FO No 1. Red infantry and cavalry detachments hold WESTERN RUN and LITTLE GUNPOWDER FALLS. Red cavalry, based on GAITHERSBURG, is active south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER. (See G2 Report.)

2. This army, organized and advancing according to march table attached, will attack Reds where found.

3. (a) Army Air Service will maintain constant observation of Red movements south of PATUXENT RIVER, about BALTIMORE and between the SUSQUEHANNA and GUNPOWDER FALLS.

The present bombing missions are continued. Hostile aerial observation between PATAPSCO and GUNPOWDER FALLS will be prevented.

Attack group will be in readiness for immediate action after 11:00 AM, 24 June 21.

See Annex No 12.

(b) 2d Cav Div (reinforced by I and II Corps Cav), gradually withdrawing to the east, will screen II and I Corps. By daylight, 25 June 21, it will cover front BUTLER—RUTLEDGE, and army's east flank. It will locate hostile forces north and northeast of BALTIMORE, while observing the front CHESAPEAKE BAY—SUSQUEHANNA RIVER.

1st Cav Brig, gradually withdrawing south, will cover front LIBERTY TURNPIKE (inclusive) SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER (inclusive). While driving in Red detachments west of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER, it will cover south flank IV Corps, and the line of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER. It will maintain contact with III Corps.

(c) III Corps, advancing in the area south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER, will prevent any extensive movement of Reds to reinforce their BALTIMORE group. It will hold Reds south and east of general line SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER—PARRS RIDGE to POTOMAC RIVER, and will observe south of POTOMAC RIVER.

(d) IV Corps, attacking any Reds encountered, will develop Red main forces and position in its zone of advance. While covering its south flank, it will be prepared to attack in force north of NICODEMUS ROAD. 4th Division remains at disposal of Army Commander.

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(e) II Corps, echeloning its right forward, will attack any Reds encountered and develop Red main forces and position. It will maintain contact with IV Corps.

(f) I Corps, concealing its movements, will move south, to area stated in march table, in such formation as to be readily engaged, should a decisive battle take place north of WORTHINGTON VALLEY. It will maintain close contact with 2d Cav Div and locate hostile forces to south and east.

Army tanks, detraining along the N C R R on GUNPOWDER FALLS will be employed with this corps in the decisive battle.

(g) Army artillery groupment will be prepared to assist corps in whose area they are marching. (See Annex No 2 Anti-aircraft.)

(x) (1) Intelligence: See Annex No 3.

(2) The importance of concealing the advance of the I, II and IV Corps will be impressed on all. While movements of these corps will be made at night as far as practicable, security and defeat of Reds will not be sacrified therefor.

(3) An early development of Red main forces energetically sought and must be secured by the III, IV, and II Corps, and 2d Cav Div, not later than morning of 25 June 21.

4. See Administrative Orders No. 7.

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

Army—(1) EMMITSBURG—TANEYTOWN — WESTMINSTER—REISTERSTOWN.

(2) TANEYTOWN—LIBERTYTOWN — MOUNT AIRY.

III Corps—Connect with army at MOUNT AIRY.

1st Cav Brig—LIBERTY TURNPIKE.

IV Corps—Same as Army (1).

II Corps—UNION MILLS—BACHMAN MILLS—MANCHESTER—HANOVER and DOVER ROADS.

I Corps—HANOVER—GLENVILLE—ROLLER—HOFFMANSVILLE—RAYVILLE.

(b) Command Posts:

No change except as indicated in march table.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution:
A.

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## c. *March Table Third Army*

23 to 25 June 21 (to accompany FO No. 5)

See Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No. 5

| *Unit* 1 | *Zone of Advance* 2 | *Location Daylight 25 June 21* 3 | *Change of Organization and hour of Passing of Command* 4 | *Corps Areas* 5 | *Railheads* 6 | *Remarks* 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| III Corps | South of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER | Depends on situation | None | North Boundary: WOODSBORO—MOUNT AIRY—PATAPSCO RIVER (excl.) South Boundary: None West Boundary: MONOCACY RIVER | No change except as requested by Corps Comdr. | |
| 1st Cav Brig | North Boundary: LIBERTY TURNPIKE (inclusive). South Boundary: PATAPSCO RIVER (inclusive) | East of ELDERSBURG—SYKESVILLE and cover line of PATAPSCO RIVER Hq at BARRETT | Released from 2d Cav Div at 5:00 AM 23 June 21 | None | NEW WINDSOR after 11:00 AM, 23 June 21 | |
| IV Corps | South Boundary: SCOTTS LEVEL BRANCH—HOLBROOK—OKLAHOMA—DENNINGS—KEYMAR all inclusive. North Boundary: CHATTOLANEE—RJ 70 and 486—EMORY CH—CRANBERRY STA—MARKERS MILL—GALT—KUMP, all inclusive | Advance guards east of general line WOODENBURG—GLEN FALLS—NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO—ELDERSBURG. 4th Div (Army Reserve) area of UNIONTOWN. Corps Hq at SANDYVILLE | No change | North and South Boundaries: same as zone of advance. West Boundary: N. C. RR. | CHQ Corps Troops and 22d Div WESTMINSTER after 11:00 AM 23 June 21. 2d Div no change. 4th Div TANEYTOWN after 11:00 AM June 21 | 4th Div moves under IV Corps. |
| II Corps (less corps cav) | South and West Boundaries: Same as north boundary IV Corps except inclusive. East boundary: TEXAS—BEREAN—MILLERS—MOUNT PLEASANT (all inclusive) | Advance guards east and south of general line BUTLER—WOODENBURG. CHQ at HAMPSTEAD | 1st Div passes to II Corps and 25th Div to I Corps at 7:00 PM 22 June 21. Corps cav passes to 2d Cav Div 6:00 PM, 24 June 21 | Boundaries: Same as zone of advance West Boundary: N. C. R. R. | CHQ and Corps Trs and 3d Div, no change. 1st Div, MELROSE after 11:00 AM 23 June 21 | |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I Corps | West Boundary: same as east boundary II Corps except all inclusive. East Boundary: N. C. RR and GUNPOWDER FALLS | Concealed in area VERONA—WEISBURG—MOUNT CARMEL—STRINGTOWN. CHQ at RAYVILLE | See II Corps, Corps Cav passes to 2d Cav Div at 5:00 AM 23 June 21. Army tanks attached at date announced later. | Boundaries: Same as zone of advance. North Boundary: N. C. RR | NEW FREEDOM for whole corps at such time as requested by Corps Comdr. Otherwise no change | Army train moves 25th Div. |
| 2d Cav Div reinforced by I and II Corps Cav | Front of I Corps and east flank of army. | Covering front of I Corps and east flank of army. DHQ depends on situation. | See I and II Corps and 1st Cav Brig. | None | PARKTON after 11:00 AM 23 June 21. | |
| AHQ Fwd Ech<br>Rr Ech | | WESTMINSTER<br>EMMITSBURG | | | TANEYTOWN<br>No change | Opens at new station at 5:00 AM, June 25. |
| AAS<br>FAIRFIELD GROUP<br>WAYNESBORO GROUP | | PLEASANT VALLEY<br>EMMITSBURG | | | TANEYTOWN<br>FAIRFIELD | Each group contains detachments of A-AA. |
| AA:<br>Gp A<br>Gp B | | GREENMOUNT (north of HAMPSTEAD)<br>REESE | Marches conducted under orders of II Corps.<br>Marches conducted under orders of IV Corps. | | MELROSE after 11:00 AM 24 June 21.<br>WESTMINSTER after 11:00 AM 24 June 21. | AA Brig distributed in detachments in accordance with anti-aircraft Annex. Movements in corps areas under supervision of the corps. |
| Army Tanks | | | | | | Move by rail on 24 June to PARKTON. |
| Other Units | No change | | | | | |

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Methods of Advance | 5 |
| The Predetermined Maneuver | 6 |
| The Advance With Strategic Advance Guard | 7 |
| The Preconceived Form of Maneuver | 8 |
| Factors Affecting the Decision | 9 |
| This Advance is a Predetermined Maneuver | 10 |

5. METHODS OF ADVANCE.—In planning an advance to battle by an army, the following three general methods or forms require consideration. The basis of all these forms is ability to execute, at the proper time, a decisive tactical maneuver, i.e., to strike a decisive tactical blow. These methods are as follows:

*a.* When the tactical maneuver can be predetermined before close contact with the enemy. In this case, the forces may be grouped initially and advanced in a form suitable to executing a predetermined maneuver.

*b.* When the decision as to the direction and the grouping of forces for the tactical maneuver depends on developments during the advance. In such a case, an advance element should precede the main forces, to develop the enemy and to form a pivot of maneuver.

*c.* When the exact tactical maneuver cannot be predetermined, as to locality, or as to which forces will execute the same, the army advances in such groupings as will carry out a preconceived *form* of tactical maneuver.

6. THE PREDETERMINED MANEUVER.—When the tactical maneuver can be predetermined, fairly accurate information of hostile intentions and positions is essential, and there should be some certainty that the enemy will not make any radical changes in his plans and dispositions. Otherwise, there is likelihood of being out-maneuvered by the enemy. These conditions are seldom found, except when the distance of the advance is relatively short, one or two days' march. The real defect in this form is that, once

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started, the supreme commander has little or no tactical influence—it results in a mechanical performance. This form is more applicable to groups of armies or large armies.

7. THE ADVANCE WITH STRATEGIC ADVANCE GUARD.—*a.* When the tactical maneuver results from developments during the advance, one finds the greatest opportunities for a supreme commander to make full use of his tactical skill and leadership. In this case, the main forces of the army should be preceded, by two or three days' marches, by an advance guard of all arms. The main forces follow in such a disposition of readiness that the units may be quickly grouped and maneuvered to grasp tactical opportunities.

*b.* The advance guard has the following important functions:

(1) Reconnaissance to locate the enemy, especially his main forces.

(2) Engage the enemy so as to establish a zone of maneuver for its army, i.e., to fix the enemy's main forces to a definite locality or to draw them in a desired direction.

(3) Cover and screen the main forces and gain time for the movements necessary to carry out the tactical maneuver planned as a result of the information secured by the advance guard.

(4) It is a pivot of maneuver for the main forces.

*c.* The advance guard should comprise all arms, as it will have to fight serious and long engagements. It comes under the direct control of the supreme commander, as its actions greatly influence the employment of the main forces.

*d.* This form of advance seldom is applicable to forces larger than an army. When several armies are employed, there is little chance for intertactical maneuver between the armies. However, the supreme commander may contemplate holding a reserve reinforcement of any army, depending on tactical developments. In such a case, each army might be preceded by a strategical advance guard. In the case of an army, this form is especially applicable when the opposing forces are some distance apart, and the size of the army is such that the necessary time for tactical maneuver may be gained by an advance guard. In the

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final analysis, this form is based on securing tactical victory by massing the main part of the available forces against the decisive hostile element. The decisive hostile element is determined and fixed by the advance guard, following which, the main body maneuvers and attacks in a decisive direction.

8. THE PRECONCEIVED FORM OF MANEUVER.—When an army advances in groups, based on a preconceived form of tactical maneuver, the following are the main considerations:

*a.* The preconceived form of the tactical maneuver is based on enveloping and surrounding the enemy, which is accomplished by a convergence of forces and a concentration on the battlefield.

*b.* The forces are grouped initially, and advance in such direction, as to envelop the enemy on one or both flanks, depending on the situation at the time he is encountered. In other words the army advances in prearranged groups. Whenever the enemy is encountered, the group directly opposed to him attacks, while the others take advantage of every opportunity to envelop or turn his flanks.

*c.* There is no maneuver based on the tactical situation. The maneuver is limited and depends on the initiative of the subordinate commanders.

*d.* Unless fortune favors, there is no striking of a decisive blow by the mass of the army. The supreme commander has little influence, once the advance starts, as radical changes in dispositions are not practicable.

*e.* There is danger of falling into a trap. The enemy's advance guard may be encountered, calling for the advance columns of each group to converge on it, thereby opening a way for a decisive tactical maneuver by the enemy.

*f.* This form tends to a piecemeal employment of the forces. It is generally applicable when great superiority exists and to groups of armies, but seldom to an army.

9. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION.—*a.* With the foregoing in mind, the general solution of a march problem for an army revolves about the following question: (1) Can a tactical maneuver be planned before contact is gained

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with the enemy or (2) should the maneuver be based on the situation developed after *initial combats*?

*b.* In addition to the foregoing, the supply and transportation (railroads and roads) situation has an important bearing on the form of the advance, groupings of forces, and the direction of their movements.

10. THIS ADVANCE, A PREDETERMINED MANEUVER.—In the solution under discussion, the principles set forth in the first case have been applied, i.e., the tactical maneuver has been predetermined and all arrangements made in accordance therewith. The conditions seem to justify this form for the reasons already given. It will be noted that the advance formation and direction are based on engaging the enemy with the III, IV and south half of II Corps, while holding the north half of the II Corps and the I Corps for the decisive blows.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested For Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 11

11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Make an estimate of the situation from the viewpoint of the Blue Army Commander.

*b.* Prepare a decision different from the one given herein. Accept the situation as it stands, and, as a result of a thorough analysis, outline an entirely different decision and solution. Compare this with the one contained herein, considering their relative advantages and disadvantages.

*c.* Study the form, contents, clearness and completeness of Field Order No. 5, Third Army. Suggest improvements—see if the time element is satisfactory.

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*d.* Study the conduct and actions of the 2d Cavalry Division up to daylight June 25. The same for the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

*e.* Study the employment of the air service of the whole army. Take up, in turn, that of divisions, corps, and army, and discuss their separate and combined functions during the advance. What relationship should exist between the army cavalry divisions and the various air service units?

*f.* Study the handling of the IV and II Corps during the advance.

*g.* Study and give a solution to the problem presented to the I Corps during the advance.

*h.* How should the army artillery groups be handled during the march?

*i.* Study the supply, evacuation, and transportation problem, and give a solution from the army view point.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, Third Army, 22 June 21.
Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 5.

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# CHAPTER V

# *The Advance of the III Corps*


| | Paragraphs |
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Maps following page 77.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Fifth Special Situation (Blue) | 1 |
| Required | 2 |


1. FIFTH SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE).—*a.* Maps: Geol. Surv. 1:62500. G3 Situation Map III Corps, 22 June 21.

*b.* The concentration proceeded as ordered.

*c.* The army warning order was received at 5:30 PM, and Field Order No. 5, Third Army, at 11:00 PM, June 22. The army G2 Reports contained the information given in Fourth Special Situation (Blue). (See G3 Situation Map, III Corps, 22 June 21.)

*d.* Cavalry reconnaissance developed Red infantry on the general line Patuxent River (opposite Brighton)—Ivory — Mountview — Henryton — North Branch of Patapsco River. Patrols penetrating the cavalry screen were unable to pass this line. South of the Patuxent River, a patrol reached Olney without encountering any Red infantry. A patrol operating towards Manassas got as far as Dranesville, and reported a Red detachment of all arms near Great Falls, Virginia. No Reds were encountered in the vicinity of Leesburg.



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*e.* The 1st Cavalry Division turned over the Clagettsville—Taylorsville front to the 903d Cavalry and moved towards Rockville. It encountered superior Red cavalry near Gaithersburg, so was forced to withdraw behind the line of the Great Seneca Creek. It has been able to prevent Red patrols from reaching the high ground northwest of Great Seneca Creek, but has been unable to penetrate the Red cavalry screen.

*f.* The 30th Division sent forward a detachment to Clarksburg to support the cavalry. The 20th Division sent forward a detachment to Ridgeville to support the cavalry and to protect railway tunnel.

*g.* The corps air service, while confirming information given by patrols, has discovered no new area of Red concentration.

*h.* The corps intelligence estimate of the situation is that an enemy advance in force may be expected south of the Patuxent River from the direction of Washington.

*i.* During the period up to June 22, the III Corps was very busy getting ready for the advance. Studies were made of probable operations and tentative field orders and march tables prepared. The communications system was carefully studied and circulation maps prepared. West of Parrs Ridge and east of the Monocacy, bridges were strengthened, road signs and communications improved, and material for repair and maintenance placed at suitable points. East of Parrs Ridge, extensive road reconnaissance was carried out by the corps and by the divisions. Necessary field orders, movement orders and administrative orders were issued.

*j.* The III Corps at 4:00 PM, June 22, was located as follows:

(See Situation Map, 22 June 21.)

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LOCATION TABLE III CORPS, 22 JUNE 21, 4:00 PM

| *Unit* (1) | *Command Post* (2) | *Railhead and Route* (3) | *Mission and Present Location* (4) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CHQ and Corps Tr (less dets) | Frederick | Frederick direct | Awaiting orders to advance. In camp vicinity of Frederick as ordered in concentration table accompanying Field Orders No 1 (less detachments on road work and maintenance traffic regulation, anti-aircraft defense, etc.). |
| 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) | Clarksburg | Barnesville Sta Any road | Screening front Potomac River—Poolesville—Clagettsville. Detachments on line of Great Seneca Creek. |
| 903d Cav | Mount Airy | Mount Airy | Screening front Clagettsville—Taylorsville—with detachments on line Millinis—Florence—Lisbon. |
| 30th Div | Hyattstown | Frederick—Washington Road via Urbana | Awaiting orders for advance. Supporting 1st Cav Div south of Patuxent River. In area Thurston—Clarksburg—Lewisdale—Green Valley—Centerville—Urbana (all inclusive). |
| 20th Div | New Market | Monrovia Any road | Awaiting orders for advance. Supporting 903d Cav north of Patuxent River. In area Monrovia—Kempton—Ridgeville—Woodville—New Market (all inclusive). |
| 11th Div | Jefferson Turnpike 1 mile southwest of Frederick | Frederick Any road | Awaiting orders for advance. In area southwest of Frederick. |

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—Formal field orders issued by General D in compliance with Field Orders No. 5, Third Army.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Reasons in brief for action taken.

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Formal Field Orders | 3 |
| Reasons in Brief | 4 |

3. FORMAL FIELD ORDERS. — *a.* Necessary warning orders were sent out at 11:30 PM, June 22. Permission was obtained to leave corps airdromes in army area and to establish certain new railheads.

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*b.* **Formal field orders were issued as follows:**

III Corps,
FREDERICK,
23 June 21, 1:00 AM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 9 }

**Maps: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam. Geol. Surv., 1:62500. Operation Map, III Corps, to accompany FO No 9.**

1. (a) Fifth Red Army holds WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE, strength, one cavalry and seven infantry divisions. No change in Red concentrations. Landings still continue. Penetration of the Red cavalry and air service screen, north of PATUXENT RIVER, has uncovered intrenchments on general line DAYTON—MOUNTVIEW—HENRYTON—HOLBROOK and north. Red cavalry, based on GAITHERSBURG, is active south of PATUXENT RIVER. Red detachment of all arms reported at GREAT FALLS, VA. (See G2 Report [omitted].)

   (b) The Third Army advances and attacks Reds where found. 2d Cav, while screening II and I Corps, withdraws to left of army. IV Corps advances in direction of GLEN FALLS. 1st Cav Brig covers right flank of IV Corps on front SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER—LIBERTY TURNPIKE (both inclusive). It will be east of line SYKESVILLE—ELDERSBURG with headquarters at BARRETT by AM, 25 June. Our cavalry is on the general line; GREAT SENECA CREEK—MULLINIX—LISBON.

2. This corps advances to prevent Reds, south of PATAPSCO RIVER, reinforcing the BALTIMORE Reds, and to hold them south and east of the general line PARRS RIDGE—SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER.

   Zone of Action:

   North Boundary: WOODSBORO (inclusive)—MOUNT AIRY (inclusive)—SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER (exclusive).

   South boundary: None.

   Rear boundary: MONOCACY RIVER.

3. (a) The 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) gradually withdrawing from the front of the 30th Div, will cover our right. Reconnaissance towards ROCKVILLE and south of the POTOMAC RIVER.

   The 903d Cav is attached to the 20th Div effective at 8:00 PM, June 23.

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(b) The 30th Div will advance on the night June 23-24 in the direction of LAYTONSVILLE and will attack the enemy where found.

Zone of Action:

South Boundary: THURSTON—CLARKSBURG—NEELSVILLE (all inclusive) — REDLAND (exclusive).

North Boundary: CENTERSVILLE—GREEN VALLEY—DAMASCUS—PATUXENT RIVER (all inclusive).

Rear Boundary: 5:00 AM 24 June: HYATTSTOWN — BROWNINGSVILLE (both inclusive).

The advance guards will reach the line of SENECA CREEK by 5:00 AM, 24 June 21. The heights of LAYTONSVILLE will be seized on the 24th of June.

It will maintain contact with the 1st Cav Div and the 20th Div.

(c) The 20th Div, reinforced by the 903d Cav, will advance on the night June 23-24 in the direction of WEST FRIENDSHIP and will attack the enemy along the line DAYTON—MOUNTVIEW.

Zone of Action:

South boundary: BROWNINGSVILLE—DAMASCUS—PATUXENT RIVER (exclusive).

North Boundary: WOODVILLE—MOUNT AIRY (both inclusive)—SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER (all inclusive).

Rear boundary: 5:00 AM, June 24; BROWNINGSVILLE—MOUNT AIRY.

NEW MARKET and MONROVIA will be clear of division troops, except DHQ, by 12:00 noon, June 23.

The head of the advance guards will reach line FLORENCE—LISBON by 5:00 AM, June 24.

Hostile position vicinity of DAYTON—MOUNTVIEW will be developed by night of June 24-25.

The division will maintain contact with the 30th Div and the 1st Cav Brig.

(d) The 11th Div, utilizing all roads from BUCKEYSTOWN to CERESVILLE (both inclusive) will move June 24 to area BARTHOLOWS—KEMPTOWN—CLAGETTSVILLE—RIDGEVILLE — MOUNT AIRY — WOODVILLE (all inclusive).

It will maintain contact with the 30th Div and the 20th Div.

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It will reconnoiter for possible advance on both sides of the PATUXENT RIVER.

The corps train (MT) will be available for movement after 5:00 AM, June 24.

All troops will be in new area by 4:00 PM, June 24.

(e) The Corps AS, while continuing present mission, will give prompt information of Red advance south of the PATUXENT RIVER. See Annnex No 1 (omitted).

The observation squadrons will remain at FREDERICK.

(f) 305th Arty (A-A) (less dets) will continue present mission from vicinity of NEW MARKET after AM, June 25. See Annex No 2 (omitted).

(g) Other corps troops will move east of the MONOCACY RIVER, 23 June 21, as ordered in attached march table.

4. See Adm O No 12 (omitted).
Railheads: (see March Table).

5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication: No change.
(b) Axes of Signal Communications:
III Corps and 20th Div: No change.
11th Div: BALTIMORE TURNPIKE.
1st Cav Div: WASHINGTON ROAD—CLARKSBURG—BOYDS.
30th Div: WASHINGTON ROAD—BRINK.
(c) Command Posts:
III Corps: NEW MARKET after 12 noon June 23.
30th Div: CLARKSBURG after midnight June 23-24.
20th Div: PARRSVILLE after 8:00 PM, June 23.
POPLAR SPRINGS after 8:00 PM, June 24.
11th Div: RIDGEVILLE after 12:00 noon, June 24.
1st Cav Div: BOYDS after 8:00 AM, June 24.

By command of Maj Gen D,

Y,
C of S.

Distribution A and
1st Cav Brig.

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*c. March Table.* To accompany FO No 9, III Corps, 23 June 21. (See Operation Map accompanying FO No 9.)

| *Unit* | *From Present Location to* | *Route* | *Railhead* | *Time of Movements and Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) | Cover right of corps | Arrange with divisions | BARNESVILLE STA. | Uncover front as divisions advance by arrangement with divisions. |
| 903d Cav | | | MOUNT AIRY. | Report to 20th Div at 8:00 PM, 23 June 21. |
| 80th Div | To line SENECA CREEK night June 23–24. Beyond heights of LAYTONSVILLE on June 24. | In zone. | FREDERICK Jc after 6:00 PM, 23 June. | Movements start 6:00 PM on 23d. Rear elements clear line HYATTSVILLE—BROWNINGSVILLE by 5:00 AM, 24th. |
| 20th Div | To line FLORENCE—LISBON night June 23–24;— develop line DAYTON—MONTVIEW on 24th. | In zone. | MOUNT AIRY after 6:00 PM 23 June. | Movements start 6:00 PM on 23d. Rear elements clear line BROWNINGSVILLE—MOUNT AIRY by 5:00 AM, 24th. |
| 11th Div | Area BARTHOLOWS—KEMPTON—CLAGETTSVILLE—RIDGEVILLE—MOUNT AIRY—WOODVILLE (all incl.) | Any roads between BUCKEYSTOWN and CERESVILLE (both incl.) | BARTHOLOWS after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Corps Tn available for movement report 5:00 AM, 24 June 21. |
| 305th Arty (A–A) | Just east of NEW MARKET. | BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Head leaves FREDERICK 6:00 AM, 23 June, clear FREDERICK 6:30 AM, clear NEW MARKET 7:30 AM. |
| 301st FA Brig (less detch) | MONROVIA | BALTIMORE TURNPIKE | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Follow special troops. Head leave FREDERICK, 10:00 AM, tail clear FREDERICK 1:00 PM, clear NEW MARKET 3:00 PM, 23 June. |
| Air Service Obsn Sq Bln Gp (less detch) | No change Just west of NEW MARKET. | BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Follow 305 Arty (A–A) clear FREDERICK 6:35 AM, 23 June, clear NEW MARKET 7:35 AM |
| 301st Engrs and 302d, 303 and 304th Engr Bns Aux. | NEW LONDON | Via RJ 266—McKAIG. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Start 8:00 AM, 23 June. |
| 301st Med Regt. | KEMPTON. | Via BALTIMORE TURNPIKE—BARTHOLOWS. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Follow Bln Gp, clear FREDERICK 8:00 AM, 23 June, clear NEW MARKET 8:30 AM. |
| Special troops | Just north of NEW MARKET. | BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Follow Med Regt, clear FREDERICK 9:00 AM, 23 June, clear NEW MARKET 10:00 AM. Moved on transport of special troops. |
| Corps Tns (less MT) | East of BARTONSVILLE. | Via BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. | MONROVIA after 6:00 PM, 24 June. | Follow 301st FA Brig head leaves FREDERICK 1:00 PM; tail clears FREDERICK 2:20 PM, 23 June. |
| Corps Tn (MT) | Assist to move 11th Div. | | | Report to 11th Div 5:00 AM, June 24. Await orders at BARTHOLOWS. |

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4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a. General Plan of Action.*—General A can take up a defensive position along the general line of Great Seneca Creek—Hoods Mill, covering Parrs Ridge, or he can advance and seize commanding ground to the east of Parrs Ridge, or he can advance and develop the enemy's position, and, incidentally, gain ground for future delaying action, if this becomes necessary. He has everything to gain and little to lose by advancing at once.

*b. Night Movements.*—Night movements are ordered east of Parrs Ridge. Although his orders and his mission do not definitely order night movement on his front, nevertheless, if he wishes to gain any benefit in the way of surprise, the movements east of Parrs Ridge, until contact is made, should be made by night as far as possible.

*c. Dispositions for the Advance.*—(1) The Reds are known to be along the Baltimore Turnpike in the vicinity of Mountview. Their strength should be developed and they should either be driven off or held while the army makes its advance. Little further information of value can be obtained by cavalry reconnaissance. The 20th Division if ordered to advance along the Baltimore Turnpike can develop the enemy's position north of the Patuxent River.

(2) South of the Patuxent River the situation is more vague. It seems probable, if the Reds intend to move in force to the north or northwest, that they will need more room to the west—possibly as far as the Monocacy River and certainly as far west as Parrs Ridge. The Red cavalry is effectively screening something and Reds are known to be in the vicinity of Washington. The situation must be developed in this area and more information gained about the enemy. The Red cavalry should be pushed aside and the front uncovered. A direct advance in the direction of Washington would be desirable if General D had a larger force but a movement in this direction would still further disperse his command. He has already a wide front. Beyond Great Seneca Creek there are the heights at Laytonsville, forming a watershed between the Great Seneca Creek

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and the Patuxent River. Beyond this, the next heights are at Olney, the watershed between Rock Creek and the Patuxent River.

(3) A movement by the 30th Division towards Laytonsville should push aside the Red cavalry, gain some information as to the Red movements, and, in addition, obtain a good position for future operations. The direction of advance of this division is nearly east in order to keep it closer to the 20th Division for mutual support. The cavalry division must cover the right. The strong position, now held by the cavalry along Great Seneca Creek, should be occupied by the division as a first step in the advance.

(4) The 11th Division is held in reserve in a central position—whence it can fill the gap between the two divisions, or reinforce either one as may be necessary. There is no need of marching it on the 23d, or at night, if it moves along the Baltimore Turnpike. But, if it moves along the Washington Road, it could be moved at once. Owing to the uncertainty of the situation, a central location of the division seems more desirable than one on the right flank. The move can be made on the 24th by daylight after the 20th Division has vacated the Ridgeville—Bartholows area. The motor transport train can assist the movement and be left in position for further movement of infantry.

*d. Corps Troops.*—(1) In the meantime the corps troops can be moved east of the Monocacy, thus clearing the roads for the movement of the 11th Division on the 24th. While General D feels that he could well leave his corps troops in their present location around Frederick, he knows that the area is needed for army establishments, hence he makes arrangements for movement of the bulk of the corps troops on the 23d of June. A number of detachments already are east of the river engaged in various works relating to the corps—such as road maintenance and reconnaissance, signal work, and anti-aircraft defense.

(2) There is no very good location for airdromes east of the Monocacy at present, and, moreover, it is not desired to interrupt the air reconnaissance at this time by a short

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move—so permission is obtained to retain the airdromes at Frederick.

*e. Period Covered by Order.*—General D issues orders covering two days' movement and leaves the details of the movement to the division commanders. He may have to make minor changes later, if further information of the enemy is developed. In order that he may be able to move his corps artillery and his reserve division, he is concerned as to the location of the rear elements of the division so that he may take necessary moves without congesting the roads.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Method of Conducting the Advance | 5 |
| The Mission is Two-fold | 6 |
| Holding Hostile Forces Out of Main Issue | 7 |
| Defense of the Line, Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge | 8 |
| The Plan Adopted | 9 |
| Details of Execution | 10 |

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5. METHOD OF CONDUCTING ADVANCE.—As the III Corps is part of a larger unit, the method of conducting the advance will be determined by the mission assigned by the higher unit and the situation.

6. THE MISSION IS TWO-FOLD.—The mission of the II Corps as given in the army order is two-fold: namely (1) to prevent the Reds south of the Patapsco River from reinforcing the Baltimore Reds, and (2) to hold the Reds south and east of the line South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac River. The object of the first part of the mission is to hold the Reds south of the Patapsco River out of the main issue. The object of the second part of the mission is to prevent the main issue from being interfered with by the Washington Reds and to keep the Reds out of the area to be used later for the concentration of the Fifth Red Army.

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(3) The mission of the III Corps may therefore be considered as a holding mission or detachment to assist the main issue on another part of the front. With such a mission, the unit should attract to itself and hold out of the main issue a hostile force at least equal to and if possible greater than itself.

7. HOLDING HOSTILE FORCES OUT OF MAIN ISSUE.—*a. Means Employed.*—To attract to itself, and hold out of the main issue, a hostile force equal to or greater than itself, the III Corps should if possible make its advance in such a manner that the enemy will be led to believe that it is the main issue and this deception should be continued until such time that the enemy will be unable to withdraw troops from the III Corps front to reinforce the main issue.

*b. Means of Causing Deception.*—To bring about the above deception, the advance to the point of initial contact should be made as a surprise and the advance thereafter aggressive, more so, in fact, than on the front of the main issue. The direction of the advance should, if possible, be such that if continued, it may strike a decisive blow to the Red forces as a whole, and the enemy should be kept deceived as to the actual strength of the forces engaged on the III Corps front until too late to reinforce the main issue.

*c. An Advance on Broad Front.*—The mission assigned the III Corps, together with the short distance to the hostile advance line, the broad front to be covered, and the short time available before the Blue attack will probably be launched, does not justify the III Corps in employing a strategical advance guard, in spite of the fact that the hostile situation on its front is very uncertain. The III Corps should advance on a broad front, with two divisions in line to develop promptly and attack the enemy on its front, and one division in reserve to support the front line divisions and continue the aggressiveness.

It thus happens that a unit when acting as part of a larger force often will be required to employ methods of action which would not be justified were it acting alone.

*d. Direction of Advance.*—The direction of advance, to cause the enemy to believe that this will be the decisive

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blow, may, in the present problem, be made towards Washington, one of the Red bases, or in the direction to separate the Washington Reds from the Baltimore Reds. If sufficient strength were available to make an advance in force in both directions, and have front line units within supporting distance after contact is made, an advance in both directions would seem desirable. Sufficient strength for an advance in both directions is hardly available. While there are certain advantages in each direction, the second part of the corps mission, that of holding the Reds south and east of the line, Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac, as will be indicated hereafter, seems to make it advisable to make the direction of advance such, that, if continued, it will separate the Washington Reds from the Baltimore Reds.

8. DEFENSE OF THE LINE PATAPSCO RIVER—PARRS RIDGE.—The advance of the III Corps must also take into consideration the second part of its mission, that of holding the Reds south and east of the line South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac River. This line is some 36 miles in extent and it is convex with respect to the III Corps. This line is too long to be occupied and defended as a defensive position. To prevent the enemy from crossing it, three plans of action may be adopted as follows:

*a.* Defend the line according to the general principles governing the defense of a river line and mountain range; namely, occupy the line with small detachments to develop a hostile force, and, with the bulk of the forces well in hand, strike a decisive blow at any hostile force while it is attempting to cross.

*b.* Advance to a position in front of the line where any hostile advance may be promptly developed, the defending force then being interposed between the hostile advance and the line, or on the line at the point where the enemy attempts to cross.

*c.* Take up a flank position which will defend a part of the line and serve as a sufficient threat to prevent the enemy from crossing the line in force along the remainder of the

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front until the defending force is driven from its flank position.

9. THE PLAN ADOPTED.—The convex shape of the line makes the plan of action given under *a* difficult of execution. This plan of action would not be satisfactory for that portion of the front along the South Branch Patapsco River, for, if the enemy succeeded in effecting a temporary crossing in force on that part of the front, he may seriously interfere with the main issue of the Third Blue Army. The plan of action given in *b*, together with a flank position defending the South Branch Patapsco River as given in *c*, seems to be the best solution for the present problem. To accomplish this the direction and objective of the advance should be such that any hostile advance may be developed early and, if the III Corps is driven back, it may take up a flank position along the South Branch Patapsco, to defend effectively that part of the line, to protect the right of the remainder of the army, and serve as a threat to any hostile force crossing to the west of Parrs Ridge between the Patapsco and the Potomac River.

10. DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—*a*. As the hostile line is approached and contact is made:

(1) Front line divisions should be within supporting distance of each other.

(2) Reserve divisions should be within supporting distance of front line divisions.

(3) Combat elements of corps troops should be within supporting distance of front line divisions.

*b*. This requires forward units to be kept well closed up and special instructions to prevent rear elements of forward units from interfering with the march of rear units.

*c*. Movements at night, at least until contact is made, may assist materially in effecting a surprise and in keeping the enemy deceived as to the actual strength of the forces employed on the front, and in causing the enemy to believe that the advance will be the main issue.

*d*. As contact is made, the cavalry is withdrawn to cover the exposed flank or flanks, and operate on the hostile flanks.

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*e.* The air service and the cavalry should carry out intensive reconnaissance to develop and locate the hostile main body on the III Corps front.

*f.* The practicability of the movements for carrying out the plans should be checked, and detailed plans for the execution of the movements prepared. New railheads and routes thereto should be provided as the troops advance.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 11

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11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation:

(1) The location, strength, and composition of the hostile forces:

(2) Hostile intentions: hostile plans in a general way to meet the Third Army advance and in detail to meet the III Corps advance.

*b.* Mission of the III Corps as given by the army field orders; plans to prevent the Reds south of the Patapsco River from reinforcing the Baltimore Reds. Consider various plans open to the III Corps and the objective, direction of advance, formation, and results of each.

*c.* Plans open to the III Corps to hold the Reds south and east of the line South Branch Patapsco—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac—combine these with plans to carry out subject *b*:

(1) Consider various plans with movements, dispositions and results of each;

(2) Combine these with plans under subject *a*, 2.

*d.* The method of execution of the plan adopted in the solution:

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(1) Concealment of movements, surprise, aggressiveness and duration of aggressive action;

(2) General principles governing formations as hostile contact is made;

(3) Mission of divisions (first line and reserve) cavalry, air service, combat corps troops.

*e.* Practicability of movements to carry out the plan adopted in the solution and detailed plans for the execution of the movements:

(1) Distances, routes and time available;

(2) The order and time of movements of cavalry, divisions and corps troops and arrangements to prevent interference;

(3) The order and time and place of movement of various units of corps troops.

*f.* Form, clearness, brevity, and completeness of the field orders.

## *Maps*

G3 Situation Map, III Corps, 22 June 21.}
Operation Map, III Corps, to accompany } following page.
FO No 9. }

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## CHAPTER VI

# *The III Corps in a Meeting Engagement*


| | | Paragraphs |
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Maps following page 92.


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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Sixth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


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1. SIXTH SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE):

(See G3 Situation Map III Corps, 4:00 PM, 24 June 21.)

*a. The Blue Forces.*—(1) The corps troops moved as ordered on June 23.

(2) The 30th Division reached, with its advanced infantry elements, by 5:00 AM June 24, the general line, Goshen—Woodfield without meeting any resistance other than Red cavalry which withdrew to the south and southeast. The division pushed on and by noon June 24 its advanced infantry elements had occupied the high ground at Laytonsville where Red infantry was encountered and driven to the east. Further advance was stopped in the vicinity of Claysville by Red infantry, supported by artillery fire which grew stronger as the afternoon advanced. A cavalry patrol operating along the Patuxent River encountered June 24 at noon, Red infantry at Brighton and



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Brookeville. Prisoners, including several officers, captured in the advance on Laytonsville were sent to the corps for complete examination.

(3) The commanding general, 30th Division, reported that he would occupy the high ground at Laytonsville and prepare to advance in force on the morning of June 25. He stated that command post was at Brink and that with the approval of the Corps commander he would establish his entire headquarters thereat on the night of June 24-25. He further stated that he believed that strong Red forces were moving northwest between Rock Creek and the Patuxent River and he suggested that he be given reinforcements.

(4) The 1st Cavalry Division withdrew to the right and south of the 30th Division as the division advanced and covered the right flank of the division along the general line, Great Seneca Creek to the Potomac River. While unable to break through the Red cavalry in its front, it was able to prevent this cavalry from operating around the southern end of Parrs Ridge. The Red cavalry appeared to be operating from the vicinity of Hunting Hill. Patrols south of the Potomac River reported no movement of Red troops and no change in the general situation.

(5) The 20th Division pushed back hostile cavalry, and, by 5:00 AM June 24, reached, with its advanced infantry elements, the line Daisy—Cooksville without encountering Red infantry. The advance was continued and by noon the leading infantry elements reached the line, Gary—Rover—Sykesville, driving back Red infantry detachments. Considerable resistance from machine gun fire was encountered. The advance was stopped by Red infantry supported by artillery, and, accordingly, preparation was made to reinforce the front line and to reconnoiter the whole of the enemy position. The 903d Cavalry, operating on the right of the division, covered the front, Patuxent River (exclusive) Gary (exclusive). Prisoners, both infantry and cavalry, were captured and sent to the corps for complete examination. The division commander reported that he would develop the enemy's position and on

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the morning of June 25 attack astride the Baltimore Turnpike. He stated that although the Red intrenchments on the Dayton—Mountview line were well located, he did not believe that they were strongly held and that he thought that a deep and decisive penetration could be made if his attack was backed up by the reserve division and corps artillery.

(6) The air service reported unusual activity in the vicinity of Laurel and Kensington on the night of June 23-24, and, on the morning of June 24, extensive movements to the northwest on the Union Turnpike—Sandy Spring Road and Laurel Road. By noon June 24 the Red air service south of the Patapsco River had been greatly increased. Great difficulty was encountered in attempting to execute reconnaissance missions and no new information of value was obtained. No indications of extensive intrenchments were observed south of the Patuxent River and no increase in the works along the Dayton—Mountview line was noticed.

(7) Reports received at 3:00 PM contained the information that the IV Corps had crossed the North Branch of the Patapsco River, north of Liberty Turnpike. Contact was established with the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Sykesville.

*b. The Red Forces.*—(1) At 4:00 PM June 24, from examination of prisoners, air reconnaissance, and information received from the army and other sources—General D had been informed that at least two Red divisions were moving in the area between the Patuxent River and Rock Creek, in the general direction of Olney ridge, and that there was a Red concentration at Laurel, and that all information indicated an attempt by the Reds to turn the right of the III Corps, hence there would be no immediate reinforcements or advance between the Patapsco and Patuxent Rivers.

(2) The force in front of the 30th Division appeared to grow stronger during the remainder of the day. The 20th Division felt out the enemy position and prepared to move into position during the night of June 24-25. Neither divi-

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sion had very definite locations of their front line troops. The Red air service was still further increased and became still more effective, but as yet had been able to operate only to a slight extent against the leading divisions. The cavalry situation to the south remained unchanged.

(3) No further information of importance was received by the Corps up to midnight June 24-25 except that there appeared to be unusual Red activity south of the Patuxent River.

The cavalry situation to the south remained unchanged.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.* — General D's decision.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Reasons in brief.

*c. Third Requirement.*—Formal field orders for June 24.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General D's Decision | 3 |
| Reasons in Brief | 4 |
| Formal Field Orders of June 24 | 5 |

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3. GENERAL D'S DECISION.—*a.* General D decides to attack early June 25, making main effort against the Reds advancing south of the Patuxent River.

*b.* Details of the plan are as follows:

(1) The 20th Division to continue the attack north of the Patuxent River.

(2) The 11th Division, now in reserve, and the 30th Division, already in line, to make the main effort south of the Patapsco River.

(3) Corps Artillery to be sent forward as follows: The 303d Field Artillery (155 how) attached to 11th Division; the 304th Field Artillery (155 guns), less one battalion, to the vicinity of Cooksville; 1st Battalion 304th Field Artillery to the vicinity of Etchison.

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(4) Orders for the attack to be issued on the afternoon of June 24.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a.* An attack by the 20th Division will develop the enemy's position astride the Baltimore Turnpike and hold the Reds in this position.

*b.* The Reds south of the Patuxent River are the more active and the more dangerous to the mission of the army. An attack made by two divisions will certainly check or defeat the Red movement more effectively than purely passive defensive measures. The attack will have to be made on the lines of a meeting engagement, as the situation is not very clear, and one division already holds the high ground at Laytonsville, while the other division is some distance to the rear.

*c.* The 11th Division has not made a difficult march, hence, by assisting the movement with the corps train, it should be able to get into position for attack early June 25. Considering the character of its operation, it would be well to attach to it the 303d Field Artillery (155 how), 3d Battalion, 903d Chemical Ammunition Train (less 4th Company) and Troop C, 903d Cavalry.

*d.* The remainder of the corps artillery is employed to assist the operations both north and south of the Patuxent. The 304th Field Artillery (less 1 battalion) is placed at Cooksville to support the 20th Division, while 1 battalion is placed in the vicinity of Etchison to support the 11th and 30th Divisions.

*e.* There is little need of moving any other corps troops at present, as they can do their work from the present locations, and further congestion of roads in the vicinity of the 11th Division is thus avoided. Movements to an area around Mount Airy can be made tomorrow, if conditions warrant, when the area will be free of division troops. However, the Forward Echelon of Corps Headquarters can move forward to Mount Airy. The divisions are free to establish advance or battle command posts if they see fit.

*f.* Although General D would like further information and more time he feels that very little additional information can be obtained before 9:00 or 10:00 AM, June 25. He

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should decide now as to his actions for tomorrow if he wishes to act against the Reds south of the Patuxent River on June 25. He can issue orders at once. His staff has field orders ready covering this general situation.

5. FORMAL FIELD ORDERS.

III Corps,
NEW MARKET,
24 June 21, 4:30 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 10. }

Maps: Geol Surv 1:62500. Operation map III Corps, to accompany FO No 10.

1. (a) Two Red divisions reported moving towards OLNEY south of the PATUXENT RIVER. No immediate reinforcement of Red line between PATUXENT RIVER and NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER is probable. (See G2 Report, omitted.)
   (b) Army advance continues. IV Corps has crossed PATAPSCO RIVER north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE. 30th Div has driven enemy from high ground at LAYTONSVILLE. 20th Div has reached line GARY—SYKESVILLE, connecting with 1st Cav Brig at SYKESVILLE. 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) covers our right on line of GREAT SENECA CREEK.
2. This corps attacks tomorrow.
3. (a) Corps AS: no change in mission.
   (b) 1st Cav Div: no change in mission.
   (c) (1) 30th Div will engage and hold the enemy east of the high ground at LAYTONSVILLE and later on its own initiative, it will attack in the direction of OLNEY in conjunction with the 11th Div on its left.
   (2) Zone of Action:
   North boundary: KINGS VALLEY (inclusive)—WOODFIELD (exclusive)—RJ 602, 1 mile north of LAYTONSVILLE (inclusive)—BROOKEVILLE (inclusive).
   Other boundaries No change.
   (d) (1) The 11th Div reinforced by 303d FA, 3d Bn 903d Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co), and Tr C, 903d Cav, will move to the vicinity of ETCHISON, and early on June 25, will attack in the direction of UNITY, in conjunction with the 30th Div on its right.

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(2) Zone of Action:
South boundary: KEMPTON (inclusive)—KINGSVALLEY (exclusive)—WOODFIELD (inclusive)—RJ 602. 1 mile north of LAYTONSVILLE (exclusive), BROOKEVILLE (exclusive).
North boundary: RIDGEVILLE—LONG CORNER—PATUXENT RIVER (all inclusive).
Rear boundary: 12:00 noon June 25; KINGSVALLEY (exclusive)—DAMASCUS—CLAGETTSVILLE (both inclusive).
(3) The division will maintain contact with the 30th and 20th Divs.
(4) The corps train (MT) will be available for this movement after 4:30 PM today.

(e) (1) The 20th Div, reinforced by the 903d Cav (less det): no change in mission.
(2) Zone of action:
Rear boundary: 12:00 noon June 25. FLORENCE—POPLAR SPRINGS (both inclusive).
Troop C, 903d Cav will report to 11th Div at ETCHISON at 6:00 PM today.

(f) *Artillery*: See Annex No 1.
(1) 1st Bn 304th FA (155 guns) will move at 8:00 PM via MONROVIA—RJ 607—RJ 567—KEMPTOWN, whence it will move under supervision of 11th Div to position in vicinity of ETCHISON. It will support the attack of the 30th and 11th Divs.
(2) The 304th FA (less det) will move at 8:00 PM via NEW MARKET—BALTIMORE TURNPIKE to position at COOKSVILLE. It will suport the attack of the 11th and the 20th Div. The movement beyond RIDGEVILLE will be under the supervision of the 20th Div. BALTIMORE TURNPIKE, between NEW MARKET and RIDGEVILLE (both inclusive), will be kept clear for this movement between 10:00 PM and 12:00 midnight.
(3) The 303d FA, following 1st Bn 304th FA, will report to 11th Div at KEMPTOWN.

(g) Other corps troops; no change in mission.
(x) Front lines will be marked out and special reports submitted by divisions as to the situations on their respective fronts as of 9:00 AM, 12:00 noon, 3:00 PM, and 6:00 PM.

4. (a) 3d Bn 903d Cml AM Tn (less 4th Co) following 304th FA will report to 11th Div at BARTHOLOWS.
(b) See Adm O No— (omitted).

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5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
30th Div: BALTIMORE TURNPIKE—CLAGETTSVILLE —DAMASCUS—CEDAR GROVE—BRINK — LAYTONSVILLE.
11th Div: BALTIMORE TURNPIKE—CLAGETTSVILLE —DAMASCUS—BOOTJACK—ETCHISON.

(b) Command Posts:
III Corps, Fwd Ech, MOUNT AIRY after 12:00 midnight, 24-25 June.
Rr Ech, NEW MARKET.
30th Div, BRINK, after 8:00 PM 24 June.
11th Div, BOOTJACK after 6:00 AM 25 June.

By command of Maj Gen D,
Y,
C of S.

Annex No 1: Artillery.
Distribution A
and
CG 2d Cav Brig.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*


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| The Mission | 6 |
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| Action Required to Meet Present Situation | 9 |
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| Missions of Various Units and Their Organization for the Attack | 14 |
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6. THE MISSION.—The mission of the III Corps as given in Field Orders No. 5, Third Army has not changed. It still has the two-fold mission of first, preventing the Reds south of the Patapsco River from reinforcing the Baltimore Reds, and second, of holding the Reds south and east of the general line, South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac River.

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7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PLAN OF ACTION. —*a.* The general principles governing the conduct of the III Corps in carrying out the above two-fold mission, which were discussed at length in Chapter V, still apply.

*b.* To prevent the Reds south of the Patapsco River from reinforcing the Baltimore Reds, the action of the III Corps should be aggressive. Its advance and attack should be made in such a manner that the Reds south of the Patapsco River will be promptly developed and will be led to believe that the advance and attack of the III Corps is the main issue of the Blue Army.

*c.* To hold the Reds south of the general line, South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge, the advance and attack of the III Corps should be made in such a direction that the III Corps may be interposed between the main Red forces south of the Patapsco River and the line to be defended. If forced to withdraw, it should be able to take up a flank position along the South Branch Patapsco to protect the right of the remainder of the Blue army and serve as a threat to prevent the Reds crossing Parrs Ridge in force.

8. THE SITUATION.—*a.* Up to 4:00 PM, June 24, Reds have been developed in force east of Laytonsville and in front of the 20th Division. The Reds in front of the 20th Division do not appear to be very strong but they are occupying an intrenched position.

*b.* The Reds in front of the 30th Division are becoming stronger and more aggressive and it seems that, by the morning of June 25, they may have at least two divisions in line on that front. All indications point to a Red attack on the 30th Division front in the near future. From Gaithersburg southwest, there seems to be Red cavalry only, which is, however, very aggressive.

*c.* North of the Patapsco River the main Blue forces are now developing the Red position.

9. ACTION REQUIRED TO MEET PRESENT SITUATION.— In the above situation the III Corps should act promptly to take the initiative in its own hands, forestalling a Red attack by an attack of its own, and leading the Reds to believe that the attack of the III Corps is the main issue of

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the Blue Army. If the III Corps delays to more thoroughly develop the Reds on its front, the Reds may take the intiative in their own hand and launch an attack and promptly develop the weakness of the III Corps.

10. DANGER IN THROWING IN LAST RESERVE DIVISION.—To accomplish the foregoing, the III Corps will have to employ its reserve division without delay. The III Corps realizes that there will be a certain amount of danger in employing the reserve division before the Red forces in its front are fully developed. It hopes to overcome this danger, in part, by the location and direction of the attack and by taking advantage of favorable terrain features for protection of flanks, and in part, by taking the initiative in its own hands, thereby upsetting any plans which the enemy may be contemplating and forcing him to follow the III Corps lead.

11. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PLAN OF ATTACK.—Important factors which should be considered in determining the front of attack and the location and direction of the main effort in the present problem are the following:

First and most important: A prompt and aggressive blow should be struck at the Red main forces on the III Corps front.

Second: the location and direction of the blow should be such that it will accomplish the best results, and such that, if continued, it may bring about decisive results thereby leading the enemy to believe that the III Corps attack will be the main issue of the Blue army.

Third: The remainder of the hostile forces on the III Corps front should be developed and held in place.

Fourth: The flanks of the corps should be protected.

Fifth: The disposition of forces resulting from the attack should be such that the III Corps may hold the enemy south and east of the line South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac.

12. PLAN OF ATTACK ADOPTED.—*a.* A main attack on the front Gaithersburg—Patuxent River, with main efforts along the Laytonsville—Olney ridge and along the Etchison—Unity—Brighton ridge, and with a secondary attack on

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the front, Patuxent River—Patapsco River, with main effort of secondary attack astride Frederick Turnpike, seems to best meet the above requirements.

*b.* The location and direction of the main attacks is such that the operation will strike the main Red forces at present on the III Corps front. If the Laytonsville—Olney ridge and the Etchison—Unity—Brighton ridge be carried, the enemy will be deprived of the important observation on that front, his control and fire power will be broken down to a greater or less extent, and his forces on the remainder of this front will be compelled to fall back. The location and direction of the main attack is such that, if continued, the operation may strike a decisive blow to the Red army. It would turn the Red intrenched position and separate the Baltimore Reds from the Washington Reds. It may, therefore, lead the Reds to believe that the III Corps attack will be the main attack of the Blue army.

*c.* The secondary attack will develop and hold the enemy on the remainder of the front and, if the III Corps is forced to withdraw, it will permit important ground to be held for withdrawing to a flank position along the South Branch Patapsco River.

*d.* The right flank will be protected by the Laytonsville ridge and Parrs Ridge, and the cavalry; the left flank by South Branch Patapsco River and the remainder of the Blue Army.

13. FRONT OF ATTACKS AND OF THE MAIN EFFORT.—The extent of the front of the attack and the extent of the front on which the main efforts are made deserves careful consideration. The situation demands a main attack on an eight-mile front and a secondary attack on a ten-mile front, or a total of eighteen miles, with only three divisions and the corps artillery for executing the attack (cavalry protects the right flank). It is apparent that very little progress can be made against strong hostile resistance if the effort be dispersed along the whole of the front. In the first place, two divisions, supported by part of the corps artillery, should be employed for the main attack. And in the main attack itself, the two divisions and corps artillery should

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concentrate their efforts along the Laytonsville—Olney ridge and along the Etchison—Unity—Brighton ridge, each of which is only one to two miles in width. If these two ridges be carried, the remainder of the Red forces on the front of the main attack will be compelled to fall back. Considering the fact that the attack is one made in a meeting engagement, the main attack has many chances of a temporary success, although it be made on an eight-mile front. The main effort of the secondary attack may be made to seize the high ground about Mountview or about Ivory or, preferably, both. Its main effort may therefore be limited to about two or three miles of its total front and at points where it will secure the most important results. It should be such that, if the enemy attacks in force on that front, the high ground about Cooksville may be held.

14. MISSION OF VARIOUS UNITS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION FOR THE ATTACK.—*a.* The mission to be assigned the various combat units of the corps, to carry out the maneuver of the corps as a whole, have been indicated in discussing the attack of the corps as a whole. The 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) should protect the right of the III Corps and develop the Reds on its front. The 30th and 11th Divisions supported by part of the corps artillery may be employed for the main attack. It would be well to attach to the 11th Division, the 303d Field Artillery (155 how), a battalion chemical ammunition train (less 4th company) and a troop of cavalry. The 20th Division, reinforced by the 903d Cavalry, and supported by part of the Corps artillery, may be employed for the secondary attack. The dispositions, zones of action, and location and direction of the main effort of each of these forces should be such that it will best carry out the corps maneuver as a whole.

*b.* The corps air service should carry out intensive reconnaissance to definitely locate the Red main forces on the III Corps front, to obtain early information of the movements of any Red reserves, especially against the III Corps right or left fronts or from south of the Patapsco River to reinforce the Baltimore Reds.

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15. SITUATION REPORTS.—The corps should obtain information as to the situation on its whole front at important periods. In the present problem it may order divisions to mark out the front line and submit special reports for the situation on their fronts as of 9:00 AM, 12:00 noon, 3:00 PM, and 6:00 PM. Divisions may have the line marked more frequently but the infantry should not be interfered with any more than necessary.

16. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS TO POSITIONS AND SUPPLY.—Plans for the details of the movements necessary for the attack should be prepared and arrangements for supply provided. In the present problem, the 11th Division may be assigned a zone of action for its advance to its position. The motor transport train may assist in the movement. Arrangements should be made for units attached to the 11th Division to join it. The movement of corps artillery to its positions should be provided for. Other corps troops may, for the present, remain in their present location and be moved forward later, if necessary, after the 11th Division is out of the way.

## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 17

17. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation in general for the whole front, and in detail for the III Corps front.

(1) Location, strength, composition, movements, intentions.

(2) On the III Corps front, will the enemy attack or defend; if he attacks, what will be the location and direction of his main effort? What will be the strength and composition of the forces employed in the main effort?

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*b.* The mission of the III Corps and the general character of action required to accomplish this mission in the present situation.

(1) The two-fold mission.

(2) A prompt and aggressive attack to forestall a Red attack.

(3) The danger involved in such an attack and means employed for overcoming it.

(4) A delay further to develop the Reds before attacking.

(5) A defensive action.

(6) A withdrawal.

*c.* The front of the attack and the location and direction of the main effort.

(1) Important factors to be considered.

(2) What should be the front of attack and what the location and direction of the main effort?

(3) Consider other plans than that adopted in the solution.

*d.* The details of the maneuver employed by the Corps as a whole in the solution adopted.

(1) Extent of front of the main attack and of the secondary attack.

(2) Necessity for concentrating effort on only a part or parts of the front.

(3) What should be the location and direction of its main effort or efforts? Reasons in brief.

(4) Consider other plans of maneuver than that given in the solution.

(5) What are the chances of success with efforts concentrated on parts of the front as given in the solution?

*e.* Missions to be assigned to each unit to carry out the plan of maneuver of the corps as a whole as adopted by the solution.

(1) Missions of divisions, cavalry, corps artillery, corps air service, other corps troops.

(2) Organization of units for attack.

(3) Zones of action and location and direction of main efforts.

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(4) Marking out front lines.

*f*. Details of movements required to carry out the attack as planned in the solution.

(1) Movement of 11th Division, routes, use of corps train to assist; time division will be prepared to take part in the attack; its condition.

(2) Movement of corps artillery.

(3) Arrangements for attached units to join 11th Division.

(4) Movement of other corps troops.

(5) Supply; railheads and routes thereto.

(6) Location of headquarters of corps and various units.

*g*. Field Orders for the Attack.

(1) Time of issue.

(2) Time its instructions will reach lower front line units.

(3) Form, clearness, brevity, completeness.

## *Maps*

G3 Situation Map, III Corps, 4:30 PM 24 June 21.
Operation Map, III Corps, to accompany FO No. 10.
} following this page.

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# CHAPTER VII

# *11th Division in the III Corps Meeting Engagement*


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## SECTION I

## *The Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Seventh Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. SEVENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* At 5:00 PM, June 24, General K, commanding the 11th Division, received a copy of Field Orders No. 10, III Corps (see preceding chapter) and pursuant thereto, ordered, by means of messages, the following movement of the 11th Division.

(1) Troop C, 903d Cavalry leaving Etchison at 6:00 PM to reconnoiter along the Etchison—Unity road.

(2) The 21st Brigade to a position near road junction 601 (1¾ miles southeast of Etchison) covering the Etchison—Unity road, the dismounted elements moving by truck, clearing Clagettsville by 7:20 PM.

(3) The 22d Brigade to a position, in massed formation, along the Bootjack—Etchison road, just north of Etchison, clearing the road.

(4) The 21st Field Artillery to a position in readiness just south and west of the road junction one-half mile south of Etchison.



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(5) The 22d Field Artillery to a position in readiness north of the Etchison—Unity road and just east of the crossroads ¼ mile east of Etchison.

(6) The 303d Field Artillery (155-mm. howitzers) to a position in readiness near road junction 636, east of Etchison.

(7) The 11th Tank Company to Etchison.

(8) The 11th Engineers to a position, in massed formation, along the road just north of Bootjack, clearing the road.

(9) The Ammunition Train, 11th Field Artillery Brigade, with 3d Battalion, 903d Chemical Ammunition Train and one section of the III Corps Ammunition Train attached, along the road just west of Bootjack.

(10) The 11th Observation Squadron to remain in its present position south of Ridgeville.

(11) The remaining troops, field trains, and service trains of the division, between Clagettsville and Damascus.

*b.* General K estimated that the movement of the combat elements as outlined above would be completed by 3:00 AM, June 25. The 1st Bn, 304th Field Artillery would be in position south of Etchison by midnight June 24-25.

*c.* The following messages were received during the evening of June 24, at the headquarters of the 11th Division, from the commanding officer, Troop C, 903d Cavalry:

From Unity, 7:30 PM.

"No enemy encountered."

From Unity, 8:15 PM.

"Hostile infantry patrols encountered east of SUNSHINE and driven back. Patrols report no enemy at TRIADELPHIA or south of road junction 497 (southwest of UNITY) to HAWLINGS RIVER. Continue reconnaissance toward BRIGHTON and BROOKEVILLE."

From Unity, 8:40 PM.

"Hostile patrols becoming numerous and aggressive. Believe hostile column is advancing on BRIGHTON—UNITY road. Will confirm."

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From Unity, 9:30 PM.

"Forced to withdraw to west. Red prisoner states that his division, the 24th, is following, but does not know its location or intentions. Am sending him to ETCHISON. My patrol to south of SUNSHINE has not returned; probably captured."

From road junction 533, 10:30 PM.

"Hostile advance seems to have ceased. Am unable to reconnoiter east of here. I remain at this point."

No further information was received from the cavalry up to 10:50 PM.

*d.* Examination of Red prisoner developed no further information of value other than that his division had been marching several nights, remaining concealed during the day.

*e.* It was learned from the headquarters of the 30th Division at Brink that the hostile position near Claysville extended about one mile to the northeast of that town; and that the 30th Division would be ready to attack at any hour after 4:30 AM, June 25; but that the actual time would be set to conform to that of the 11th Division.

*f.* The commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 304th Field Artillery, notified General K that the battalion would be available for any normal assignments requested in support of the 11th Division, the extreme range of the guns being about 17000 yards.

2. REQUIREMENTS:

*a. First Requirement.* General K's decision.

*b. Second Requirement.* Formal orders issued by General K on night of June 24-25.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

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| Decision | 3 |
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3. DECISION.—*a.* General K decides to attack at 5:30 AM, June 25, making the attack along the Etchison—Unity road in column of brigades, and keeping north of the Hawlings River.

*b.* To support the attack with all available artillery.

*c.* To attach the tank company to the leading brigade (21st).

*d.* To move the units into their positions for the attack at once.

*e.* To direct Troop C, 903d Cavalry to withdraw to the north and cover the left flank of the division.

*f.* To move the reserve brigade (the 22d) to covered positions near road junction 601 and along the north bank of the Hawlings River south of road junction 601 and direct them to cover the right of the 21st Brigade and maintain connection with the 30th Division.

4. FORMAL ORDERS.

11th Div,
RIDGEVILLE, MD.,
24 June 21, 11:50 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 6. }

Maps: Geol. Surv., 1:62500.

1. (a) The enemy occupies a position near CLAYSVILLE, extending about one mile northeast of that town. North of the PATUXENT RIVER, he is on general line GARY—ROVER—SYKESVILLE. Two Red divisions were reported today moving to northwest in the direction of OLNEY. A hostile column, strength unknown, was encountered tonight along the BRIGHTON—UNITY road and holds UNITY and to the west nearly as far as RJ 533.

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(b) The III Corps attacks tomorrow, with 30th, 11th, and 20th Divs from right to left. The 30th Div from near LAYTONSVILLE attacks in the direction of OLNEY. The 20th Div, reinforced by the 106th Cav, attacks north of the PATUXENT RIVER.

(c) The 1st Bn 304th FA, from a position near ETCHISON, supports the 30th and 11th Divs. It fires on TRIADELPHIA and inderdicts the stream crossings one-half mile south of RJ 497 (southwest of UNITY) and 378 (1 mile south of SUNSHINE). It undertakes counter battery missions should hostile artillery be located.

2. This division will attack along the ETCHISON—UNITY road, the 21st Brig leading.

Line of departure: unimproved road 1000 yards west of RJ 633—ravine to the south.

Time of attack: 5:30 AM.

Zone of action:

Northern boundary: PATUXENT RIVER (incl).

Southern boundary: RJ 602, 1 mile north of LAYTONSVILLE (incl)—BROOKEVILLE (excl.)

3. (a) The 21st Brig, with 11th Tk Co attached, will occupy line of departure at once. It will attack astride ETCHISON—UNITY road with regiments abreast, its right keeping north of HAWLINGS RIVER.

(b) (1) The 11th FA Brig will support the attack.

(2) The 21st FA will support the right regiment of the 21st Brig from positions southwest of RJ 601, moving to position via ETCHISON. After the capture of UNITY, one accompanying battery will be attached to the 21st Brig for the period of daylight, June 25, only.

(3) The 22d FA will support the left regiment of the 21st Brig from northwest of RJ 601.

(4) The 303d FA will support the 21st Brig from near RJ 636.

(5) Regiments will move to positions at once. There will be no firing prior to 4:30 AM. Fire support of attack will begin at 5:30 AM by neutralizing advance hostile positions, by harassing UNITY—BRIGHTON road to the limit of range, and by bombarding UNITY and SUNSHINE. All regiments will be advanced promptly, via ETCHISON—UNITY road. (See sub-paragraph g.)

(c) The 22d Brig, in reserve, following 21st FA, will move to protected positions as follows, and be pre-

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pared to march immediately on receipt of orders: one regiment near RJ 601, one regiment along the north bank of HAWLINGS RIVER south of RJ 601. The latter regiment will reconnoiter between right of the 21st Brig and southern boundary of division, and with one company of infantry and one section of machine guns, will maintain connection between the 21st Brig and the 30th Div.

(d) The 11th Tank Co is attached to 21st Brig.

(e) Troop C, 903d Cav, will withdraw to north at 4:15 AM and cover left of the division. It will maintain connection with 903d Cav north of PATUXENT RIVER.

(f) The 11th Div AS will determine at daybreak the strength and dispositions of the enemy, and will reconnoiter UNITY—BRIGHTON road, the SUNSHINE—TRIADELPHIA road, and roads south from RJ 497 and SUNSHINE. The landing field will be advanced to a location between BOOTJACK and ETCHISON. Front lines will be marked out at 9:00 AM, 12:00 noon, 3:00 PM, and 6:00 PM.

(g) One company 11th Engrs is attached until further orders to 11th FA Brig to assist in the advance.

4. See Adm O No 6.

5. (a) Ax Sig Com: Div and 21st Brig: ETCHISON—UNITY—BRIGHTON road.

(b) CPs:
Div: BOOTJACK at 4:00 AM.
21st and 22d Brigs: RJ 601.

K,
Maj Gen.

Distribution: (Omitted.)

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

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5. FACTORS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE DIVISION COMMANDER.—The attack of the 11th Division is a part of a

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concerted corps attack, yet the division commander must act on his own initiative in several important respects. Among these are the time of attack, the plan of maneuver, and the formation of the attack.

6. TIME OF ATTACK.—The part which the 11th Division has in the corps mission of holding the Reds south and east of the line Parrs Ridge—South Branch Patapsco River can be fulfilled best by a quick incisive blow. It is, therefore, preferable to attack early, even with incomplete information of the enemy, rather than to wait for a daylight reconnaissance, which would enable the enemy to develop his force and prepare to meet the attack with a portion thereof, while continuing the northward movement of the remainder.

7. PLAN OF MANEUVER.—The division zone of action is so wide that an attack over the entire front is out of the question. The enemy, so far as is known, is across the Unity—Brighton ridge, a prominent terrain feature favorable for maneuver. The main blow should be struck here. Moreover, from the corps viewpoint, a deep attack in the direction Unity—Brighton will not only have the effect of passing by the most difficult terrain feature (along the Hawlings River), but will envelop the right of any hostile position south of that river and east of Claysville and thus assist the attack of the 30th Division.

8. FORMATION FOR THE ATTACK.—*a.* A formation of brigades abreast would give a powerful and rapid attack if the enemy were in a strong position near Unity, since reserves could be placed in action promptly as needed. But that formation would not be so favorable if the attack goes to great depth. If the situation, as developed later, presents an opportunity to out-maneuver the enemy along the Etchison—Unity road, it would be advantageous to have a strong reserve made up of a single unit.

*b.* The interval between the 11th Division and the 30th Division is important. It is unnecessary to deploy in this interval, however, since the enemy is not known to be there at present. There is some likelihood of reserves be-

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ing needed in this locality and they should be so placed that they may be promptly employed if needed. For this reason it is preferable therefore, not to commit too much of the infantry to action along the Etchison—Unity road when it may be necessary to employ some of it elsewhere. For these reasons a formation with brigades in column is best suited to the situation.

*c.* The attacking brigade can best use about two battalions in line, initially, and the division commander might have prescribed this. The blow is given weight and carrying power by the support of all available artillery, and by the attachment of the tank company and an accompanying battery to the attacking brigade.

*d.* The situation affords a good opportunity for the employment of the cavalry attached to the division in a suitable role—reconnaissance, covering a flank, and liaison.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 9

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9. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The division intelligence estimate of the situation, particularly as to the plans open to the enemy and his probable intentions.

*b.* The advisability of delaying the attack until later, with a view to making a further reconnaissance.

*c.* Advantages of making the attack early and the time of arrival of the elements in their positions for the attack.

*d.* The direction of the attack. Advantages and disadvantages of the one chosen in the solution given above. Suggest an alternate direction.

*e.* Formation for the attack. Discuss the relative advantages of brigades abreast and brigades in column, other than as given above.

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*f*. Location of reserves and their possible employment, other than south of the Hawlings River.

*g*. Discuss the probability and method of employment of the reserve south of the Hawlings River.

*h*. How will the reserve brigade carry out the mission assigned of "maintaining connection between the 21st Brigade and the 30th Division?"

*i*. The employment of the tank company. How will it be used? Is the attachment of this company to the leading brigade the best method of handling it?

*j*. Employment of the artillery; character of missions to be undertaken by the 1st Battalion 304th FA (155-mm. guns); the 303d FA (155-mm. howitzers); the 21st and 22d Field Artillery regiments; action of the acompanying battery.

*k*. The employment of Troop C, 903d Cavalry; how will it carry out the missions assigned?

*l*. The 1st Observation Squadron; how will it carry out the missions assigned?

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# CHAPTER VIII

# *The Army Attacks*


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Maps following page 119.


## SECTION I

## *The Situation and Requirements*


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| Eighth Special Situation | 1 |
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1. EIGHTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The advance of the Third Army was carried out in accordance with the provisions of F.O. No. 5. However, owing to situations developed during the advance, the army stood at daylight June 25, as follows (see Situation Map, Third Army, 5:00 AM, 25 June 21):

(1) *III Corps.*—During June 23 and 24, the III Corps succeeded in driving in the Red cavalry and uncovering Reds holding groups of intrenchments on the general line Henryton—Mountview—south of Ivory—Brighton. On the foregoing days reliable reports indicated the movement of at least two Red divisions from near Washington, towards the general line Gaithersburg—Brighton, and a concentration of Red troops about Laurel. The III Corps, while holding the front between the Patapsco and Patuxent River on the general line Sykesville—Triadelphia with the 20th Division and corps cavalry, is, on the morning of June 25, advancing southeast with the 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Cav-



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alry Brigade), and the 30th, and 11th Divisions, to engage the Reds advancing from the direction of Washington. It is expected that an engagement between these forces will take place in the early afternoon of the 25th on the general line Triadelphia—Gaithersburg.

(2) 1st Cavalry Brigade (reinforced) and IV Corps were forced to engage considerable numbers during the whole of the 24th, especially in crossing the North Branch Patapsco River. However, this was accomplished north of the Liberty Turnpike. By daylight, June 25, these troops stood as follows:

(a) 1st Cavalry Brigade (reinforced by IV Corps Cavalry) holding the front Oakland—Haight—Gorsuch and west along South Branch Patapsco River.

(b) IV Corps: 2d Division—One-half of the division is holding the high ground on the general line Oakland—SW of 633—566—to Westminster Turnpike SE of Glen Falls, the other half is in reserve west of North Branch Patapsco along Gamber Turnpike.

22d Division: The advance guard (one-fourth of the division) is holding the high ground on the general line, east of Glen Falls Station and north of Slade Run. Rest of the division concentrated between Lawndale and Woodensburg.

Corps headquarters and troops (less cavalry) and Groupment B, Army Artillery as stated in March Table, F.O. No. 5.

(3) *II Corps.*—(a) Except for the 3d Division, the II Corps encountered few Reds. The 1st Division was moved entirely at night; the corps cavalry in its front covering its movements. The advance guard of the 3d Division, working in conjunction with that of the 22d Division, had a lively engagement on the 24th east of Woodensburg, eventually driving in the Red advance troops. By daylight, June 25, the corps stood as follows:

(b) 3d Division Advance Guard (one-fourth of the division) is holding the high ground north of Slade Run. Rest of division near Fairview.

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1st Division: Concealed between Mantua and Haletown. Corps cavalry is holding high ground north of Deadman Run in contact with superior Reds.

Corps headquarters and troops (less cavalry) and Groupment A, Army Artillery as stated in March Table. F.O. No. 5.

(4) *I Corps.*—The I Corps is concentrated by daylight, June 25, as directed in F.O. No. 5. Army tanks are on trains awaiting orders at New Freedom.

(5) *2d Cavalry Division (reinforced).*—The 2d Cavalry Division, moving east on the 23d, encountered Red cavalry which retired east to Gunpowder Falls and then southeast. Red cavalry persistently refused to accept a decisive battle. Upon clearing the front of the II Corps, the 2d Cavalry Division, utilizing the corps cavalry (I and II) to cover the front of the II and I Corps, concentrated in the vicinity of Jacksonville. The corps cavalry eventually gained the high ground south of Western Run, but was unable to advance south of Western Run Turnpike. However, a few dismounted patrols succeeded in reaching Falls Road (at the head of Beaverdam Run), and Texas, reporting encounters with Red patrols. The patrols of the 2d Cavalry Division, reconnoitering the crossings of Gunpowder Falls, from Warren to Chesapeake Bay, encountered hostile fire at all crossings. Observing patrols to the east saw no signs of Reds.

(6) All other army troops reached the destinations given in F.O. No. 5.

*b.* By 7:45 AM, 25 June 21, the Commander, Third Army, through reports from Corps Commanders, the Air Service, and the Commander, 2d Cavalry Division, has the following information in addition to that given heretofore:

(1) The leading units of the IV and II Corps and the 2d Cavalry Division (reinforced) renewed the advance at daylight but encountered serious resistance and were making no progress.

(2) During the 24th, the air service observed detachments of Red cavalry in the area Lutherville—Towson, a concentration of dismounted troops about Lake Roland, and

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continuous movements of troops on roads northwest of Baltimore. The Red air service seems to have concentrated in the area along, and south of the South Branch Patapsco River, and has prevented Blue aerial observation in that vicinity, or towards Washington and Annapolis, since daylight June 25th.

(3) Late in evening of June 24th, reports of the presence of Red naval and transport ships in Delaware Bay reached Third Army from GHQ.

(4) In the immediate front of the IV and II Corps the Red situation appears as follows. The intrenchments previously mentioned seem to have been made continuous in both positions; strong points have been discovered at the following points in advance of the general line: Tyler, east of 633, north of 682, about 623 and 629, spur north of Emery Grove, ridge east of 397 south of Delaware Run, on the spur south of Big Spring—Oregon Road.

(5) To the east of Oregon, only a few intrenchments were discovered, such as scattered and freshly made trenches on the ridge of Wolftrap Br., and the spurs north of Merryman Branch.

(6) Groups of Red artillery (calibers equivalent to division and corps artillery) were located in the vicinity of Wards Chapel, Delight, and Belltown, and east of Gwynnbrook.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.* — Decision of Commander, Third Army.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Any field orders issued by Third Army Headquarters prior to 3:00 PM, 25 June, 1921.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

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| Decision | 3 |
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3. DECISION.—*a.* The army will attack, striking its decisive blow against Red right during the forenoon of

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June 26th. The decisive attack will be based on carrying Chestnut Ridge; and the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, thereby outflanking the Red defenses to the west, and commanding the approaches to Baltimore. The decisive blow will be made by the II and I Corps, supported by the 2d Cavalry Division.

*b.* In the meantime, while the III Corps continues its operations south of South Branch Patapsco River, the IV Corps and right of the II Corps will clear the Reds out of the area about Reisterstown, and gain a footing on the southern slopes of Worthington Valley. These attacks should not only gain suitable ground for the main attack on the 26th, but assist in wearing down the Reds and draw their forces to the Reisterstown part of the front.

4. FIELD ORDERS.—*a. Messages.*

Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
25 June 21, 8:00 AM.

To Commanders III, IV, II and I Corps,
1st Cavalry Brigade.
2d Cavalry Division.
Copies to Army Staff.

Army attacks, enveloping Red right, located on CHESTNUT RIDGE. Detailed orders issue at 11:00 AM today. In meantime, the following preliminary operations will be energetically carried out today: III Corps continue as planned; 1st Cavalry Brigade secure 645 ridge northeast of HENRYTON; IV Corps and right of II Corps clear area of REISTERSTOWN by advancing to general line NORRIS BRANCH—ST. GEORGE and road junction 442—BIG SPRING road, within respective zones; IV and II Corps attack at 4:00 PM, and will be supported by army artillery and attack aviation from 4:00 PM.

Left of II Corps, I Corps, and 2d Cavalry Division, will prepare to join attack at daylight tomorrow. I Corps, with I and II Corps cavalry attached, will attack tomorrow west of GUNPOWDER FALLS. Army tanks now at disposal I Corps, detrain at PARKTON. Special precautions must be taken by left of II Corps and I Corps to conceal movements. See later orders. Acknowledge.

X,
Chief of Staff.

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*b. Instructions to Army Artillery and Air Service Commanders.*—In addition to those contained in foregoing message, special instructions were given which included:

(1) "The army artillery will be in position by 4:00 PM and will support attack as follows:

(a) "Groupment A, from positions south of Berean, supports the II Corps.

(b) "Groupment B, from positions near Pleasant Grove, supports the IV Corps.

(c) "Both groupments will be prepared to move by 8:00 PM to new positions. The employment of army artillery this date will be subordinated to missions for tomorrow's attack. Movements into position designated above under control of respective corps.

(2) "The army bombardment and attack groups will support the attack this afternoon as follows:

(a) "From 3:15 PM to 5:15 PM. The bombardment group will bomb hostile artillery in area of Liberty Turnpike—The Caves.

(b) "At 4:00 PM the attack group will attack Red ground troops in vicinity of Reisterstown. Attack to be made under direction of IV Corps.

(c) "Hostile air reconnaissance of area of I and II Corps will be prevented at all cost."

*c. Formal Field Orders.*—(1)

**Third Army,**
**WESTMINSTER,**
**25 June 21, 11:00 AM.**

FIELD ORDERS)
No 7. )

**Maps: Geol Surv 1:62500. Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 7, 25 June 21.**

1. (a) South of PATAPSCO RIVER, the Reds while holding general line HENRYTON—MOUNTVIEW—BRIGHTON, are advancing in some force northwest, between the PATUXENT and PATOMAC RIVERS. A Red concentration reported near LAUREL. North of PATAPSCO RIVER, Reds have strengthened their positions (See FO No 5) and hold points in advance thereof on the general line, TYLER—633—north of

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682—about 623 and 629—spur north of EMERY GROVE—ridge east of 397—south of DELAWARE RUN—spurs south of BIG SPRING—OREGON road. Some intrenchments have been discovered on high ground near WOLFTRAP BR., and north of MERRYMAN BRANCH. Hostile artillery groups observed in areas of WARDS CHAPEL, DELIGHT and BELLTOWN, and east of GWYNNBROOK. During the 24th the following Reds were observed: cavalry detachments about LUTHERVILLE and TOWSON; a concentration of dismounted troops about LAKE ROLAND; continuous movements of Reds northwest of BALTIMORE. (See G2 Report.)

(b) Our III Corps, with its left near SYKESVILLE, is covering between PATAPSCO and PATUXENT RIVERS and attacks today Red advance south of PATUXENT RIVER. North of PATAPSCO RIVER, we have defeated Reds in several local engagements and crossed the NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO. The 2d Cav Div, while covering front of I Corps, is in contact with Reds on GUNPOWDER FALLS.

(See Situation Map attached.)

2. (a) The army will attack enveloping Red right. The II and IV Corps will secure today the high ground east and west of REISTERSTOWN. A general attack on front east of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO will be launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow. (See Operation Map attached.)

(b) Zones of Action:

(1) III and IV Corps and 1st Cav Brig, no change.

(2) II and I Corps change at 11:00 PM this date to:

II Corps:

West boundary, no change;

East boundary, from BEREAN to include RJ 483—CRONHARDT—STEVENSON—ARLINGTON.

I Corps:

West boundary, same as II Corps;

East boundary, west of GUNPOWDER FALLS and DULANEY VALLEY and SWEETAIR TURNPIKE.

3. (a) III Corps will continue its operations south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER. Red strength between PATAPSCO and PATUXENT RIVERS will be developed without delay and contained.

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(b) 1st Cav Brig (reinforced), while securing 645 ridge northeast of HENRYTON, will maintain close contact with III and IV Corps, and prevent any Red advance between these corps.

(c) IV Corps, securing this date the general line: NORRIS BRANCH—ST GEORGES—ridge west of RJ 442, will advance tomorrow to line RANDALLSTOWN—SUDBROOK PARK. It will drive hard with its left and secure the high ground on both banks of GWYNNS FALLS.

(d) II Corps, securing this date, the general line: ridge 1000 yds south of RJ 486 and RJ 442—BIG SPRING road, will advance tomorrow south of the line SUDBROOK PARK—ARLINGTON (exclusive). While assisting the left of the IV Corps, its main effort will be directed so as to carry, in conjunction with I Corps, and in quick succession, CHESTNUT RIDGE, the ridge south of the THE CAVES, and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

(e) I Corps, reinforced by the cavalry of the I and II Corps, and army tanks, will envelop hostile right and drive the enemy southwest of BALTIMORE. While carrying CHESTNUT RIDGE in conjunction with II Corps, and ridge of WOLFTRAP BR., it will turn the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by a rapid advance in the general direction LUTHERVILLE—ARLINGTON.

(f) 2d Cav Div, while observing to the south and east, will cross GUNPOWDER FALLS, between WARREN and SUMMERFIELD, prior to 6:00 AM tomorrow. It will facilitate the advance of I Corps, first, by taking in flank and rear the high ground overlooking YORK TURNPIKE, and later, by preventing any Red advance east of TOWSON.

(g) 4th Div (army reserve) will move tonight to a concealed position near TAYLORSVILLE. It will be in readiness for immediate movement after 9:00 AM tomorrow. It will gain contact with IV and III Corps and 1st Cav Brig.

(h) The army artillery will support the general attack:

(1) Gp A, moving tonight to positions south of BUTLER, supports I Corps.

(2) Gp B, moving tonight to positions southwest of DOVER, supports IV and II Corps.

(3) Movements and assignments of position will be made by the Corps commanders in whose area the army artillery groupments are located.

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(4) From 4:30 AM, army artillery will concentrate its fire in support of left of II and right of I Corps. Persistent gas will not be employed. (See artillery annex.)

(i) The Army Air Service will carry out the following missions:

Bombardment group will bomb hostile artillery and prevent Red troop movements on roads north of BALTIMORE.

Attack group, at 5:30 AM, will attack Red ground troops on CHESTNUT RIDGE, and later, in conjunction with infantry advance, Reds south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

Observation group, will determine hostile movements north of BALTIMORE, and in area south of PATAPSCO RIVER, and locate front line II and I Corps at 11:00 AM.

Pursuit group, will prevent Red air reconnaissance of II and I Corps areas prior to attack. (See air service annex.)

x. (1) It is essential that the deployment of the I Corps, and of the left of the II Corps, be concealed in every way possible.

(2) I and II Corps cavalry pass to I Corps at 6:00 PM this date.

(3) Army artillery commander will personally coordinate employment of artillery supporting I and II Corps.

(4) The I and II Corps will exert every effort to carry rapidly CHESTNUT RIDGE, ridge south of THE CAVES, and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

4. See Adm O No 8. (Omitted.)

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

Army (1) WESTMINSTER—REISTERSTOWN—REISTERSTOWN TURNPIKE.

(2) WESTMINSTER—TAYLORSVILLE—MOUNT AIRY.

III Corps: as designated by Corps.

1st Cav Brig: LIBERTY TURNPIKE to NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO.

IV Corps: same as (1) for army.

II Corps: HAMPSTEAD—ARCADIA—PLEASANT GROVE—DOVER—CHATTOLANEE.

I Corps: RAYVILLE — WEISBURG — YORK TURNPIKE.

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2d Cav Div: JACKSONVILLE—JARRETTSVILLE TURNPIKE—DULANEY and SWEETAIR TURNPIKE.

(b) Command Posts:

Army, III Corps, 1st Cav Brig, IV Corps and Cav Div, no change.

II Corps—ARCADIA } Effective at 11:00 PM,
I Corps—VERONA } 25 June 21.

By command of General A:

X
Chief of Staff.

Distribution: A.

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SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*


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| Defects of the Parallel Battle | 10 |
| Essential Steps in Decisive Form of Battle | 11 |
| Principles of Maneuver Battle Applied to Present Problem | 12 |


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5. AN ATTACK FROM THE ARMY VIEWPOINT.—*a.* The present problem relates to an army in an attack. Prior to discussing the problem, it seems well to consider briefly an attack from the army viewpoint. In the offensive, from an army viewpoint in contrast to that of a division, there are salient differences which need consideration. The theory of the offensive, its form, and its objective, remains the same, irrespective of the size of the force. It is in the method of execution, in the means of securing decisive results, and in the application of the principle of economy of forces, that we find the difference.

*b.* In considering the offensives of smaller units, whether acting independently or as a part of a larger force, it is found that the basis of their attacks is a mission associated with a higher commander's plan or scheme of things.

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The small units are, each, one of the many tools utilized in the whole machine. While they seek to defeat the enemy, to inflict losses on him, etc., the object back of all their fighting is generally to capture positions, terrain features, hold the enemy in their front, etc., all of which go to insure the success of the army commander's plan. As an example, take an advance guard action—made to insure the success of the operation of the main body, or take a division in an attack as a part of a corps—the mission of both is to gain, successively, position after position. While such actions contribute to the army commander's end in view by causing losses, disorganization, etc., the viewpoint of the lower commander must necessarily be different as to the direction of the fight.

*c.* From the army viewpoint, the end sought is destruction of enemy's forces in contrast to gaining a position or piece of terrain, and all efforts are directed and exerted with this in view. While the capture of a hostile position, an envelopment of a hostile flank, or a penetration, are essential steps or actions in the conduct of a fight, such factors are not the ultimate objects, or the sole means of gaining the end sought, which is the destruction of the enemy. In the decisive battle between armies the end sought is a conclusion which will find the hostile army destroyed. The capture of positions, etc., is of secondary importance. All plans, all fighting, the utilization of all forces and all arms, etc., are directed with the foregoing in mind. A battle fought with any other motive in mind is not a decisive battle and should only be undertaken for special reasons.

*d.* In the layman's mind, and possibly in the minds of too many military officers, a battle is pictured as the methodical and successive use of the different arms of the service. They visualize a decisive battle as a moving picture play in which the leading characters are the different arms, infantry, artillery, cavalry, air service, etc. They like to represent the cavalry and air service in the prologue which unfolds the scene of battle and the leading characters; then the artillery, by its terrific bombardments, breaking down

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the walls which surround and conceal the characters and plot of the play; after which the infantry, with its tanks and other arms, advances, disentangles the plot, and catches and hangs the villain. The decisive battle is far from such a conception. Although each arm of service plays its tactical role in producing the end sought, this role is carried out as a part of the work of tactical teams, that is, divisions and corps. Rather than resulting from the distinct action of the arms of the service, the decisive battle is produced by the combined efforts of several corps and a number of divisions.

*e.* Another false view results from a lack of broad conception of a decisive battle. This springs from a spirit of independence as well as from self-centered interest. Subordinate units sometimes have not the conception of a common goal for the whole army towards which all must drive with one object in mind, that is, a decision which means victory. The subordinate is apt to limit his consideration to his own limited sphere of action, he is apt to complain if he is successful and the adjacent units do not keep up with him. In fact, instead of taking advantage of the tactical opportunity of his advanced position to continue driving for the common goal, he will halt and wait for adjacent units to come up. The subordinate often fails to realize that a decision in battle results from the combined efforts of all units. While some units succeed and others fail, success comes when all drive as a team for a common goal, a decision.

6. HOSTILE FORCES DESTROYED BY BATTLE AND PURSUIT.—How is the destruction of the enemy's forces secured in the decisive battle?

*First,* by the battle itself, in which the attacker overthrows the enemy by disorganizing his command, tactical team, discipline, and cohesion.

*Second,* by the pursuit, during which the victor, utilizing his moral superiority, completes the enemy's destruction.

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7. ENEMY OVERTHROWN IN BATTLE BY TACTICS AND MANEUVER.—*a.* How is the enemy overthrown, disorganized, etc., in battle?

*b.* Some view the decisive battle as comprising solely a large number of individual, or local fights, between opposing companies or battalions. While such engagements are essential, and go to make up the battle, they, by themselves or considered as a whole, do not produce decisive results. While these local fights are the essence of battle, the enemy's disorganization is produced by a well arranged combination of forces which inspires coordinated blows in a decisive direction.

*c.* Napoleon stated "Two Mamelukes could hold their own against three Frenchmen; but 100 Frenchmen did not fear 100 Mamelukes; 300 would beat an equal number; and 1000 would beat 1500, so great was the influence of tactics, order and maneuvers."

*d.* While individual valor is a great asset, this factor alone is not sufficient to produce victory. As the size of the force grows, valor loses its influence, tactics and maneuver become more and more important. Therefore, from the army viewpoint, the overthrow and disorganization of the enemy is produced by tactics and maneuver, which combine in decisive blows all arms, and by superior strength, that is, a proper combination of forces.

8. BATTLES ARE WON BY MORAL RATHER THAN PHYSICAL EFFECT.—*a.* The combination of forces should be conceived with what object in view?

*b.* Should the object be primarily to inflict losses on the enemy or are other effects to be sought? If the results are to be produced primarily by losses, then the secret is to oppose the enemy with better guns, better rifles, or more guns and more rifles. In other words, is his overthrow and destruction to be sought and brought about, primarily by superiority in mechanical devices? This is not thought to be correct. Battles are not won primarily by physical effects, i.e., by losses. The psychology of the battlefield is more important. The moral effect of the attack has the greatest weight.

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*c.* "One hundred thousand men suffer ten thousand casualties and confess themselves beaten; they retreat before the victors who have lost as many men, if not more. Moreover, neither one side nor the other knows, when retiring, either what numbers they have lost themselves or what the casualties have been on the opposite side." (General Cardot.)

*d.* It is not, therefore, the physical fact of having sustained losses, still less a comparison between losses, which makes the enemy yield and withdraw, give up fighting, and abandon disputed ground the conquest of which marks the beginning of victory.

*e.* "Ninety thousand vanquished men withdraw before ninety thousand victors merely because they have had enough of it, and they have had enough of it because they no longer believe in victory, because they are demoralized, because their moral resistance is exhausted;" (merely moral, for the physical situation is the same on both sides), (General Cardot). It was with this in his mind that Joseph de Maistre wrote: "A battle lost is a battle one thinks one has lost," for, he added, "a battle cannot be lost physically." Therefore, it can only be lost morally. But then, it is also morally that a battle is won, and we may extend the aphorism by saying: "A battle won is a battle in which one will not confess oneself beaten."

*f.* Consequently, the aim in the decisive battle is to break the enemy's spirit, destroy his moral power, i.e., "destroy his hope in victory." All combination, all efforts, all fighting must be aimed at this goal. Here then we find the main difference in the viewpoint of the army and the lower units.

9. ENEMY'S SPIRIT BROKEN BY MORAL SUPERIORITY AND SURPRISE.—*a.* From the tactical viewpoint, what are the main factors utilized to destroy the enemy's spirit?

*b.* (1) *First,* the inculcation in the troops of a spirit of moral ascendency, i.e., a "will to conquer." Here, psychology comes into play and is the commander's means of instilling his force with such a moral superiority that fighting will only end with victory.

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(2) *Second,* the power of surprise.

*c.* "Whatever a thing may be, be it pleasant or terrible, the less it is foreseen, the more it pleases or frightens. This is seen nowhere better than in war, where surprise strikes with terror even those who are much the stronger party."

*d.* Surprise is the prime factor in breaking the enemy's spirit and will much more so than losses. Surprise is secured in decisive battles.

(1) Not by ambush, attacking the enemy in rear as in small wars.

(2) Rather the surprise consists in striking such an unexpected, supremely violent, blow that the enemy through lack of time or immediately available forces, cannot parry it.

(3) Surprise amounts to crushing the enemy from a short distance by numbers employed within a limit of time. Otherwise, he can meet it.

(4) In other words, numbers (including volume of fire), time and space, or maneuvering, are the elements of surprise.

*e.* (1) "To beat an adversary it is not necessary to sever his arms, his legs, and his head, pierce his chest and burst open his belly all at once. One sword thrust to his heart or one stunning blow on his head insures the result." (General Cardot.)

(2) The object is to destroy the enemy's discipline, organization, control, his chain of command, and to transform his tactical units into masses and mobs, thereby destroying tactical teamplay and command.

(3) Success comes when the enemy's command system is severed, sometimes even at one point. Therefore, apply the surprise power in a supreme stroke directed at a vital point in the enemy's system. The decisive battle is based on "intentional, resolute, sudden, and violent action of the masses on a selected point." This is produced by a maneuver of the masses and of their fire power resulting in a supreme effort, a decisive attack which achieves surprise.

(4) In other words, the plan for a decisive battle should be to shatter the enemy's hopes for victory. This

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is accomplished by destroying his moral power, his courage, and his confidence in himself and results from a breaking up of his discipline, his means of command, tactical control, cohesion, teamplay, that is, disorganizing him so that his will is subordinated. The means of bringing about such a state of affairs is a surprise blow, insured by a combination of fire and shock action, driven in a decisive direction.

10. DEFECTS OF THE PARALLEL BATTLE.—*a.* Opposed to this so-called Maneuver Battle, which is based on a supreme effort, that is, a decisive attack which achieves surprise, is the so-called Parallel Battle or Battle of Lines. In this latter case the plan is based on engaging the enemy on the whole front, and when favorable circumstances arise, applying reserves under the direction of the supreme commander. In other words, the maneuver is dependent on developments during the fight. The defects of the Parallel Battle method may be summarized as:

(1) Decisive action must await developments of the fight which are dependent on the initiative of subordinates.

(2) Success rests on the results attained by individual, group, and local combats, instead of on an initial combination of forces for a decisive blow.

(3) Such a battle is based on a constant wear and tear, secured by employing troops everywhere, and successively, until some particular unit is locally successful. It means an engagement of the enemy everywhere and a constant reinforcement of the whole line to maintain the fight. Reserves become reservoirs for feeding the fighting line. The decision seldom affects more than a portion of the forces engaged and results from a sum (or excess) of local successes which the supreme commander is seldom able to influence. It is a battle of attrition in contrast to one based on a decisive blow aimed at demoralization of the enemy.

(4) The Parallel Battle is of an inferior type when compared with the Maneuver Battle. The former is only avoided when initial battle plans provide the means for, and utilize, the decisive attack as the basis of the engage-

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ment. The forces should be combined and fought with such a plan as a guide.

11. ESSENTIAL STEPS IN DECISIVE FORM OF BATTLE.—*a.* The essential steps in the decisive form of battle may be summarized as:

(1) Reconnaissance to locate the enemy, and to gain information upon which to direct the attack.

(2) Holding attacks to protect the decisive attack by locating, immobilizing, and paralyzing the enemy, absorbing his activity, and preventing his maneuvering.

(3) The decisive attack.

(4) The pursuit.

*b.* The utilization, combination, and distribution of the forces should be based on the foregoing. It should be kept in mind that, while economy of forces should be practiced to insure sufficient strength for the decisive attack, more troops and more time will be involved in the reconnaissance and holding attacks. The true decisive attack will generally have fewer troops and be of a shorter duration.

12. PRINCIPLES OF MANEUVER BATTLE APPLIED TO PRESENT PROBLEM.—In the solution given the endeavor has been to apply the principles of the Maneuver Battle. While attracting and engaging the enemy with the III Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, and immobilizing him with the IV Corps and a part of the II Corps, the I Corps, 2d Cavalry Division, and II Corps, are expected to make the decisive blow. The decisive blow has been prepared with precautions to insure surprise, and is so directed as to strike the vitals of the Red forces north of the Patapsco River. Once the high ground south of Green Spring Valley is in Blue possession, Red tactical organizations, chain of command and supply, and lines of retreat, should be so shattered that demoralization sufficient for decisive victory results.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 13

13. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* An estimate of the situation from the Third Army viewpoint and the preparation of a different solution from that given herein.

*b.* An estimate of the Red situation including an analytical study of the Red defenses, the terrain in relation thereto and Red's probable line of action. Include conclusions as to Red's weak and strong areas and effect of Blue attacks against the same.

*c.* Study the general conception of the army attack as ordered. Point out the advantages and disadvantages, give the underlying principles which prompt the plan adopted. Study results from viewpoints of success and failure.

*d.* From the army viewpoint study the advantages of the preliminary attack ordered for afternoon of June 25. Compare advantages with plan to hold everything for one general attack on morning of June 26.

*e.* Study the handling of the IV Corps in the preliminary and main attacks.

*f.* Study the employment of the air service during the preliminary and main attacks.

*g.* Study the mission and method of accomplishment of mission assigned to the 2d Cavalry Division.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, Third Army, 25 June 21.
Operations Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 7, 25 June 21.
} Following this page.

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# CHAPTER IX

# *The Army Artillery in the Attack*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Section I—The Situation and Requirements | 1- 2 |
| Section II—A Solution | 3 |
| Section III—Discussion of Principles | 4- 6 |
| Section IV—Topics Suggested for Study | 7 |

Maps following page 128.


## SECTION I

## *The Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Ninth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. NINTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—The army artillery advanced, pursuant to Field Orders No. 5, Third Army, June 22; Groupment A to Greenmount and Groupment B to Reese. On the morning of June 25, army artillery headquarters received the message from the army, at 8:00 AM, in regard to the preliminary operations and the general attack (Chapter VIII), and had obtained advance information as to the provisions of Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, issued at 11:00 AM.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—The field orders as actually issued on June 25, by Major General E, Army Chief of Artillery, commanding the army artillery.

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*


| | Paragraph |
|---|---|
| Field Orders | 3 |




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3. FIELD ORDERS.

Third Army Artillery,
WESTMINSTER,
25 June 21, 8:30 AM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 4. }

**Maps: Geol Surv 1:62500.**

1. (a) The Reds hold points on general line TYLER—633—about 623 and 629—spur north of EMORY GROVE—ridge east of 397—spurs north of BIG SPRING—OREGON road, and in prolongation of this line to the east and south. Hostile intrenchments have been located on general line HOLBROOK—REISTERSTOWN—ridge east of GLYNDON and also on general line HARRISONVILLE—BELLTOWN—THE CAVES.

   (b) Our army attacks tomorrow morning, enveloping the Red right located on CHESTNUT RIDGE. Detailed orders issue today. As a preliminary operation, the IV Corps to the west, and the right of the II Corps to the east attack at 4:00 PM today, to clear the area of REISTERSTOWN by advancing to general line NORRIS BRANCH—ST GEORGE and road junction 442—BIG SPRING road. Boundary between corps: RJ 709 (northeast of GWYNNBROOK)—RJ 486 (east of GLYNDON)—EMORY CHURCH (all to II Corps).

2. Army artillery will support today's attack of IV and II Corps.

3. (a) Groupment A will support II Corps, moving to positions via BLACK ROCK ROAD, as follows: Howitzer regiment along FALLS ROAD south of BEREAN; gun regiments along the 656—BEREAN road.

   (b) Groupment B will support IV Corps, moving via CARROLLTON and RIDGE ROAD to positions along DOVER ROAD as follows: one howitzer regiment in and about PLEASANT GROVE, one howitzer regiment to south and gun regiment to north of that town.

   (x) (1) Movement to positions at once, under control of II Corps.

   (2) Primary fire missions will be in zone of corps supported selected in consultation with respective corps commanders. In addition, each group will be prepared to deliver fire in the zone of corps other than one supported when ordered from these headquarters.

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(3) Open fire with artillery of corps supported.
(4) Groupments will be prepared to advance at 8:00 PM to positions to be ordered later. Regulate fire missions accordingly.

4. See Adm O No 5.

5. (a) Signal Communication: through headquarters of corps supported and corps lines.
(b) Command Posts: II Corps and Groupment A: HAMPSTEAD,
IV Corps and Groupment B: SANDYVILLE.

Annex No 1 Artillery.
Distribution A.

E,
Major General.

ANNEX NO 1 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 7, THIRD ARMY.

ARTILLERY

Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
25 June 21, 11:00 AM

Maps: Geol Surv 1:62500.

1. (a) Enemy situation as in Field Order No 4. Some intrenchments have been discovered on high ground near WOLFTRAP BR and north of MERRYMAN BRANCH. See G2 Report and Artillery Information Service Bulletin (omitted).
(b) (1) Our army attacks at 5:00 AM tomorrow, on front east of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER, enveloping Red right, with IV, II and I Corps from right to left.
(2) Boundaries: Between IV and II Corps: EMORY CHURCH—RJ 486—RJ 709—CHATTOLANEE (all to II Corps). Between II and I Corps: BEREAN—RJ 482 (south of BUTLER)—CRONHARDT—STEVENSON—ARLINGTON (all to II Corps except BEREAN to I Corps).
(3) Corps Missions:
IV Corps: securing today, general line: NORRIS BRANCH—ST GEORGE—ridge west of RJ 442, to advance tomorrow to line RANDALLSTOWN—SUDBROOK PARK.
II Corps: securing today, general line: ridge west of RJ 442 and RJ 442—BIG SPRING road,

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to advance tomorrow south of line SUDBROOK PARK—ARLINGTON (exclusive). Its main effort to be directed so as to carry, in conjunction with I Corps and in quick succession, CHESTNUT RIDGE, ridge south of THE CAVES, and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

I Corps: to envelop hostile right and drive enemy southwest of BALTIMORE. While carrying CHESTNUT RIDGE in conjunction with II Corps and ridge of WOLFTRAP BR, it will turn ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by a rapid advance in general direction of LUTHERVILLE—ARLINGTON.

2. The general attack will be supported by all artillery with corps, and by army artillery.

3. (a) For I and IV Corps, the progression of artillery fire within 500 yards of the boundaries of II Corps will be same as or faster than that of the II Corps.

(b) Groupment A, from positions near BUTLER, will support I Corps. Its fire mission will be primarily in support of right of corps.

(c) Groupment B, from positions near DOVER, will support IV and II Corps. Its fire missions will be primarily in support of left of the II Corps, support being given IV Corps as needed on direct call of latter.

(x) (1) Army artillery will open fire at 4:30 AM. Fire missions will be selected in consultation with respective corps commanders. Each groupment will be prepared to deliver fire in zones of corps other than those supported when ordered from these headquarters.

(2) Army artillery positions and sectors of fire are shown on attached map. Movement to these positions will begin at 8:00 PM today under control of corps, the areas of which are involved.

(3) Division and corps artillery will be advanced rapidly in the attack and will precede army artillery. During the night of June 26-27, army artillery will be advanced under control of the corps to new positions on general line GWYNNBROOK—CRONHARDT—TEXAS, as shown on attached map.

(4) Persistent gas will not be employed.

4. See Adm O No 6.

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5. (a) Signal Communication: Through headquarters of corps supported and corps lines.
(b) Command Posts: Effective 11:00 PM today.
I Corps and Groupment A: VERONA.
II Corps and Groupment B: ARCADIA.

By command of General A

X
Chief of Staff.

Official:
E
C of A

Operation Map to accompany Annex No 1, FO No 7.
Distribution A.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General Discussion | 4 |
| Road Spaces | 5 |
| Ammunition Carried | 6 |

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4. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a*. The army artillery is directed to support both the preliminary operation of the 25th and the attack of the 26th. The amount of army artillery available is comparatively small and its main missions, in point of time and importance, are necessarily confined to the front of the principal attack. The situation may so develop, however, that the fire of these units is needed on other parts of the front and for this reason it is directed that the pieces be so emplaced that they are able to fire on the front of adjacent corps. For the proper coordination of effort, normal missions are to be arranged in consultation with the commanders of the corps supported.

*b*. (1) The mission of supporting the attack of the 26th is the primary one and the work of the 25th must not be permitted to interfere therewith. Particularly must this be borne in mind with regard to the time required to emplace the pieces in their first firing positions and to get

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them out of those positions and ready to move forward on the night of the 25th. The time allowed for the movement to the initial positions is rather short. It is reasonable to assume, however, in view of the situation existing at daylight, June 25th (Chapter VIII) that the army artillery units had been warned to be ready to move early on that date. It ought to be possible, therefore, for the units to start their leading tractor elements on the road at 8:30 AM, June 25th. (2) Assuming a rate of 2.5 miles per hour, the leading tractor element of Groupment B would reach positions near Pleasant Grove (9 miles) in 3½ hours; the rear tractor element in 4½ hours; or between 12:00 noon and 1:00 PM and would have from three to four hours to emplace the pieces and prepare for firing. (3) Groupment A has about ten miles to move and would arrive between 12:30 and 1:30 PM and have from 2½ to 3½ hours for emplacing the pieces. (4) These periods, though less than that usually taken as the minimum for emplacing these types of artillery, should enable at least a part of this artillery to support the attack of June 25th. The positions assigned are along the road and no attempt would be made to provide other than temporary emplacements. The motor cars and truck elements would proceed separately (at 8 miles an hour) and would arrive in ample time, including that needed for reconnaissance and for preliminary work on emplacements.

*c.* The movement to the second position on the night of the 25th covers about three miles in the case of each group. The units must be ready to open fire from these positions at 4:30 AM, 26th June. Therefore, par. 3 (x) (4) of Army Field Order No. 4, directs that these units "be prepared to advance at 8:00 PM," i.e., they must be out of their emplacements, on the road, and ready to move by that time.

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## 5. Road Spaces:

### *a. Groupment A.*

| | *Troops* | *C Tn* | *F Tn* | *Totals* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Regiments, 155 mm guns | 10330 yds | 4800 yds | 1500 yds | 16630 yds |
| 1 Regiment, 8" howitzers | 6030 | 2400 | 895 | 9325 |
| 1 Balloon group, (5 companies) | 1790 | (1) | | 1790 |
| 1 Observation squadron | 719 | (1) | | 719 |
| ½ Ammunition train | | | 5820 | 5820 |
| Totals | 19169 | 7200 | 8215 | 34584 yds |
| | 1.8 | 4 | 4.6 | 19.6 mi. |

### *b. Groupment B.*

| | *Troops* | *C Tn* | *F Tn* | *Totals* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Regiment, 155 mm guns | 5165 | 2400 | 750 | 8315 |
| 2 Regiments, 8" howitzers | 12060 | 4800 | 1790 | 18650 |
| 1 Balloon group, 5 companies | 1790 | (1) | | 1790 |
| 1 Observation squadron | 535 | (1) | | 535 |
| ½ Ammunition Train | | | 5820 | 5820 |
| Totals | 19550 | 7200 | 8360 | 35110 yds. |
| | 11.1 | 4 | 4.8 | 20. mi. |

(1) Small units not separated into elements.

## 6. Ammunition Carried:

### *a. Groupment A.*

| | ROUNDS | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 155 mm | 8-in. | Total |
| 1 Regiment, 155 mm guns | 5760 | | 5760 |
| 1 Regiment 8" howitzers | | 1440 | 1440 |
| ½ Ammunition train, loaded two-thirds 155-mm and one-third 8" | 4032 | 1008 | 5040 |
| Totals | 9792 | 2448 | 12240 |
| per piece | 204 | 102 | |

### *b. Groupment B.*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Regiment, 155-mm. guns | 2880 | | 2880 |
| 2 Regiments, 8" howitzers | | 2880 | 2880 |
| ½ Ammunition train, loaded one-third 155-mm. and two-thirds 8" | 2016 | 2016 | 4032 |
| Totals | 4896 | 4896 | 9792 |
| per piece | 204 | 102 | |

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 8

7. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Movement of the army artillery to the first positions for the preliminary operation. Is it possible in point of time available? Are the positions used suitable? Give other positions which would meet the situation.

*b.* Desirability and practicability of a single position from which the army artillery can support both the preliminary operation and the main attack.

*c.* The character, number, and method of assignment of missions for the army artillery in the preliminary operation. Should the Army Chief of Artillery have exercised any influence over the corps and division artillery?

*d.* Field Orders No. 4, Third Army Artillery; its form and adequacy. Should a warning order or message have been used?

*e.* Ammunition supply. How will it function? How should the ammunition train be loaded? The capabilities of the army artillery in sustained firing, from the standpoint of time, number of rounds and scope of missions.

*f.* Same as 1 for the second position.

*g.* The character, number and method of assignment of missions for the army artillery in the attack of June 26th.

*h.* What missions or instructions could have been given to the corps and division artillery in the artillery annex to Field Orders No. 7, Third Army?

*i.* Plan of forward movement of the artillery during the attack. Is the order adequate in this respect? Propose an alternate solution.

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*j*. Annex No. 1 to Field Orders No. 7, Third Army. Form and completeness other than as covered below.

*k*. Coordination by the army artillery commander of the employment of the artillery suporting the I and II Corps.

## *Maps*

Operations Map, Third Army Artillery, to accompany Annex No. 1 to F.O. No. 7, 25 June 21.

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# CHAPTER X

# *The Intelligence Service, Third Blue Army*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| Section I. | —First Situation and Requirement | 1- 2 |
| Section II. | —A Solution | 3-13 |
| Section III. | —Second Situation and Requirement | 14-15 |
| Section IV. | —A Solution | 16-17 |
| Section V. | —Topics Suggested for Study | 18 |

Maps—following page 151.


## SECTION I

## *First Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General and Special Situations | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. GENERAL AND SPECIAL SITUATIONS.—The situation is that covered by the general and special situations as given in Chapters I to IV, inclusive.

2. REQUIREMENT.—A brief discussion of the organization and use of the Intelligence Service of the Third Army; including plans for intelligence operations in the Third Army Area.

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General Discussion | 3 |
| Maps | 4 |
| Counter-espionage | 5 |
| Espionage | 6 |
| Radio Intelligence | 7 |




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Decoding ---------- 8
Censorship, Press and Mail ---------- 9
Propaganda ---------- 10
Observation and Reconnaissance ---------- 11
Prisoners of War and Documents ---------- 12
Plans for the Operations ---------- 13

3. GENERAL DISCUSSION.—*a. Initial Information.*—In a case such as the one under consideration when the army is organizing and preparing to operate in a new theater, the initial information of the enemy and intelligence estimate of the situation must necessarily be furnished by the higher headquarters that has had means for gaining the necessary data.

*b. Organization of Intelligence Service.*—The G2 of the army takes immediate steps to organize the army intelligence service. Some of the sections may be made use of immediately, others must wait for the arrival of the troops.

*c. Procedure in Preparing Intelligence Plans.* — (1) When the Third Army headquarters is temporarily established at Harrisburg on June 8, 1921, the intelligence section is fully equipped and organized. As no troops at this time have arrived, G2 can devote himself to organizing the inintelligence service of the army. G2 works out a plan, published in an intelligence annex (see Combat Orders) to one of the early field orders that will reach all army corps and army troops which are to make up the army. One such annex, issued at the beginning of the operation, should be sufficient until the situation changes radically. Details may be changed by a brief memorandum or by messages from time to time, particularly as regards paragraph 3.

(2) G2's plan should take full cognizance of the enemy's situation and intentions. He should establish in his mind the decisive factors in the situation from the enemy's point of view and from that of his own commander. These may refer to the disposition and movements of troops and establishments, terrain features, or, from a purely intelligence viewpoint, to parts of the theater from which information is so meager as to permit no conclusions.

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(3) The decisive elements in the plans of the opposing commanders may be and often will be, the same, but they may also be different. G2 should provide in his plan for watching most carefully the areas that concern the decisive elements.

(4) It is assumed that he has prepared, and supplied to all concerned, the necessary enemy situation and special intelligence maps, summaries, and intelligence estimates of the situation.

4. MAPS.—*a.* (1) A full supply of 1-inch maps covering the new area has been obtained. All units of the army will soon have need for these. Map supply is automatic, so that whenever new units come into the area they receive them, and whenever movements require it, the proper new sheets are issued. Requests or requisitions for maps are necessary only when the automatic supply fails. This requires that G2 be kept informed at all times of movements ordered or contemplated.

(2) The army engineer has maps made up into division and smaller unit bundles in accordance with the tables in force. These tables are the result, approved by the army commander, of a conference between G2, G3, the chief of army artillery and the army engineer.

*b.* The best map that there is at present of the area under consideration is the Geological Survey 1-inch map. Maps of other scales will be required for staff work and by the artillery. The scales having been decided upon at the conference, and approved, the work of preparing and reproducing then begins. Old maps and survey data are supplemented by new surveys and aerial photographs. The army engineer conducts the field work under the plan adopted by G2.

*c.* (1) Photographic airplane missions are laid out to cover the entire area, or as much as is immediately necessary. When the observation squadrons arrive, from the 10th to the 12th of June, they are sent out for photographs at once by the army air service commander as directed by G2.

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(2) The photographic plan should tie in with the surveying plan so as to provide details to be filled in over the control data. Time and effort should not be wasted on parts of the country that will probably not be fought over.

5. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE.—*a.* The War Department probably has certain espionage and counter-espionage personnel at work in the area that is being taken over by the Third Army. In view of the distance of the area from the former theater of operations, however, the system is probably not extensive. The counter-espionage agents would be considerably scattered, and it would probably be best to let them continue as they have been; at least until the organization of the area is completed; arrangements being made to have them report to the army G2 in the meantime.

The Third Army ought to be furnished with an unusually large number of intelligence police. It will be assumed that 100 report on June 8, 40 for temporary duty and 60 to be retained permanently for duty with the army or with the corps at the discretion of the army G2.

*b.* (1) One of G2's first concerns is to take measures to prevent the enemy's spies from learning the details of the Blue concentration. If authority to prescribe restricted areas, in which the movements of civilians may be to some extent checked by means of a pass system, has not been received, steps to obtain it, by telegraph, should be immediately taken.

(2) The selection of these areas requires that G2 be familiar with the plans of the commander in chief and the army commander. He should study the railroad concentration table issued by General Headquarters and the organization and concentration table, Third Army. The railroad and road systems should be examined with a view to determining the points or areas that will probably attract Red espionage personnel. Accessibility to Red agents should be considered, and, in the absence of any guide as to how much the Reds may have learned about the Blue movements and intentions, it should be assumed that the enemy has a good intelligence service and enough information to send

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agents to the points that offer the greatest opportunities for gathering data.

(3) The restricted area to be established is solely for the purpose of controlling the movements of civilians with a view to uncovering activities of the enemy's agents. It has nothing to do with traffic regulations or control of the movements of military persons. The military police and the intelligence police sometimes work together, however, and the provost marshal should know what G2 is doing and where his intelligence police are stationed. If either police comes across anything that concerns the other, prompt report should be made. The counter-espionage restricted area may or may not be subdivided so as to coincide with the corps areas. The size of the former depends principally upon the number of towns, roads, and railroads, that must be watched. Other things being equal, however, it is better to have corps counter-espionage areas as long as operations continue in one theater, the intelligence police remaining in the areas to which originally assigned, no matter how the corps staffs may change. This tends toward continuity of policy and effort, and brings about better results, since the men become thoroughly familiar with local conditions. All of the intelligence police personnel in an army area is best directed and administered by the army G2 rather than by corps G2s, unless a corps is operating independently, in which case the duties and operation of its G2 become practically those of an army G2.

*c.* The restricted area once decided upon, G2 should select points at which to station from one to three or four intelligence police, depending upon the importance of the station. By arrangement with G1, the officer in charge of civil affairs, and the army service area commander, if any, the help of the local authorities is obtained, and local detectives, police, and especially commissioned citizens, exercise the actual control over movements of civilians. The local authorities are given blank passes which they fill in and issue in accordance with regulations. They open the necessary offices and control stations, check arrivals and departures over roads and railroads and at hotels and board-

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ing houses, report on local inhabitants who may fall under suspicion, watch for communication with the enemy by any means, and help in every way to keep track of all persons entering or leaving the terrain under their jurisdiction. The local representatives of G2, the intelligence police, are furnished with local suspect lists. They make no arrests, but request such action by the local authorities or the military police. When persons are suspected of espionage it is usually better to let them go on for a time unhindered, except that their mail is secretly examined and that their movements are closely watched. In this manner codes are often learned and the entire spy system, or a large part of it, is uncovered; then wholesale arrests are made. The intelligence police supervise and guide the work of the civilians and keep in constant touch with G2 through his counter-espionage officer. If there is a local provost marshal, they get into touch with him.

*d.* All of this assumes that the local authorities will help, and implies that friendly territory is being considered. If these conditions do not exist, the work must be done largely by military personnel if it is not possible to employ civilian agents. Under these circumstances a great many more soldiers will be needed and the results will ordinarily not be so good.

*e.* With the above in mind, G2 works out a counter-espionage plan for covering the concentration and submits it for approval. He should watch the country which will be occupied by the cavalry that is to cover the concentration. He therefore decides to have the restricted area include Parrs Ridge on the southeast. The mountains between the Potomac and Juniata Rivers, with stations at McConnelsburg, Shady Gap, Blairs Mills, and Newport, offer a good line for closing the rear and making it difficult for spies to go well inland and enter the area from the northwest. East of the Susquehanna the line can still follow the mountains and include stations at Pine Grove, Auburn, and Reading; then, swinging around with posts at Lancaster and the towns nearby, it can come back to the Susquehanna at Columbia and Wrightsville. South of the Potomac, sta-

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tions at Leesburg and other points that cover the approaches to Charlestown are necessary. Within the area so bounded, stations at Harrisburg, Lebanon, and York on the east, and Hagerstown and Charlestown on the west will help keep movements of troops secret. Stations between these points will be necessary to complete the system and cover the marching troops. They can be placed at Carlisle, Gettysburg, Hanover, Hanover Junction, Ebbvale, Westminster, Frederick, and such other places as developments might require.

6. ESPIONAGE.—*a.* The direction of espionage in the area about Baltimore and Washingon might be retained by the War Department or General Headquarters. Since the Third Army has a front all its own, it is perhaps more probable that an espionage officer would be attached to the army intelligence section. This officer would have the necessary authority, data and funds for carrying on the work under the direction of the army commander and the immediate supervision of the army G2.

*b.* Assuming that such an officer has reported, G2 considers what information susceptible of being gathered by spies is required. He then checks up the information that he already has on file, notes what part of it needs verification or amplification, and the additional data that should be obtained. Based on the conclusions so formed, he works out his espionage plan for approval.

*c.* The details of the plan need not be gone into more than to say that they involve choosing points at which to select one or more local representatives and working out means of getting information back. The local representatives, in a situation such as this, are usually well known residents of the place under consideration. They in turn select four or five or perhaps more subordinates, who in their turn choose others to work under them. In this manner a net is created in which no agent knows any other than his immediate superior. This provides the maximum protection for individual agents and for the entire system, making it hard for the enemy's spies to learn much by worming their way into the net as agents.

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*d.* G2 plans to select agents in Washington, Annapolis, and Baltimore, the three ports, and in the towns about which the Red troops are located. His plan also provides for selecting agents in the areas that the Reds might still occupy or over which they must advance. Finally he desires to use a number of agents on the railroads and roads. The last named will ordinarily find good points of observation in buildings along or near the railroads and the principal roads, and will learn a great deal about troop movements.

*e.* The information of the enemy given in the Commander-in-Chief's instructions to the Commanding General, Third Army, as well as the other information that is in the possession of the army commander on the evening of June 9 is typical of what secret agents learn.

*f.* The best means of getting information back is, perhaps, by messenger, though it is also the slowest. Radio, the telegraph, the telephone, pigeons, and visual signals, to say nothing of more devious methods such as advertisements in newspapers, and so on, can all be used. Codes and ciphers must also be prepared and distributed to agents for use. Each agent reports to his immediate superior, and it is only the chief representative in each place who sends back the data gathered, together with his estimate of its accuracy and reliability.

7. RADIO INTELLIGENCE.—*a.* G2 confers with the army signal officer on the equipment and personnel that are available for the radio intelligence service, and on the best place at which to locate them, considered from a purely technical point of view. They consider the following:

(1) Listening-in on commercial and our own military telephone and telegraph lines in Blue territory (counter-espionage).

(2) Listening-in by secret agents on commercial and enemy's military telephone and telegraph lines in Red territory (espionage and counter-espionage).

(3) Wireless intercepts for military information and counter-espionage, and also to establish a press service and check and send propaganda.

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(4) Radio goniometry to locate and identify the enemy's wireless stations and nets.

*b.* In the present case there seem to be no reasons for G2 to prefer any particular locations for the various radio intelligence agencies other than that they should be in good positions for a later advance. He, therefore, puts the problem of selecting locations into the hands of the signal officer, leaving it to him to provide for efficient work and quick transmission of results to army headquarters.

8. DECODING.—*a.* Closely connected with radio intelligence is the subsection of the army intelligence section that looks over every intercepted message, including written, radio, telegraph, and telephone messages. First this subsection decodes and deciphers for the purpose of uncovering any information contained in the messages. Next it works out the enemy's radio nets and identifies the units by the call letters, thus helping to establish and follow changes in the battle order.

*b.* The corresponding group at General Headquarters ordinarily examines the enemy's codes and ciphers, and solves them, and looks for colorless inks, arbitrary codes not based on any system, and similar methods of transmitting information by use of spies. This work is also sometimes done at army headquarters and might be in this case.

*c.* It cannot be foretold how long it will take to solve the enemy's codes and ciphers, but it can be reasonably assumed in the present case, with the enemy organizing as he is and necessarily sending a good many messages, that it will be possible to read his code in three or four days after the intercept stations start working. On the other hand, it is to be expected that the enemy will exercise due precaution and change his code as frequently as his number of messages sent seems to indicate advisable, so that there are bound to be times at which codes cannot be read. At such times, G2 will watch other indications with particular care, for a code is usually changed when an operation is in preparation.

*d.* G2 should see that the signal officer takes the necessary precautions to prevent breaking down the Blue codes

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and ciphers, and should watch for indications that this has been done so that prompt protective changes can be made.

9. CENSORSHIP.—*a.* If there is no general order from the War Department or General Headquarters that covers the matter, G2 drafts an order covering the entire subject of censorship, based on the regulations in force and the latest instructions, and requests the army commander to issue it.

*b.* G2 has a press officer in his section. He arranges to have all war correspondents report to this officer, who exercises the prescribed control over their movements and censors their dispatches. The press officer is guided by the censorship regulations issued by the War Department and by instructions from General Headquarters.

*c.* In case of an army operating, as the Third Army is, in a separate theater of its own, the army commander might impose additional censorship restrictions, but not so far as to modify materially the policy or instructions of higher authority. Nothing in the situation seems to call for such action in the case of the Third Army.

*d.* The censorship of correspondence of civilians should be carried out only under authority from the War Department, and falls principally within the province of counter-espionage. Only mail to and from persons whose names are on the suspect lists or about whom nothing at all is known, and mail to and from certain localities, such as towns within the enemy's lines, is ordinarily opened. Even in these cases the work of opening mail is done in such a manner as to keep the censorship secret. The conditions of the problem do not indicate any authority for this procedure, but it would be obtained at once if it had not already been given.

*e.* Telegraph, cable and radio censorship are handled in the same general manner as postal censorship, and the messages can be read without any trouble at the local offices.

*f.* Censorship of mail of persons in the military service (actually or constructively) is carried out by unit and

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local commanders in accordance with censorship regulations.

10. PROPAGANDA.—*a.* Propaganda is ordinarily handled only from the highest headquarters. The Army seldom has much to do with it other than to see that the matter sent it for distribution reaches its destination among the enemy's troops or the civilians in occupied territory. It has nothing to do with propaganda for home consumption.

*b.* In the case of the Third Army, a propaganda officer might be attached to the intelligence section, especially if the War Department or General Headquarters had laid out an extensive propaganda program. The whole question might also conceivably be left in the hands of the army commander and G2, in which case a propaganda officer well versed in the psychology of the enemy would be needed.

*c.* Articles in local publications, wireless, and telegraph messages sent in the clear, or in code if of a military nature, and intended to mislead or deceive the enemy, carefully considered conversations where sure to be overheard, specially prepared papers purposely lost but not too obviously left about, and hints dropped here and there make good propaganda, and are almost sure to reach the enemy. Leaflets dropped among hostile troops and information distributed to the enemy's soldiers in some manner are also sometimes effective under certain conditions of morale.

*d.* The conditions of the problem do not cover the subject of propaganda, but it might perhaps be used to some advantage in keeping up the morale of the Blue inhabitants in occupied territory or to mislead the enemy.

11. OBSERVATION AND RECONNAISSANCE.—*a. Aerial Reconnaissance.*—(1) The part of paragraph 3 (a) in Field Orders No. 1, Third Army, that concerns the observation squadrons is G2's aerial reconnaissance plan expressed in the most brief and general manner. It reads:

"The army air service will start its reconnaissance as early as possible and determine Red troop concentrations and movements between the SUSQUEHANNA and POTOMAC RIVERS. Information is especially desired covering troop movements in the vicinity of WASHINGTON."

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A more complete expression of the plan appears in the Intelligence Annex. The complete details are put into a memorandum to the chief of the army air service. This prescribes areas to be covered visually or photographically, put down in order of their urgency.

(2) Among the most urgent missions is the securing of photographs for map restitution. Of the same urgency are missions to watch the roads and railroads about Baltimore and Washington for troop movements, and to photograph every establishment put up by the enemy, especially about the ports. Then follow night reconnaissance missions, especially over camps and railroad lines and yards. Finally come missions for rephotographing areas to determine changes. These missions are given daily to the air service.

(3) In preparation for the expected attack, G2 also obtains oblique photographs on the area south of Parrs Ridge and west of Gunpowder Falls.

(4) In addition to this general laying out of missions, G2 has planes sent out as the occasion may arise to watch particular things or to get information missed before.

(5) If the weather should be unfavorable for flying or for observation or photography from the air, G2 would be very seriously handicapped in this preliminary work before contact on the ground is well established.

*b. Balloon Observation.*—The observation balloons will probably arrive about June 10. They would be of some use if sent up at once but would be without protection. G2 wants the information, however, and considers the risk worth taking. He requests that a balloon go up near Westminster to watch the roads and railroads towards Baltimore.

*c. Ground Observation.*—(1) G2 has a number of observers in his section. Assuming that he has equipment for three posts, as might easily be the case, he can use his observers at once, particularly to watch roads and railroads in the enemy's territory.

(2) The observers can see such things as moving trains at long distances, perhaps ten miles, if atmospheric condi-

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tions are favorable and good observation points can be found. This will supplement aerial observation, but more important, it will also permit of getting some sort of road and railroad traffic normals, at least in certain localities.

(3) Having only the 1-inch map, G2 does not feel that he can select observation posts himself. He has, however, an observation officer trained in just such work. He directs him to take men and equipment for three posts and station them on or near Parrs Ridge at the most favorable points for observation of roads and railroads in the occupied territory, and particularly of the area between and about Baltimore and Washington. The posts will make reports in code by commercial telegraph and telephone. They will be careful not to do anything that would unnecessarily betray their positions, guarding against the enemy's observation and spies, and against local curiosity and gossip.

*d. Ground Reconnaissance.* — The instructions for ground reconnaissance contained in paragraph 3 (b) and (c), Field Orders No. 1, Third Army, sum up such plans as G2 has made for ground reconnaissance at this time. They provide for covering the front, Parkton—Susquehanna River by patrols from the 2d Cavalry Division (reinforced by 1st Brigade) and later the identification of Red main forces about Baltimore by the same troops. The 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) is to secure the identifications in the vicinity of Washington. As time goes on more specific instructions for making reconnaissance in certain limited areas for the purpose of obtaining particular identifications can be worked out and submitted for incorporation in field orders.

12. PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS.—In view of the fact that the first prisoners and documents captured will probably be few and of particular importance to the army commander, G2 arranges to have them held by the troops that take them for only the shortest possible time and to have them sent to Emmitsburg by motor car. He agrees with G1 and G4 on a location for an army prisoner of war inclosure in Emmitsburg. No prisoners will be probably re-

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ceived before June 11, when army headquarters will have moved to its new location, so that there is no need to send prisoner examining personnel ahead.

13. PLANS FOR THE OPERATION.—*a. Preliminary Measures.*—(1) From the first moment at which he knows the general plan of the commander in chief and at least the outlines of the plan of the army commander, G2 studies the information that is on hand or that comes in. He prepares studies on such subjects such as: the rate at which the Red forces are and may be landed; the enemy's railroad situation as to both lines and rolling stock; the Red organization; and movements of Red troops and their location (battle order); all of which the general needs to make his plans.

(2) Thereafter G2 makes a plan for getting additional information along the lines he can foresee will be needed; the enemy's situation as to supplies, equipment and ammunition; the location of depots and dumps of all kinds—the location of sanitary establishments; the location of the enemy's airdromes and the strength and kind of his air service, and data of like nature. All of these matters help to get some idea of the direction in which the enemy is going to move. G2 also takes measures to obtain any particular information that the army commander and staff may ask for.

(3) G2 may issue his plan in the form of an intelligence annex, or he may give his instructions directly to the individuals concerned. G2 now has only the G2s of the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions to deal with, so far as combat intelligence is concerned, but he knows that he will soon have four corps G2s in addition. He, therefore, decides to issue a short annex and to issue another and complete one to accompany the field order for the advance.

*b. Means of Securing Information.*—Until June 10, G2 has no way of getting information except through spies and by radio intelligence. On that date the army observation squadrons begin to arrive, and later on troops will be beyond Parrs Ridge and prisoners and documents may be expected. In preparation for this G2 gets up a general plan

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of aerial and ground reconnaissance, and plans the manner in which he will handle prisoners and documents.

*c. Decisive Elements.*—(1) In considering the elements of the situation that may become the decisive ones it seems to G2 that, from an army viewpoint, these may be of two kinds. First those which relate to strategy and affect the operation as a whole, and second those which are tactical in nature.

(2) G2 has undoubtedly just prepared an intelligence estimate of the situation for the use of the army commander in working out his plan. The general conclusion reached in the estimate appears in Chapter IV and is not repeated. This estimate included a discussion of the very points that G2 now has to consider.

(3) No matter what strategical plan the Reds adopt, before they can go ahead seriously with their invasion, they must gain space about their bases. As stated in Chapter I, such a move could not well be to the southwest, but would have to be generally northward. It might be straight toward the northwest or it might pivot about Baltimore and swing around to the north and northeast. Either of these moves would include taking and holding Parrs Ridge. G2 therefore considers Parrs Ridge a preliminary decisive element.

(4) From a tactical viewpoint, and depending upon the amount of information that the Reds have gained about the Blues, the valley of the South Branch Patapsco River offers the Reds an opportunity to put the Blues at a serious disadvantage by separating the III Corps from the remainder of the army. Preparation for such a move would include a certain degree of concentration opposite the right of the III Corps. A concentration south of the South Branch Patapsco River might also indicate the enemy's intention to drive back the right of the III Corps and envelop the flank of the Blue Army. G2 therefore considers a concentration in this area a second decisive element.

(5) A third decisive element might develop if the Reds should be found to be concentrating in rear of their right.

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Turning to the decisive elements from the Blue point of view, G2 learns from the army commander that he considers the first and broad decisive element the act of keeping of the Reds hemmed in close to their bases so that their defense may be less effective and they may be crushed with less difficulty. From a tactical point of view he considers the Red defensive position opposite the Blue center a decisive element which, when taken, will threaten and finally command Baltimore, the principal Red base. G2 asks himself just when he, if he were the Red commander, would feel that the situation was becoming desperate. He decides that this would be when the Blues had taken the ridge south of Green Spring Valley. He therefore considers the entire defensive system, but particularly the defenses and garrison of the last named ridge a decisive element.

(6) The flanks are always elements of importance, and G2 decides to take the necessary steps to watch them and to keep fully informed of the location and movements of the enemy's flanks. In this situation he believes that the flanks are not, at least for the present, really decisive elements.

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## SECTION III

## *Second Situation and Requirements*

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14. SPECIAL SITUATION.—G2 has proceeded along the lines indicated and has the army intelligence service working fairly well, but lacking somewhat in coordination. He has issued a brief intelligence annex supplemented by fragmentary instructions, directly to his own personnel, and through the chief of staff to others. He has been informed of the army commander's decision to attack and has assisted in working out the complete plan, applying the informa-

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tion gained and his knowledge of the enemy's methods, organization, equipment and characteristics.

15. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—The Intelligence Annex to Field Orders No. 5, Third Army.

*b. Second Requirement.*—A brief explanation of the preparation of intelligence annexes.

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution*

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### 16. G2 ANNEX TO FIELD ORDERS NO. 5, THIRD ARMY.

ANNEX NO____ TO FIELD ORDERS NO 5, THIRD ARMY

INTELLIGENCE

Third Army,
EMMITSBURG,
22 June 21, 10:00 PM.

Maps: Geol Surv, 1:62500. G2 Situation Map (omitted).

1. A Red army has landed at WASHINGTON and BALTIMORE. Hostile troops of all arms have been encountered in some strength as far inland as the general line POTOMAC RIVER near GREAT FALLS—vicinity of GAITHERSBURG—PATUXENT RIVER opposite BRIGHTON—west of IVORY — MOUNTVIEW —HENRYTON —GLEN FALLS — south of WORTHINGTON VALLEY—WESTERN RUN—GUNPOWDER FALLS—LITTLE GUNPOWDER FALLS.

   The enemy's air service has been very active but has not been strong enough to penetrate our air screen.

   Although the enemy's intentions are not indicated definitely, it is probable that he will act offensively, probably against our right, south of the PATAPSCO RIVER. For details see G2 Studies (omitted), G2 Situation Maps of 14 and 21 June 21 (omitted), and special studies and maps issued (omitted).

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2. There has been little opportunity to gain information of the enemy up to the present.

Information to verify or disprove enemy's intentions (see paragraph 1), based on the main concentration and the supply situation.

3. (*a*) *Prisoners, Deserters and Other Persons.* Prisoners and deserters will be examined only briefly at division and lower headquarters. Rapid and complete examinations will be made at corps headquarters. Prisoners will be sent back so as to reach army prisoner of war enclosure at WESTMINSTER within 48 hours of time of capture, except in case of III Corps, whose time is extended to 96 hours. Arrangements will be made locally for use of available empty transportation going to the rear for moving prisoners.

Prisoners will be especially questioned to determint location of concentration points, routes of advance, and establishments in rear.

Prisoners will be classified at divisions according to regimental organizations and report will be made by wire through corps to army G2.

Inhabitants of areas formerly held by enemy will be questioned by intelligence police.

(*b*) *Documents and Captured Material.*

Documents, especially orders, required from all parts of front.

Documents taken from prisoners will accompany them to army prisoner of war enclosure, properly bundled and secured, except in cases of special importance, when they will be forwarded without delay.

Divisions will arrange for prompt collection of documents on battlefield and for forwarding them to corps on day found. Corps may retain documents twelve hours, except in case of III Corps, where complete examination will be made by special personnel furnished.

Exploitation of documents will be especially to determine data described in paragraph 3 (a).

Character and state of enemy's equipment and supply will be estimated by division and corps through examination of salvage. New weapons, shells, or other articles found, will be reported to army at once and sample forwarded.

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(*c*) *Reconnaissance and Observation*:

*Ground Reconnaissance*: Identifications are required from all parts of army front immediately, and at least once daily, until further notice. Reports of results of reconnaissance and observation will be made by wire twice daily, as follows:

III Corps: Within its zone of action and south of POTOMAC RIVER, with particular reference to Red cavalry about GAITHERSBURG, to any increase or decrease of enemy's strength on corps front, and to any concentration within striking distance of left flank of corps.

IV Corps: Within its zone of action, with particular reference to details of dispositions and organization of Red main forces and defensive positions.

II Corps: Within its zone of action, with particular reference to details of dispositions and organization of Red main forces and defensive positions. Special attention to ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

I Corps: Within its zone of action, with particular reference to exact location of enemy's right flank and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

2d Cavalry Division: East of left flank of I Corps, observing SUSQUEHANNA RIVER and CHESAPEAKE BAY and locating Red forces north and northeast of BALTIMORE. Between LIBERTY TURNPIKE and PATAPSCO RIVER, locating hostile forces and defensive positions. On front of III Corps as directed from corps headquarters.

*Aerial Reconnaissance*: Continuous day and night observation required over all territory held by Reds within observation zone of army, corps and divisions.

Particular reference to concentrations south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER, Red defensive positions opposite Blue center, ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY, rear establishments.

Army special missions will be called for when necessary, with special attention to following areas:

About BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON, with particular reference to road and railroad movements to or from area south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO

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RIVER, or signs of concentration in that area, and to learning movements of enemy's right flank.

South of PATUXENT and POTOMAC RIVERS, for purpose of discovering any attempt to move around our right flank.

Between GUNPOWDER FALLS and the SUSQUEHANNA RIVER, including landing places on CHESAPEAKE BAY, for purpose of discovering any attempt to move around our left flank.

See Map No 1, attached (omitted).

*Ground Observation*: Road and railroad movements along entire army front will be observed and reported, particularly those that indicate transfer of troops to or from area south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO RIVER.

Each corps will be responsible for observation to its front and flanks. I Corps will use ridge from near REISTERSTOWN to GUNPOWDER FALLS when in our possession.

*Aerial Observation* (*Balloon*): Balloon observation over same area and for same purposes as ground observation. Army balloons will report particularly on BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON areas.

*Airplane Photographs*: All establishments and field works of enemy will be photographed as often as necessary to determine changes. Army missions will be called for as needed. See Map No 2 attached (omitted).

(*d*) *Radio Intelligence.*

No change. Stations will be prepared to follow advance as ordered. Hostile army, corps, and division nets will be localized and determined without delay. Special attention to intercepts.

(*e*) *Counter-Espionage.*

Counter-espionage by corps area under direction of Army G2. Intelligence police will advance closely behind troops, visit all liberated towns and question inhabitants.

4. MAP SUPPLY.

(*a*) *Maps.*

Following maps are available:

General map, GETTYSBURG-ANTIETAM, 1″= 15 miles.

1:200,000 Map, Third Army edition (assumed).

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1:62500 Geological Survey Map.
1:21120 map, Third Army edition (assumed).
Map supply will be automatic and as laid down in regulations. Corps and division will be careful to provide lower units with sheets for new terrain, when necessary, without requisition.
Until further orders, special requisitions for maps will be made to G2 of unit concerned.

(*b*) *Photographs.*
Oblique photographs will be issued by army for distribution down to platoon commanders.
Vertical photographs will be obtained, annotated, and issued by G2s concerned. Copies to Army G2.

5. DISSEMINATION AND REPORTS.
(a) Army G2 Report, to include corps.
(b) Army G2 Situation maps, same distribution as report.
(c) Reports from corps, and army troops, to Army G2, twice daily by wire. Routine written reports, by courier daily. Copies of all maps, studies, or other matter issued, will be sent to Army G2.
(d) Army G2 Report closes at 8:00 PM.
(e) All reports to be submitted in the morning, will be in hands of army G2 by 8:00 AM, all evening reports by 8:00 PM.

By command of General A

X
Chief of Staff.

Official
ZY
A C of S, G2.

Distribution same as Field Orders No 5, Third Army.

17. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEXES.—*a.* G2 studied the enemy's situation and possible courses of action from the earliest possible moment. As more information came in, the situation gradually cleared up in his mind and he was able to make the studies concerning the enemy which the army commander used in arriving at his decision. He felt, however, that his information had to be supplemented, especially in the areas which he considered decisive. He, therefore, submitted requests to the Chief of Staff for reconnaissance

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and identifications by the Army Cavalry, from time to time, and also planned the measures he would take to complete the information so gained after the corps had established contact. The paragraph on ground reconnaissance in the foregoing annex and the instructions for patrolling and reconnaissance contained in paragraph 3 of the field order are the result of this planning.

*b.* In writing the annex, G2 considered that the corps and division G2s were competent, and therefore did not put a great deal of detail into his instructions. Especially did he leave considerable latitude to the G2 of the III Corps, since that corps is some distance away and has a comparatively large front.

*c.* The corps G2s issues intelligence annexes to the corps field orders, based on the army G2's annex, their own corps field orders, and necessities of the case from the corps point of view. They locate their ground and balloon observers so as to cover the important parts of their front, the balloon covering parts of the front that offer no facilities for ground observation. Unless the army has reserved certain points for its own observers, the corps may use any suitable places in their areas, and may in return reserve certain points for their own use.

*d.* Knowing the time at which the army G2 requires prisoners, documents, reports, summaries, and all other information, the corps G2s put into their annexes instructions to division G2s calculated to make it possible to comply with the army G2's orders.

*e.* The corps G2s include in their annexes details as to areas to be covered by ground reconnaissance, based on the instructions in the army annex and local conditions. These details should be worked out as early as possible and form the basis for the reconnaissance and patrolling directed in the corps field orders.

*f.* In general, it may be said that the corps G2s go through the same process as the army G2 in getting out their annexes, with the exception that their plans must also be made to fit in with those of the army.

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## SECTION V

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 18

18. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Is the assumed enemy situation as represented on the attached map reasonable from the point of view of the Red commander in chief?

*b.* Is the information shown on the attached G2 situation map reasonable from the point of view of what could be learned by the application of the intelligence annex? What part of the information was obtained by the strictly army agencies (as distinguished from corps and divisions)?

*c.* Does the intelligence annex fail to provide for gaining any information that might be of special value to the Blue Army commander? What is it and how could it be obtained?

*d.* The manner in which the several agencies available were employed in obtaining the information called for by the army intelligence annex and that shown on the G2 situation map, by

(1) I Corps.
(2) II Corps.
(3) III Corps.
(4) IV Corps.

## *Maps*

G2 SITUATION MAP, THIRD ARMY

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CHAPTER XI

# *The I and II Corps in the Army Attack*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Part A—The I Corps Attack | 1- 4 |
| Part B—The II Corps Attack | 5- 8 |
| Part C—Discussion of Principles | 9-12 |
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Maps—following page 189.


## Part A

## THE I CORPS ATTACK


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Section I—Situation and Requirements | 1-2 |
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### SECTION I

### *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Eleventh Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. ELEVENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.*—Geol. Surv., 1:62500. Situation Map I Corps and II Corps, daylight, 25 June 21.

*b.* The situation given in the eighth situation (Chapter VIII) is continued.

*c.* At daylight June 25, the I Corps had occupied the concealed positions ordered by Field Orders No. 5, Third Army, as shown on the attached Situation Map, I Corps and II Corps, daylight, June 25.



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*d.* General B, commanding the I Corps, received Army Message, dated 8:00 AM, June 25, at 8:20 AM, June 25, and Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, dated June 25, at 12:00 noon June 25. Extracts from this order were telephoned to the I Corps at 11:10 AM, June 25.

*e.* The operation ordered for the afternoon of June 25 was being carried out according to schedule by the II and IV Corps.

*f.* Up to noon, June 25, no additional information was received, other than information confirming that already explained in the eighth special situation (Chapter VIII).

*g.* The weather is fair with light breeze from the southwest. Forecast for tomorrow, no change.

2. REQUIREMENTS.

*a. First Requirement.*—Field Orders by I Corps to carry out Field Orders No. 7, Third Army.*

*b. Second Requirement.*—Reasons in brief for action taken.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Field Orders | 3 |
| Reasons | 4 |

---

3. FIELD ORDERS.—*a. Messages.*

I Corps,
RAYVILLE,
25 June 21, 9:30 AM.

(1) To Commanders:
23d Division
25th Division
II Corps Cavalry
I Corps Cavalry
Corps Artillery.

---

*The 101st FA (155 how), Co A 101st Bln Gp, and 1st Bn 901st Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co) are attached to the 23d Div.
The 102d FA (155 how), Co B 101st Bln Gp, and 2d Bn 901st Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co) are attached to the 25th Div.

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Army issues order at 11:00 AM today for general attack to take place tomorrow. I Corps, reinforced by army tanks, and II and I Corps cavalry, will attack west of GUNPOWDER FALLS. Special precautions must be taken to conceal movements to position. 23d Division will prepare to attack astride YORK TURNPIKE. II and I Corps Cavalry will operate on left flank of corps. Divisions will prepare to relieve II and I Corps cavalry on our front. Commanders' conference will be held at RAYVILLE at 2:30 PM today.

Y
Chief of Staff.

(2) Through Message Center.

During the morning, the following details were arranged by telephone and messages:

(a) Arrangements made with Commanding General, 2d Cavalry Division, for use of roads in area Monkton—St James Corner—Phoenix—Gunpowder Falls (all inclusive) for troop movement night of June 25-26.

(b) Outline of proposed operation for June 26 obtained from Commanding Generals, II Corps, and 2d Cavalry Division. Copies of Field Orders from these units will be received later.

(c) Arrangements made with Third Army for change of railheads as follows: I Corps, Walker; 25th Division, Parkton; 23d Division, Whitehall; II and I Corps Cavalry, Blue Mount. Effective 12:00 Noon 26 June, by which time track will be prepared by corps troops, assisted by army troops.

(d) Arrangements made for movement of Army Tanks to Parkton. One heavy and one light battalion to be ready to detrain by 5:00 PM today. One light battalion to be ready to detrain by 5:00 AM tomorrow.

(e) Necessary directions given to military police to clear Falls Road for movements of Groupment A, Army Artillery, to position in vicinity of Berean for today's attack by IV and II Corps.

*b. Field Order.*

I Corps,
RAYVILLE,
25 June 21, 3:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 7. }

Maps: Geol Surv, 1:62500. Operation Map, I Corps, to accompany FO No 7, 25 June 21.

1. (a) Reds hold general line GLEN MORRIS—ridge east of junction of SLADE RUN and DELAWARE RUN—

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CHESTNUT RIDGE, south of the BIG SPRING—SHAWAN—OREGON road. Second line south of THE CAVES and GREEN SPRING VALLEY. Some intrenchments have been discovered on high ground near WOLFTRAP BR and high ground north of MERRYMAN BRANCH. Artillery groups observed in areas about WARDS CHAPEL—BELLTOWN—DELIGHT and GWYNNBROOK. Cavalry detachments were observed yesterday about LUTHERVILLE and TOWSON, dismounted troops about LAKE ROLAND, and a continuous movement of troops on roads northwest of BALTIMORE.

See Summary of Intelligence (omitted).

(b) III Corps moves today to attack south of PATUXENT RIVER. IV and II Corps have forced crossing of PATAPSCO RIVER north of OAKLAND. II Corps holds high ground north of SLADE RUN and DEADMAN RUN, 1st Div on left.

2d Cav Div, operating from vicinity of JACKSONVILLE, is in contact with Reds along GUNPOWDER FALLS. With II and I Corps Cav, it is covering our front on the general line of WESTERN RUN TURNPIKE. II Corps Cav north of SHAWAN. I Corps Cav north of MARBLE HILL. Dismounted patrols have reached FALLS ROAD (at head of BEAVERDAM RUN) and TEXAS, reporting encounters with Red patrols.

(c) The Third Army attacks at 5:00 AM, 26 June, enveloping the hostile right.

The IV and II Corps, supported by AAS, and by Gp B, AA, from near PLEASANT GROVE, and Gp A, AA, from south of BEREAN, attack at 4:00 PM today to secure the high ground east and west of REISTERSTOWN.

The II Corps secures today the general line: ridge 1000 yds south of road junction 486—road junction 442—BIG SPRING road. Tomorrow, it advances south of the line SUDBROOK PARK—ARLINGTON (exclusive) and, in conjunction with the I Corps, carries in quick succession CHESTNUT RIDGE—THE CAVES and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

The 2d Cav Div crosses GUNPOWDER FALLS between WARREN and SUMMERFIELD by 6:00 AM, 26 June, and facilitates the advance of the I Corps by taking in flank and rear the high ground overlooking YORK TURNPIKE and by preventing Red

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advance east of TOWSON. II and I Corps Cav pass to I Corps at 6:00 PM today.

Gp A, AA, supports the attack of the I Corps; on 26 June, from positions near BUTLER, on 27 June, from positions on general line CRONHARDT —TEXAS. Movements in corps area under control of I Corps.

2. (a) The I Corps, reinforced by II and I Corps Cav and Army Tanks, will attack at 5:00 AM, 26 June. See Operation Map, I Corps to accompany FO No 7.

(b) It will envelop the hostile right and drive the enemy southwest of BALTIMORE.

It will carry CHESTNUT RIDGE in conjunction with the II Corps.

It will take high ground near WOLFTRAP BR.

It will turn the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by a rapid advance in the general direction of LUTHERVILLE and ARLINGTON.

(c) Zone of Action:

Right boundary: MILLERS—FALLS ROAD—BEREAN (all inclusive)—RJ 482—CRONHARDT—STEVENSON—ARLINGTON (all exclusive).

Left boundary: NORTHERN CENTRAL RAILROAD —GUNPOWDER FALLS—DULANEY and SWEETAIR TURNPIKE—TOWSON (exclusive).

Rear boundary: No change.

3. (a) (1) The 25th Div will attack on the front RJ 482 (exclusive)—RJ 1 mile west of MARBLE HILL (exclusive). See Operation Map, I Corps, to accompany FO No 7.

(2) It will carry CHESTNUT RIDGE in conjunction with left Div II Corps. By carrying the crest of the high ground west of YORK TURNPIKE, it will assist the advance of the 23d Div. It will continue the advance in the direction of ROCKLAND—BARE HILLS, and, in conjunction with the 23d Div, will turn the high ground south of JONES FALLS.

It will reach the northern slopes of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by dark, 26 June.

It will maintain contact with the II Corps.

(3) Zone of Action:

Right boundary: BLACKROCK—FALLS ROAD—BEREAN (all inclusive)—RJ 482—CRON-

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HARDT—STEVENSON—ARLINGTON (all exclusive).

Left boundary: EVNA (inclusive)—BACON HALL—BELFAST (exclusive)—WESTERN RUN (inclusive)—TEXAS (exclusive)—BROOKLANDVILLE—ROCKLAND—MT WASHINGTON (inclusive).

Rear boundary: After 8:00 PM, 26 June, BUTLER (inclusive)—BELFAST (exclusive).

(b) (1) The 23d Div, reinforced by 5th Hv Tk Bn, 6th L Tk Bn, and 901st Cml Am Tn (less 1st and 2d Bns) (each less 4th Co), will attack on the front RJ 1 mile west of MARBLE HALL (inclusive)—ASHLAND (exclusive). See Operation Map, I Corps, to accompany FO No 7.

(2) It will advance rapidly in the direction of LUTHERVILLE—WOODBROOK.

It will take the heights north and northwest of LAKE ROLAND.

It will turn the heights south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY in conjunction with the 25th Div.

It will continue the advance in the direction of WOODBROOK—ROLAND PARK.

With its artillery, it will neutralize the hostile positions on the high ground near WOLFTRAP BR and on the high ground north of MERRYMAN BRANCH and will assist the II and I Corps Cav in clearing up this ground.

It will reach high ground north of LAKE ROLAND and south of LUTHERVILLE by dark June 26.

It will maintain contact with the II and I Corps Cav and the 2d Cav Div.

(3) Zone of Action:

Right boundary: EVNA (exclusive)—BACON HALL—BELFAST (inclusive)—WESTERN RUN (exclusive)—TEXAS (inclusive)—BROOKLANDVILLE—ROCKLAND—MT WASHINGTON (exclusive).

Left boundary: GUNPOWDER FALLS—PHOENIX (inclusive)—ASHLAND—hill ½ mile east of COCKEYSVILLE—DULANEY and SWEETAIR TURNPIKE—TOWSON (exclusive)—GOVANS (inclusive).

Rear boundary: After 8:00 PM 26 June BELFAST (exclusive)—SPARKS (inclusive).

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(c) (1) The II and I Corps Cav, Col I commanding, will attack on the front ASHLAND (inclusive) —GUNPOWDER FALLS. See Operation Map I Corps, to accompany FO No 7.

(2) Assisted by the artillery of the 23d Div, it will clean up the high ground near WOLFTRAP BR and the high ground north of MERRYMAN BRANCH.

It will be prepared to assemble on the high ground east of TEXAS on the night of June 26-27 for use as corps reserve.

It will maintain contact with the 2d Cav Div.

Leaving outposts in position north of WESTERN RUN TURNPIKE until relieved by division troops, it will withdraw by 9:00 PM today to a position between ASHLAND and GUNPOWDER FALLS.

(3) Zone of Action: After 9:00 PM June 25.

Right boundary: PHOENIX (exclusive)—ASHLAND—hill ½ mile east of COCKEYSVILLE—MERRYMAN BRANCH (inclusive).

Left boundary: GUNPOWDER FALLS.

(d) (1) Artillery. See Annex No 1 (omitted).

AA opens fire at 4:30 AM June 26.

Corps and Div Arty will open fire at 4:30 AM June 26.

Initial concentration will be on CHESTNUT RIDGE—east of CRONHARDT—high ground near WOLFTRAP BR, and high ground north of MERRYMAN BRANCH.

Non-persistent gas only will be used.

Hostile positions near WOLFTRAP BR and MERRYMAN BRANCH will be gassed.

(2) Corps Arty will support the attack as follows:

103d FA: June 26, from position 1 mile south of PHILOPOLIS.

June 27, from position near TIMONIUM.

104th FA: June 26, from position west of PHILOPOLIS.

June 27, from position near TEXAS.

(3) The Div Arty will follow the attack closely. It will precede the AA and the Corps Arty. It will be south of the line CRONHARDT—TEXAS by 6:00 PM, June 26.

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(e) (1) Corps AS. See Annex No 2 (omitted).
(2) It will support the attack.
It will operate against enemy ground troops.
It will keep close touch with the 2d Cav Div advance.

(f) Tanks. See Annex No 3 (omitted).
(1) 5th Hv and 6th L Tk Bns will pass to 23d Div at PARKTON at 5:00 PM, June 25.
(2) 7th L Tk Bn will be held in corps reserve at PARKTON.

(g) For anti-aircraft defense, see Annex No 4 (omitted).

(h) For other corps troops, see Adm O No 9 (omitted) and March Table.

(x) (1) Unless otherwise ordered, the attack will be continued each morning at 5:00 AM.
(2) Deployment will be concealed.
(3) For movements, see March Table.

4. See Adm O No 9 (omitted).
Railheads, after 12:00 noon, 26 June.
I Corps: WALKER.
25th Div: PARKTON.
23d Div: WHITEHALL.
I and II Corps Cav: BLUE MOUNT.

5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication. See Annex No 5 (omitted).

(b) Axes of Signal Communication:
I Corps: RAYVILLE—VERONA—YORK TURNPIKE.
25th Div: STRINGTOWN—BUTLER—FALLS ROAD—ROCKLAND—MT WASHINGTON.
23d Div: PINE HILL—YORK TURNPIKE—GOVANS.
I and II Corps Cav: YORK TURNPIKE.

(c) Command Posts.
I Corps: RAYVILLE until 11:00 PM June 25 then VERONA.
Gp A,AA: HAMPSTEAD until 11:00 PM June 25 then VERONA.
25th Div: STRINGTOWN until 10:00 PM June 26, then SHAWAN.
23d Div: PINE HILL until 10:00 PM, June 26, then COCKEYSVILLE.
I and II Corps Cav: After 6:00 PM June 25: YORK TURNPIKE 1 mile north of ASHLAND.

By command of Major General B,

Y

Chief of Staff.

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Distribution A
and to:

CO I Corps Cav.
CO II Corps Cav.
CG Gp A,AA.
CO 5th Hv Tk Bn.
CO 6th L Tk Bn.
CO 7th L Tk Bn.

See table, page 161.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF FOR ACTION TAKEN.—*a. The Mission of the I Corps.*—The I Corps makes the envelopment. It must make a deep drive in order to outflank the enemy positions on Chestnut Ridge, Cronhardt Ridge and ridge south of Green Spring Valley.

*b. Plan of Maneuver to Carry Out Mission.*—(1) The ground along the York Turnpike is most suitable for a rapid advance but it is overlooked by high ground on both the east and the west. This high ground must be taken or neutralized in order that a deep drive may succeed. This ground presents a formidable obstacle to a frontal attack. The left of the II Corps operates against Chestnut Ridge and Cronhardt Ridge from the northwest. The 2d Cavalry Division can be expected to give aid as far as the high ground east of Texas is concerned. If General B can take the crest of the high ground to the west of York Turnpike and neutralize the enemy's positions on the high ground between Merryman Branch and Western Run, the 23d Division should be able to advance rapidly down York Turnpike. The 25th Division, by operating against Chestnut Ridge, and Cronhardt Ridge, from the northeast, should be able, successively, to outflank these positions, and, in conjunction with the left of the II Corps, at least confine, if not decisively defeat the enemy in this area, thus allowing the 23d Division to make a deep drive.

(2) The maneuver expected is shown on the operation map rather than described in detail in the field order. The plan is discussed at the commanders' conference which has been called at about the time that the field order will be ready.

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## c. MARCH TABLE, I CORPS—To accompany FO No 7, 25 June 21.

| *Organization* | *Date* | *From* | *To* | *Route* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25th Div | Night June 25–26 | Vicinity of STRINGTOWN. | SHAWAN—OREGON front. | All roads in zone except as prescribed for artillery. | Movement to positions to be concealed. I and II Corps Cavalry to be relieved by midnight June 25–26 and moved to left. |
| 23d Div | Night June 25–26. | Vicinity of PINEHILL. | OREGON—MARBLE HILL front. | All roads in zone except as prescribed for artillery. | Movement to positions to be concealed. I Corps Cavalry on its front to be relieved by midnight June 25–26 and moved to left. |
| II Corps Cav | Night June 25–26 | North of SHAWAN | ASHLAND—GUNPOWDER FALLS front. | Roads between divisions and front and by arrangements with divisions. | Movement through zones of 25th and 23d Divisions under control of those divisions. |
| I Corps Cav | Night June 25–26 | North of MARBLE HILL | ASHLAND—GUNPOWDER FALLS front. | Roads between divisions and front and by arrangements with divisions. | Movement through zones of 25th and 23d Divisions under control of those divisions. |
| Gp A, AA (less F Tn, Am Tn, and Obsn Sq) | Night June 25–26 | BEREAN | Vicinity of BUTLER | FALLS ROAD | Start 8:00 PM, clear BEREAN 11:00 PM, clear BUTLER 12:00 midnight. |
| | Night June 26–27 | BUTLER | Line CRONHARDT—TEXAS. | FALLS ROAD and OREGON—TEXAS Road. | 904th Arty (8 inch) via OREGON—TEXAS road. Start 8:00 PM, Clear TEXAS 10:00 PM<br>901st Arty (155 mm guns) via FALLS ROAD—SHAWAN—616. Start 8:00 PM. Clear 616 10:00 PM.<br>902d Arty follow 901st Arty. Start 11:00 PM. Clear 616, 1:00 AM. |
| F Tn and Am Tn Gp A, AA. | June 26 | BEREAN | BUTLER | FALLS ROAD | See Administrative Orders.<br>Obs Sq, no change. |
| 103d FA (155 mm How) (less F Tn) | Night June 25–26 | MONKTON | 1 mile south of PHILOPOLIS | MONKTON—ST JAMES CORNER—SPARKS. | Start at 12:00 midnight; clear PHILOPOLIS 2:30 AM. |
| | Night June 26–27 | South of PHILOPOLIS. | Vicinity of TIMONIUM. | YORK TURNPIKE. | Start 1:00 AM; clear TIMONIUM at 3:30 AM. |
| 104th FA (155 mm Gun) (less F Tn) | Night June 25–26 | WIESBURG | West of PHILOPOLIS. | HEREFORD—YORK TURNPIKE. | Start 8:00 PM; clear PHILOPOLIS 11:00 PM. |
| | Night June 26–27 | PHILOPOLIS. | TEXAS. | YORK TURNPIKE. | Start 6:00 PM; complete movement 8:00 PM. |
| Remainder 101st FA Brig | June 26 | | | | See Arty Annex and Adm O. Elements of Observation Battalion will go forward with regiments. |
| 901st Cml Am Tn (less Dets with divs) | Night June 25–26 | EKLO | 23d Div | RAYVILLE—WEISBURG—HEREFORD. | Start 11:00 PM. |
| A Tks | June 25 | NEW FREEDOM | PARKTON | By rail. | The heavy and 1 light bn report to 23d Div at 5:00 PM. |
| Other corps troops | No change except as indicated in Annex No 4 and Adm O. Movements in division areas on nights June 25–26 and June 26–27 will be reduced to a minimum. | | | | |

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*c. Information to Permit Reconnaissance.*—General B, in his warning order, must give some information as to the attack. He does not yet know his western boundary. He knows that Chestnut Ridge must be enveloped, and so assigns tentative fronts and missions to divisions to allow for reconnaissance and such movements as may be made during the day. He can decide now as to a drive along York Turnpike.

*d. Missions Assigned Various Units.*—(1) *The 23d Division* is assigned a relatively narrow front astride the York Turnpike in order to ensure a deep drive to outflank the Green Spring Valley position. The formation should be in column of brigades as is indicated by the narrow front.

(2) *The 25th Division* is given the mission of taking the high ground west of York Turnpike, thus leaving the 23d Division free to make a deep advance. The maneuver expected is a rapid advance with the left, thus outflanking and boxing in the enemy on Chestnut Ridge and Cronhardt Ridge, and assuring possession of the crest overlooking York Turnpike. The bulk of the division would be massed on the left. A relatively wide front is assigned to permit maneuver. The left of the II Corps will have to execute a similar maneuver against Chestnut Ridge and Cronhardt Ridge from the west.

(3) By utilizing the *Chemical Ammunition Train* with the 23d Division, the hostile positions east of Cockeysville and north of Merryman Branch can be so neutralized as to allow the ground to be cleaned up by the two corps cavalry regiments. After completion of this operation, the cavalry can pass to corps reserve for use elsewhere. The 2d Cavalry Division no doubt will help further south.

*e. Depth and Continuation of Attack.*—An advance of about 6 miles is ordered for the 26th, in order to pass through the enemy's artillery positions and to get into position for carrying the Green Spring Valley line. A renewal of the attack at 5:00 AM each morning is ordered to insure a concerted attack during the operation.

*f. Forward Displacement of Artillery.*—In order to facilitate the movement of division troops, and to allow divi-

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sion commanders to arrange for forward movement, the movements of the army and corps artillery are prescribed in the march table for two nights. These units take up much road space, and, with the exception of the 155-mm. howitzers, take from 4 to 6 hours for emplacement. The division artillery must move with the attack, hence it is ordered forward during the 26th. The movement of the heavy guns on the night of June 26-27 is made in such a way that some heavy guns are always in position. The corps 155-mm. guns will be in action before the last army 155-mm. gun starts its move. The corps 155-mm. howitzers are held in position until after midnight. These artillery movements might appear only in the artillery annex, but, on account of the road space involved, they are included in the march table as a ready reference for all commanders.

*g. Use of Tanks.*—Each division has a light tank battalion. Two-thirds of the army tanks are given the 23d Division, as it has the most favorable ground for their use. This will insure tanks for use against the Green Spring Valley position. The 23d Division may be able to assist the 25th Division at difficult places along the crest of the high ground overlooking York Turnpike. The light battalion, held at Parkton, provides for reserves.

*h. Use of Gas.*—The bulk of the gas should be concentrated on the most favorable ground, i.e., north of Merryman Branch and near Wolftrap Branch. A gas concentration in this area should permit the ground being cleaned up by the cavalry without any delay to the 23d Division.

*i. The Air Service.*—The air service is given an attack mission in addition to its usual mission. There is more air service than is needed for artillery uses and for observation.

*j. Movements Corps Troops and Trains.*—Movements of corps troops and trains are reduced to a minimum on the night of the deployment. The bulk of the corps troops do not have to move to perform their functions. After the division rear boundaries are moved forward, some troop movement orders may have to be issued for corps troops, depending on the development of the situation.

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# Part B

# THE II CORPS ATTACK


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Section I—Situation and Requirements | 5- 6 |
| Section II—A Solution | 7- 8 |


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twelfth Special Situation | 5 |
| Requirements | 6 |


5. TWELFTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.*—Geol. Surv., 1:62500, Westminster, Parkton, Ellicott, Baltimore and Taneytown quadrangles. Situation Map I Corps and II Corps, daylight 25 June 21.

*b.* The situation given in the eighth special situation, (Chapter VIII) is continued.

*c.* At daylight June 25, the situation of the II Corps is as shown on the Situation Map, I and II Corps, daylight June 25.

*d.* At 8:15 AM, June 25, the Commander, II Corps, receives the message, Third Army, dated 25 June, 8:00 AM (see Chapter VIII).

*e.* At 8:50 AM, June 25, the Commander, II Corps, receives a copy of Field Orders No. 4, Third Army, *Artillery*, dated 25 June 21, 8:30 AM (see Chapter IX).

*f.* At 11:30 AM, June 25, the Commander, II Corps, receives Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, dated 25 June 21, 11:00 AM (see Chapter VIII).

*g.* No important changes in the situation occurred on June 25, before the hour for the Commander, II Corps, to issue orders to carry out the instruction conveyed by the foregoing messages and orders.



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*h.* The weather is fair, with light wind from the southwest. Forecast for tomorrow: no change.

6. REQUIREMENTS. .

*a. First Requirement.*—Orders issued by II Corps to carry out Field Orders No. 7, Third Army.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Reasons in brief for actions taken.

Note:—a. The 201st FA (155 how), Co A 201st Bln Gp, and 1st Bn 902d Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co) are attached to the 1st Div.
b. The 202d FA (155 how), Co B 201st Bln Gp, and 2d Bn 901st Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co) are attached to the 3d Div.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Orders | 7 |
| Reasons | 8 |

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7. ORDERS ISSUED BY II CORPS.

*a. Messages.*

II Corps,
HAMPSTEAD,
25 June 21, 8:30 AM.

To Commanders:
1st Division.
3d Division.
II Corps Artillery.
II Corps Air Service.

Third Army attacks tomorrow enveloping Red right located on CHESTNUT RIDGE. II Corps will issue orders for this attack at 2:00 PM today.

As a preliminary operation to the general attack tomorrow, the IV Corps and the right of the II Corps attack within their respective zones at 4:00 PM today to clear the REISTERSTOWN area by advancing the line to the general line NORRIS BRANCH — ST GEORGE — road junction 442 — BIG SPRINGS road. II Corps will issue orders for the preliminary attack at 10:30 AM today. In the meantime, reconnaissance and preparations will be made for the preliminary attack today and the general attack tomorrow.

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The 1st Division will remain concealed today. Special precautions will be taken to see that its location is not discovered by the enemy.

The 3d Division will carry out the II Corps attack today. It will be supported by corps and army artillery.

The 203d FA (155 mm how) will move at once to positions near FAIRVIEW, via CR south of ARCADIA—FAIRVIEW. It will clear CR south of ARCADIA by 10:00 AM.

The 204th FA (155 mm gun) will move at once to positions 2 miles east of PLEASANT GROVE via TRENTON and BLACK ROCK ROAD. It will clear BLACK ROCK ROAD by 10:00 AM.

Air service will carry out intensive reconnaissance of hostile positions within corps zone of action to beyond hostile second position. Information of hostile positions and dispositions desired by 11:30 AM today.

X,
Chief of Staff.

*b. Orders for Preliminary Attack.*

II Corps,
HAMPSTEAD,
25 June 21, 10:30 AM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 10. }

Map: Geol Surv, 1:62500. Operation Map II Corps to accompany FO No. 10, 25 June 21.

1. (a) The Reds have strengthened their first intrenched position extending through HOLBROOK—REISTERSTOWN—ridge southeast of GLYNDON, and their second intrenched position extending through HARRISONVILLE—BELLTOWN south of THE CAVES—south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. In front of their first intrenched position, the Red advanced position extending through TYLER—east of 633—north of 682—about 623 and 629—spur north of EMORY GROVE—ridge east of 397 (south of DELAWARE RUN)—spur south of BIG SPRING—OREGON road offered stubborn resistance to the advance guards of the IV Corps, and the right of the II Corps early today. Groups of Red artillery (75s and 155s) have been located in vicinity of WARDS CHAPEL—DELIGHT—BELLTOWN and east of GWYNBROOK.

(b) The Third Army attacks on June 26, enveloping Red right located on CHESTNUT RIDGE.

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(c) As a preliminary operation, the IV Corps, and the right of the II Corps, supported by army artillery and army air service, attack at 4:00 PM today to clear the area of REISTERSTOWN by advancing to the general line NORRIS BRANCH—ST GEORGE—road junction 442—BIG SPRING.

2. (a) II Corps attacks in conjunction with the IV Corps at 4:00 PM today, and prepares for the general attack tomorrow.

(b) Zones of Action:

II Corps: no change.

3d Division: left boundary changed to include DOVER—MANTUA—BIG SPRINGS.

1st Division: changed as above.

3. (a) 3d Division, supported by corps and army artillery, and the artillery of the 1st Division, will carry out the attack of the II Corps at 4:00 PM today. It will seize the spurs northeast of EMORY GROVE and west of road junction 442 in cooperation with the 22d Division on its right, and it will seize the hills north and west of BIG SPRING and carry the line to spur 1000 yards south of road junction 486—road junction 442—BIG SPRING road.

(b) 1st Division (less artillery) remains concealed today and prepares for the general attack tomorrow.

(c) The II Corps Cavalry will hold the high ground north of DEADMAN RUN and support by fire the attack of the 3d Division against the hill north of BIG SPRING.

(d) (1) Groupment A, Army Artillery, from positions near BEREAN, the 204th Field Artillery (155 mm gun) from positions 2 miles east of PLEASANT GROVE, the 203d Field Artillery (155 mm how) from positions near FAIRVIEW, and the 1st Field Artillery Brigade (1st Division), from positions 1 mile northeast of DOVER, support the attack of the 3d Division today.

(2) Corps and army artillery are charged with counter battery and distant interdiction fires. All guns not needed for this work will support the infantry advance by firing on successive objectives beyond zones of division artillery. Non-persistent gas will be used against the ridge south of THE CAVES and the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

(3) Division artillery will support the infantry advance. The 1st Field Artillery Brigade will

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be assigned mission by the 3d Division. Division artillery will employ non-persistent gas against selected points of the hostile intrenched position extending from Hill 709 to the east along CHESTNUT RIDGE; this fire to cease not later than 4:15 PM. It will employ smoke to blind observation stations along that line. The Commander, 3d Division, may make additional use of gas and smoke at his discretion.

(4) Artillery will open fire for the attack today at 4:00 PM.

(5) Groupment B, Army Artillery, from positions near PLEASANT GROVE, supports the IV Corps.

(e) The 201st Observation Squadron will carry out intensive reconnaissance within the corps zone of advance as far south as BALTIMORE.

(f) Anti-aircraft defense, no change in mission.

(g) Other corps troops—See Administrative Order No 12 (omitted).

(x) All units will prepare for the general attack for tomorrow.

4. See Administrative Order No 12 (omitted).

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
II Corps: HAMPSTEAD—ARCADIA—DOVER.
1st Division: Same as II Corps.
3d Division: FAIRVIEW—to 1 mile south—thence 1½ miles southeast, thence south to RJ 486.

(b) Command Posts:
II Corps: HAMPSTEAD.
1st Division: PLEASANT GROVE.
3d Division: FAIRVIEW.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution (omitted).

*c. Orders for General Attack.*

II Corps,
HAMPSTEAD,
25 June 21, 2:00 PM.

FIELD ORDER }
No. 11. }

Map: Geol. Surv., 1:62500.

1. (a) There have been no important developments in the hostile situation on the front of the II Corps since

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Field Orders No 10, II Corps, was issued (see FO No 10, II Corps, dated 25 June 21, 10:30 AM).

To the east of the II Corps, some intrenchments have been discovered on the high ground near WOLFTRAP BR and MERRYMAN BRANCH. During the 24th, Red cavalry detachments were observed about LUTHERVILLE and TOWSON, a concentration of dismounted troops about LAKE ROLAND, and continuous movements of Reds to the northwest of BALTIMORE.

(b) The Third Army attacks enveloping the Red right. A general attack will be launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow on the front east of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO.

(c) III Corps attacks south of the PATUXENT RIVER.

IV Corps, securing this date the general line NORRIS BRANCH—ST GEORGE—ridge west of 442, advances tomorrow to the line RANDALLSTOWN—SUDBROOK PARK. It will drive hard with its left and secure the high ground on both banks of GWYNNS FALLS.

I Corps will envelop the hostile right and drive the enemy southwest of BALTIMORE. It will carry CHESTNUT RIDGE in conjunction with the II Corps and turn the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by a rapid advance in the direction LUTHERSVILLE—ARLINGTON.

2. (a) II Corps, securing today the general line spur 1000 yards south of road junction 486—road junction 442—BIG SPRING will advance tomorrow south of the line SUDBROOK PARK—ARLINGTON (exclusive). It will drive hard with its right, and, in conjunction with the I Corps, will carry in quick succession CHESTNUT RIDGE, the ridge south of THE CAVES, and the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. The attack tomorrow will be launched at 5:00 AM.

(b) Zones of action: (See Operation Map, II Corps to acompany FO No 10, 25 June 21.)

II Corps: West boundary, no change.

East boundary, from BEREAN (excl) to include road junction 482—CRONHARDT—STEVENSON—ARLINGTON.

3d Division: West boundary: same as corps.

East boundary: after 8:00 PM today changed from DOVER (exclusive) to include road junction 442—NORTH RUN north of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

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Rear boundary: no change.

1st Division: West boundary: same as east boundary 3d Division.

East boundary: same as corps.

Rear boundary: no change.

3. (a) The 3d Division will attack at 4:00 PM today and advance the line to the general line, spur 1000 yards south of road junction 486—road junction 442—BIG SPRING. (See FO No 10, II Corps.) Tomorrow, attacking within its reduced zone, it will drive hard with its left and seize in rapid succession Hill 709, ridge south of THE CAVES, and ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. Units of the 3d Division, within the new zone of the 1st Division, will be relieved by the latter by midnight June 25-26.

(b) The 1st Division (less 1 battalion) will remain concealed during daylight today. Tomorrow, attacking within the zone assigned, it will drive hard with its right and assist the advance of the 3d Division. It will envelop CHESTNUT RIDGE from the west and cooperate with the 25th Division of the I Corps in mopping up that ridge. It then will assemble as reserve, south of CHESTNUT RIDGE, and prepare for further attacks. Its artillery will be prepared to advance to assist the 3d Division in the capture of the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. The II Corps Cavalry on its front will be relieved by 12:00 midnight and moved to the east.

(c) (1) Groupment A, Army Artillery, II Corps artillery, and 1st Field Artillery Brigade support the attack of the 3d Division today. (See FO No 10, II Corps.)

For the attack tomorrow:

Groupment A, Army Artillery supports the I Corps.

Groupment B, Army Artillery from position southwest of DOVER, supports the II and IV Corps.

The 203d Field Artillery, from positions 1½ miles east of WOODENSBURG, and the 204th Field Artillery, from positions northeast of MANTUA, support the 1st and 3d Divisions.

(2) Artillery opens fire for attack tomorrow at 4:30 AM.

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(3) Corps and army artillery is charged with counter battery, distant interdiction, and harassing fire. All guns not required for these missions will support the infantry advance by firing on successive objectives beyond the zone of division artillery. The hostile positions on ridge south of THE CAVES and south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY will be harassed and interdicted, and hostile reserves prevented from occupying them. Non-persistent gas will be employed on the ridge south of THE CAVES until 9:00 AM, and on the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY until 10:00 AM. The advance of the infantry will be covered by concentrations on sensitive points. The main effort will be concentrated on the left of the 3d Division and the right of the 1st Division.

(4) Division artillery will employ smoke to blind observation stations on Hill 709, Hill ½ mile northeast of Hill 709, Hill 730 and main observation points on CHESTNUT RIDGE. Division commanders may employ non-persistent gas within their zones of advance. For points within 2000 yards of their eastern boundary, arrangements will be made with divisions on their left.

(5) Artillery will follow the advance closely. Division artillery will precede corps and army artillery (see March Table attached).

(6) See Annex No 1, Artillery (omitted).

(d) The air service: The corps squadrons will carry out intensive reconnaissance within corps zone of action to BALTIMORE. Army air service attacks Red ground troops on CHESTNUT RIDGE at 5:20 AM, and later, in conjunction with infantry, south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY.

See Annex No 2 (omitted).

(e) For Anti-Aircraft defense, see Annex No 3 (omitted).

(f) One battalion, 1st Division, will be stationed at PLEASANT GROVE as corps reserve.

(g) For other corps troops, see Administrative Order No 13 (omitted).

(x) (1) All movements of troops into position for the attack tomorrow will be made after dark, the enemy being kept in ignorance of the movements. Special precautions will be taken by

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the 1st Division to avoid observation. For details of movements see March Tables attached.

(2) Every effort will be made to carry rapidly, CHESTNUT RIDGE, the ridge south of THE CAVES and the ridges south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. The ridge south of THE CAVES will be seized by 2:00 PM tomorrow, and the ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY by 6:00 PM.

4. See Administrative Order No 13.

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

II Corps: HAMPSTEAD — ARCADIA — PLEASANT GROVE—DOVER—CHATTOLANEE.

3d Division: FAIRVIEW—to 1 mile south—thence 1½ miles southeast—thence south to road junction 486—road junction 442—Hill 709.

1st Division: PLEASANT GROVE — MANTUA — CRONHARDT.

(b) Command Posts:

II Corps: HAMPSTEAD until 11:00 PM, 25 June 21, then to ARCADIA.

1st Division and 3d Division, no change.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution (omitted).

See table page 173.

8. REASONS IN BRIEF FOR ACTION TAKEN.—*a. The Attack on June 25.*—(1) *Field Orders and Warning Message.*—The II Corps issues a formal field order for this attack in order to secure coordinated action. It will be some time before a formal field order can be prepared. Hence a warning message is issued at once for the following reasons.

(a) The 3d Division is notified at once in order that it will not continue to fritter away its strength in disconnected advance guard attacks, and in order that it may have as much time to prepare for the attack at 4:00 PM as possible.

(b) The Corps Artillery is ordered forward at once in order to prepare its positions for the attack at 4:00 PM, and in order to clear the roads for the movements of army artillery.

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## *d. March Table*—To accompany FO No 11, II Corps.

| *Organization* 1 | *Date* 2 | *From* 3 | *To* 4 | *Route* 5 | *Remarks* 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Div | Night June 25–26 | Vicinity of PLEASANT GROVE. | The RJ 482—442 front. | All roads in area when not assigned to other troops by this table. | Movement to position to be concealed. Units of 3d Div in 1st Div sector to be relieved by midnight June 25–26. Movement of trains to be reduced to minimum. See Adm O (omitted). |
| 3d Div | Night June 25–26 | Position at end of today's attack. | The RJ 442—spur 1 1-3 mi west of RJ 442 front. | All roads in area when not assigned to other troops by this table. | Troops of 3d Div in 1st Div area to be relieved by midnight June 25–26 by arrangement with commander 1st Div. |
| Gp B, AA (less F Tn, Am Tn, Obsn Sq) | Night June 25–26 | Vicinity of PLEASANT GROVE | SW of DOVER. | DOVER ROAD. | Start from PLEASANT GROVE 8:00 PM. Clear PLEASANT GROVE by 11:00 PM. Clear DOVER by 11:30 PM. |
| F Tns, and Am Tn, Gp B, AA. | June 26 | Vicinity of PLEASANT GROVE. | SW of DOVER. | DOVER ROAD. | Move during day of June 26. See Adm O (omitted) Obsn Sq. no change. |
| Gp B, AA (less F Tns Am Tn, and Obsn Sq). | Night June 26–27 | SW of DOVER. | 905th A (8″) and 906th A (8″) to north of CRONHARDT; 903d A (145) to 1 mi. west of GWYNBROOK. | 905th A (8″) and 906th A (8″) by DOVER—MANTUA—CRONHARDT road; 903d Hv A (155) RJ 415—RJ 442—HILL 709 road. | 205th A and 906th A begin movement 8:30 PM; clear DOVER, 10:30 PM; complete movement 11:45 PM. 903d A (155) begin movement 8:30 PM; clear RJ 405 at 9:30 PM; complete movement 10:30 PM. |
| 203d FA (155 How) Co C 2d Bln Gp (less F Tn). | Night June 25–26 | FAIRVIEW | 1½ miles east of WOODENSBURG. | FAIRVIEW to 1 mi south thence 1½ mi southeast thence south. | Start 8:00 PM; clear FAIRVIEW 9:00 PM; complete move[illegible]nt 10:00 PM. |
| 204th FA (155 Gun) Co D 2d Bln Gp (less F Tn). | Night June 25–26 | 2 mi east of PLEASANT GROVE | Northeast of MANTUA. | Secondary road leading south from present position then to road to MANTUA. | Start 8:00 PM; clear present position 9:00 PM; complete movement 10:00 PM. |
| Remainder 201st FA Brig | June 25–26–27 | Join troops during day, no movements during night June 25–26 and June 26–27. Elements of observation battalion go forward with regiments. See Adm O (omitted). | | | |
| 203d FA (155 How) | Night June 26–27 | 1½ mi east of WOODENSBURG. | To 1 mi west of CRONHARDT. | RJ 486—RJ 442—RJ 676—RJ 631 (NE of CRONHARDT). | Start 7:00 PM; clear position 7:45 PM; clear RJ 631 8:45 PM; complete movement 9:00 M. Precedes Gp B, AA, and 204th F A. |
| 204th FA (155 gun) | Night June 26–27 | Northeast of MANTUA. | 1 mi west of CRONHARDT. | MANTUA—CRONHARDT road to RJ 631. | Start 7:45 PM; clear MANTUA 8:30 PM; complete movement 9:30 PM. Precedes Gp B, AA. |
| Other corps troops | See Adm O and Annex No 3—anti-aircraft. No movements within division areas on night June 25–26 except in compliance with these orders. | | | | |

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(c) The Corps Air Service is ordered to carry out intensive reconnaissance at once in order that all information possible may be obtained for the attacks on the 25th and 26th.

(d) Units should be given as much time as possible to make reconnaissance and prepare for the two attacks.

(2) *1st Division, Except Artillery, Kept Concealed.*—The 1st Division, except artillery, is not used in the attack on June 25. It is necessary that its presence be kept concealed from the enemy. The artillery of the 1st Division should be employed to support the attack on June 25, 1921. This is necessary on account of the great front on which the 3d Division attacks, and also to carry out the spirit of the army commander's orders.

(3) *Plan of Maneuver.*—The 3d Division is ordered to seize spurs northeast of Emory Grove, south of road junction 486 and hills north and west of Big Spring. These are the key points of the hostile advance position within the 3d Division zone of advance. The enemy probably will attempt to hold these points. It is important that they be captured and mopped up today, in order that they may not interfere with tomorrow's attack. If these points are seized, the line may be readily carried to the general line spur 1000 yards south of road junction 486 and the road junction 442—Big Spring road. These points are mentioned in the corps order in order to insure their capture today, and in order to coordinate the action of the 3d Division and the corps and army artillery.

(4) *Use of Gas.*—(a) Non-persistent gas is employed against the hostile second position south of The Caves and Green Spring Valley on June 25th in order to delay its organization and occupation.

(b) Non-persistent gas is employed on the hostile first intrenched position on June 25th as long as its employment is considered safe. This will interfere with further organization of the position, and may disorganize and weaken it to a certain extent, thus facilitating its capture on June 26th.

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(5) *Use of Smoke.*—Smoke is used to blind the most important observation stations used by the enemy for control of artillery fire, and for command and intelligence.

(6) *Information Furnished Lower Units.*—All available information of the enemy is given in Field Order No. 10, in order that it may be used by the troops in preparing their plans for both attacks.

*b. The Attack on June 26.*—(1) *Factors Affecting Plan of Maneuver.*—In deciding upon the plan of maneuver of the II Corps, the following points should be considered:

(a) The area Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt is a natural stronghold. The features of the terrain within this area make it possible for the enemy to offer stubborn resistance for its defense. Although the information available early on June 25 does not show positively that this area is strongly held, it is reasonable to assume that it will be before the morning of June 26. Hence a penetration along the left boundary of the II Corps doubtless will meet stubborn resistance at Chestnut Ridge and at the natural defensive lines between Chestnut Ridge and Cronhardt.

(b) Hills 709 and 830 are key points to the hostile first intrenched position on this front. If captured, they furnish observation over the hostile communications as far south as Baltimore. Their capture permits the attack to envelop the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt area, and the Reisterstown area.

(c) The nearest point of the hostile second intrenched position is the ridge south of The Caves. By a rapid advance, this point may be seized before it is strongly occupied or reinforced. Its capture turns the hostile intrenched position to the west.

(d) That part of the ridge south of Chattolanee apparently does not constitute a part of the hostile second intrenched position. If it be seized, the hostile intrenched position to the east is turned.

(e) The I Corps makes its main effort with its left, enveloping the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt area from the

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east. The IV Corps drives hard with its left and seizes the high ground on both banks of Gwynn Falls.

(2) *Plan of Maneuver Adopted.*—Hence, in carrying out the mission of the army as a whole, it seems advisable for the II Corps to make its main effort with its right, envelop the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt area from the west, in cooperation with the I Corps, and seize important tactical points in the hostile second intrenched position before they can be strongly occupied or reinforced. This maneuver takes into consideration the natural and artificial terrain features, and permits cooperation with the I and IV Corps on the left and right.

(3) *Missions Assigned Various Units.*—The front of attack in the northern part of the II Corps zone is about four miles. If divided equally between divisions, rather wide fronts would be assigned for making a deep penetration. In its southern part it is contracted to about two miles. In order to carry out the maneuver, the front assigned to the 3d Division is greatly contracted and it is ordered to make the deep penetration. The front assigned to the 1st Division is wide and it is ordered to drive hard with its right and envelop the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt area from the west, and then assemble as reserves. This should insure a rapid and deep penetration and the prompt envelopment and capture of the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt area.

(4) *Artillery, Gas, Smoke.*—(a) Instructions sufficient to insure coordinated action between the Corps and army artillery, and the divisions are given in the body of the field order.

(b) The lack of definite information of hostile strength and lines of resistance makes the use of the rolling barrage seem undesirable.

(c) Gas is used against the hostile second intrenched position in order to neutralize and disorganize it, and to prevent its being occupied and reinforced. Thus it may be more easily seized by the rapid and deep penetration. Gas is used for this purpose as long as it is considered to be safe. Corps artillery is assigned this mission in order that divi-

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sion artillery may concentrate its efforts in support of the infantry.

(d) Smoke is used to blind the important observation stations used for control of hostile artillery fire, command, and intelligence.

(5) *Advancing Artillery During Attack.*—Plans have been prepared for the advance of the army and corps artillery on the nights of June 25-26 and June 26-27. This should permit divisions to prepare an orderly plan for the advance without interference from army and corps units, and supply columns. The movement of corps and army artillery, on the night of June 26-27, is so regulated that some elements of these units will be in action at all times, and all will be in position at daylight on the following day.

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## Part C

## DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES


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9. THE ATTACK ON JUNE 25.—*a. Character of the Attack.*—On June 25, the IV and II Corps carry out a preliminary operation with the object of seizing the hostile advance works and securing a good line of departure for the main attacks on the 26th. Army artillery and attack aviation support this preliminary attack.

*b. The Mission.*—The mission assigned the II Corps in the preliminary operations is as follows: "The IV Corps and II Corps, supported by army artillery and attack aviation, attack at 4:00 PM to clear area of Reisterstown by advancing to the general line Norris Branch—St. George and 442—Big Springs road."

*c. Teamplay.*—In carrying out its mission the II Corps should utilize the support given it by the army artillery and it should cooperate with the IV Corps in carrying out the attack of the two corps as a whole.

*d. Surprise.*—It is extremely important that the left of the II Corps be kept concealed in order that the main effort of the army on the 26th will not be prematurely disclosed to the enemy.

*e. Decisive Elements in the Attack.*—(1) What are the decisive elements in the II Corps attack on the 25th?

(2) If the spurs northeast of Emory Grove and west of 442 and the hills north and west of Big Springs be seized, the line may be carried to the objective assigned without difficulty. The seizure of the spurs northeast of Emory Grove and west of 442 will also assist the IV Corps in the



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accomplishment of the maneuver of the two corps as a whole.

*f. Plan of Maneuver to Obtain Decisive Elements.*—(1) What plan of maneuver should be employed for seizing the spurs and hills mentioned above?

(2) Hostile observation stations along hill 709—Chestnut Ridge should be blinded and neutralized by smoke and gas, while the infantry, supported by artillery, advance and envelop the spurs and hills mentioned.

*g. Mission Assigned the Various Units for Carrying Out the Maneuver.*—(1) How should the units of the corps be employed and the fire power of all arms be combined for carrying out this maneuver?

(2) The 3d Division may be employed to seize the spurs and hills mentioned, while the artillery blinds and neutralizes the hostile observation along hill 709—Chestnut Ridge, and furnishes close support to the attack. The division artillery is the best for the latter purpose. Considering the front of attack, it would be well to utilize the division artillery of the 1st Division to support the 3d Division. The II Corps cavalry may assist by supporting fire.

*h. Movements of Corps and Army Artillery.*—In order to be emplaced in time for the attack, corps and army artillery should be moved to positions promptly.

10. THE ATTACK ON JUNE 26.—*a. The Maneuver of the Army as a Whole.*—In the attack on June 26, the maneuver of the army, as a whole, provides for the III Corps, 1st Cavalry Brigade and IV Corps to make a holding attack while the II Corps, I Corps and 2d Cavalry Division strike the decisive blow, by enveloping the Red right. Army artillery and attack aviation support the attack of the II Corps and I Corps.

*b. Teamplay by I and II Corps.*—The plan of action of the II and I Corps should be such that it will best carry out the specific missions assigned them, utilize the support furnished by the army artillery and attack aviation, and cooperate with adjacent units in carrying out the maneuver of the army as a whole.

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11. THE I CORPS ATTACK, JUNE 26.—*a. The Mission.*—The I Corps, reinforced by the cavalry of the I and II Corps and Army Tanks, is ordered to envelop the hostile right and drive the enemy southwest of Baltimore. While carrying Chestnut Ridge, in conjunction with the II Corps, and the ridge of Wolftrap Branch, it will turn the ridge south of Green Spring Valley by a rapid advance in the general direction of Luthersville—Arlington.

*b. Decisive Elements in the Attack.*—(1) What are the decisive elements in the I Corps attack?

(2) In order to accomplish its mission, the I Corps must make a deep and rapid advance, turn the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, and advance in the direction of Luthersville—Arlington. This will completely envelop the hostile defensive zone (both first and second positions), and assist materially in the reduction of the hostile defensive zone to the west, and in breaking down the hostile control and morale. Any objective short of the ridge south of Green Spring Valley will not accomplish the desired results.

(3) The greater the surprise with which the blow is struck, and the more powerful and more aggressive the action, the greater will be the decisive results.

*c. Plan of Maneuver to Obtain the Decisive Elements.*—(1) What plan of maneuver should be employed to reach promptly the ridge south of Green Spring Valley?

(2) The zone of action assigned to the I Corps is some 5½ to 7 miles in width. The depth of the advance required is some 6 miles. With only two divisions available, and supported or reinforced only by one group of army artillery, the attack aviation and army tanks, the I Corps will not be able to strike a powerful blow on its whole front. Sufficient artillery, machine guns and tanks are not available for furnishing a powerful support for an attack on its whole front. Nor is sufficient infantry available for making a powerful attack on the whole of that front and, at the same time, for holding out reserves for continuing the pressure. And furthermore, should the I Corps attempt to reduce the whole of its zone as it advances, it will be unnecessarily delayed in reaching a decisive position on the ridge

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south of Green Spring Valley. The more promptly this position is reached, the more decisive will be the results. The I Corps, therefore, should concentrate its main effort on a part of its front, with the object of making a deep and rapid advance to reach a position on the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, while neutralizing and reducing the remaining strongholds of its zone by envelopment.

(3) In planning the maneuver of the corps as a whole, for accomplishing the above, the following points deserve consideration:

(a) The area Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt (including high ground overlooking York Turnpike) constitutes a natural stronghold. It has been organized for defense. Any frontal attack made against the part of this stronghold within the I Corps zone will no doubt meet stubborn resistance, hence the progress of the advance doubtless will be slow.

This stronghold may be taken more readily by envelopment from the east by the I Corps, and envelopment from the west by the II Corps.

(b) The area of Wolftrap Branch—Merryman Branch is naturally strong. Also some work has been done in organizing it for defense. A frontal attack against this area no doubt will be slow. This area may be taken best by envelopment from the west.

(c) The high ground Merryman Branch—Timonium is naturally strong. The 2d Cavalry Division will assist in overcoming any resistance which may be encountered in this area by turning it from the east and south.

(d) The ground along York Turnpike is favorable for making a deep and rapid advance. For such an advance to succeed, however, the hostile observation overlooking York Turnpike from the east and west either must be neutralized by gas or smoke, or seized and held.

(e) Blue observation for supporting the attack is more favorable for an attack along York Turnpike than on any other part of the zone of action.

(4) The best plan of maneuver for the I Corps, therefore, appears to be to concentrate its main effort for mak-

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ing a deep and rapid advance along York Turnpike, to seize promptly the high ground about Timonium, and turn the ridge south of Green Spring Valley; while seizing or neutralizing the area Wolftrap Branch—Merryman Branch, and enveloping the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold (including high ground overlooking York Turnpike) from the east, in conjunction with a similar envelopment of the same stronghold by the II Corps from the west.

*d. Missions Assigned Various Units to Carry Out Maneuver.*—(1) How should the units of the corps be employed and the fire of all arms be combined for carrying out this maneuver?

(2) One division may be employed for making the deep and rapid advance along York Turnpike to seize promptly the high ground about Timonium and turn the ridge south of Green Spring Valley. For this purpose, it should be assigned a narrow front and be assisted by other units and arms as indicated below. It should be strongly reinforced by tanks.

(3) One division may be employed for enveloping from the east the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold (including high ground overlooking York Turnpike) and thereby assist the advance of the division making the main effort and cooperate with the II Corps in the reduction of that stronghold. The zone of action assigned should be suitable for making the envelopment. The I and II Corps Cavalry, supported by artillery and assisted by the division making the main effort, may be employed for neutralizing and reducing the Merryman Branch—Wolftrap Branch area. This permits the division making the main effort to make a more rapid advance, thus conserving its strength for the decisive blow.

(4) (a) The artillery may be employed as follows: to assist in breaking down hostile resistance along York Turnpike in front of the main effort; to neutralize (by smoke, gas, and high explosive) the hostile observation stations in the areas Wolftrap Branch, Merryman Branch, Timonium, and high ground overlooking York Turnpike from the west; to neutralize the hostile fire, especially that

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of the hostile artillery and supporting arms; to pin hostile reserves to the ground, thus preventing them from occupying the high ground about Timonium, and the ridge south of Green Spring Valley in front of the main effort; to interfere with the hostile communications and supply; and, finally, to assist in the reduction of the strongholds of the zone. The main effort of the artillery should be directed towards supporting and assisting the advance of the main effort of the corps. This does not mean, necessarily, that the greater part of its fire will be placed in front of the main effort, but rather on hostile elements which may interfere with the advance of the main effort.

(b) The lack of definite information as to hostile dispositions and the extent of the front of attack makes progressive concentrations, for the support of the attack, preferable to a rolling barrage. An effective rolling barrage could be provided for only a small part of the front of attack.

(5) The bombing group, army air service, will assist by bombing hostile artillery, and by preventing hostile Red troop movements on roads north of Baltimore. The attack group, army air service, at 5:20 AM, will assist ground troops in carrying the eastern edge of the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold (including high ground overlooking York Turnpike), and, later, in turning the ridge south of Green Spring Valley.

12. THE II CORPS ATTACK, JUNE 26.—*a. Mission.*—The mission assigned the II Corps, for the attack on June 26, is to advance south of the general line Sudbrook Park—Arlington. It is to assist the left of the IV Corps. At the same time, its main effort is to be in conjunction with the I Corps, so directed as to carry Chestnut Ridge, the ridge south of The Caves, and the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, in quick succession.

*b. Decisive Elements in the Attack.*—(1) What will produce the most decisive results in the II Corps attack for carrying out the mission assigned the II Corps and for assisting in the maneuver of the army as a whole?

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(2) If the II Corps makes a deep and rapid advance and seizes the ridge south of The Caves, it will assist in breaking down the hostile control and morale; it will assist in reducing the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold, and in preventing hostile reserves on the II Corps front from being employed to check the envelopment made by the I Corps and 2d Cavalry Division; and it will turn the hostile defensive zone to the west, thus assisting the advance of the left of the IV Corps. If this advance be promptly continued, to seize a foothold on the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, the results will be still more decisive.

*c. Plan of Maneuver to Obtain the Decisive Elements.* —(1) What plan of maneuver should be employed by the II Corps for the prompt seizure of the ridges south of The Caves and south of Green Spring Valley?

(2) The zone of action assigned the II Corps is some 4 miles in width along the objective assigned for the 25th, and some 2½ miles in width south of Green Spring Valley. The depth of the advance required, to reach the ridge south of The Caves, is about 3½ miles, and, to reach the ridge south of Green Spring Valley, about 5 miles. The II Corps, therefore, should concentrate its main effort on a part of its front in order that the force employed to seize the ridge south of The Caves, and south of Green Spring Valley, be not delayed while all hostile strongholds in the zone are being reduced (for reasons see par. 11*c* above).

(3) (a) The part of the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold in the II Corps zone no doubt will offer serious resistance, thus causing serious delay to a rapid advance in the eastern part of the corps zone of action. This stronghold preferably should be enveloped from the west by the II Corps, in cooperation with an envelopment from the east by the I Corps.

(b) If hill 709 be seized, it will assist in the envelopment of Chestnut Ridge and the Reisterstown area. In the right of the corps zone of action, this ridge is the only place, between our front and the ridge south of The Caves, that is favorable to hostile resistance.

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(4) The best plan of maneuver for the II Corps seems, therefore, to be to make its main effort with its right; promptly to seize hill 709, the ridge south of The Caves, and the ridge south of Green Spring Valley; while enveloping the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold from the west, in cooperation with the I Corps, and assisting the advance of the left of the IV Corps.

*d. Surprise.*—Surprise, in the location, direction, and time of attack, accompanied by a powerful and aggressive main effort, are important elements for the attack.

*e. Missions Assigned Various Units to Carry Out the Maneuver.*—(1) How should the units of the corps be employed and the fire power of all arms be combined for executing the above maneuver?

(2) The right division should be assigned a narrow front and ordered to make a deep and rapid advance to seize hill 709, the ridge south of The Caves and the ridge south of Green Spring Valley.

(3) The left division should be employed to envelop the Chestnut Ridge—Cronhardt stronghold from the west, and to drive hard in the direction 730—Cronhardt to assist and protect the advance of the right division. It should be given a zone of action suitable for that purpose.

(4) The artillery should be employed to assist the maneuver of the corps as a whole and that of its divisions. In this attack, it may be employed to assist in breaking down hostile resistance in front of the main effort; to neutralize hostile observation stations along 709—Chestnut Hill Ridge; to neutralize the hostile fire, especially that of the hostile artillery and supporting arms; to neutralize the ridges south of The Caves and south of Green Spring Valley, and roads leading to them, by gas and high explosives, and to interfere with their being occupied by hostile reserves before our own advance seizes them. In the above, division artillery furnishes close support to the infantry, while corps and army artillery furnish counter battery and the more distant fire.

(5) The bombardment group, army air service, bombs hostile artillery and prevents Red troop movement on roads

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leading north from Baltimore, while the attack group assists the advance of the main effort in taking hill 709—730, and, later, south of Green Spring Valley.

*f. Troop Movements.*—(1) In both the I Corps and II Corps attack, arrangements must be made for moving troops to positions for the attack. It is important that these movements be concealed in every possible way. The heavier guns of the corps artillery and the army artillery require considerable time to be emplaced for attack; hence sufficient time must be allowed for this purpose.

(2) During the attack, artillery should follow up the attack closely. To insure that this may be done arrangements should be made before the attack is launched for its forward displacement.

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## Part D

## *Topics Suggested for Study*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Attack of II Corps, June 25 | 13 |
| Attack of I Corps, June 26 | 14 |
| Attack of II Corps, June 26 | 15 |


13. ATTACK OF II CORPS, June 25.

*a.* Hostile situation:

(1) Hostile works—advanced works, main positions.

(2) Strength of hostile forces occupying the advanced works—intentions—hostile support for the advanced works.

*b.* Mission of the II Corps and plan of maneuver for carrying out mission:

(1) Mission.

(2) Decisive elements for the attack.

(3) Maneuver to secure the decisive elements.

(4) Cooperation with II Corps.

*c.* Employment of units of corps and fire power of all arms to carry out maneuver adopted.

(1) Divisions.

(2) Artillery: division, corps, and army; gas, smoke.

(3) II Corps cavalry.

*d.* Movements to positions for attack.

*e.* Orders for attack: form, brevity, clearness, completeness, time of issue.

14. ATTACK OF I CORPS, June 26.

*a.* Hostile Situation:

(1) Hostile intrenched positions and strongholds.

(2) Strength, composition, location, and intentions of hostile troops in front of I Corps, and of hostile reserves which may be employed on that front.

*b.* The mission of the I Corps and plan of maneuver to carry out its mission:

(1) Mission.



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(2) Decisive elements in the I Corps attack; discuss others than those given in the solution.

(3) Maneuver to secure the decisive results; discuss others, in addition to that given in the solution.

(4) Cooperation with II Corps and 2d Cavalry Division in the maneuver of the army as a whole.

*c.* Employment of units of the corps, and fire power of all arms, for maneuver given in the solution, and for other plans of maneuver.

(1) Divisions: missions, zones of action, cooperation with adjacent divisions.

(2) I and II Corps cavalry.

(3) Artillery: special targets and missions to assist maneuver.

(4) Air Service (Army): special targets and missions to assist in maneuver.

(5) Tanks.

*d.* Movements to positions for attack.

*e.* Orders for the attack.—Form, brevity, clearness, time of issue.

15. ATTACK OF II CORPS, June 26.

*a.* Hostile situation:

(1) Hostile intrenched positions and strongholds.

(2) Strength, composition, location and intentions of enemy in front of II Corps, and of hostile reserves which may be employed on that front.

*b.* Mission of II Corps and plan of maneuver for carrying out mission:

(1) Mission.

(2) Decisive elements in II Corps attack; discuss others than those given in solution.

(3) Maneuver to secure decisive results; discuss others in addition to that given in the solution.

(4) Cooperation with I and IV Corps in maneuver of army as a whole.

*c.* Employment of units of the corps and fire power of all arms to carry out the maneuver given in the solution and for other plans of maneuver.

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(1) Divisions: missions, zones of action; cooperation with adjacent divisions.

(2) Artillery: special targets and missions to assist maneuver.

(3) Air Service (army): special targets and missions to assist maneuver.

*d.* Movements to positions for attack.

*e.* Orders.—Form, brevity, clearness, completeness, time of issue.

## *Maps*

G3 Situation Map, I and II Corps (daylight June 25).
Operation Map, I Corps (to accompany F.O. No. 7).
Operation Map, II Corps (to accompany F.O. No. 10).

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# CHAPTER XII

# *The III Corps Withdraws*


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Maps following page 208.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Thirteenth Special Situation (June 26th) | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. THIRTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.*—Geol. Surv., 1:62500. Situation Map, III Corps, noon 26 June 21.

*b. The 11th and 30th Divisions.*—The attack of the III Corps on 25 June 21 (see Chapter VI) at first made considerable progress on its right, in front of the 30th and 11th Divisions, but finally was brought to a halt that day on the general line north of Emory Grove—north of Redland—west of Mt. Zion—Sunshine—Triadelphia. The opposition comprised infantry and artillery.

*c. The 1st Cavalry Division.*—The 1st Cavalry Division, following the right flank of the 30th Division, reached the general line north of Emory Grove—north of Gaithersburg—north of Clopper—thence along the Great Seneca to the Potomac. Stubborn resistance was encountered along the line Emory Grove—Gaithersburg—Clopper. Hostile cavalry only was encountered on this front. Several attempts were made by the hostile cavalry during the after-



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noon to break through the Blue cavalry towards Old Germantown.

*d. The 20th Division.*—On the left front of the III Corps, the 20th Division reinforced by the III Corps cavalry, drove in the hostile outpost and carried their line to the front of the hostile intrenched position extending along ridge west of Mountview—through Ivory and Glenelg, but was unable to carry the intrenched position on account of the stubborn resistance offered by the opposing infantry and artillery. The strength of the hostile artillery on this front was greater than that of the Blues. The line reached on June 25 by the 20th Division and the III Corps cavalry extended from Sykesville—along Sykesville Road to hostile intrenched position—thence along hostile intrenched position to Glenelg—thence to Triadelphia where it connected up with the 11th Division. Hostile cavalry was encountered north of Mountview.

*e. Air Service.*—On the front of the III Corps, the hostile air service had superiority in the air during the afternoon of June 25, repeatedly breaking through the Blue screen. Despite repeated efforts, the Blue air service was unable to penetrate the hostile screen.

*f. Hostile Identifications and Disposition.*—G2 reports to include 8:00 PM, June 25th, contained the following Red identifications and dispositions:

21st Red Division: vicinity Mountview to the south.

Red Cavalry, X Red Corps: Mountview to the north.

24th Red Division: on the Sunshine front.

25th Red Division: on the Mt. Zion front.

Red Cavalry, XI Corps: Redland—Emory Grove.

1st Red Cavalry Division: Gaithersburg to the west and southwest.

Red heavy artillery: believed to be corps artillery, in general areas of Clarkson, about Dayton and about Brighton.

Hostile concentrations at Laurel and at Ellicott City: believed to be two additional Red divisions.

*g. Orders Received June 25.*—At 8:30 AM, June 25, the III Corps received the message, Third Army, dated 25

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June, 8:00 AM, directing preliminary operations for a general attack, and at 11:30 AM received Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, dated 25 June, 11:00 AM, directing a general attack. (See Chapter VIII.)

*h. Action Taken June 25th.*—During the 25th, the hostile forces confronting the III Corps have not been greater in strength than those of the latter, except in cavalry and artillery. Reports for the last few days, and the action of the hostile air service on the 25th, indicate that the enemy contemplates an offensive on the III Corps front. When this will be undertaken is not known. If the III Corps discontinues the offensive, the Reds will be able to withdraw troops from the III Corps front to reinforce the Red right. The Commander, III Corps, issued Field Orders No. 11, at 8:30 PM, 25 June, directing that the attack be continued at 6:00 AM, June 26.

*i. Red Attacks June 26th.*—(1) At 4:30 AM, June 26, the Reds attacked along the whole III Corps front, making their greatest efforts astride and just south of the Frederick Turnpike.

(2) At noon, the situation was as follows (see G3 situation map III Corps, noon June 26th).

(a) On the front of the 30th and 11th Divisions, the Red attack was repulsed. To assist in checking a hostile penetration north of the Patuxent, the reserve brigade of the 11th Division was thrown in to hold the line Triadelphia —Roxbury Mills—hill 441, the division boundary being changed to conform to this extension.

(b) On the front of the III Corps cavalry and the 20th Division, the Blues were driven back. At noon, these two units were holding the line, hill 441 (1 mile NE of Roxbury Mills)—hill 578 (1 mile E of Glenwood)—Rover —Sykesville. A message from the Commander, 20th Division, stated that he would be unable to hold his present line from hill 441 to north of Rover, as it was unsuitable for defense, and that he was preparing to fall back, at 4:00 PM, to the line hill 441—Glenwood—hill 594 (1 mile SE of Cooksville)—hill 609 (2 miles E of Cooksville), which he expected to hold. He reported that the Reds in his front,

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both infantry and artillery, had been greatly reinforced during the night; that prisoners from the 23d Red Division had been captured near hill 578; and that additional Red heavy artillery had been located southeast of Ivory.

(c) The 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) on the right of the 30th Division, was driven back by the Red cavalry, and at 11:00 AM, assisted by the 30th Division, was holding a line north of Whetstone Run.

(d) The Blue air service reported Red columns of all arms starting west from camps around Ellicott City at 11:30 AM. The Reds prevented Blue air reconnaissance towards Laurel and Washington.

*j.* Reports of the attacks north of the Patapsco, received by the Commander, III Corps up to noon June 26, indicated the following results:

(1) The preliminary attack made by the IV Corps and the right of the III Corps on June 25, was successful. The attack reached its objectives at all points, but had met with stubborn resistance at Reisterstown and St. George.

(2) The general attack north of the Patapsco, launched on June 26, was making fair progress against the Red right. The I Corps had reached Texas, and the II Corps had taken hill 709 and 730, and both were continuing their advance south of those points. Chestnut Ridge was offering stubborn resistance to the advance of these two corps. The IV Corps had made very little progress except on its extreme left, where it was following the right of the II Corps.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.* — Decision of the Commander, III Corps with reasons in brief.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Orders issued by the Commander, III Corps.

NOTE.—Weather fair; slight breeze blowing from the southwest Forecast for tomorrow: no change.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
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| Decision | 3 |
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3. DECISION.—The Commander, III Corps, decides to report the situation to the Army Commander, and recommend that the III Corps withdraw by stages to a line north of the South Branch Patapsco, with its left at Sykesville and right about Mount Airy; that the left boundary of the III Corps be changed, at 8:00 PM today, to include Sykesville—Freedom—Gist—New Windsor—Keymar, all inclusive; that the elements of the 1st Cavalry Brigade holding the front about Sykesville, within the changed zone of the III Corps, be relieved by the 20th Division at 11:00 PM, June 27; and that the 4th Division be held in readiness to support the left of the III Corps.

4. REASONS. — *a. Mission.* — The mission of the III Corps as given in Field Orders No. 5, Third Army, dated 22 June 1921, 10:00 PM and Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, dated 25 June 1921, 11:00 PM, is as follows: To hold the Reds south and east of the general line, South Branch Patapsco—Parrs Ridge—to Potomac River, and to develop and contain the hostile strength south of the Patapsco.

*b. The Enemy.*—(1) The hostile strength developed on the 25th and 26th in front of the III Blue Corps, is superior to the Blues in infantry, artillery, cavalry, and air service; the greater part of their hostile force is concentrated in front of the 20th Division, the III Corps cavalry, and the left front of the 11th Division. The hostile infantry strength on this part of the line seems to be about twice as strong as the Blues. The hostile artillery, especially heavy artillery, seems to be much superior. On the right front of the 11th Division and on the front of the 30th Division, the strength of the two forces seems to be about equal. On the

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right of the 30th Division, however, the hostile cavalry is more than twice as strong as the Blue cavalry, which is now enveloping the right of the 30th Division.

(2) Reports indicate that Red forces of all arms were starting west from camps about Ellicott City at 11:30 AM, June 26. They may reach the front of the 20th Division about 2:00 PM and be deployed for attack in considerable strength about 4:00 PM. This would still further increase the superiority of the Reds on that front.

(3) The Blue air service has been unable to make reconnaissance towards Laurel and Washington up to noon on June 26. Considerable activity was reported about Laurel on the 25th, and it is possible that the 23d Red Division came from that place during that night. There may or there may not be other Red forces advancing from Laurel and Washington.

(4) On the front north of the Patapsco the Reds have shown considerable strength, and seem to be able to hold their own against the Blue army attack. While the Blues have gained some initial successes in carrying out their envelopment of the Red right, the Reds have offered stubborn resistance to both the I Corps and the II Corps on Chestnut Ridge, which shows that they were prepared to a certain extent to meet such envelopment. At any rate, the fact that forces of all arms started west from Ellicott City at 11:30 AM today indicates that the Reds consider that those particular forces will not be needed for a time at least to reinforce the Red right.

(5) The above indicates that the Reds intend to continue their offensive south of the Patapsco in spite of the attack of the Blue army north of the Patapsco. The location and direction of the main effort of the Reds indicates that they intend to drive back the left flank of the III Corps and separate it from the main Blue army north of the Patapsco. Having succeeded in this they may intend to crush the III Corps before it can be supported by the main Blue army, in which event additional Red troops may be employed, if available, to envelop the right of the III Corps; or they may intend to hold the III Corps off to the west while

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they turn north of the Patapsco and envelop the right and rear of the main Blue army.

*c. Blue Forces.*—(1) The 20th Division and III Corps cavalry are confronted by an enemy greatly superior in strength both in infantry and artillery. At the beginning of the day this superiority in strength was over two to one. At that time these two units were engaged on a front of about ten and one-half miles. On such a great front, when opposed by such a superiority in strength, it is not surprising that they were driven back. They should not be expected to hold such a great front against a superior and aggressive enemy. Only the timely intervention of the reserve brigade of the 11th Division, which took over part of the front held by these two units and assisted in stopping the hostile penetration, saved the 20th Division and corps cavalry from being enveloped from the south and driven to the northwest. This assistance from the 11th Division greatly improved the situation of these two units. The front now held by these two units is about seven and one-half miles. This is too great a front to be held against a superior and aggressive enemy. At present, however, the enemy appears to be attacking in force on only five and one-half miles of this front. The hostile reserves approaching from the east may be employed to extend the hostile attack to the north. If so, the 20th Division cannot be expected to hold long without reinforcements. The 20th Division should be given artillery reinforcement for counter battery.

(2) The 11th Division is now holding a front of five and one-half miles. It is apparently opposed at present by a somewhat superior infantry force and by superior hostile artillery. If the hostile reserves from Ellicott City are thrown in on its front, the 11th Division should not be expected to hold a great length of time.

(3) The 30th Division is at present holding a front of six and one-half miles, and, in addition, it is assisting the 1st Cavalry Division on its right. The 1st Cavalry Division is protecting the right of the 30th Division, and the right of the III Corps. The hostile infantry opposed to the

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30th Division is about equal or less than the strength of the 30th Division, but the combined hostile infantry and cavalry strength opposed to the 30th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division is superior, while the artillery is apparently about the same. Although the 30th Division and 1st Cavalry Division may hold temporarily against the present hostile forces opposed to them, they cannot be expected to hold out long against new forces which may develop from the southeast or south.

(4) The III Corps at present has no reserves. All divisions, the corps artillery, and the corps cavalry, are seriously engaged. The fire of the artillery, from its present positions or from new positions, may be used, however, to support the front hardest pressed. In case of great emergency the corps engineers may be used.

(5) The 4th Division is stationed, in army reserve, at Taylorsville which is only nine miles to the northwest of the 20th Division. If ordered to assist the III Corps, the 4th Division should be able to give valuable support to the left of the III Corps within five or six hours. Instructions given the 4th Division in Army Field Orders No. 7 indicate that this division is to be used to support the III Corps, the IV Corps, or the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Its orders direct it to be ready to move after 8:00 AM today. If the hostile reserves approaching from Ellicott City are thrown in against the 20th Division's left before the withdrawal is completed, the 4th Division may be needed.

*d. Plans Open to the Commander, III Corps.*—In order to carry out his mission of holding the enemy south and east of the South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge and to contain the hostile forces south of the Patapsco, and prevent them from reinforcing the front north of the Patapsco, several plans may be considered by the Commander, III Corps. They include the following:

(1) *To Attack.*—The enemy is in superior force and is himself attacking. Apparently he intends to continue his attack, while the III Corps is hard pressed to withstand him. No opportunity is offered at present for taking advantage of faulty dispositions of the enemy. Should the

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attack of the enemy stop however, the III Corps would again have to attack in order to hold the enemy and prevent him from using forces now on this front to reinforce other parts of the line.

(2) *To Hold His Present Position.*—On account of the extended front now held, and since it has no reserves, it will not be possible for the III Corps to hold its present position for a great length of time without considerable reinforcements if the enemy continues his attacks. The front is too extended. The enemy with only an equal force, by concentrating on part of the front and holding on the remainder, should be able to break through. The addition of the 4th Division would not be sufficient reinforcements to hold the present location for any great length of time.

(3) *To Reduce the Length of the Present Line.*—The III Corps cannot reduce the length of its present line without withdrawing, for if it attempted to do this, its flanks would be at once enveloped.

(4) *To Withdraw.*—By withdrawing, the III Corps should be able to reduce the length of its present front and greatly improve its present dispositions. Under the present situation, several plans of withdrawal may be considered.

(a) *To Withdraw to the West.*—Although this would permit the III Corps to shorten its front and improve its dispositions, it would permit the enemy to advance to the north of the South Branch Patapsco River, a movement which the III Corps is ordered to prevent. In addition, it would subject the right of the IV Corps and the main Blue army to envelopment from the south. It would also subject the III Corps to the danger of being cut off from the remainder of the Blue army. All of these must be prevented.

(b) *To Hold With the Left and Withdraw the Right to Some Line South of the South Branch Patapsco.*—This would give the III Corps an opportunity to shorten its front and greatly improve its dispositions. It is believed, however, that a withdrawal to a line south of the South Branch Patapsco is not great enough to meet the needs of the pres-

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ent situation. Besides there is no exceptionally strong natural line of defense south of the Patapsco.

(c) *To Withdraw to the Line North of the South Branch Patapsco.*—This seems to offer many advantages. It is an exceptionally strong natural line of defense. It is a good flank position for preventing the enemy from passing to the west of Parrs Ridge. It is sufficiently far to permit the III Corps properly to concentrate its forces and improve its dispositions. With the left flank at Sykesville and the right about Mount Airy, both flanks will be protected, one by adjacent troops, the other by Parrs Ridge. The extent of the front is about ten miles. If the front is equally divided, each division would be required to hold only about three and one-third miles. Considering the natural strength of the position and the protected flanks, the III Corps should be able to put up a strong defense along this line.

*e. The Plan Selected by the Commander, III Corps.*—The best plan of action for the Commander, III Corps, seems to be, therefore, to withdraw to the line of the South Branch Patapsco, with left at Sykesville and right about Mount Airy. The withdrawal to be carried out by stages, for several reasons, as follows:

(1) Time must be allowed for rear installations (hospitals, ammunition depots, etc.) to be evacuated.

(2) The distance the right flank has to withdraw is rather great for a single night, especially when very little notice is given.

(3) The withdrawal requires a pivoting movement to the rear which ends up practically at a right angle to the original front. To avoid confusion, and to insure a smooth working of the supply system, it is desired that this abrupt change be not made too suddenly, without preliminary warning and preparations.

(4) If the withdrawal were made all of the way in a single night, the III Corps would be too far away from the hostile forces on its front to contain them should they attempt to move north to reinforce the Red right.

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*b. Withdrawal Made at Night.*—The withdrawals are to be made at night in order to conceal the movements from the enemy and in order to carry out the withdrawal while the troops are not engaged in actual combat.

5. ORDERS ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER, III CORPS.—Assuming the Army Commander's approval of the III Corps recommendations, the following orders issue:—

*a. Warning Message.*

III Corps,
RIDGEVILLE,
26 June 21, 12:30 PM.

To Commanding General:
20th Division
11th Division
30th Division
4th Division
1st Cavalry Division
Corps Artillery Brigade

Copies of the message to the Corps Staff.

1. The enemy attacked at 4:30 AM today making his main efforts against our left front where he has gained some ground. He has also gained ground on our extreme right. Hostile forces of all arms reported marching west from ELLICOTT CITY at 11:30 AM today.

2. The III Corps withdraws to a line north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO; left at SYKESVILLE, right about MOUNT AIRY. The withdrawal will be carried out at night in two stages; night of June 26-27 to general line SYKESVILLE—GLENWOOD—HIPSLEY MILL—BOOTJACK—KINGS VALLEY—KINGSLEY; and the night of June 27-28 to the line north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO.

3. The present front line must be held along the entire front until 11:00 PM tonight, then the left of the line must hold while the right of the line is being withdrawn.

4. Preparations for the withdrawal will be begun at once, but all movements for the withdrawal must be made at night.

5. Written orders for the withdrawal will be issued at 2:00 PM today.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

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*b. Field Orders*: (1)

III Corps,
RIDGEVILLE,
26 June 21, 2:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS
No 12.

**Maps: Geol. Surv., 1:62500.**

1. (a) The enemy attacked at 4:30 AM today, making his main efforts against our left where he threw in reinforcements of infantry and artillery, and succeeded in gaining some ground. He has also gained some ground on the front of our 1st Cav Div. He has been repulsed with heavy losses on other parts of our front. Hostile forces of all arms were reported marching west from ELLICOTT CITY at 11:30 AM today.

   (b) The attack of our army north of the PATAPSCO is progressing favorably. By noon today, TEXAS, and hill 730 and hill 709 were captured, and our troops were advancing south of those points. CHESTNUT RIDGE was offering stubborn resistance. The IV Corps has gained some ground on its extreme left.

   The III Corps now holds the general line, SYKESVILLE—ROVER—ROXBURY MILLS—TRIADELPHIA—north of REDLAND—north of WHETSTONE RUN—GREAT SENECA CREEK. At 4:00 PM today, the 20th Division will withdraw to the line, hill 609 (2 miles E of COOKSVILLE)—hill 564 (1 mile SE of COOKSVILLE)—GLENWOOD.

   4th Division, in army reserve at TAYLORSVILLE, is in readiness to support the III Corps.

2. The III Corps withdraws by stages, as per march table attached, to a line north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO; left at SYKESVILLE; right at MOUNT AIRY.

   Left boundary: after 8:00 PM today, changed to SYKESVILLE—FREEDOM—GIST—NEW WINDSOR—KEYMAR, all inclusive.

3. (a) 20th Division, reinforced by 303d FA after withdrawal tonight, will hold at all cost the line SYKESVILLE—hill 609 (2 miles E of COOKSVILLE)—hill 594 (1 mile SE of COOKSVILLE)—GLENWOOD (incl) until the night of 27-28 June when it withdraws in conjunction with the 11th Division on its left. It will relieve the troops of the 1st Cavalry Brigade

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holding SYKESVILLE by 11:00 PM, 27 June 21. On the 28th it will hold the line SYKESVILLE (incl)—MORGAN (excl).

(b) 11th Division, less 303d FA, but reinforced by 1 bn 302d FA after withdrawal tonight, will hold its present line until 11:00 PM tonight, when it will withdraw in conjunction with the 30th Division. On the 27th it will hold the line GLENWOOD (excl)—PATUXENT RIVER south of HIPSLEYS MILL to 1½ miles west of that place. It will relieve the III Corps cavalry on its front by midnight tonight. On the 27th, it will be prepared to support, with its artillery, the right front of the 20th Division. On the night, June 27-28, it will continue its withdrawal in conjunction with the divisions on its right and left. On the 28th it will hold the line MORGAN—WATERVILLE (both incl).

(c) 30th Division will hold its present front until 11:00 PM tonight, when it withdraws in conjunction with the 11th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. On June 27, the 30th Division (less 1 regiment) will hold the line PATUXENT RIVER, 1 mile east of BOOTJACK—BOOTJACK—MAGRUDER BRANCH (1 mile east of KINGS VALLEY). On the night of June 27-28 it will continue its withdrawal in conjunction with the 11th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division. On June 28 it will hold the line WATERVILLE (excl)—PARRS SPRING (incl).

(d) During the withdrawal, corps artillery will support the left front of the corps, special attention being paid to front of 20th Division (for movements and positions, see march tables attached). Full advantage will be taken of the present opportunity to use gas, both persistent and non-persistent. Heavy concentrations will be employed against the enemy on the front of the 20th Division. Movements of 303d FA, and battalion 302d FA, to new divisions will be made under control of divisions concerned.

(e) The 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) will withdraw in conjunction with the 30th Division, protecting its right and the right of the corps. Prompt reports will be made of any hostile movements to the west of PARRS RIDGE.

(f) The corps air service will carry out intensive reconnaissance to locate hostile movements from WASHINGTON, LAUREL, and ELLICOTT CITY to-

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wards the northwest, north or northeast; and also to detect any hostile movements to the west of PARRS RIDGE.

(g) The III Corps Cavalry, relieved from front line by the 11th Division, by midnight tonight, will take station at WATERSVILLE and one regiment, 30th Division, will take station at PARRS SPRING, as corps reserves. Movements to stations will be under control of 11th Division and 30th Division, respectively.

(h) For other Corps troops, see Administrative Order No— (omitted).

(x) (1) The 20th Division must hold at all cost until the right of the Corps line is withdrawn.

(2) Special precautions will be taken while withdrawing to insure mutual support of adjacent units.

(3) Weak rear guards, with cavalry and machine guns, will hold positions evacuated and develop and delay the hostile advance. Contact with the enemy must be maintained.

(4) Bridges will be destroyed, roads blocked, telegraph lines cut and other demolitions used to delay the hostile advance.

(5) The two positions to which troops withdraw will be reconnoitered during the previous day and marked by signs. Work on organizing the position north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO will be begun by divisions as soon as possible, all available troops being used for that purpose (see Engineer Annex to be issued later). (Omitted.)

(6) Rear areas of divisions will be changed at 8:00 PM today and at 8:00 PM tomorrow. Movements of rear units to new areas will be begun at that time by arrangement between adjacent divisions. Movements to new rear areas must be completed before daylight on the following day.

4. See Administrative Orders (omitted).

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communications.

III Corps: RIDGEVILLE—LISBON—WINFIELD.

20th Division: POPLAR SPRINGS—LISBON—DANIEL—BARRETT.

11th Division: BOOTJACK—POPLAR SPRINGS—then same as corps.

30th Division: BRINK—RIDGEVILLE—WEST FALLS.

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(b) Command Posts:
III Corps: change to WINFIELD 8:00 PM, 27 June.
20th Division: change to BARRETT 9:00 PM, 27 June.
11th Division: change to POPLAR SPRINGS, 9:00 PM, 26 June and to DANIEL 9:00 PM, 27 June.
30th Division: change to RIDGEVILLE 9:00 PM, 26 June, and to WEST FALLS 9:00 PM, 27 June.

By command of General A.

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution (omitted).

See table, page 205.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

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| General Principles Governing Plan of Action | 7 |
| The Situation | 8 |
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6. MISSION TWO-FOLD.—The mission of the III Corps as given in Field Orders No. 5, Third Army, dated 22 June 21 (Chapter IV), and Field Orders No. 7, Third Army, dated 25 June 21 (Chapter VIII), may be briefly defined as follows: to develop and contain hostile forces south of the Patapsco River to prevent them from reinforcing the Reds on the front of the main attack of the Third Army, and to hold the Reds south of the general line, South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac River.

7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PLAN OF ACTION.—The general principles governing the proper plan of action to carry out this mission, including the methods and means which should be employed to develop and contain the Reds south of the Patapsco and to hold them south of the general line South Branch Patapsco—Parrs Ridge,

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## (2) MARCH TABLE TO ACCOMPANY F. O. No. 12.

| *Unit* | *Position 26 June* | *Zones of Action 8:00 PM 26 June Changed to* | *Position 27 June* | *Zones of Action 8:00 PM 27 June Changed to* | *Position 28 June* | *Railhead* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CHQ | RIDGEVILLE | | 8:00 PM changed to WINFIELD. | | | No change. | |
| 20th Div | SYKESVILLE—GLENWOOD. | Left bounday: Same as Corps (See par. 2 FO 12). Right boundary: GLENWOOD—LISBON—GOSNELL, all incl. Rear boundary: GOSNELL—FREEDOM. | Until 11:00 PM SYKESVILLE—GLENWOOD. | Left boundary: No change. Right boundary: GLENWOOD—CARRS MILL (both inclusive)—MORGAN—WINFIELD (both excl). Rear boundary: WINFIELD—GIST (both excl). | SYKESVILLE—MORGAN. | 27 June to NEW WINDSOR. | |
| 11th Div | Until 11:00 PM 1 mile NE of ROXBURY MILL—1½ mi. SW of SUNSHINE. | Left boundary: same as 20th Div. Right boundary: 1½ mi SW of SUNSHINE—½ mi W of HIPSLEYS MILL—LONG CORNER (excl)—RIDGEVILLE (incl). Rear boundary: GOSNELL—RIDGEVILLE. | Until 11:00 PM GLENWOOD—PATUXENT 1½ mi W of HIPSLEYS MILL. | Left boundary: same as 20th Div. Right boundary: PATUXENT 1½ mi W of HIPSLEYS MILL—WATERVILLE (incl)—1½ mi SW of TAYLORSVILLE. Rear boundary: WINFIELD (excl)—1½ mi. SW of TAYLORSVILLE. | MORGAN—WATERVILLE. | 27 June to UNION BRIDGE. | |
| 30th Div | Until 11:00 PM 1½ mi SW of SUNSHINE—north of EMORY GROVE. | Left boundary: same as right boundary 11th Div. Right boundary: EMORY GROVE—W of GOSHEN—1 mile E of KINGS VALLEY—KEMPTON. Rear boundary: RIDGEVILLE—KEMPTON. | Until 11:00 PM 1 mile E of BOOTJACK—1 mi E of KINGS VALLEY. | Left boundary: Same as 11th Div. Right boundary: 1 mi E of KINGS VALLEY—CLAGETTSVILLE—PARRS SPRING—UNIONVILLE. Rear boundary: 1½ mi SW of TAYLORSVILLE—2 mi S of UNIONVILLE. | WATERVILLE—PARRS SPRING. | 27 June, WOODSBORO. | |
| 1st Cav Div (less 1st Brig) | Extend right of 30th Div | Left boundary: same as right of 30th Div. | Extend right of 30th Div. | Left boundary: Same as right of 30th Div. | Extend right of 30th Div. | 27 June to WOODSBORO. | |
| 1st Bn 104th FA | Until 8:00 PM 2 mi NW of UNITY. | | Until 8:00 PM CARRS MILL. | | NW of DAY. | | Movements regulated by 11th Div. |
| 104th FA (less 1st Bn) | W of COOKSVILLE. | | Until 8:00 PM W of COOKSVILLE. | | E of DAY. | | Movements regulated by 20th Div. |
| 903d Cav | Until 11:00 PM. GLENWOOD 1 mi N of ROXBURY MILLS. | | WATERVILLE as Corps Reserve. | | Future orders. | | Movements regulated by 11th Div. |
| Other Corps Troops (less Det) | Present location until 8:00 PM. | | SW of NEW WINDSOR. | | | | See Adm O. |

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have been discussed at length in Chapters V and VI and need not be discussed at length in the present problem. A brief mention of those principles which have a bearing on the present problem should be sufficient.

8. THE SITUATION.—While making an aggressive attack, to develop and contain the Reds south of the Patapsco River, and to forestall an attack by the Reds, the III Corps has engaged its whole force on a very extended front and is now attacked by a somewhat superior hostile force. However, thanks to the aggressive attack of the III Corps, the greater part of the Red force also has been caught and pinned to a position on a very extended front and so far as troops at present engaged are concerned, the Reds have only a very little advantage over the Blues. However, additional Red reinforcements are approaching, so the III Corps must take measures to improve its situation.

9. PLAN OF ACTION TO MEET PRESENT SITUATION.—*a.* On such an extended front (about 20 miles for three divisions), the III Corps cannot hope to hold its present position by offering a passive defense against a superior and aggressive enemy. It seems advisable for the III Corps to withdraw, in order to shorten its front and improve its dispositions.

*b.* It seems advisable for the withdrawal to be made towards a flank position along the South Branch Patapsco, from which the III Corps can protect, and be united with, the right flank of the main Blue army, and, at the same time, prevent the Reds passing to the west of Parrs Ridge by the threat offered by the flank position (see Chapters V and VI).

*c.* Should the enemy not follow up the withdrawal, the III Corps should again attack in order to contain the Reds south of the Patapsco to prevent them from being employed to reinforce the Reds on the front of the main attack of the Blue army. The withdrawal by stages is in furtherance of this idea, and time should be available for the abrupt change of the supply system to the flanks. For these purposes, the withdrawal is made by stages.

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10. IMPORTANT DETAILS.—*a.* The withdrawal should be made at night in order that troops may be withdrawn while not engaged in actual combat, and in order that the movements may be kept concealed from the enemy.

*b.* A weak rear guard, strong in machine guns and cavalry, should be left behind to maintain contact with the enemy, and develop and delay an advance.

*c.* Negative measures such as demolitions, destruction of bridges, felling trees across the roads, etc., and gas, should be employed to delay the hostile advance. These should not be executed, however, until it is known that the enemy will attempt to advance, for the III Corps may have to return to the attack.

*d.* Units required to hold their present positions on the left of the front, should have their fronts shortened and should be reinforced by additional artillery fire.

*e.* Special precautions should be taken to coordinate the withdrawal of the various units.

*f.* It would be well to have positions to be occupied at night marked out on the preceding day.

*g.* Work on organizing the final position to which the corps withdraws should be begun promptly.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study---------- 11

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11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.

*a.* The hostile situation:

(1) Strength, composition, location, movements and intentions.

(2) The hostile attack—front of attack, front and strength of main effort, direction and probable objective.

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(3) When and where will hostile reserve be employed —front of attack, direction and objective?

*b.* Our own situation:

(1) Location and extent of front of various units.

(2) Can the III Corps hold its present position?

*c.* Mission of III Corps and plans of action open to the commander:

(1) Mission.

(2) Attack.

(3) Hold present position.

(4) Withdraw—to rear, to flank; position to which withdrawal should be made. Improvement in dispositions effected by withdrawal.

*d.* Details of carrying out the withdrawal to position along South Branch Patapsco River:

(1) Continuous or by stages.

(2) If by stages, various positions to be occupied.

(3) Means for improving dispositions of left flank, which holds.

(4) Means employed to coordinate withdrawal of various units.

(5) Means employed for maintaining contact with and developing and delaying hostile advance.

(6) Evacuation and supply during withdrawal—change in rear areas of divisions.

*e.* Field Orders:

(1) Time of issue.

(2) Period covered.

(3) Form, brevity, clearness, completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, III Corps, noon June 26.
Operation Map, III Corps (to accompany FO Nc. 12)
} following this page.

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## CHAPTER XIII

# *The III Corps in Defense and Counter Attack*


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## SECTION I


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| Red Attack Morning June 27 | 5 |
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| Progress of Attack of Main Blue Army | 7 |
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1. FOURTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION (BLUE).

*a.* Maps: Geological Survey 1:62500. Situation Map III Corps, noon 27 June 21.

*b.* The situation as given in CHAPTER XII is continued.

*c.* The Engineer Annex to Field Orders No. 12, III Corps, issued at 2:30 PM, June 26, give instructions for organizing for defense the position north of the South Branch Patapsco. The plan of defense called for defense of the river line by organizing and holding the important tactical areas and expelling hostile penetrations by counter attack. (This is explained in detail in CHAPTER XIV.)

*d.* Work on the position was ordered begun at once by all troops which could be spared for that purpose. At least



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one-half of the division engineers, and such other division troops as could be spared, were to begin work in their respective areas. The Corps Engineer Regiment (less 1 bn) and the Auxiliary Engineer Battalions were to begin work on the area Hoods Mills—483 (N of Hoods Mills)—662 (SE of Day)—Morgan. In case the Reds attempted to envelop the left of the III Corps on June 27, by an attack north of the South Branch Patapsco, the Corps Engineers (less one battalion) were to be prepared to stand to arms and defend, at all costs, the above area and the line Tuckers Br—Piney Branch to South Branch Patapsco. The Engineers, 20th Division, were to begin work on the area north of Sykesville and Gaither. In case the Reds attempted to envelop the III Corps left on June 27th, the Engineers 20th Division were to fall back, delaying the Red advance, and hold spur southwest of Barrett from Tuckers Branch to Piney Branch.

2. RED ACTIVITIES, AFTERNOON JUNE 26.—During the afternoon of June 26, 1921, the Reds continued their attacks but apparently threw in no new reinforcements. At 2:00 PM, they drove back the III Corps cavalry and continued their advance, seized hill 600 (1 mile NW of Glenwood) and attacked hill 543 (1 mile W of Glenwood). The Red attack against hill 543 was repulsed, and the Reds were driven out of hill 600 by counter attacks of the 20th Division. Glenwood was not recaptured by the Blues. On account of the above envelopment, the Blue line through Rover fell back at 3:00 PM instead of 4:00 PM as planned.

3. BLUE WITHDRAWAL.—On the night of June 26-27, the III Corps withdrew as planned (see F. O. No. 12, III Corps, 26 June 21) to the general line Sykesville—hill 600 (1 mile NW of Glenwood)—Patuxent south of Hipsleys Mill—Bootjack—Kings Valley.

4. BLUE RAIDS.—A Blue raid, made between midnight June 26, and 2:00 AM June 27, one mile south of Sykesville, located elements of the 20th Red Division in line at that place. Another Blue raid, made at the same time north of Roxbury Mills, located elements of the 23d Red Division still in line.

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5. THE RED ATTACK, MORNING OF JUNE 27.—At 5:00 AM June 27th, the Reds renewed their attack along the entire III Corps front, apparently making their greatest efforts astride the South Branch Patapsco and against the left of the 11th Division. Blue rear guards, left in the positions vacated by the withdrawal of the right of the III Corps, were quickly driven back and closely pursued. In this pursuit, however, the Reds were greatly delayed by the demolitions and gas employed by the Blues, and by the Blue machine gun detachments left behind to delay the Red advance.

6. DETAILED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION AT NOON JUNE 27.—Detailed developments in the situation, according to the reports received from time to time by the Commander III Corps, until noon June 27, are indicated briefly by the following (see Situation Map III Corps, noon 27 June):

*a. Reports received until 9:00 AM*:

(1) At 7:00 AM, Reds have driven back 1st Cavalry Brigade and seized ridge one mile north of Gorsuch and Sykesville, and are advancing towards the west, delayed by detachments of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, driven out of Sykesville, and by the Engineers, 20th Division.

(2) At 8:00 AM, Red attacks against hill 540 (S of Gaither) hill 595, hill 614, and hill 609, made with the greatest determination, have been repulsed.

(3) Reds are attacking on the left front of the 11th Division with the greatest determination. At 7:00 AM, Reds seize hill one mile southwest of Glenwood, and, at 8:00 AM, attack hill 543 and hill 551. The attack against the two latter hills is repulsed.

(4) At 8:00 AM, the Red pursuit on the right front of the III Corps has reached the general line Etchison—Brink.

*b. Reports received to 12:00 noon June 27th*:

(1) At 10:00 AM, the Red envelopment north of the South Branch Patapsco has reached the general line Piney Run (N of Sykesville)—hill 638 and hill 618 (3 mi NW of

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Sykesville)—thence south along Piney Branch to South Branch Patapsco. Reds have renewed their attacks against hill 540 (south of Gaither), hill 595 and hill 614, and have been again repulsed. An attack against hill 608 (north of Springfield Hospital), made at 10:00 AM, was repulsed by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The III Corps cavalry is holding spur southeast of Barrett and is in contact with 1st Cavalry Brigade north of Piney Creek.

(2) At 10:30 AM, the Red penetration along ravine to Cooksville has been expelled by counter attack.

(3) At 10:30 AM, Reds seized hill 551 (1 mile southeast of Daisy) and are penetrating up Cattail Creek towards Daisy. The 11th Division is preparing to expel this hostile penetration by counter attack.

(4) At 11:00 AM, Reds are attacking along Patuxent south of Hipsleys Mill and to the east and west of Bootjack, and the Red cavalry is attempting to cross Little Bennett Creek at Kingsley.

(5) The Red air screen has prevented Blue air reconnaissance towards Ellicott City and Washington. A Blue plane, which broke through the Red screen towards Laurel about 10:00 AM June 27, observed no Red movements in that area except heavy supply trains. The Blue air service and cavalry have observed no Red movements to the west of Parrs Ridge except Red cavalry in pursuit of the III Corps.

7. PROGRESS OF ATTACK, MAIN BLUE ARMY.—Reports of the attack of the main Blue army, north of the South Branch Patapsco, indicate that the attack is progressing favorably, though meeting with stubborn resistance. By 10:00 AM June 27, the left of the I Corps had seized the high ground north of Lutherville, and the right of the II Corps was attacking the right south of The Caves; Chestnut Ridge was still held by the Reds. The left of the IV Corps had seized the high ground east of Gwynbrook. The right of the IV Corps and the 1st Cavalry Brigade had made very little progress.

8. ASSIGNMENT OF 4TH DIVISION.—At 11:10 AM June 27, the 4th Division was assigned to the III Corps.

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9. REQUIREMENTS.

*a. First Requirement.*—The decision of the Commander, III Corps, with reasons in brief.

*b. Second Requirement.*—The Field Orders issued to carry out the Commander's decision.

NOTE.—Weather fair. Slight breeze blowing from the west. Forecast for tomorrow: no change.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution, First Requirement*

Paragraphs

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10. DECISION OF THE COMMANDER, III CORPS.—The Commander III Corps decides to hold his present position today, continue the withdrawal tonight, and expel the Reds north of the South Branch Patapsco by counter attacks, launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow. The counter attack will be planned as a surprise and with a view to inflicting the greatest possible losses upon the Reds.

11. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a. Mission.*—(1) The mission of the Commander, III Corps, briefly stated, is to hold the Reds south and east of the general line South Branch Patapsco—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac, and to contain the Reds south of the South Branch Patapsco.

(2) When Field Orders No. 12, III Corps, dated 26 June 21, 2:00 PM, were issued, all combat units of the corps were deployed on a very extended front and were seriously engaged holding the attack of an enemy somewhat superior in strength. At that time, the enemy apparently was attempting to take advantage of the very extended deployment, and the weak center of the III Corps, to penetrate the left center of the corps line. Additional hostile reserves were approaching the left front of the corps line, part of which, at least, would be able to take part in the

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combat late in the afternoon, if thrown in as elements arrived on the battlefield.

(3) To meet this embarrassing situation, the commander III Corps decided to withdraw, in order to improve his dispositions by shortening his line and furnishing additional support to the left of his line; to withdraw to a line north of the South Branch Patapsco, in order to carry out that part of his mission requiring him to hold the Reds south and east of the general line South Branch Patapsco—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac; and to withdraw by stages, in order that, if necessary, he can resume the offensive to contain the Reds south of the South Branch Patapsco.

*b. The Red Forces.*—(1) By noon June 27, the Reds have followed up the withdrawal of the III Corps closely and are attacking along the entire corps front. Apparently, they are making their greatest efforts astride the South Branch Patapsco, where, apparently, a new Red division had been thrown in, and against the present left of the 11th Division, where their main effort was made on the 26th.

(2) Apparently two Red corps (with a combined divisional strength of five Red divisions), with their corps artillery and corps cavalry, and in addition, a Red cavalry division, are attacking the III Corps.

(3) Although the Reds have a superiority in heavy artillery, its effectiveness has been reduced to a certain extent, especially on the right of the III Corps, by the withdrawal of the III Corps on the 26th and on the night of June 26-27.

(4) Apparently the 20th Red Division, a new unit, is attacking astride the South Branch Patapsco with the intention of enveloping the left of the 20th Blue Division and the III Blue Corps. So long as the 20th Blue Division holds hill 540 and hill 595 south of Gaither, and the 1st Cavalry Brigade holds the high ground north of Springfield Hospital, the envelopment by the 20th Red Division will be rendered more or less ineffective, during daylight hours at least, by the cross fire from the foregoing Blue units.

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(5) The 21st Red Division apparently is continuing its attack against the center and right front of the 20th Blue Division.

(6) The 23d Red Division apparently is continuing its efforts in the same locality in which it attacked on the 26th. It found that part of the Blue line very weak on the 26th for the III Corps cavalry was holding part of that front. The III Corps cavalry was still holding part of that front at 11:00 PM on the 26th. On the 27th, the 23d Red Division found the left of the 11th Division in its front.

(7) The 24th Red Division and the 25th Red Division apparently are continuing their attack on their respective fronts. On account of the withdrawal of the right of the III Corps towards the northwest, it is possible that these two units are engaged with the right of the 11th Blue Division and with the 30th Blue Division. On account of the distance these units have had to go to follow up the withdrawal, and on account of the delay caused by measures employed by the Blues, they probably will not be able to make a well prepared attack on the 27th, nor can they reasonably expect support by their own corps artillery on that date.

*c. The Blue Forces.*—(1) The Blue detachments (III Corps cavalry, engineers 20th Division, and engineers III Corps) north of the South Branch Patapsco should have no difficulty in limiting the Red penetration north of the South Branch Patapsco on the 27th, as this Red penetration is rendered more or less ineffective by the positions held by the 20th Blue Division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

(2) The 20th Blue Division is now holding the attack of a part, at least, of the 20th Red Division, and the attack of the 21st Red Division. The attack of the 20th Red Division has been rendered more or less ineffective for the reasons given. Protection for the left flank of the 20th Blue Division is furnished by the South Branch Patapsco, by the Blue detachments north of that stream, and by the cross fire from the 1st Cavalry Brigade against the right of the Red envelopment. Although the 20th Blue Division is holding a greater front than it should be required to hold under

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normal conditions, where the enemy would be able to concentrate two to three divisions against such a front it seems to be able in the present situation, to hold its front and probably will be able to continue to hold it for the remainder of the day.

(3) The 11th Blue Division has been holding the attack of the 23d Red Division during the morning of the 27th. This attack has been made with the greatest determination, and, in general, has been repulsed. The greatest efforts of the 23d Red Division probably will be over before noon on the 27th. On the other hand, the 24th Red Division probably will strike the right of the 11th Division about noon, and its greatest efforts probably will come during the afternoon. While the 11th Division is holding a greater front than it should be required to hold, under normal conditions, it probably will be able to hold its positions on the 27th.

(4) As the Reds will be unable to make a prepared attack against the 30th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division before the afternoon of the 27th, and as this attack probably will have no corps artillery support, these two units should have no difficulty in holding their positions on that day.

(5) The 4th Division, now located at Taylorsville, has been assigned to the III Corps.

*d. Plans Open to the Commander, III Corps.*—In order further to shorten his line and improve the dispositions of his corps, while carrying out his mission, the Commander III Corps considers the following plans:

(1) To resume the offensive. By employing the 4th Division for surprise attacks against the Red right, some initial success might be obtained, but, considering the superiority in strength which the Reds still have, and the present situation, the Blues hardly could hope to obtain a decision. Furthermore, it is doubtful if such an attack could be launched before the 28th. It can hardly be expected that the right of the III Corps will be able to hold on the 28th. In case, however, that the Reds do not continue their offensive on the 28th, the Commander III Corps will

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consider resuming the offensive to contain the Reds on his front.

(2) To hold his present position today and employ the 4th Division to expel the Reds now north of the South Branch Patapsco by counter attacks launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow. If it were certain that the units of the III Corps, now engaged with the Reds, could hold their present positions today and tomorrow, such a plan would offer maximum results, but it is not probable that the right of the III Corps will be able to hold on the 28th. If the Reds are given the night of June 27-28 to move troops into their salient north of the South Branch Patapsco, the Blue detachments north of the South Branch Patapsco and the left of the 20th Division cannot be expected to hold the attacks of the Reds at 5:00 AM tomorrow.

(3) To employ the 4th Division for counter attack on the afternoon of the 27th to expel the Reds now north of the South Branch Patapsco, and continue the withdrawal, as planned, on the night of 27th-28th. Such a plan would furnish relief to the left of the line in the shortest possible time and would greatly assist in carrying out the withdrawal tonight. It is too late, however, to expect the 4th Division to carry out a well prepared and coordinated counter attack on the 27th, nor could such an attack be made as a complete surprise, since the Reds have superiority in the air on the III Corps front.

(4) To hold the present position today, continue the withdrawal tonight, and expel the Reds now north of the South Branch Patapsco by counter attack launched by the 4th Division, supported by corps artillery and the 20th Division, at 5:00 AM tomorrow. This plan seems to offer many advantages. There should be no question as to the units of the corps being able to hold their new positions tomorrow. Detachments of the corps, holding areas north of the South Branch Patapsco, may be relieved, and the area north of Hoods Mills and Morgan made secure, by the 20th Division. With that area made secure, and with a counter attack launched by the 4th Division as a surprise

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at daylight tomorrow, from the direction of Eldersburg—Freedom towards the ridge north of Sykesville and Gaither, the maximum results should be obtained.

---

## SECTION III

## *A Solution, Second Requirement*

Paragraph

The Field Orders Issued to Carry out the Commander's Decision ---------- 12

---

12. FIELD ORDERS ISSUED TO CARRY OUT THE COMMANDER'S DECISION.

III Corps,
RIDGEVILLE,
27 June 21, 2:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 13. }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500.

1. (a) The Reds continued their attack at 5:00 AM today, closely followed up the withdrawal of the III Corps right, and are now attacking along the entire corps front. Their main efforts are made astride the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO, where the 20th Red Division has entered the line, and against the left of the 11th Division. Their attack astride the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO drove back the 1st Cavalry Brigade early today and then advanced towards the west. This Red envelopment will be limited today by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the III Corps cavalry and detachments of the corps, to the line PINEY RUN (north of SYKESVILLE)—BARRETT—spur 1 mile southwest of BARRETT—TUCKERS BR—PINEY BRANCH.

(b) The 1st Cavalry Brigade counter attacks in conjunction with the III Corps at 5:00 AM tomorrow; the objective of 1st Cavalry Brigade is the high ground northeast of SYKESVILLE.

(c) The attack of our army north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO is progressing favorably, though meet-

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ing with stubborn resistance. The envelopment of the right of the main Red Army is still gaining ground, very little progress has been made by the right of the IV Corps and the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

2. The III Corps will continue its withdrawal to the position north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO tonight, and expel the Reds who have gained a footing north of that stream by the counter attack at 5:00 AM tomorrow.

Left Boundary changed to include MORGAN RUN southwest of GAMBER—ELDERSBURG—SYKESVILLE (all incl.).

3. (a) (1) 4th Division, reinforced by 303d Field Artillery, will remain concealed during daylight today. At 8:00 AM today, it will move by roads north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE to position in rear of cavalry screen along general line BARRETT (excl)—FREEDOM—ELDERSBURG. At 5:00 AM tomorrow, it will counter attack from FREEDOM—ELDERSBURG toward GAITHER—SYKESVILLE. This attack will be pushed with the greatest determination, the high ground north of GAITHER and SYKESVILLE will be seized promptly and the retreat of the Reds north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO will be cut off promptly. It will cooperate with the 1st Cavalry brigade on its left. It will hold the front HOODS MILLS (excl)—SYKESVILLE (incl).

(2) The 303d Field Artillery will join 4th Division after withdrawal from line tonight; movements by arrangement between 20th Division and 4th Division.

(3) Right boundary: 1½ miles west of GIST—BARRETT (excl)—HOODS MILLS (excl).
Left boundary: Same as corps.
Rear boundary: 1½ miles west of GIST—2 miles east of GIST.

(b) (1) 20th Division will hold its present position until 11:00 PM today when it will withdraw to position HOODS MILLS—WOODBINE (both incl). It will relieve the corps engineers of the defense of the area HOODS MILLS—483—662 (southeast of DAY)—MORGAN, by 11:00 PM, 27 June 21, and hold that area at all costs. It will support the counter attacks of

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the 4th Division by artillery and machine gun fire. The III Corps cavalry will hold BARRETT (see instructions for III Corps cavalry). It will send the 303d Field Artillery to join 4th Division after withdrawal tonight.

(2) Change in boundaries at 8:00 PM tonight:
Right boundary: Hill 600 (excl)—CARRS MILL—WOODBINE—DAY—DANIEL (all incl).
Left boundary: Same as right boundary 4th Division.
Rear boundary: 1½ miles west of GIST—WINFIELD (excl).

(c) (1) 11th Division will hold its present position until 11:00 PM today when it will withdraw to position WOODBINE (excl)—WATERVILLE (incl).

(2) Change in boundary at 8:00 PM tonight:
Right boundary: 1½ miles west of HIPSLEYS MILL—WATERSVILLE (incl)—1½ miles southwest of TAYLORSVILLE.
Left boundary: Same as right boundary of 20th Division.
Rear boundary: WINFIELD (excl)—1½ miles southwest of TAYLORSVILLE.

(d) (1) 30th Division will hold its present position until 11:00 PM today when it will withdraw to position WATERSVILLE (excl)—PARRS SPRING (incl).

(2) Change in boundaries at 8:00 PM tonight.
Right boundary: DAMASCUS—CLAGETTSVILLE—PARRS SPRING—WOODVILLE (all incl).
Left boundary: Same as right boundary 11th Division.
Rear boundary: 1½ miles SW of TAYLORSVILLE—2 miles north of WOODVILLE.

(e) (1) Corps artillery, from its present positions, will support the left front of the corps today. Tomorrow, from positions west of DAY, it will support the left front of the corps, and the attack of the 4th Division. It will furnish counter battery and distant interdiction fire. Tomorrow, after our detachments have withdrawn to the north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO, it will employ smoke and gas to neutralize hostile observation on hills south of GAITHER, HOODS MILLS and MORGAN. All

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guns not needed for the above purposes will be used to support the infantry advances in the counter attack by progressive concentrations in advance of the division artillery. Movements to new positions will begin at 8:00 PM and be under control of 11th Division.

(2) Full advantage will be taken of the present opportunity to use both persistent and non-persistent gas. Only non-persistent gas will be employed north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO. Artillery preparation for the counter attack will start at 4:30 AM tomorrow.

See Annex No 1, Artillery (omitted).

(f) (1) 1st Cavalry Division (less 1st Brigade) will continue on its present mission of protecting the right of the 30th Division and the III Corps. It will withdraw at 11:00 PM tonight, in conjunction with the 30th Division, to a position west of PARRS SPRING. Prompt reports will be made of any hostile movements to the west of PARRS RIDGE.

(2) The III Corps cavalry will continue on its present mission of holding the spur southeast of BARRETT between PINEY BRANCH and PINEY RUN, and of maintaining connection with the 1st Cavalry Brigade to the north of PINEY RUN. Any hostile movements to the north of PINEY RUN will be delayed and promptly reported. It will screen the deployment of the 4th Division for the counter attack tomorrow. After the counter attack of the 4th Division has cleared the enemy in its front, the cavalry will assemble at BARRETT as corps reserve.

(g) The corps air service will carry out intensive reconnaissance towards WASHINGTON, LAUREL, and ELLICOTT CITY, and over PARRS RIDGE as far south as the Potomac. Any Red movements across PARRS RIDGE towards the west will be reported promptly.

(h) The corps engineers (less 1 bn) will continue to hold area north of HOODS MILL and MORGAN, and line TUCKERS BR—PINEY BRANCH, until relieved by the 20th Division at 11:00 PM tonight. For further instructions, see Administrative Orders No—(omitted).

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(i) For other corps troops, see Administrative Orders No — (omitted).

(x) (1) Special precautions will be taken to insure mutual support and protection to adjacent units while withdrawing.

(2) Bridges will be destroyed, roads blocked and other demolitions will be employed to delay the hostile advance.

(3) Work will be continued on organizing the position north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO for defense (see Engineer Annex), (omitted).

(4) All movements for the withdrawal will be made after dark. Adjacent divisions will make arrangements for movements to new rear areas, made necessary by change of rear zones of action, at 8:00 PM tonight.

(5) Every precaution will be taken to conceal arrangements for the counter attack which will be launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow. This counter attack will be carried out with the greatest determination and the maximum losses will be inflicted on the enemy.

4. See Administrative Orders No—(omitted).

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

III Corps, 20th Division, and 30th Division: no change.

4th Division: WINFIELD—GIST—JOHNSTOWN—SYKESVILLE.

11th Division: POPLAR SPRINGS—GOSNEL—WINFIELD.

(b) Command Posts:

III Corps: WINFIELD, after 8:00 PM 27 June.

4th Division: GIST after 8:00 PM 27 June.

20th Division: RJ 831 (1½ miles north of DAY) after 9:00 PM 27 June.

11th Division: GOSNELL after 9:00 PM 27 June.

30th Division: WEST FALLS after 9:00 PM 27 June.

By command of General A,

X,
Chief of Staff.

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## SECTION IV

## *Discussion of Principles*

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| Time and Manner of Employing Reinforcements | 15 |
| Ability of III Corps to Hold Present Position | 16 |
| Time, Location, Direction and Objective of Counter Attacks | 17 |
| 20th Division Assists by Fire Only | 18 |
| Concealment of Movements for Counter Attacks | 19 |

13. THE PROBLEM AND THE MISSION.—The present problem is a continuation of that given in Chapter XII. The mission of the III Corps is unchanged.

14. THE SITUATION.—The III Corps, having been caught with its whole force engaged on a very extended front, and attacked by a superior Red force, is withdrawing to a flank position along the South Branch Patapsco for the two-fold object of (1) shortening its front and improving its dispositions, and (2) of holding the Reds north and east of the general line South Branch Patapsco River—Parrs Ridge to the Potomac River. Before the final withdrawal position has been reached, and before the frontages of units have been shortened sufficiently, the enemy follows up the withdrawal closely, resumes the attack, is enveloping the left of the II Corps, and exerting considerable pressure against the left center.

15. TIME AND MANNER OF EMPLOYING REINFORCEMENTS.—Should the 4th Division, which has been turned over to the III Corps, be employed to repulse the hostile envelopment today? If the III Corps can hold its present position today, much more decisive results may be obtained by employing the 4th Division for a surprise counter attack launched at daylight tomorrow.

16. ABILITY OF III CORPS TO HOLD PRESENT POSITION. —*a.* Can the III Corps hold its present position today? The 1st Cavalry Division, the 30th Division, and the right of the

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11th Division, although employed on a very extended front, should have no serious difficulty, for the enemy will not be able to launch a well supported attack against them. The attack against the 11th Division will not be a concerted attack. It will first strike the left of that division, and, later, its right. Although it is on an extended front, it should be able to hold. The ability of the III Corps to hold its present position today rests with the 20th Division, the engineers, and the cavalry.

*b*. The 20th Division is holding a much greater front than it should be expected to hold normally with the enemy in position to employ two or three divisions directly against it. However, in the present situation, it need hold only a part of its whole front to accomplish its mission. So long as it holds the high ground south of the South Branch Patapsco, its cross and flanking fire, together with that of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, should render the hostile envelopment more or less ineffective, at least during daylight hours. Under these conditions, it is believed that the 20th Division will be able to hold, and that the hostile envelopment may be rendered more or less ineffective and confined as planned.

17. TIME, LOCATION, DIRECTION, AND OBJECTIVE OF COUNTER ATTACKS.—*a*. When should the counter attack be launched, and what should be its location, direction and objective?

*b*. On account of extended fronts at present held by units, the withdrawal should be continued to the position just north of the South Branch Patapsco tonight, and the counter attack launched at daylight tomorrow. The 20th Division should hold the high ground northwest of Hoods Mills at all costs. The counter attack should be made by the 4th Division, preferably from Freedom—Eldersburg towards Gaither—Sykesville. If the high ground north of Gaither be seized promptly and the high ground northwest of Hoods Mill be held, the hostile troops in the salient should be cut off and captured or destroyed.

18. THE 20TH DIVISION ASSISTS BY FIRE ONLY.—It does not seem necessary for the 20th Division to take part in the counter attack except to support it by fire. By hold-

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ing on to the high ground northwest of Hoods Mills, it should carry out its part in confining and cutting off the hostile troops within the salient.

19. CONCEALMENT OF MOVEMENT FOR COUNTER ATTACK.—The movements of the 4th Division, to its position for the counter attack, should be screened by the cavalry and concealed in every possible way.

## SECTION V

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ..... 20

20. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation:

(1) Strength, composition, location.

(2) Front of attack—front, direction and probable objectives of main efforts—probable intentions.

(3) Is the plan of attack assumed for the Reds the most probable under the situation? Discuss other plans of attack in which the Red reinforcements may have been employed.

*b.* Own situation:

(1) Positions and frontages held by various units.

(2) Can they hold their present position today?

*c.* Plans of action open to the Commander III Corps.—Plans given in the solution and other plans.

*d.* The counter attack:

(1) When should it be launched?

(2) What is its location, direction, and objective?

(3) What forces should be employed in the counter attack, and missions of each?

*e.* Details for continuing the withdrawal.

*f.* Orders:

(1) Time of issue.

(2) Form, brevity, clearness, completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation Map III Corps, noon 27 June 21.

Operation Map VII Corps, to accompany FO No. 13.

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# CHAPTER XIV

# *The Army Defends*


| | | Paragraphs |
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| SECTION | IV.—A Solution | 7- 9 |
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| SECTION | VI.—Topics Suggested for Study | 15 |

Maps following page 244.


(NOTE.—In connection with the discussion of the defensive in this chapter, it is recommended that Chapter XII, Volume III, Tactical Principles and Decisions, The General Service Schools, 1922, be read. It will be noted that the discussion in the following chapter brings out to a certain extent the development of the defensive system from the old conception of parallel lines of trenches, to the modern conception (as described in Chapter XII, Tactical Principles and Decisions) of mutually supporting defensive areas organized in depth, or in a deep zone, connected up as time permits by communication trenches, extending not only from front to rear, but laterally; thus resulting in parallel lines of trenches again, connecting more intensively intrenched topographical strongholds.)

## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Fifteenth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The general attack on June 26, 1921, met serious resistance in its early stages, especially along Chestnut Ridge and to the east. The battle raged continuously, without decisive results, during the 26th, 27th, and the day of the 28th, when the Blue left reached Lake Roland. During the night of June 28-29, signs of Red withdrawal were noticed, and, at daylight on the 29th, all Blue forces east of North Branch Patapsco



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were in full pursuit. The Reds apparently had planned a withdrawal in advance, as the major portion of their forces succeeded in passing south of the Patapsco River. Although about 10,000 Reds, considerable ammunition, and a few guns and wagons were captured, it was evident that the Red troops were not disorganized to any great extent.

*b.* The Blue pursuit was pushed with as much vigor as the physical state of the troops permitted, reaching the line of the Patapsco by the evening of the 29th.

*c.* The Blue G2 reports to 7:00 PM, June 29th, contained the following important information (see Situation Map, Third Army, 7:00 PM, 29 June 21).

(1) Confirmed identifications to date:

(a) East of North Branch Patapsco: Fifth Red Army Headquarters moved from Baltimore to Laurel June 25; VIII and IX Corps, former held west and latter east part of line; 15th, 16th, 17th, 19th and 22d Divisions in line from west to east; 1st Cavalry Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division; two brigades of Naval forces, which were holding Baltimore, have retired to south of Patapsco.

(b) West of North Branch Patapsco (south of South Branch Patapsco): X and XI Corps in line from east to west; 20th, 21st, 23d, 24th and 25th Divisions in line from east to west; 1st Cavalry Division operating on west flank of Red Army, apparently less 1 brigade.

(2) Unconfirmed identifications: 40th, 42d and 50th Divisions said to be in and about Washington and Annapolis.

(3) Blue air forces have superiority of the air. Few, if any, Red planes have succeeded in passing north of the Patapsco and its South Branch since evening June 28.

(4) In the fighting since June 25, it was definitely established that the basis of the Red plan was to hold north and west of Baltimore, while striking a decisive blow in the west. While the Blue pressure on the Baltimore front forced a Red withdrawal of that part of the line, the Red attack to the west continued, and reached the line of the Patapsco (South Branch).

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(5) By 7:00 PM, June 29, the Red order of battle appeared to be as follows: (See G3 Situation Map attached.)

(a) From mouth of Patapsco to Ellicott City; IX Corps with naval brigades, 22d and 19th Divisions from east to west.

(b) From Ellicott City to mouth of North Branch Patapsco; VIII Corps with 17th and 16th Divisions from east to west.

(c) From mouth of North Branch of Patapsco to Hoods Mills; X Corps with 20th and 21st Divisions from east to west.

(d) From Hoods Mills to Parrs Spring: XI Corps with 23d, 24th and 25th Divisions from east to west.

(e) In area of Kemptown: 1st Cavalry Division.

(6) The whereabouts of the 15th Division, and the unconfirmed divisions, is unknown. However, Red concentrations have been reported at Laurel, Jessup, Brookeville and Gaithersburg.

(7) Although the Red forces engaged about Baltimore have suffered considerably, they have so far resisted successfully all Blue attempts to cross the Patapsco. To the west, the Reds have attacked without success on the front Sykesville—Gaither—Hoods Mill, and at Watersville. Red naval forces in Chesapeake Bay have been bombarding Baltimore and north bank Patapsco since noon the 29th. Except for naval guns the Reds seem to have no guns of calibers larger than organic corps artillery.

*d.* In addition to the foregoing, at 7:00 PM June 29, the Commander of the Third Army is aware of the following:

(1) Red forces have landed in Delaware Bay and are advancing north towards the mouth of the Susquehanna. Blue forces have been dispatched against these Red troops by Blue GHQ.

(2) Several attempts made by the Blues on June 29 to cross the Patapsco, between North Branch Patapsco and mouth of Patapsco, have failed.

(3) The IV, II and I Corps, during the fighting since the 24th, have suffered about 15% casualties (principally

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in infantry). The advance has caused considerable mixing of units, also occasional congestion of traffic in the area north and west of Baltimore.

(4) The III Corps has had heavy fighting since the 25th, in which it has suffered about 15% casualties. Although it has been able to hold the line of the Patapsco (South Branch), the Red attacks along that front have forced the constant employment of all divisions (including 4th) in the front line. Some difficulties of supply and traffic control were experienced in the abrupt change of front, but this phase now is running smoothly.

(5) Ten days' supplies for 300,000 men and depots of ammunition have been captured in Baltimore.

(6) W.M. RR has been repaired to Glyndon, and the N.C. to Lutherville.

*e.* The following table shows the location, etc., of all Blue troops at 7:00 PM, June 29. (Also see G3 Situation Map attached.)

See table, facing page 230.

2. REQUIREMENT.—General A's decision and brief reasons therefor.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

Decision ---------- 3
Reasons in Brief ---------- 4

---

3. DECISION.—General A decides to hold defensively the line of the Patapsco River and South Branch Patapsco until he can reorganize his army, when he will resume the offensive.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a.* There are two courses of action open to General A, that is: (1) To continue the offensive by forcing a crossing of the Patapsco on the front of the IV and II Corps, or

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(2) To hold temporarily the line of the river until he can reorganize his army, and then to attack at a more favorable location. Both courses have advantages and disadvantages.

*b.* A continuation of the offensive will take advantage of the psychological effects of victory and defeat, and, if successful, probably will halt the Red attack to the west, and may cut off the Reds from their bases to the south. However, a concerted attack hardly can be made prior to the morning of July 1st. The Blue troops need reorganization. A crossing of the Patapsco, on the front in question, is a serious operation, even against defeated but organized troops. Then again, if the offensive is not successful, and the Reds succeed in the west, the Third Army will find itself in a precarious situation. Red strength seems to be to the west. If the unconfirmed divisions exist and appear in front of the III Blue Corps, a Red attack should be successful.

*c.* On the other hand, a delay to reorganize the army will give time, not only to meet any Red blow on the west, but also to insure concerted action by the whole army. The left of the Third Army is somewhat mixed up as a result of the attack. It is not in suitable shape for immediate movement and maneuver. Time will be well spent in reorganizing and rearranging the team for effective collective employment. The course of action for General A to follow is an open question. The correctness of his decision could only be judged by subsequent events.

## SECTION III

## *Situation and Requirement (Continued)*

Paragraphs

Fifteenth Special Situation (continued) ---------- 5
Requirement ---------- 6

5. FIFTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION (CONTINUED).—At 7:10 PM, June 29, General A receives the following telegram:

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General Headquarters,
ALBANY, N Y
29 June 21, 6:45 PM.

Commander, Third Army.

Reds, landing in DELAWARE BAY, have seized DOVER, and have advanced detachments at ELKTON. XX Blue Corps, reaching vicinity of PHILADELPHIA on July 1, will resist this Red advance. Halt your advance and hold line of PATAPSCO and SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO until further orders. 45,000 replacements will begin reaching Third Army regulating stations early July 1. They are fully equipped and partially trained. Three regiments portee 75s at your disposal arriving LEBANON PM July 1.

X,
C of S.

6. REQUIREMENTS:

*a. First Requirement.*—A statement of the general plan of defense decided upon by General A.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Assuming no change in the situation, the plan of troop movements to make effective the decision arrived at pursuant to the requirement in paragraph 6*a*.

*c. Third Requirement.*—The Third Army field order for the defense. (Assume that intermediate situations have been covered by previous orders and Reds hold south bank of Patapsco and its South Branch, as previously indicated.)

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

The Plan of Defense ..... 7
The Plan of Troop Movement ..... 8
The Field Order for the Defense ..... 9

---

7. THE PLAN OF DEFENSE.—*a.* The plan of defense will be based on:

(1) The defense of selected areas to be held by comparatively few troops, while main reliance is based on local and general counter attacks.

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(2) (a) As far as practicable, two general lines of defensive areas will be organized, each comprising intrenched areas as pivots for local and general counter attacks. The first line of areas will comprise the high ground on the north bank of the river as far east as Thistle, thence east along Wilkins Avenue. An advance position, from about Orange Grove to Clifford, will be held as an outpost. The second line of areas will comprise the high ground as the general line, South of Woodville Branch—841—745—Day—North of Springfield Hospital—hill 645—north of 306—north of Granite—SW of Hebbville—Belmont—Johnnycake Road—Edmondson Avenue—outskirts of Baltimore. (See Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No. 10.)

(b) Although time will hardly be available for extensive organization, the defensive areas should be prepared in a relatively short time. The front line divisions will hold the defensive areas, and, by use of local reserves, prevent any hostile penetration of the two positions. Corps and army reserves will maintain the continuity of the second position by local and general counter attacks.

*b.* The foregoing scheme permits a large portion of the army to be held as a mobile reserve, which meets the tactical situation, that is, the defense of a relatively long line, with a river as an obstacle. In addition, opportunity will be given to divisions to rest and to absorb replacements. The fact that the Reds have apparently only corps and smaller caliber artillery favors the scheme.

*c.* Hostile dispositions and previous action, as well as the conditions of terrain and exposure of west flank, prompt a Blue disposition giving greater strength to the west than to the east of North Branch Patapsco. The loss of Baltimore is of less importance than the turning of the Blue right flank.

*d.* The details of the plan are indicated in the field order given later.

*e.* With the foregoing in mind, the general dispositions of the Third Army will be as follows (see Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No. 10):

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(1) II Corps—3d and 22d Divisions, to hold front from Baltimore to Brice Run.

(2) IV Corps—2d and 23d Divisions, from Brice Run to Springfield Hospital.

(3) III Corps—4th, 11th and 30th Divisions, from Springfield Hospital to west of Mount Airy.

(4) Army Reserves:

(a) I Corps, with 25th Division east of North Branch Patapsco, 20th Division west of above river, and 1st Division on the west flank of the army.

(b) 1st Cavalry Division concentrated in rear of west wing, with observation to west and south.

(c) 2d Cavalry Division on east flank, with one regiment observing towards Havre de Grace.

8. THE PLAN OF TROOP MOVEMENT.—*a.* While the plan of defense given above is the ultimate object, the initial movement of troops should be based on the immediate situation. The vicinity of North Branch Patapsco, and the right wing of the army, are, at present, the most dangerous areas. The initial movement of troops therefore should provide against immediate hostile attacks in said areas. The situation, Blue air superiority, and cover afforded by the terrain, warrant, and even demand, daylight movements.

b. The following table gives the plan of movements (see Situation Map, Third Army, 7:00 PM, 29 June 21, and Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No. 10).

See table, page 234.

9. THE FIELD ORDER FOR THE DEFENSE.

Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
1 July 21, 7:00 AM.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 10.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500 and Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 10.

1. The Reds in our immediate front hold south bank PATAPSCO, and its south branch without change. (See G2 Report and Situation Map Third Army, 29 June 21.)

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## TABLE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS, THIRD ARMY

(See paragraph 8b, page 233)

| *Unit* | *Destination* | *How Made* | *Route* | *Departure and Arrival Times* | *Railhead* | *Movements Controlled By* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Div | Area of UNIONVILLE —WELDON—ENGLARS MILL. | By truck and Marching. | Roads north of NICODEMUS ROAD (incl) and thence north of LIBERTY TURNPIKE. | Start 1:00 PM, June 30. Truck column complete 6:00 AM July 1. Marching complete 6:00 PM, July 1. | KEYMAR from 6:00 AM July 1. | Third Army. |
| 23d Div | Relieve 1st Cav Brig. | By marching. | As arranged by IV Corps south of NICODEMUS ROAD. | Start 1:00 PM June 30. Complete relief by 1:00 PM, July 2. | HAMPSTEAD 6:00 PM, July 1. | IV Corps controls movement by arrangement with II Corps. |
| Gp A AA | Position in readiness at WINFIELD. | By marching. | LIBERTY TURNPIKE. | Starts 10:00 AM, June 30; complete 8:00 PM, June 30. | KEYMAR after 6:00 AM, July 1. | Third Army. |
| 1st Cav Brig | LIBERTYTOWN. | By marching. | LIBERTY TURNPIKE. | Starts 2:00 PM, July 2 complete by 6:00 AM, July 3. | WOODSBORO 6:00 AM, July 2. | Third Army. |
| 25th Div | WORTHINGTON VALLEY. | By marching. | DOVER ROAD. | Start 2:00 PM June 30. Complete 2:00 PM, July 1. | PARKTON. | Third Army. |
| I Corps Hq and troops (less Art Brig) | BALTIMORE. | By marching. | Designated by Corps. | Corps Commander takes charge of city at once. | BALTIMORE. | |
| Art Brig I Corps | Disposal III Corps. | By marching. | Follow 23d Div. | | GLEN FALLS. | III Corps by arrangement with II and IV Corps. |
| 2d Cav Div | LAKE ROLAND. | By marching. | YORK TURNPIKE. | When relieved by I Corps. | BALTIMORE. | 1 regt observing towards HARVE DE GRACE. |
| Army Tanks (less 1 L bn) | NEW WINDSOR. | RR | Via HANOVER. | Start 6:00 PM June 30. | Enroute. | Third Army. |
| 1 bn L Tks | Disposal IV Corps. | By marching. | Follow Art I Corps. | | WESTMINSTER after 6:00 PM July 1. | IV Corps. |
| 3 regts 75 mm guns, Portee | Detrain at WESTMINSTER camp south thereof. | | | Arrive 2 July AM. | | By army arty comdr. |

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Although it is comparatively quiet east of SYKESVILLE, Red activity on the rest of the front continues. Local attacks west of WOODBINE and east of PARRSVILLE have been thrown back.

2. (a) Pursuant to instructions from GHQ, this army will hold the line of PATAPSCO RIVER and its south branch. The defense is based on the defense of the areas indicated hereinafter, supported by vigorous local and general counter attacks.

(b) Defensive areas will be organized by corps to secure two lines of resistance as follows:

Delaying Area—main line of resistance:

Spur NE of Plane No 4—RIDGEVILLE—WATERSVILLE—high ground overlooking SOUTH BRANCH and PATAPSCO RIVER to THISTLE, thence along WILKINS AVENUE. From THISTLE east, the outpost area will include an organized line of resistance along north bank of PATAPSCO RIVER.

Battle Position—main line of resistance:

Ridge 1 mile SW of WOODVILLE—841 (N of MOUNT AIRY)—745—DAY—618—608—622—624—645—N of 306—480—333—482—N 348—440—JOHNNYCAKE ROAD and EDMONDSON AVE.

(c) Corps defensive sectors—effective 2 July 21, 6:00 AM.

II Corps—East Boundary—GUNPOWDER FALLS.
North Boundary—WORTHINGTON VALLEY.
West Boundary—PINE ORCHARD—DORSEY RUN—BRICE RUN—RANDALLSTOWN—GARRISON—MANTUA (all excl).

IV Corps—East Boundary—Same as west boundary II Corps.
North Boundary—RED RUN—OAKLAND—MORGAN RUN.
West Boundary—GLENELG—SYKESVILLE—JOHNSTOWN—GAMBER (all excl).

III Corps—East Boundary—Same as west boundary IV Corps.
North Boundary—LIBERTY TURNPIKE.
West Boundary—DAMASCUS—UNIONVILLE.

2d Cav Div—Covers east flank.
1st Cav Div—Covers west flank.
(See Engineer Annex, omitted.)

3. (a) II Corps will organize without delay the following areas:

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(1) Between BRICE and DOGWOOD RUNS, (2) area of BELMONT—CATONSVILLE, (3) area of KENWOOD. The area east of BALTIMORE will be observed. Plans will provide for employment of 25th Div and 2d Cav Div in case of a general hostile attack.

(b) IV Corps will organize without delay the following areas:

(1) Between GRANITE and FALLS RUN. (2) Between FALLS RUN and NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO, (3) Hills 645 and 506, (4) hill 622 and 624, (5) 553 and NE of SYKESVILLE. It will insure close cooperation with adjacent corps. Plans should contemplate use of the 25th and 20th Divs in case of a general hostile attack.

(c) III Corps will organize without delay the following areas:

(1) SYKESVILLE—GAITHERS and ridge west of 534, (2) GAITHERS—HOODS MILLS, (3) area of RJ 618 and 565, (4) HOODS MILLS—MORGAN to include 579, (5) area north of WOODBINE to include 641 and main spur overlooking GILLIS FALLS, (6) area of DAY, (7) area north of WATERSVILLE between 547 and 745, (8) area north 768, (9) area of MOUNT AIRY, (10) area of 700, (11) ridge between 742 and 597. Special arrangements will be made to hold, to the last, areas (1), (4), (6), (7), (9) and (11).

Plans should provide for employment of 1st and 20th Divs in case of a general hostile attack.

The 20th Div will be relieved from front line service 4 July 21, 6:00 AM, and move to area southeast of LEES MILL in army reserve.

(d) I Corps Hq and Corps troops (less art brig) are relieved from present duty 5 July 21, 6:00 AM, and will assemble in army reserve in vicinity of SMALLWOOD. At the above time, army reserve divisions, 1st, 20th and 25th, pass to I Corps control, remaining at army disposal.

(e) (1) The Army Chief of Artillery will insure coordination of artillery missions between adjacent corps. The nature of the defense demands such mobility of light guns as will insure prompt and effective support for local and general counter attacks. Each corps will

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designate and regulate definite routes and positions for rapid reinforcement by 75-mm portee artillery. Persistent gas will be employed south of PATAPSCO and its south branch. Gas concentrations (non-persistent) will be employed between defensive areas of delaying area.

(2) Gp B, AA, from position south of LIBERTY TURNPIKE (east of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO), will support the II and IV Corps, covering especially the front ELLICOTT CITY—WEST FRIENDSHIP.

(3) Art Brig, I Corps, from positions in area south of line ELDERSBURG—BARRETT, will support IV and III Corps, covering especially areas of MOUNTVIEW and COOKSVILLE—LISBON.

(4) Gp A, AA, from positions north of MOUNT AIRY, will support the III Corps, covering especially the areas of POPLAR SPRINGS and BARTHOLOWS. (See Artillery Annex.)

(f) Army Tanks assigned to support corps as follows:

(1) IV Corps—1 bn L Tks for employment east of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO.

(2) III Corps—1 bn L Tks for employment in the center and right of the corps.

(3) 1 bn Hv Tks will be held at NEW WINDSOR in army reserve.

(4) Light tanks will be employed in counter attacks on orders of division and corps commanders. Definite arrangements will be made by corps commanders to insure their timely and effective employment.

(g) 1st Cav Div will cover the army's right, prevent hostile reconnaissance north of BALTIMORE TURNPIKE, and determine location and movements of Red forces in rear of Red left. Early information desired of any Red movement to west of PARRS RIDGE. Main part of the division will be held in readiness near NEW LONDON.

(h) The army air service will carry out missions as directed in Air Service Annex. The attack group will be held in readiness to support corps.

(i) Army Reserve—I Corps, including 1st, 20th and 25th Div. Division commanders and subordinate commanders will be prepared for rapid advances to support corps in their front.

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The 25th Div will be prepared for immediate entrucking. Army Train will be held in readiness near REISTERSTOWN.

(2) 2d Cav Div will maintain close touch with II and IV Corps and constant observation of north shore of CHESAPEAKE BAY and towards HAVRE DE GRACE.

(x) (1) Passage of command of units, not otherwise specified herein, effective 2 July 21, 6:00 AM.

(2) Defense of the army front will be based primarily on local and general counter attacks. At least one-half of the infantry available in each corps will be held in division and corps reserve for counter attacks to insure holding the line of resistance of the delaying area and the battle position, from which there will be no withdrawal. The outpost line of resistance in front of the II Corps may be abandoned in case of a foreseen general attack.

(3) With the foregoing in view, corps commanders will arrange for rapid employment of reserves and artillery fire in decisive counter attacks.

(4) The defensive areas specified will be given priority in work.

4. See Administrative Order No ____ (omitted).

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

(See Signal Communication Map attached) (omitted).

(b) Command Posts:

Army—WESTMINSTER.
I Corps—SMALLWOOD.
II Corps—ARLINGTON.
IV Corps—TYLER.
III Corps—WINFIELD.
1st Cav Div—NEW LONDON.
2d Cav Div—RUXTON.

By command of General A:

A,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution: A.

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## SECTION V

## *Discussion of Principles*

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| Application to the Solution | 14 |

10. CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFENSIVE.—*a.* The defensive has always been classified as the "passive" and the "active" defensive. This classification is based, primarily, on the purpose of and the method of conducting the defense. The experiences of the World War teach many important lessons in this connection. The distinction in the past was briefly as follows:

(1) *Passive defense.*—No decisive counter offensive action was contemplated, the sole object being to hold ground by negative measures and by fire power delivered from the position.

(2) *Active defense.*—This was based on engaging the enemy in a defensive position, in order to prepare for a decisive counter attack. The whole scheme was based on counter attacks, and especially on one or more decisive counter attacks.

*b.* The distinction made, in the foregoing, has little application today. All defense, of any class, must be based on counter attacks. No defense can be maintained against modern weapons unless it combines flexibility, counter attacks, and fire power. The power of modern artillery, aerial bombing, chemicals, machine guns, and tanks, make it difficult for the defender, presumably weaker in these elements, to hold ground, subjected to such fire, by merely occupying the same. While this is not impossible, the losses are out of all proportion. Success is assured, primarily, by flexibility of the defense, combined with sufficient available means with which to recapture lost ground. With the

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foregoing in mind, one may summarize the present distinction in the conduct of the defense as follows:

(1) *Passive defense.*—Based on denying the enemy a decision in contrast to particular terrain features. This is accomplished by conducting the defense in depth (a zone) which provides for flexibility and basing all dispositions, etc., on local and general counter attacks which should prevent the enemy gaining decisive results.

(2) *Active defense.*—Based on securing a decision which is produced by a counter offensive driven in a decisive direction.

11. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE.—*a.* In the passive defense by larger forces, the flanks are generally protected, calling for a penetration by the attacker. Two general forms of attack may be expected under such conditions:

(1) *Where the locality of the hostile main attack is known.*—In theory at least, the attack is generally based on securing some local advantage and will be limited thereto. The attacker endeavors to concentrate superior fire power and by bombardment to destroy the defenses, and then to seize and hold them. After a period of preparation, the limited attack may be repeated.

(2) *When a decisive attack is made seeking a decision.*—The basis is generally surprise and a superior concentration of all means, especially infantry and artillery, on the front of the decisive blow. No prolonged bombardment is used, as, with it, surprise is not practicable. Secret concentration, and a surprise attack based on intensive fire support, rapid advances, and continuous fighting for a long period, are the main characteristics of such offensives.

*b.* In either of the two forms of attack outlined above, it must be conceded that, if well arranged and prepared, the attackers will penetrate the defender's forward positions, and will advance to the limit of the initial effective range of their light guns. If the attacker is able to execute such an attack, then the defender must expect such a penetration and arrange his defensive to counteract it.

*c.* The foregoing establishes the following principles: The defense should hold forward positions with relatively

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weak forces, avoiding exposure of large forces to an intense artillery fire. The backbone of these weak forward forces should be machine guns and anti-tank defenses, supported by artillery fire delivered by distant batteries. The defender's main reliance should be in holding the bulk of his infantry and light artillery in reserve, in readiness to deliver local and general counter attacks. The same light artillery may be able to perform the two functions indicated, but the counter attack missions are the more important.

12. CONDUCT OF THE PASSIVE DEFENSE.—*a.* To meet the conditions indicated above, as well as the associated strategical and tactical phases of the problem, higher commanders will generally have to adopt one of the following general methods for a part of or for the whole system of defense:

(1) Holding one position, the main line of resistance of which is within effective initial range of the hostile light guns. Here will be found only a shallow outpost or covering area. In this method, the battle position is held with only sufficient forces to break and use up the enemy's main forces, and to make him exhaust himself (infantry and ammunition) in capturing the position. It is then retaken by counter attacks of strong reserves.

(2) Holding two positions in depth, the forward position being an outpost and delaying area, and the rear one the main battle position, with its main line of resistance generally beyond the initial effective range of the hostile light guns. In this method, the forward positions delay the attack and break up its continuity, so that, when the enemy forces reach the main position without adequate artillery support (which is advancing to new positions), they may be overcome by counter attacks.

(3) Holding a defensive zone in which there is no fixed battle position to be held at all costs, but rather a zone within which the fighting occurs, and beyond which the enemy will not be permitted to penetrate. The depth of the zone will vary, but always should be greater than the range of hostile light guns. There will be defensive areas comprising local positions, in contrast to continuous defensive

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positions. These areas are arranged for mutual support, and as pivots for counter attacks. In this method, while reserves are concentrated under cover of the defensive zone, the forces in the zone, fighting in groups, delay and disorganize the attack, that is, pave the way for the decisive counter offensive to be launched by the newly arrived reserves. There is no holding at all cost of continuous lines, rather a "give" and a "retake" by local counter attacks to prevent the enemy from penetrating the zone, and to weaken him preparatory to the counter blow. There should be great flexibility in the whole system.

*b.* From the viewpoint of higher commanders, aside from terrain and local conditions, the form of defense is greatly influenced by availability of reserve forces for counter blows. Time and space factors are vital. If reserves are immediately available, the depth of defensive arrangements may be relatively small. When three or four days must pass before reserves can arrive, the depth is greater.

13. ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUND.—*a.* In most instruction and practice, construction of field fortifications is based on continuous intrenched lines. There results a tendency to rigidity in the conduct of the defense that cannot be accepted under present conditions of warfare. In reality, the present methods of conducting the defense demand that field fortifications be based primarily on defensive areas. These areas are arranged in lines and in depth, to take advantage of terrain features and to facilitate the method of defense adopted for the particular situation. They comprise centers of resistance and groups of centers of resistance, arranged laterally and in depth for mutual support, and as pivots for counter attacks.

*b.* Continuous intrenched lines were developed to their fullest extent in the World War. Although defensive areas were not recognized officially, they actually were employed. When the defense has existed for a long time, continuous lines will be made. However, in the beginning, the first work is done on the important terrain features, resulting in lines of defensive areas covering the whole depth of the defense.

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*c.* However, four considerations influence the initial selection of the continuous line or the defensive areas system:

(1) *Concealment.*—The defensive areas afford better concealment for a short defense than the continuous lines system. For a long defense the converse is true.

(2) *Superiority in artillery.*—In a prolonged defense, if the attackers have a marked artillery superiority, the defensive areas are more easily destroyed than lines, the occupied part of which may be changed frequently.

(3) *Method of conducting the defense.*—If the situation requires a position to be held at all costs, then continuous lines are more suitable, whereas, if the basis of the conduct of the defense is counter attack, defensive areas are more suitable.

(4) *Extent of defense.*—If the defense is to be on a relatively small front and shallow in depth, continuous lines are more applicable, whereas the opposite is true when the defense is on a broad front and of considerable depth.

*d.* The trend of thought, in the defensive organization of the ground for large forces, is towards defensive areas for initial construction, which, as time permits, are joined by continuous lines.

14. APPLICATION TO THE SOLUTION.—An endeavor has been made in the solution to apply the principles indicated in the foregoing. The army has a long front which must be hastily organized. A rigid defense along the Patapsco would have little chance of succeeding. It appears best to adopt the greatest flexibility, which is secured by organizing two lines of defensive areas, so located as to be mutually supporting and at such a distance from the enemy that a hostile advance would find itself beyond efficient artillery support before a penetration could be achieved. Such an arrangement permits the conduct of the defense on the basis of counter attacks, especially desirable in view of the obstacle, i.e., the Patapsco River.

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## SECTION VI

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

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15. TOPICS FOR STUDY.

*a.* Make an estimate of the Blue situation as of 7:00 PM, June 29.

*b.* Study of Blue army commander's decision made at 7:00 PM, June 29. Give another solution with pros and cons.

*c.* Study the general plan of defense adopted by Blue commander. Give principles underlying the plan and submit a different solution.

*d.* Discuss the II Corps plan of defense, based on army order. Show how corps occupies its front, giving location of infantry battalions and artillery battalions.

*e.* Same for IV Corps.

*f.* Same for III Corps.

*g.* Discuss the plan of troop movements ordered by army commander. Are they practicable? Study the time and space factor.

*h.* Discuss the defense order; completeness, practicability.

*i.* Discuss the employment of the 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions.

*j.* Discuss the probable attack plans open to the Reds, and how Blues may meet them.

## *Maps*

Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 10, 1 July 21.
G3 Situation Map, Third Army, 7:00 PM, 29 June 21.
} following this page.

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# CHAPTER XV

# *The Third Army Counter Attack*


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Maps following page 261.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


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| Sixteenth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. SIXTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.* — Geol. Surv., 1:62500. Situation Map Third Army, 6:00 PM 8 July 21.

*b.* The work of organizing the defensive position north of the South Branch Patapsco and the Patapsco as prescribed by Field Orders No. 10, Third Army, dated 1 July 21, 7:00 AM (see Chapter XIV), was begun July 1 and by July 8 a great deal had been accomplished.

*c.* The Reds, however, did not permit this work to proceed without interference. During the period July 1-8, 1921, they kept up a continuous artillery bombardment and harassing fire against all located and suspected works and detachments of the Blues, carried out numerous raids, and a few local attacks. In their harassing fire, the Reds employed a great amount of gas, both persistent and non-persistent. The enemy action greatly interfered with the prosecution of the work of organizing the ground for defense,



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and compelled work on all positions which could be seen by the enemy, to be carried out at night.

*d.* Blue G2 Reports between 7:00 PM June 29, and 7:00 PM, July 7, gave the following information (see Situation map, Third Army, 7:00 PM, 29 June 21, Chapter XIV):

(1) The 40th Red Division relieved the 22d Red Division and the 22d Division relieved the 19th Red Division. These reliefs were carried out on the nights of July 3-4 and July 4-5.

(2) The present location of the 19th Red Division is unknown.

(3) On July 3, the 42d Red Division was located at Brookville, and on July 5, the 15th Red Division was located at Laurel.

(4) There were no changes in the concentrations at Jessups and Gaithersburg. The identification of 50th Red Division was still unconfirmed.

(5) Between June 29 and July 5, a great number of rear installations were placed back of the Red line. The majority of these, especially those located since July 4, appeared to be in rear of the Red left.

(6) Up to dark on July 7, Blue ground and air observers reported no abnormal movements in rear of the Red left. All traffic and movements appeared to be normal. Blue airplane photographs taken on the 6th indicated an increase in artillery and other emplacements along the Blue left, and photographs taken on the 7th indicated an increase in traffic leading into and out of woods and other places of concealment in rear of the Red left. While these signs indicate Red reinforcement of their left, they do not give positive proof of such reinforcement on account of the fact that a great deal of movement and much fighting had been taking place in that area during the past thirteen days.

(7) Blue raids made on the nights of July 5-6, 6-7 and 7-8, indicate no change in the Red battle order.

(8) Reds continued to land troops at Washington and vicinity until July 5, after which there appeared to be a decrease in these movements.

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(9) Reds continue to land troops on Delaware Bay. The XX Blue Corps is having difficulty in arresting the Red advance to the north.

*e.* At 1:00 AM July 8, the Reds began an intense artillery preparation and at 5:00 AM they launched an attack along the entire Third Army front. Their main effort was made on a twelve-mile front against the left center of the Third Army between the mouth of North Branch Patapsco and Watersville.

*f.* Detailed developments in the situation according to reports received from time to time by the commander Third Army until 6:00 PM July 8, are briefly indicated by the following (see Situation Map, Third Army, 6:00 PM, July 21, Chapter XV):

*Reports Received up to Noon July 8*:

(1) On front, mouth of Patapsco to mouth of North Branch Patapsco:

By 9:00 AM, the Reds had seized local high ground east of Cella and northeast of Woodstock. Attempts to cross the Patapsco at other points had failed or had been driven back by counter attacks.

(2) On front, mouth of North Branch Patapsco to the west:

(a) By 9:00 AM, the Reds have penetrated the delaying area north of Henryton and Gorsuch, north of Hoods Mills and north of Woodbine, and are enveloping the areas about hill 645, north of Sykesville—Gaither, and northeast of Morgan.

(b) By 11:00 AM, the Reds have seized part of area about hill 645, but the Blues are still holding areas north of Sykesville—Gaither and northeast of Morgan. Corps are preparing to expel these penetrating forces by counter attacks, using part of the light tank battalions.

(c) Prisoners from the 15th Red Division north of Gorsuch, and from the 42d Red Division north of Hoods Mills, were captured in local counter attacks. Other Red prisoners captured indicated no other changes in Red battle order.

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(d) Red artillery, 8-inch, is located southeast of Sykesville.

*Reports Received From Noon to 6:00 PM, July 8th:*

(1) On front, mouth of Patapsco to mouth of North Branch Patapsco:—no change.

(2) On front, mouth of North Branch Patapsco to the west:—

(a) By 3:00 PM, counter attacks by corps have failed to stop the Red penetrations and the Reds had seized areas about hill 645 and north of Sykesville—Gaither, and have captured part of the areas about hill 622 and about Day.

(b) By 5:00 PM the Red penetration included (east to west) Marriottsville—hill 645—hill 622—hill 595—hill 608—east of 618 (but not including 618)—Day—Watersville. Red attempts to advance beyond that line have been repulsed.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.* — Decision of the Commander, Third Army, with reasons in brief.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Field orders issued to carry out the commander's decisions.

NOTE:—Weather fair; a five-mile breeze blowing from the northwest. Forecast for tomorrow: no change.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

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Reasons ---------- 4
The Field Orders Issued to Carry out the Decision ---------- 5

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3. THE DECISION.—*a.* It is decided to crush the Red main effort promptly by employing all available reserves (except cavalry) in counter attack at 5:00 AM July 9, drive the Reds back across the South Branch Patapsco, and be prepared to continue the attack.

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*b.* The counter attack will be launched as a surprise and the maximum possible losses inflicted upon the enemy. There will be three main efforts, one from Tuckers Branch east of Day towards Hoods Mills, another from Piney Run west of Eldersburg towards Sykesville, and the third, from across the North Branch Patapsco towards hill 645 and Gorsuch. A fresh division supported by artillery, tanks, and air service will be used for each of these main efforts.

4. REASONS.—*a. Mission.*—The mission of the commander Third Army is to hold the line of the Patapsco and South Branch Patapsco until further orders.

*b. The Red Forces.*—(1) Reports indicate that the Reds have thrown in practically their entire force in one supreme effort. If reports are correct, the Reds have only one reserve division, possibly two. Their reserve division has seen hard fighting during the last twelve days and has been in reserve for only three days.

(2) The main effort is on a twelve-mile front from the mouth of the North Branch Patapsco to Watersville. Attacks further east are only local, made with a view to distract attention from the main attack. In the main attack the Reds are apparently employing six divisions, including reinforcements of one new division and one division which has been out of line over ten days. Red army heavy artillery supports the attack. This is the first appearance of this heavy artillery.

(3) The weight, location, and direction of the Red main attack indicates that they are attempting to penetrate the Blue right center, and, with the right of their main attack protected by the North Branch Patapsco, throw the Blue right back upon Parrs Ridge.

(4) The Red main attack has made considerable progress. On a twelve-mile front it has advanced some two to three miles. The Reds have penetrated the Blue battle position, but their advance beyond their present line was at least temporarily repulsed by 5:00 PM. They will probably make no further progress today but may be expected to resume their attack tomorrow.

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(5) The Red attack has carried their main forces across the South Branch Patapsco. Their advanced line is now generally beyond effective artillery support. If the crossings of the South Branch Patapsco are properly interdicted, the Reds will be unable to advance a great part of their artillery before 5:00 AM, tomorrow.

(6) Developments on Delaware Bay indicate that Reds may cross the Susquehanna in the near future and advance against the left rear of the Third Blue Army.

*c. The Blue Forces.*—(1) Three Blue divisions, the 11th, the 4th and the 23d, bore the brunt of the fighting July 8. They were engaged against six Red divisions. These Blue divisions have been driven back a considerable distance, and no doubt have suffered heavily in casualties and prisoners. They were able, however, to stop the Red advance, temporarily at least; by 5:00 PM. They should not be expected to hold Red attacks tomorrow without reinforcements. Corps counter attacks, supported by part of the light tank battalions, have failed to expel the Red penetrating forces.

(2) The army has three comparatively fresh divisions, three regiments of 75-mm. guns, portee, one heavy tank battalion, and the two light tank battalions which were employed in the corps counter attacks on July 8th. The army has no immediate prospects of additional reinforcements other than replacements.

(3) The XX Blue Corps is having difficulty in arresting the Red advance on Delaware Bay. Should the Reds succeed in driving the XX Blue Corps back to the north, the Reds may advance across the Susquehanna. If so, the Third Blue Army will have to protect its flank from that direction. A conservative estimate indicates that no troops will be needed for that purpose before five to ten days.

*d. Plans Open to the Commander.*—To meet the present situation the commander has two general plans open to him for consideration:

(1) *To withdraw to the north.* This plan is dismissed at once on the grounds that it abandons his mission of holding the line of the Patapsco and South Branch Pa-

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tapsco until further orders, and neither the slight superiority of the Reds in the Third Army front, with their initial successes, nor the future possibility of a dangerous Red advance from the Susquehanna affords a possible excuse for present withdrawal.

(2) *To reinforce the III and IV Corps by units from army reserve, and to drive the Red penetrating forces back across the South Branch Patapsco by counter attack.* This general plan offers several solutions differing only in such details as strength of reinforcements, time of attack, and results to be secured. The following are considered:

(a) *To reinforce the III and IV Corps with two of the army reserve divisions and three regiments of 75-mm. guns, portee, to prevent further advance of the Red penetration on July 9, and to launch a carefully prepared counter attack, to drive the Reds back across the South Branch Patapsco, July 10.* The addition of two fresh divisions and three regiments of 75-mm. guns should enable the corps to stop further penetration on July 9, and the length of time available for preparation should result in a well coordinated plan of attack. The great disadvantage of this plan is that it allows time for the Reds to advance their artillery and to establish themselves firmly north of the South Branch Patapsco. Such improvement in the Red situation renders the success of the Blue counter attack on July 10 doubtful, even if the last Blue reserve division be thrown in.

(b) *To expel the Red main penetration by counter attack launched at 5:00 AM, July 9, by employing two reserve divisions, the 75-mm. gun, portee, regiments, and the tanks.* This plan, like the foregoing, retains a division in army reserve, available for meeting possible counter measures by the known Red reserves. It has the great advantage of striking the Reds before they can advance all of their artillery and become firmly established north of the South Branch Patapsco. Such counter attack, if a surprise and if in the proper direction, should result in the expulsion of Red penetrating forces. Its success, however, would not be certain, and, at best, it would not inflict the maximum

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losses upon the enemy, even in his present embarrassing situation.

(c) (1) *To crush promptly the Red main effort by employing all available reserves (except cavalry) in counter attack at 5:00 AM, July 9, drive the Reds back across the South Branch Patapsco, and be prepared to continue the attack.* This plan has many advantages. Three comparatively fresh divisions, three regiments of 75s, and part of three tank battalions are within striking distance. The Reds within the salient have their backs to the South Branch Patapsco, and by 5:00 AM July 9, they will not have been able to advance the greater part of their artillery, particularly if the stream crossings are well interdicted by the Blue forces. Such counter attack should result in the prompt expulsion of the Red penetrating force, in the infliction of maximum possible losses, and if highly successful, in the practical annihilation of three or four Red divisions. Such a success would give the Third Blue Army a superiority in strength over the Red forces now confronting it, and place this army in a position for resuming the offensive or for making detachments to meet a possible Red advance from the Susquehanna.

The disadvantages of this plan are the short time available for preparations, and the lack of reserves while the counter attack is being carried out. All army reserve units have been preparing for such employment since July 1. With preliminary instructions phoned at once and army field orders issued by 7:00 PM, all units should be in position and prepared for the attack by 5:00 AM July 9. The operation should be successful by the middle of the afternoon and the Reds should be entirely expelled from the salient by night. Any counter measure which the Red reserves may undertake cannot make itself felt before the middle of the afternoon, July 9. There are no exposed Blue flanks or other vulnerable places for these Red reserves to strike.

*e. Details of Plan for Carrying Out the Counter Attack.*—(1) A study of the contoured map and the disposi-

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tions of the two armies indicate that three main efforts for the counter attack are desirable. The Red penetration extends over a twelve-mile front with a depth of only two or three miles. In order to expel the enemy from this salient in the easiest possible manner and at the same time to inflict the maximum possible losses, three areas should be promptly seized as follows: area about hill 645 and north of Henrytown, area north of Sykesville, area northeast of Morgan. If those areas are seized, the Reds will be unable to remain north of the South Branch Patapsco; if they are seized promptly, very heavy losses may be inflicted.

(2) Simple, direct, and favorable directions of attack to secure the above areas are as follows:

(a) Across North Branch Patapsco towards hill 645 and Gorsuch. This line affords excellent observation, permits close artillery and machine gun support, and affords cover and concealment for tanks which may advance down west bank of North Branch Patapsco and join main attack with left of 23d Division.

(b) From Piney Run west of Freedom towards Sykesville: This line affords good observation, permits close artillery and machine gun support, and affords cover and concealment for tanks from hostile artillery fire.

(c) From Tuckers Branch east of Day towards Hoods Mills: This line affords good observation, permits close artillery and machine gun support and affords cover and concealment for tanks from hostile artillery fire.

*f. Chances of Success of Plan Adopted.*—The greatest advance absolutely necessary for any of the above attacks is one to one and one-half miles. With a fresh division for each attack and good artillery, machine gun, and tank support, this advance should be promptly made, particularly if the attacks be launched as a surprise.

5. THE FIELD ORDERS ISSUED TO CARRY OUT THE DECISION.—Preliminary instructions were phoned to all units concerned immediately after 6:00 PM, and the field orders below were issued at 7:00 PM.

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Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
8 July 21, 7:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 11. }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500.

1. The enemy launched a general attack at 5:00 AM today along the entire Third Army front, making his main effort on a twelve-mile front between the mouth of the NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO and WATERSVILLE. With the greatest effort he reached by 5:00 PM today the line to include (east to west) MARRIOTTSVILLE—hill 645—hill 622—hill 595—hill 608—east of 618 (but not including 618) — DAY — WATERSVILLE. Red attempts to advance beyond that line have been repulsed. Two fresh Red divisions have entered the line on that front, the 15th at GORSUCH and the 42d at HOODS MILLS. East of the mouth of the NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO, only local attacks were made by which the Reds have seized local high ground northeast of WOODSTOCK and east of OELLA. All other Red attacks have been repulsed or driven back (see G2 Report).

2. (a) The Third Army will crush the Red main effort promptly, drive the Reds back across the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO and the PATAPSCO, and be prepared to continue the attack.

   (b) Zones of action:

   No change except boundary between II and IV Corps temporarily changed to give ELDERSBURG (excl)—GORSUCH (excl)—MOUNTVIEW (excl) to III Corps.

3. (a) III Corps, reinforced by 1st Division, 20th Division, two regiments 75-mm. guns, portee, two regiments 155-mm. howitzers from I Corps Artillery, and one battalion heavy tanks, will attack on the front WATERSVILLE—ELDERSBURG and hold on the remainder of its front. It will make two main efforts; directions, from TUCKERS BR east of DAY towards HOODS MILLS and from PINEY RUN west of ELDERSBURG towards SYKESVILLE. The high ground northeast of MORGAN and north and northeast of SYKESVILLE will be promptly seized. The 1st Division and the 20th Divisions will be used to make the two main efforts.

   (b) IV Corps, reinforced by 25th Division and one regiment 75-mm. guns portee, will attack on the front

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ELDERSBURG—mouth of NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO and against the local penetration northeast of WOODSTOCK and hold on the remainder of its front. It will drive hard from across NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO towards hill 645 and GORSUCH promptly seizing hill 645 and the high ground north of HENRYTOWN. The 25th Division will be used to make the main effort.

(c) II Corps will expel the Red force penetrating east of OELLA and hold on the remainder of its front. At 5:00 AM it will make deep raids opposite THISTLE and RELAY.

(d) (1) Groupment A, Army Artillery, from positions north and northeast of MOUNT AIRY, will support the III Corps, covering specially the area POPLAR SPRINGS—COOKSVILLE.

(2) The Artillery Brigade, I Corps, from present positions south of line BARRETT—ELDERSBURG will support III Corps and IV Corps, covering specially areas COOKSVILLE—MOUNTVIEW. Two regiments, 155-mm. howitzers, will be attached to III Corps.

(3) Groupment B, Army Artillery, from present positions near HERNWOOD will support the IV Corps and the II Corps. Its main efforts will be in support of the IV Corps and in covering the MOUNTVIEW area.

(4) Artillery preparation for the counter attack will begin at 4:00 AM, July 9. All crossings of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO in rear of the Red penetration will be heavily interdicted throughout the night and until the enemy is driven south of that stream. From 4:50 AM artillery will concentrate its efforts in support of the three main attacks.

(5) Non-persistent gas will be employed at once against the enemy north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO (except in area hill 645 to the south), and its use will be continued until 3:00 AM. On July 9, both smoke and gas will be used to neutralize hostile observation on high ground south of WOODBINE, HOODS MILLS, GAITHER, and GORSUCH. Only non-persistent gas will be employed south of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO until further orders. Corps and divisions may make such addi-

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tional use of smoke and non-persistent gas as may be desirable and safe.
See Annex No 1, Artillery (omitted).

(e) 1st Cavalry Division will continue its present mission.

(f) The army air service will carry out the following missions:—

(1) Bombardment group, bomb main crossings of SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO, and Reds north of that stream throughout the night, but will conserve main effort for support of main counter attacks tomorrow by bombing Red artillery and Red troops attempting to cross SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO.

(2) Attack group at 5:30 AM attack Red ground troops in support of the three main attacks.

(3) Observation group, detect and promptly report any movement of Red army reserves.

(4) Pursuit group, main efforts to screen and support main counter attack.
(See Annex No 2, Air Service, omitted.)

(g) Army Reserve, 2d Cavalry Division, will continue to maintain close contact with IV Corps and II Corps and observe north shore of CHESAPEAKE BAY and towards HAVRE DE GRACE.

(x) (1) Movements of army reserve units assigned to corps will be under control of corps to which assigned. All movements will be made after dark and preparations for the counter attack carefully concealed from the enemy. Special precautions will be taken in advancing tanks to their positions for the attack.

(2) The three main attacks will be made with the greatest determination and the areas assigned as objectives will be promptly seized and the retreat of the enemy to the south of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO promptly cut off. Efforts must not cease until all Reds north of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO have been captured or driven south of that stream.

(3) The Red main effort will be promptly crushed and all units will be prepared to carry the attack to the south of the SOUTH BRANCH PATAPSCO upon receipt of orders from these headquarters.

4. See Administrative Orders No—(omitted).

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5. (a) Axes of signal communication: no change.
(b) Command Posts: no change.

By command of General A,
X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A.

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## SECTION III

## *A Discussion of Principles*

Paragraphs

The Situation ---------- 6
Reason for the Red Success ---------- 7
The Situation Requires a Counter Attack ---------- 8
The Plan of Maneuver for the Counter Attack ---------- 9

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6. THE SITUATION.—The Third Army is defending a defensive zone along the Patapsco and South Branch Patapsco. Its mission is to hold this line until further orders. The enemy has concentrated practically all of his available reserves, made a powerful surprise attack against part of the front, and has succeeded in effecting a considerable penetration. The hostile advance is now beyond the range of effective hostile artillery support from initial positions. This hostile artillery and all ammunition and supplies will have to be advanced across an obstacle, the South Branch Patapsco.

7. REASONS FOR THE RED SUCCESS.—What is the secret of the Reds' success on July 8? It is not due to a great superiority in strength as a whole, but to a skillfully concealed concentration of available reserves for a powerful surprise attack against a part of the Third Army front.

8. ACTION REQUIRED TO MEET SITUATION.—The mission and the situation requires the Third Army to expel the penetrating forces by counter attack.

9. THE COUNTER ATTACK.—*a. Time of Counter Attack.*—When should the counter attack be launched? In the present situation it is practicable to place all available reserves in position for a fairly well coordinated attack at

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daylight July 9. It seems that no material advantage will be gained by permitting the Red penetration to proceed further before the counter attack is launched. The Red advance line is now beyond the range of effective artillery support, and a considerable obstacle, the South Branch Patapsco, must be crossed by the hostile artillery, ammunition, reserves, and supplies, before the advance can be continued or the positions gained can be held. The crossings of the South Branch Patapsco may be interdicted by the artillery and air service, hence it should be possible for a Blue counter attack, made at daylight tomorrow, to have a considerable advantage over the Reds in effective support.

*b. Location of Reserves for Counter Attack.*—The above brings out the importance of so locating reserves on the defensive that they may be promptly placed in position for counter attack on any part of the front, and of making early preliminary arrangements and reconnaissances for such movements and employments.

*c. The Plan of Maneuver.*—(1) *The General Principles Governing Plan.*—The plan of maneuver for the counter attack should be such that: it will break down the hostile observation, control and morale, inflict the greatest losses upon the enemy, and insure his expulsion from the salient; troops will be prepared to follow up any advantages gained.

(2) *Main Efforts, Location, Direction and Objectives.*—In the present situation the counter attack may be best made against the hostile penetration. On account of the shallowness of the depth of the penetration as compared with its front, the maneuver should be made in three main efforts as follows:

(a) Across North Branch Patapsco towards hill 645 and Gorsuch.

(b) From Piney Run west of Freedom towards Sykesville.

(c) From Tuckers Branch east of Day towards Hoods Mills.

(3) *Neutralizing Hostile Observation.*—Hostile observation south of the South Branch Patapsco should be neutralized.

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(4) *Plan Adopted Fulfills the General Principles Governing Plans.*—If these three main efforts succeed, hostile observation, control, and morale, north of the South Branch Patapsco, should be completely broken down, the greatest losses will be inflicted upon the enemy, and, if the attack is highly successful, the enemy may be followed up across the South Branch Patapsco.

*d. Missions Assigned Each Unit, Practicability of Movements, and Chances of Success.*—The manner in which units are employed, and the fire power of all arms as combined in the counter attack, is given in the field orders; the practicability of the movement, and the chances of success of the counter attack, is explained in the solution of the problem.

## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 10

10. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a. The Red Attack.*

(1) Main attack:—concentration for attacks; location and direction, frontage and forces employed.

(2) Local attacks:—Location and direction; forces employed; object.

(3) Probable intentions of enemy.

(4) Red army reserves; probable strength, condition and location; for what purpose and where may they be employed?

(5) Is the assumed Red attack reasonable and the most probable under the given situation; if not how may their attack have been made?

*b. Situation of Reds in Main Attack.*

(1) Location and direction of main efforts, forces employed; is progress assumed for main attack reasonable?

(2) Obstacle at the back of the main penetration.

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(3) Situation of Reds within the main penetration; infantry and infantry weapons (machine guns, light mortars, one-pounders, artillery, tanks).

*c. Situation of Blue Troops.*

(1) Forces opposing Red main effort; strength; condition; can they hold tomorrow without reinforcements?

(2) Blue army reserves; composition, location; how soon may they be employed against Red main attack, and against other parts of the front?

*d. Plans Open to the Blue Commander.*

(1) Plans considered in the solution.

(2) Other plans which may have been considered.

*e. Details of Plan Adopted.*

(1) Location and direction of main efforts, and forces employed in each. Is dispersion of effort into three main efforts justified?

(2) Compare strength, composition, and condition of Red and Blue forces which will be opposed to each other in the Blue counter attack.

(3) What are the chances of success of the Blue counter attack as planned?

(4) Discuss other detailed plans or methods which may have been employed for the Blue counter attack.

*f. Missions Assigned Each Unit for the Counter Attack.*

(1) III Corps;
(2) IV Corps;
(3) II Corps;
(4) Army Artillery;
(5) Tanks;
(6) Air Service;
(7) 2d Cavalry Division;
(8) Army Reserve;
(9) Movements of reserve units assigned to corps.

*g.* Importance of and chances of making location and direction of main efforts a surprise.

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*h. Field Orders.*

(1) Form;
(2) Clearness;
(3) Brevity;
(4) Completeness;
(5) Time of issue.

## *Maps*

Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO 11, following this page.

Situation Map, Third Army, 6:00 PM, 8 July 21, following this page.

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# CHAPTER XVI

# *The Army Withdraws*


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Maps following page 278.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Seventeenth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. SEVENTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION. — *a. General.* —While the Third Army's counter attacks were successful in driving the Reds south of South Branch Patapsco, the situation in the vicinity of the Susquehanna was developing rapidly. The situation as it appeared to the commander, Third Army at 6:00 AM, July 15 was as follows (see Situation Map, Third Army, 6:00 AM, 15 July 21):

*b. Susquehanna Reds.*—(1) The Reds have continued to land forces of all arms on Delaware Bay and have pushed north to the general line, Wilmington—west to Octoraro Creek—thence to Susquehanna River. They appear to be holding this line defensively, at least temporarily. The information received to date indicates Red strength in this area as approximately six to seven divisions, with due proportion of corps and army troops. The XX Blue Corps is opposing the Reds on this line.

(2) During July 13, the Third Army's air service, and patrols of the 2d Cavalry Division, secured definite indica-



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tions of a Red crossing in force to the west bank of the Susquehanna at Havre de Grace. During the 14th, the 2d Cavalry Division, operating east of Little Gunpowder Falls, encountered Reds of all arms and was forced to retire westward. By 6:00 AM, July 15, the situation shows that Reds, to the strength of at least two divisions and about one regiment of cavalry, are operating west of the Susquehanna. Red forces of all arms have reached Belair, Aberdeen and north of Deer Creek along the Susquehanna. Red cavalry detachments are along the east bank of Little Gunpowder Falls as far north as Blackhorse. Reds have thrown two ponton bridges across the Susquehanna via Garrett Island. They are employing a considerable air force in protecting the Susquehanna bridges from Blue bombing operations.

*c. Landings in Chesapeake Bay.*—Since July 5, the landing of Red forces in Chesapeake Bay has decreased materially and now appears to be limited to replacements and casuals.

*d. Red Order of Battle.*—The fighting along the Patapsco and its south branch has developed the Red order of battle to be as follows at 6:00 PM, July 14:

(1) From mouth of Patapsco to Ellicott City: IX Corps, with Naval Brigades, 22d and 40th Divisions in line from east to west.

(2) From Ellicott City to mouth of North Branch Patapsco: VIII Corps, with 17th and 16th Divisions in line from east to west.

(3) From mouth of North Branch Patapsco to Hoods Mills: X Corps, with 15th and 42d Divisions in line from east to west.

(4) From Hoods Mills to Parrs Springs:

XI Corps, with 23d and 24th Divisions in line from east to west.

(5) On west flank of Fifth Red Army: 1st Cavalry Division.

(6) Red reserve divisions, location not known: 19th 20th, 31st and 25th Divisions. These divisions have been out of the line from four to ten days. Unknown Reds garrison Washington and other cities in Red control.

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(7) Fifth Red Army Headquarters is located at Laurel.

*e. Red Activity.*—A noticeable increase in Red heavy artillery has been indicated by artillery support in the center of the Red Fifth Army. While Red activity along the front of the Fifth Red Army has been comparatively quiet for a few days, there are positive indications of the movements of reserves toward the east. Red cavalry and air units have been especially aggressive for the last two days in preventing Blue reconnaissance around the Fifth Red Army's west flank. However, no Reds have been seen west of Parrs Ridge.

*f. Reorganization of Third Blue Army.*—(1) The inactivity of the last few days has given the Third Blue Army an opportunity to reorganize, absorb replacements, regulate supplies, etc. It has recovered from the effects of the Red attacks and is now in good spirits. The army order of battle remains the same as contemplated by F.O. No. 10, Third Army, July 1, 1921 (Chapter XIV), except as follows (see Situation Map, Third Army, 6:00 AM, 15 July 21, this chapter).

(a) 1st Division has changed places with 30th Division.

(b) 20th Division has changed places with 4th Division.

(c) 25th Division has changed places with 22d Division.

(d) Corresponding changes in railheads were made.

(2) The 35th Division has been sent as reinforcement from Second Army. The first unit began to arrive (by RR) at Lebanon regulating station, on the morning of July 13; the last unit arrived on the morning of July 15th. Previous army orders directed detrainment and assembly of this division about Taneytown with railhead at same place.

(3) Locations of units are the same as shown in the location table in Chapter XIV, except for the changes of divisions, the 35th Division, and the 2d Cavalry Division. The 2d Cavalry Division has retired to the west bank of

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Little Gunpowder Falls. While observing the front Chesapeake Bay—Blackhorse and thence east to the Susquehanna, the bulk of the Division is near Jacksonville.

*g. Orders from General Headquarters.*—At 6:00 AM, July 15, the commander, Third Army, receives the following message:

General Headquarters,
ALBANY,
15 July 21, 3:00 AM.

Commander, Third Army.

Available information indicates DELAWARE Reds contemplate holding between WILMINGTON and SUSQUEHANNA RIVER while advancing in force on BALTIMORE. The XX Blue Corps will contain DELAWARE Reds on present line, thereby limiting Red's immediate effort to the west to less than five divisions. No additional Blue troops will be available for operations in your theater until after Sept 1. Second and Fifth Armies will be started to the lines of the SUSQUEHANNA and POTOMAC RIVERS for operations in conjunction with the Third Army. These armies should be concentrated probably about HARRISBURG—CARLISLE, and HARPERS FERRY—HAGERSTOWN about August 15 and Sept 15 respectively. The XX Corps will be reinforced sufficiently to prevent DELAWARE Reds advancing north of the SUSQUEHANNA, but no reinforcement can be sent you prior to the arrival of the Second and Fifth Armies. The Third Army will conduct its operations with the foregoing in mind and especially with the mission of insuring the concentration of the Second and Fifth Armies in the areas stated. Acknowledge.

By command of the Commander in Chief,
X,
Chief of Staff.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.* — Decision of Commander, Third Army, with brief reasons therefor.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Field orders issued by the Third Army prior to 15 July 21, 6:00 PM, assuming that there is no change in the situation.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Decision | 3 |
| Reasons for Decision | 4 |
| Orders | 5 |

3. DECISION.—The Third Army will be gradually withdrawn, by echelon from east to west, to the general line of Parrs Ridge, with its center southeast of Westminster. In the meantime, the I Corps (with three divisions) will be concentrated secretly to the north, with the object of striking the north flank of the Delaware Reds.

4. REASONS.—*a.* The new mission of the Third Blue Army is to hold the two Red forces east and south of the Catoctin and South Mountains until the Second and Fifth Armies complete their concentration, that is, until about August 15 and September 15. While every opportunity should be grasped to take the offensive with the object of inflicting serious losses, still the Third Army should so conserve its strength and fighting power as to insure an accomplishment of its mission. Therefore it should not engage in battles unessential to the end sought.

*b.* Four general plans of action seem open to the Third Army, i.e.:

(1) (a) While holding the Fifth Red Army on the line of the Patapsco, to detach sufficient force to hold the Delaware Reds on the line of Gunpowder Falls.

(b) The Third Army has not sufficient strength for the defense indicated. It is probable that the Reds will continue to send divisions to the west of the Susquehanna. Within a short time, the Third Army will be engaged with nearly twice its strength. The Blue position would be precarious, with both flanks exposed and the greater part of the command tied to the area of Baltimore. Such a solution resigns the initiative, sacrifices maneuvering ability,

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and risks destruction in one battle without reasonable chances of a decisive success.

(2) (a) While holding the Delaware Reds with cavalry and one or two divisions, to attack the Fifth Red Army.

(b) The relative strength of the two opposing armies, especially after the detachment of Blues to meet Delaware Reds, is such that the chances of success are few, if any. An attack against the Red left no doubt would have initial success, in view of the Red concentration to the east. However, decisive results hardly could be expected without an advance to the vicinity of Gaithersburg. With the Third Army extended on such a front, the Delaware Reds would have an opportunity to strike a decisive blow.

(3) (a) While holding the Fifth Red Army on the present line, to detach five or six divisions for a decisive offensive against the Delaware Reds.

(b) Such a plan has many advantages, especially the opportunity to destroy the Delaware Reds before they can cooperate closely with the Fifth Red Army or be strongly reinforced by the Reds landing in Delaware. However, the plan seems to have one vital weakness. After detaching at least four divisions, will the Third Army be able to hold its present line against the pending attack of the Fifth Red Army? If this Red attack effect a penetration of the Blue line west of Baltimore, the Third Army will be separated into two bodies liable to defeat in detail. In view of the mission assigned the Third Army, the risk involved, and the lack of reasonable chances for decisive results, the plan is discarded, except as indicated later.

(4) (a) While withdrawing the left and center of the army and forming a new line of battle along Parrs Ridge, to strike a decisive blow against the Delaware Reds.

(b) The foregoing plan has many advantages and some disadvantages. The Third Army will be maintained as a unit and be placed in a better position to meet both Red forces and to carry out its main mission of covering the concentrations of the Second and Fifth Blue Armies. It will forestall the Fifth Red Army's pending attack and will draw the bulk of that army in the most advantageous direc-

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tion for the Blues. It seems probable that the Delaware Reds will advance west in the hope of joining in the pursuit of the Blues, and gaining contact with the Fifth Red Army. An opportunity should thereby be created for the Blues to strike such a decisive blow, as, at least, will halt Red operations for some time. The loss of Baltimore, and the opportunity given to the two Red forces to operate together against their weaker enemy, are weaknesses in the plan. However, the advantages enumerated seem to be more important and decisive.

(c) This plan contains most of the advantages associated with the third plan, while avoiding the risks involved therein. The one weakness to the plan relates to the Blue right. However, if the Red Fifth Army strikes in that direction with its main forces, an opportunity may be presented to carry out the third plan.

5. ORDERS.—*a. Messages.*

Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
15 July 21, 7:00 AM.

Commanders I, II, III and IV Corps,
1st and 2d Cav Divs.

Army withdraws by echelon from east to west to general line of PARRS RIDGE extending from HAMPSTEAD via CARROLLTON, SMALLWOOD, BIRD HILL, WINFIELD to include MT AIRY. Withdrawal by stages, first stage, to general line CRONHARDT—OWINGS MILLS—east of WARDS CHAPEL joining present position at 645; second stage, DOVER, GLEN MORRIS, THE BUNKER, ELDERSBURG, joining present line at hill 618; third stage, to general line of PARRS RIDGE given above. First stage of withdrawal to be completed by daylight tomorrow. Cavalry of II and IV Corps to hold present positions as long as practicable.

2d Cav Div will delay advance DELAWARE Reds and prevent their crossing GUNPOWDER FALLS prior to daylight July 17. I Corps troops available to that Corps at 6:00 PM this date. Field Orders will be issued at 11:00 AM today. Make necessary arrangements. Acknowledge.

X Y Z,
Chief of Staff.

By telegraph and telephone.
Copy to staff.

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*b. Field Orders.*

Third Army,
WESTMINSTER,
15 July 21, 11:00 AM.

FIELD ORDERS)
No 12. )

**Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500, and Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO 12.**

1. (a) Indications of concentrations by Fifth Red Army, with object of attacking our east wing, are confirmed. Our aerial and cavalry reconnaissance around Red left has met strong opposition.

Reds, landing in DELAWARE, are crossing to west bank SUSQUEHANNA at HAVRE DE GRACE. At least two divisions have been located this date at BELAIR, ABERDEEN and north of DEER CREEK along SUSQUEHANNA, with small cavalry detachments on east bank of LITTLE GUNPOWDER FALLS as far north as BLACKHORSE (see G2 Report and Situation Map, Third Army, 15 July 21).

(b) Our 2d Cav Div is in contact with DELAWARE Reds along LITTLE GUNPOWDER FALLS.

2. This Army, while gradually withdrawing to general line of PARRS RIDGE, will attack vigorously the north flank of the DELAWARE Reds (see withdrawal table and operation map).

3. (a) The army air service, while continuing its bombing operations against HAVRE DE GRACE bridges, will screen especially the concentration and operations of I Corps. Early information desired of hostile advance north of PATAPSCO RIVER and on Red west flank.

(b) 1st Cav Div will continue present mission, making special efforts to gain information of Red dispositions east of line DAMASCUS—GAITHERSBURG.

2d Cav Div will prevent DELAWARE Reds crossing GUNPOWDER FALLS before daylight July 17, screen the concentration of I Corps, learn of hostile movements north of DEER CREEK and cover left of II Corps.

(c) I Corps, concentrating in area southeast of GLENVILLE, will be prepared to attack vigorously the DELAWARE REDS. While concealing its concentration, I Corps will gain and maintain contact with DELAWARE Reds.

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(d) II Corps, withdrawing gradually as per attached table, will support the left of the IV Corps and halt Red advance as long as practicable by holding ridge south of GREEN SPRING VALLEY. Maintain close contact with the 2d Cav Div and prevent Red forces penetrating between 2d Cav Div and II Corps left.

(e) IV Corps, withdrawing gradually as per attached table, will support left of III Corps. Hold successively general line of OLD COURT ROAD and ridge west of RANDALLSTOWN to conform to withdrawal of right of II Corps.

(f) III Corps, except for slight withdrawal on its left to conform to IV Corps, will hold present position at all cost until further orders. Beginning at daylight tomorrow, this Corps will demonstrate against Reds in its front by heavy artillery bombardment and strong infantry raids to be made by each division.

(g) Gp A, AA is attached to III Corps.
Gp B, AA will support the II and IV Corps.

(h) (1) Army Reserve: 30th Division is at disposal of III Corps for work on second position but will so arrange its dispositions as to have at least half the division available for early action.
(2) Heavy tank battalion, no change.

(x) (1) Withdrawing corps will take special steps to insure mutual support between flank units of adjacent corps.
(2) The III and right of IV Corps will make certain that present positions are held at all costs until further notice.
(3) Cavalry will be utilized by the withdrawing corps, to hold present positions and delay Red advance.
(4) As soon as troops may be made available, Corps will commence work on organizing the positions along PARRS RIDGE. The III Corps will organize, without delay, a rear position on the ridge south of TALBOT BRANCH (see Engineer Annex to be issued later).
(5) Negative measures, such as destruction of bridges and other demolitions, will be taken by all Corps. Persistent and non-persistent gas may be employed by II and IV Corps at discretion Corps Commanders.

4. See Administrative Order No—(omitted).

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5. (a) Axes of Signal Communications: No change except:
I Corps: MANCHESTER ROAD—ROLLER.
II Corps: HANOVER ROAD and REISTERSTOWN TURNPIKE.
IV Corps—NICODEMUS ROAD.

(b) Command Posts: Effective on dates and at places as follows:

| | 6:00 AM, 16 July: | 6:00 AM, 17 July: |
|---|---|---|
| Army | No change. | No change. |
| 1st Cav Div | No change. | No change. |
| 2d Cav Div | JACKSONVILLE. | Depends on situation. |
| I Corps | HOFFMANSVILLE. | HOFFMANSVILLE. |
| II Corps | GLYNDON. | RICHARDS MILL. |
| III Corps | No change. | No change. |
| IV Corps | No change. | BIRD HILL. |

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Appendix: Withdrawal Table.

See table, pages 272 and 273.

Distribution: A.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Scope of Discussion | 6 |
| Conduct of the Army as a Covering Force | 7 |
| Attacking the Enemy in Detail | 8 |
| The Ambuscade Defensive | 9 |
| Conduct of an Army Withdrawal | 10 |

---

6. SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION.—*a.* In this situation, endeavor has been made to furnish the basis for a discussion of the following main considerations:

(1) The conduct of an army having, as its main mission, the covering of the concentrations of larger forces.

(2) The perceiving of the opportunity and weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of attacking the enemy "in detail."

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## WITHDRAWAL TABLE, THIRD ARMY, Appendix to FO No 12

### July 15-16-17-etc.

### (See Operation Map, Third Army, accompanying FO No 12)

| *Unit* | *Zones of Action* | *Location July 16 6:00 AM* | *Location July 17 6:00 AM* | *Future Location* | *Railheads from 6:00 AM July 16th* | *Routes for movements* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| AHQ | | | | | | | |
| Fwd Ech | | No change. | No change. | TANEYTOWN. | TANEYTOWN. | | Subject to future orders. |
| Rr Ech | | No change. | No change. | GETTYSBURG. | GETTYSBURG. | | |
| AAS | | | | | | | |
| Bomb and Pur Gps | | No change. | No change. | GETTYSBURG. | GETTYSBURG. | West of MONOCACY. | |
| Obsn and Atk Gps | | No change. | No change. | HARNEY. | GETTYSBURG. | Via TANEYTOWN. | |
| A Tks (less L Tks) | | No change. | No change. | No change. | NEW WINDSOR. | | Light tanks remain with corps. |
| AA | | | | | | | |
| Gp A | | No change. | No change. | South of WELDON along LIBERTY TURNPIKE. | No change. | Regulated by III Corps. | |
| Gp B | | Vicinity of FINKSBURG. | Vicinity of FINKSBURG. | Vicinity of FENBY. | CRANBERRY STA. | Regulated by II Corps. | |
| 1st Cav Div | Operate on west flank. | No change. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| 2d Cav Div | Operate on east flank. | Hold DELAWARE Reds east of GUNPOWDER FALLS. | Hold DELAWARE Reds east of GUNPOWDER FALLS. | Cover advance and east flank I Corps. | PHOENIX July 16, ALESIA July 17, 6:00 AM. | | |
| I CORPS | | | | | | | |
| CHQ and Corps Trs. Reinforced by Portee 75s. | Future Orders. | HOFFMANSVILLE. | HOFFMANSVILLE. | HOFFMANSVILLE. | GLENVILLE. | WASHINGTON ROAD. WESTMINSTER and MANCHESTER ROAD. | The concentration of I Corps must be made with utmost secrecy. While mounted troops may move in small bodies during daylight, all other troops will move at night. G3 controls all movements to include night July 16–17. Portee 75s available I Corps after 8:00 PM July 15. |
| 35th Div | Disposal I Corps from 6:00 AM, July 16. | Infantry, etc. moved by motors vicinity of STILTZ —Animal drawn —BACHMANS. | Bivouac in vicinity of STILTZ. | Disposal I Corps. | GLEN ROCK. | Motors via LITTLESTOWN—HANOVER—VALLEY JC—GLENVILLE and animal drawn via STUMPTOWN—MARKERS MILL—UNION MILLS—SACHMAN MILL—EBBVALE—BLACKROCK—FISCAL. | |

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| 4th Div | Disposal I Corps from 6:00 PM July 15. | No change except animal drawn to vicinity HOUCKSVILLE. | Infantry, etc. moved by truck vicinity GRAVES RUN MILLS. Animal drawn same place. | Disposal I Corps. | LINEBORO July 17 6:00 AM. | Truck via WASHINGTON ROAD—MANCHESTER ROAD—MILLERS. Animal drawn via SMALLWOOD—REESE—CARROLLTON—ALBANTOWN—HAMPSTEAD. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 22d Div | Disposal I Corps from 6:00 AM July 16. | Vicinity RAYVILLE by marching. | Vicinity RAYVILLE by marching. | Disposal I Corps. | Change July 17, 6:00 AM to GLENVILLE. | Any roads east of FALLS ROAD. | |
| III CORPS | Change at 6:00 AM July 17 to: North and East Boundary:—LITTLE MORGANS RUN—DENNINGS—NEW WINDSOR. West Boundary extended to KEYMAR. All incl. | No change. | No change except left of Corps retire to vicinity Hill 618—ELDERSBURG. | Hill 840—WINFIELD—Hill 833—763—737—MOUNT AIRY—700, with a second position on ridge west of hill 833 and south of TALBOT BRANCH. | No change. | Any within Corps zone. | 30th Div at disposal of III Corps for work on second position south of TALBOT BRANCH. |
| II CORPS No change in divisions | Changes effective 11:00 PM July 15:—West Boundary extend from RANDALLSTOWN to RJ 536—RJ 673—RJ 633 (all excl)—BEAVER RUN (incl). East Boundary—BALTIMORE—FALLS ROAD (incl). | General line, CRONHARDT—OWINGS MILL—RJ 556. | General line DOVER—GLEN MORRIS—The BUNKER. | General line, HAMPSTEAD—HOUCKSVILLE—CARRALLTON—DEERPARK. | 3d Div—MELROSE. 23d Div—EBBVALE. CHQ and Corps Trs GREENMOUNT. | Any in corps zones. | |
| IV CORPS No change in divisions | See II and III Corps. | Conforming to movement II Corps to general line, RJ 556—north of FALLS RUN—joining present position at hill 645. | Conforming to movement II Corps to general line, THE BUNKER—east of RJ 596—ELDERSBURG. | General line, DEERPARK—BIRD HILL—Hill 802—WINFIELD. | Only change 23d Div to MEDFORD. | Any in Corps area. | |

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(3) The considerations involved in an "Ambuscade Defensive."

(4) The conduct of a withdrawal from an army viewpoint.

*b.* While the study includes many other prniciples and subjects for discussion, space is available only for a brief consideration of the foregoing.

7. CONDUCT OF THE ARMY AS A COVERING FORCE.—While there is no doubt that in most cases, the best method of accomplishing a tactical mission is to take the offensive, a unit as large as an army, must conduct its operations with national victory in mind. Battles which do not assist in securing this end are useless and may jeopardize national success. In its present situation, the Third Blue Army has little chance of securing a decisive victory, whereas final national success seems probable if decision can be denied to the Reds during the concentration of the Second and Fifth Blue Armies. The mission of the Third Army seems clear. However, the accomplishment thereof does not necessitate inactivity, immobility, and surrender of the initiative. The mission of covering the concentrations of the two armies, while at the same time avoiding a decisive battle, can be better accomplished by maneuvering than by a passive defensive. Instead of attempting to set itself in a defensive attitude astride the roads leading to the two concentration areas, it seems better for the army to hold itself ready to attack Reds advancing in either direction. In other words, it should stand as a threat which the Reds must remove before taking any decisive action in any other direction. By operating in the general direction of Gettysburg, this object should be accomplished. At the same time, the Third Army should realize that the gaining of time without engaging in a decisive battle is the result desired. In comparing the distance available for retirements with the amount of delay that must be gained, it is evident that engagements will be necessary. These engagements should be of its own choice. It should retain the initiative, which can only be accomplished by offensive

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action,—demanding in this situation opportune maneuvering.

8. ATTACKING THE ENEMY IN DETAIL.—*a.* The situation presented affords an opportunity for consideration of the principles underlying the form of maneuver commonly known as "defeating the enemy in detail." This form of maneuver has contributed to the world's greatest battle successes. The Third Blue Army faces the Fifth Red Army and the Delaware Reds who are separated by several marches and are converging in direction of advance. Before these two Red forces are able to make a physical connection, can the Third Blue Army defeat one of them while containing the other? In other words can the principles of "economy of forces" be so applied that a decisive superiority can be employed against one Red force without jeopardizing the whole Blue Army? Conclusions and reasons are given in the solution. Napoleon's Campaigns give many illustrations of this principle. In the World War, the battle of Tannenburg is an example.

*b.* Such a maneuver is susceptible of application either by relatively superior or weaker forces. It has been utilized more advantageously by the weaker side. With superior forces, a small portion of the command contains one part of the enemy while the major portion strikes the decisive blow. With weaker forces, deception is essential. A few troops are utilized as a screen, to hold and deceive one part of the enemy forces, while practically the whole army is thrown with great rapidity and force against the other enemy forces.

*c.* Such a maneuver demands a careful consideration and balancing of the time and space factors, and of the defensive and deceptive capabilities of the containing force. The morale of the troops, and the personal characteristics of the opposing commanders, are prime considerations. Half-hearted measures, generally disastrous, have no place in such a maneuver. In a map problem, these considerations cannot be represented in a true light. The situation under consideration, in an actual conflict, might involve such personal characteristics as to make it practicable for the Blues

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to adopt the maneuver indicated. Omitting such considerations, a better solution of the Third Army's problem seems to be an ambuscade defensive.

9. THE AMBUSCADE DEFENSIVE.—*a.* There are many forms of the "Ambuscade Defensive." However, the basis of all forms is the creation of an opportunity for a decisive surprise counter blow. Such a situation may be brought about in several ways. The enemy may be exhausted by continuous fighting, he may be led in a direction which opens the way for a flank attack, or he may be caught in a passage of defiles when space is not available for the employment of his entire force. The surprise element, coupled with availability of fresh forces and timely cooperation between the defending and attacking elements, are essential for success.

*b.* In the situation under discussion, endeavor has been made to illustrate the second general form, that is, leading the enemy in a direction which will open the way for a flank attack. The plan seems practicable and promises excellent results. In addition, it meets the possible danger of a Red threat against the Blue left.

10. CONDUCT OF AN ARMY WITHDRAWAL.—*a.* The text book, Tactical Principles and Decisions, sets forth the principles which guide the withdrawal of small forces. While most of these principles are applicable to an army withdrawal, there are modifications due to the size of the force, questions of supply, and difficulties of traffic regulations and control.

*b.* The size of the force, as in all tactical operations of an army, necessitates an initial plan covering several days. To place distance between the main forces and the enemy, and to break off the engagement, it is necessary that the smaller units be moved in a designated direction as fast as tactical opportunity will permit. If the scheme of withdrawal is based on a plan announced daily, many such opportunities are lost, or, in taking advantage of them, smaller units are apt to cross columns, thus interfering with each other, and causing confusion in troop movement and supply.

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*c.* Although the plan should cover the movements for several days, well thought out stages are essential to meet unforeseen local tactical situations, to insure cooperation between adjacent units, and to meet logistical requirements. These stages should be based on tactical terrain features as well as on probable tactical situations and distance to be covered in successive movements.

*d.* The withdrawal should be arranged as a progressive and successive retirement of the larger units. Within these larger units, corps and divisions, the principles relating to covering forces and assembly points apply. The army should secure a breaking of the fighting, and place distance between its main forces and the enemy, by a gradual retirement to distant areas—first of army troops and complete divisions, and later corps headquarters and troops. The front is gradually narrowed by such a process until the remaining forces are able to form a rear guard. It seldom is practicable to retire complete corps without exposing adjacent units to flank attacks.

*e.* The withdrawal of an army, from close contact with an enemy, is a delicate operation requiring ample time and carefully prepared plans. Flexibility in plans is essential to meet unforeseen tactical situations.

## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ..... 11

11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The situation presented in the problem. Discuss from viewpoint of naturalness, practicability, and principles and lessons intended to be taught.

*b.* The decision of the Commander, Third Army. Discuss the pros and cons of any plans of action open to the Third Army. Give conclusions as to the best plans.

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*c.* Taking the third plan, as given in solution, as a basis for discussion, discuss the tactical principles and lessons which are involved therein, give some historical examples of the application of these principles which should guide in the execution of this plan.

*d.* Assuming that third plan is adopted, discuss the composition, distribution and organization of the forces and their mission to execute the same.

*e.* Discuss the details (from the army viewpoint) of the execution of the plan adopted. Is the execution practicable as ordered? How can it be improved?

*f.* Give the tactical principles governing the withdrawal of army from action. How do these differ from those given for an independent division?

*g.* Discuss the withdrawal of the IV Corps. How will it be executed?

*h.* Discuss the role and employment of army and corps artillery in the withdrawal.

*i.* Discuss the mission of the 2d Cavalry Division. How executed?

*j.* Discuss Field Orders No. 12, Third Army, as to form, clearness, brevity, completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, Third Army (6:00 AM, July 15), following this page.

Operation Map, Third Army (to accompany F.O. No. 12), following this page.

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# CHAPTER XVII

# *The II Corps Withdraws*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION I. | —Situation and Requirements | 1- 2 |
| SECTION II. | —A Solution | 3- 4 |
| SECTION III. | —Discussion of Principles | 5 |
| SECTION IV. | —Topics Suggested for Study | 6 |

Maps following page 289.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Eighteenth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. EIGHTEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION.

*a. Maps.*—Geological Survey, 1:62500. G2 Situation Map, II Corps, 6:00 AM, July 15.

*b.* The situation given in the Seventeenth Special Situation, Chapter XVI, is continued. See also Chapter XIV.

*c.* The situation of the II Corps at 6:00 AM, July 15, is shown on Situation Map II Corps. The 201st Field Artillery, Company A, 201st Balloon Group, and the 1st Battalion, 902d Chemical Ammunition Train are attached to the 25th Division. The 202d Field Artillery, Company B, 201st Balloon Group and the 2d Battalion, 902d Chemical Ammunition Train are attached to the 3d Division. The locations of the corps troops are shown on the situation map. A number of these units are distributed over the corps area on their normal duties.

*d.* The army message, dated 15 July 21, 7:00 AM, was received by the Commander, II Corps, at 7:30 AM. Third



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Army Field Order No. 12, dated 15 July 21, 11:00 AM, was received by the Commander, II Corps, at 10:30 AM.

*e.* The weather is fair, with a light west wind. Forecast for tomorrow, no change.

2. REQUIREMENTS.

*a. First Requirement.*—Orders issued by II Corps to carry out the army message and field orders.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Reasons in brief for actions taken.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

Orders ---------- 3
Reasons ---------- 4

---

3. ORDERS ISSUED.—*a. Message.*

II Corps,
ARLINGTON,
15 July 21, 8:00 AM.

Commanders,
25th and 3d Divs, FA Brig, Corps AS, 902d Cav, A-AA.

Army withdraws by echelon from east to west to general line of PARRS RIDGE extending from HAMPSTEAD via CARROLLTON, SMALL WOOD, BIRD HILL, WINFIELD to include MOUNT AIRY. Withdrawal by stages, first stage to general line CRONHARDT—OWING MILLS—east of WARDS CHAPEL—joining present position at 645; second stage to line DOVER—GLEN MORRIS—THE BUNKER—ELDERSBURG—joining present position at hill 618; third stage to general line of PARRS RIDGE given above. First stage of withdrawal to be completed by daylight tomorrow. 2d Cavalry Division will delay advance of DELAWARE Reds and prevent their crossing GUNPOWDER FALLS prior to daylight 17 July 21.

The II Corps will begin its withdrawal from present position after darkness tonight. The II Corps cavalry will be prepared to take over present front at 11:00 PM tonight. Preliminary measures necessary to carry out withdrawal

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will be begun at once but no movement of troops which may betray withdrawal will be made before night. Field orders covering the withdrawal will be issued at 1:00 PM today.

X,
Chief of Staff.

By telegraph and telephone.
Copies to staff.

*b.* FIELD ORDERS.

II Corps,
ARLINGTON,
15 July 21, 1:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 12. }

**Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500; Operation Map II Corps, to accompany FO No 12.**

1. (a) Indications of concentrations by Fifth Red Army with object of attacking the east wing of our army are confirmed. The DELAWARE Reds are crossing to the west bank of the SUSQUEHANNA at HAVRE DE GRACE. At least two divisions have been located this date at BELAIR, ABERDEEN and north of DEER CREEK along the SUSQUEHANNA, with some cavalry and detachments on east bank of LITTLE GUNPOWDER FALLS as far north as BLACKHORSE.

   (b) The Third Army, while withdrawing to the general line of PARRS RIDGE, with right at MOUNT AIRY and left at HAMPSTEAD, will attack north flank of DELAWARE Reds.

   (c) The II, IV, and III Corps withdraw by stages from the left. The I Corps, from concealed positions in the area GRAVE RUN—RAYVILLE—STILTZ, will make the attack on the DELAWARE Reds as they follow up the withdrawal. The 2d Cav Div will prevent DELAWARE Reds crossing GUNPOWDER FALLS before daylight 17 July 21. It will screen concentration of I Corps and cover left of II Corps. Gp B Army Arty will support the II and IV Corps. It moves tonight to positions in vicinity of FINKSBURG (see March Table).

   Army air service bombs HAVRE DE GRACE bridges.

2. Beginning at 8:00 PM tonight, the II Corps withdraws by stages as per March Table attached to position along PARRS RIDGE with right at DEER PARK (excl) and left

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at HAMPSTEAD (incl). (See Operation Map II Corps, to accompany FO No 12.)

3. (a) The 25th Div will hold present position until 11:00 PM tonight, when it will turn over its front to 902d Cav and withdraw, as ordered in March Table, in cooperation with divisions on its right and left. On the 16th, it will hold the position RJ 556 (excl)—OWINGS MILLS (incl), the position RANDALSTON—PIKESVILLE being held, temporarily, to delay hostile advance. At 11:00 PM, 16 July 21, leaving weak rear guards to cover its front, it will withdraw to position THE BUNKER (excl)—GLEN MORRIS (incl). This latter position will be held until further orders. It will send one battalion engineers, at once, to work on its part of the PARRS RIDGE position.

(b) The 3d Div will hold present position until 11:00 PM tonight, when it will turn over its front to the 902d Cav and withdraw, as ordered in March Table, in cooperation with the 25th Division. On the 16th, it will hold the position OWINGS MILLS (excl)—CRONHARDT, the position PIKESVILLE—BROOKLANDVILLE being held, temporarily, to delay the hostile advance. At 11:00 PM, 16 July 21, leaving weak rear guards to cover its front, it will withdraw to the position GLEN MORRIS (excl)—DOVER (incl). This latter position will be held until further orders. It will support the 902d Cav in protecting our left and in preventing enemy from penetrating between the II Corps and 2d Cav Div. It will send one battalion engineers, at once, to work on its part of PARRS RIDGE position.

(c) The 902d Cav, on the night of July 15-16, will take over the corps front at 11:00 PM. It will hold the positions vacated by the divisions, and delay the hostile advance. When driven back, it will protect the corps left and prevent a hostile penetration between the II Corps and the 2d Cav Div. In protecting the corps left, it will be supported by the 3d Div.

(d) Corps artillery, withdrawing on July 15 to positions west and northeast of OWINGS MILLS, and on July 16 to positions west and northeast of GLEN MORRIS (see March Table), will support the withdrawal, and assist in delaying the hostile advance and in the defense of the successive positions. Ar-

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tillery will maintain liaison with the corps cavalry and local security detachments of the successive positions, and delay the hostile advance in their front by timely long range fire. It will prevent any close hostile pursuit of the cavalry, the local security detachments, and the forces holding the RANDALLSTOWN—BROOKLANDVILLE position, when they withdraw through the main position. Persistent and non-persistent gas will be freely employed.

(e) The 205th A-AA, withdrawing in accordance with March Table, will assist in the anti-aircraft defense of the successive positions, and support corps and division observation planes.

(f) The Corps Obsn Gp will reconnoiter south of PATAPSCO RIVER, towards BELAIR and JOPPA, and watch especially for hostile reserves and columns of a hostile advance. The Corps Bln Gp (less det) from positions in rear of center of successive positions, will observe for command, intelligence, and artillery fire.

(g) The Corps Engrs (less 1 bn for work on roads) will move at once to work on the PARRS RIDGE position.

(h) All corps troops, except as covered in this order and Adm O No 16, will be in rear of division near rear boundaries by midnight each night.

(x) (1) All movements during the withdrawal will be made at night, and special precautions will be taken to prevent the enemy from finding out that withdrawal is being made.

(2) Special precautions will be taken to insure cooperation and mutual support of adjacent units during the withdrawal, and to prevent the enemy from closely following the advance detachments through the main withdrawal positions.

(3) Bridges will be destroyed, roads blocked, telegraph lines destroyed, and other demolitions and gas, will be employed to delay the hostile advance.

(4) The positions to which troops withdraw during the night, will be reconnoitered and marked during the preceding day.

(5) Work on the PARRS RIDGE position will be begun at once (see Engineer Annex) (omitted).

4. See Adm O No 16 (omitted).

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5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
II Corps: REISTERSTOWN TURNPIKE—HANOVER ROAD.
25th Div: ROLLING ROAD—PIKESVILLE—REISTERSTOWN TURNPIKE—WESTMINSTER TURNPIKE.
3d Div: ARLINGTON—RALSTON—CHATTOLANEE—GWYNNBROOK—GLYNDON—HANOVER ROAD.

(b) Command Posts:

| | *16 July 6:00 AM* | *17 July 6:00 AM* |
|---|---|---|
| II Corps: | GLYNDON | RICHARD MILLS |
| 25th Div: | DELIGHT | GLEN FALLS |
| 3d Div: | GWYNNBROOK | WOODENSBURG |
| 902d Cav: while covering front: | LOCHEARN | GWYNNBROOK |
| While protecting left: 508, 2 mi. N of CRONHARDT | | PLEASANT GROVE |

By command of General A,
X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution: A
and
2d Cav Div,
I Corps,
IV Corps.

See March table facing page 284.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a. Mission.*—The mission of the II Corps is to withdraw by stages, as ordered by the army, delay the hostile advance, cooperate with the IV Corps and prevent the enemy penetrating between the 2d Cavalry Division and the II Corps.

*b. The Enemy.*—(1) The enemy is threatening to attack the II Corps on the Patapsco front, and also on the flank from across Gunpowder Falls.

(2) On the Patapsco front, the enemy has two and one-half divisions and two Naval Brigades in line, against the two divisions of the II Corps. As the II Corps is holding a twelve-mile front, the enemy may employ as many as six or seven divisions against the II Corps. While the enemy evidently is preparing to attack, such attack probably will not be launched before daylight July 16.

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(3) The Delaware Reds now have two divisions and some cavalry west of the Susquehanna. At 5:00 AM July 15, this force was about 20 miles from the left flank of the II Corps. It is being delayed by the 2d Cavalry Division, which has orders to prevent the Reds crossing Gunpowder Falls before daylight 17 July 21.

*c. The II Corps.*—(1) The II Corps is now holding a twelve-mile front, with two divisions in line and the corps cavalry in reserve. Tonight, it withdraws about six miles on its right and thirteen miles on its left, and, for one day, holds a position some seven miles in extent. Tomorrow, it again withdraws about five miles to hold a second position some seven miles in extent.

*d. Enemy Cannot Interfere.*—Considering the enemy situation, the II Corps should have no serious difficulty in carrying out its mission.

*e. Time of Withdrawals.*—To avoid withdrawing during actual combat, and to keep the withdrawal concealed from the enemy as long as possible, movements are made at night and special precautions are taken to keep them concealed. Withdrawal during actual combat is always a difficult operation with small units. It is even more difficult with large units. In each case, front line units withdraw from the position at 11:00 PM. On the first night, this will give time for corps troops to be cleared out; on the second night, it should be late enough to permit all fighting to cease before the position is vacated.

*f. Assignment of Fronts.*—On the 16th, the right division is assigned a shorter front than the left division, as the former may be subjected to much heavier attacks than the latter.

*g. Corps Cavalry.*—Corps cavalry is used for the twofold mission of taking over the front vacated by divisions in order to maintain contact with, and delay a hostile advance; and of protecting the left of the corps after being driven back.

*h. Organization of New Position.*—Work on the new position is begun at once by the greater part of the engi-

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neers. Some engineers are left behind to keep the roads open and to execute demolitions.

*i. Plans for Troop Movement.*—(1) The plans for the movement deserve consideration. There are only two good roads available. However, there are a number of secondary roads which may be used. On account of the great mass of troops and consequent road spaces required (see Table of Road Spaces, Chapter III), it will be necessary to utilize these secondary roads or else begin movements in the daytime. Motorized elements of corps troops are moved out first on the two good roads, while foot troops, animal-drawn units, and tractor elements, move on secondary roads and on the good roads after the motorized units have cleared. Groupment B, Army Artillery, which takes 20 miles of road space, is included in these movements.

(2) The medical regiment, the air service, the special units, and motor trains, are moved all the way to positions in rear of second withdrawal position. The engineers and animal-drawn trains are moved in two bounds, on account of distance involved.

(3) Precautions are taken to avoid confusion in crossing columns of the 22d Division and the 4th Division and I Corps troops. Such crossings of columns are undesirable and are avoided when practicable. When necessary to make such crossings, points for the crossings are selected so that the roads permit units to form in double column and alternately pass the point of crossing. If this be done, comparatively little delay is caused to the march of either column.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

Paragraph

Discussion of Principles ---------- 5

---

5. DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLES.—*a. Previous Discussion.*—The general principles governing the withdrawal of the

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army, in this situation, are given in Chapter XVI. A number of the general principles to be considered in the withdrawal of a corps are given in Chapters XII and XIII, and in the preceding section of this chapter. Hence this discussion is limited to a brief résumé.

*b. Action to Prevent Hostile Interference.*—A coordinated hostile attack seems improbable prior to daylight July 16. Hence, by starting the withdrawal on the night of July 15, the danger of serious hostile interference is precluded. Otherwise, hostile interference with the withdrawal is prevented by the use of covering detachments, and by making the withdrawal in stages. See paragraphs 4*b* and 4*c*.

*c. Withdrawals Made at Night.*—The movements are made at night, for reasons already stated. See paragraph 4*e*.

*d. Withdrawals Made at 11:00 PM.*—The withdrawals from successive positions are made at 11:00 PM, for reasions already stated. See paragraph 4*e*.

*e. Maintaining Contact with and Delaying Hostile Advance.*—The cavalry takes over the vacated positions. It maintains contact with the enemy and delays the hostile advance. On withdrawing, it covers the flank. It is supported by long range artillery fire. See paragraph 4 *f*.

*f. Preventing Close Pursuit Through Withdrawal Positions.*—Artillery and machine guns prevent the pursuing enemy from following the rear guard closely through the withdrawal position. See paragraph 3 (d) of field order.

*g. Negative Measures.*—Negative measures are employed to delay the hostile advance. See paragraph 3 (x) (3) of field order.

*h. Order of Movement to the Rear.*—Motorized elements are moved out first on the good roads. Tractor elements, animal-drawn units, and foot troops move on the secondary roads, if necessary, and follow the motorized elements on the good roads. See paragraph 4*h* (1).

*i. Time Required for Corps Troops to Prepare for Movement.*—Corps troops should be able to move within one or two hours after receipt of notice. The motor sec-

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tions of the corps train are not used for troop movement until they have carried their normal loads to the rear.

*j. Crossing of Columns.*—Crossing of columns is avoided when possible. In this instance, it seems necessary to cross columns. Military police are used at points of crossing to assist in traffic control. See paragraph 4*h* (3).

## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 6

6. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation:

(1) On the Patapsco front—strength, intentions, hostile reserves which may be employed on that front, probable time of attack.

(2) On Gunpowder Falls front—strength, composition, movements, probable intentions; when may the hostile forces reach the II Corps flank?

*b.* The situation of the II Corps and general plan of withdrawal:

(1) Location and disposition of units of the corps.

(2) Withdrawal positions for the 16th and 17th.

(3) Can the enemy seriously interfere with withdrawal of II Corps?

(4) General plan of withdrawal.

*c.* Mission of each unit during the withdrawal:

(1) 25th and 3d Divisions.

(2) Corps cavalry.

(3) The artillery.

(4) The engineers.

(5) The air service.

(6) Supply and evacuation.

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*d.* Details of the movements:
(1) Relief of front by cavalry.
(2) Corps troops.
(3) Divisions.
*e.* Field Orders:
(1) Time of issue.
(2) Form, clearness, brevity, completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation map, II Corps (6:00 AM, July 15)
Operation map, II Corps (to accompany FO No. 12)
} following this page.

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## CHAPTER XVIII

# *The Counter Offensive*

## (*Army and Corps*)


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Maps following page 311.


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### SECTION I

## *Nineteenth Special Situation (Third Army)*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Situation of the Third Army at 9:00 AM, July 17 | 1 |
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1. NINETEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION (THIRD ARMY, TO INCLUDE 9:00 AM, JULY 17.)—*a.* (1) The withdrawal was carried out, on the nights of July 15-16 and 16-17 as planned (see Chapter XVI, and Situation Map, Third Army and I Corps, 8:00 AM and 2:00 PM, 17 July 21, Chapter XVIII).

(2) At daylight on the 17th, the Third Army stands with II, IV and III Corps, in order from left to right, along the general line Dover—Glen Morris—The Bunker—Eldersburg—Morgans, thence west along the South Branch Patapsco. Corps cavalry and rear guards are holding the position Cronhardt—Owings Mills — Wards Chapel — hill



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645, thence west along the South Branch Patapsco, from which the army withdrew on the night July 16-17.

(3) The I Corps, with 4th, 22d, and 35th Divisions, has been secretly concentrated in the area, Grave Run Mills—Rayville—Stiltz. The 2d Cavalry Division (attached to I Corps), and the I Corps cavalry, are screening the concentration of the I Corps, covering the left flank of the II Corps, and locating and delaying the advance of Red columns from the Susquehanna.

(4) The 1st Cavalry Division, in endeavoring to reconnoiter around the left of the Fifth Red Army, has encountered serious opposition and has been unable to penetrate east of the general line Kempton—Damascus—Gaithersburg.

(5) The Fifth Red Army apparently did not become aware of the withdrawal until the forenoon of the 16th, when it attacked on the whole front of the Third Army, but succeeded in gaining ground only on that part of the front which had been vacated by the Third Blue Army. On the front of the III Blue Corps, the Reds made no gain. The Blues, therefore, were able to make good their withdrawal without serious difficulty.

(6) The Delaware Reds had developed considerable strength and continued their advance towards the left of the Third Blue Army.

*b.* Developments in the Red situation, according to reports received by the Commander, Third Blue Army, up to 9:00 AM, July 17, are briefly indicated by the following (see Situation Map, Third Army and I Corps, showing situations at 8:00 AM and 2:00 PM, 17 July 21).

(1) Fifth Red Army: (a) On the 16th, the Fifth Red Army attacked on the whole front of the Third Blue Army and followed up the withdrawal of the Third Blue Army's left to the general line Cronhardt—Owings Mills —Wards Chapel.

(b) On the 17th, the Fifth Red Army continued its attacks, and promptly followed up the new withdrawal of the left and center of the Third Blue Army. In following up the withdrawal, the Reds were delayed by Blue corps

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cavalry and rear guards, and, by 8:00 AM, appeared to have reached the general line Timber Grove—Oakland—Springfield Hospital.

(c) The right of the Fifth Red Army appeared to be along Reisterstown Turnpike. On the afternoon of the 16th, prisoners of the 22d Red Division were captured at Owings Mills, and the IX Red Corps cavalry was operating against the 3d Blue Division.

(d) Blue G2 Reports, up to 9:00 AM, July 17th, showed no change in Fifth Red Army's order of battle since 6:00 PM July 14th (see Chapter XVI) except that the naval brigades had dropped out of line and occupied Baltimore. No Red reserve divisions have appeared in line during the last few days, and in spite of intensive Blue air reconnaissance, the location of the Fifth Red Army Reserves is still unknown.

(2) Delaware Reds:—During the 16th, the Delaware Reds forced the 2d Cavalry Division from the crossings of Little Gunpowder Falls, on the front Jacksonville—Chesapeake Bay, and pushed on towards Gunpowder Falls. Three groups of Red columns, about a division in each group, are reported as advancing in the following general directions:

(a) The south group is moving south of the Maryland and Pennsylvania RR. On the 16th it succeeded in crossing Gunpowder Falls, the heads of the columns reaching Towson and connecting with the right of the Fifth Red Army. At 8:00 AM on the 17th, advance guards from these columns were approaching Cronhardt.

(b) The center group, moving north of the Maryland and Pennsylvania RR, and, generally, via Jacksonville—Phoenix, reached the front Phoenix—Bosley on the night July 16-17. On the 17th it continued its advance towards the west, and by 8:00 AM, its advance guards were approaching Western Run.

(c) The north group is echeloned to the rear. It crossed Little Gunpowder Falls near Hess early on the 17th, and, at 8:00 AM, was approaching St. James Corner. A Red cavalry regiment, at Blackhorse, has been identified as the XII Red Corps cavalry.

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(d) The Blue air service reports additional Red columns approaching Belair and points to the south of Belair, early on the 17th.

2. REQUIREMENT.—The decisions of the Commander, Third Army, with reasons in brief.

NOTE.—Weather fair. Slight breeze blowing from the west. Forecast for tomorrow: no change.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

The Decisions of the Commander, Third Army ..... 3
Reasons in Brief ..... 4

---

3. DECISIONS OF THE COMMANDER, THIRD ARMY.—The commander decides that:

*a.* The Third Army will hold its present position and permit the Delaware Reds to advance against it on the 17th, and will crush the Red right by surprise counter attacks with the I Corps, launched at daylight on the 18th.

*b.* The advance of the Delaware Reds against the left of the II Corps will be delayed by the II Corps cavalry, and by the I Corps cavalry and the 2d Cavalry Division, to such an extent that the Reds will be unable to launch a prepared attack against the II Corps left on the 17th and that this Red envelopment will be limited on the 17th to the general line Dover—Pleasant Grove—Mount Carmel—Weisburg.

*c.* The details of the counter attack on the 18th will depend upon developments in the situation on the 17th.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a. Mission.*—(1) The mission of the Third Army is to hold the two Red forces east and south of the Catoctin and South Mountains until the Second and Fifth Armies complete their concentration, i.e., until about August 15 and September 15 respectively, although every opportunity should be grasped to take the offensive.

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The Third Army, nevertheless, should conserve its strength and fighting power to the extent necessary to insure the accomplishment of its mission.

(2) On July 14, when the Third Army was given this mission, it was defending the line of Patapsco and South Branch Patapsco against the Fifth Red Army, which was superior in strength. At the same time, other Red troops had crossed the Susquehanna and were marching against the left of the Third Army. To meet this situation, the Commander, Third Army, decided to withdraw gradually, by echelon from east to west, to the general line of Parrs Ridge, with center southeast of Westminster. In the meantime, the I Corps, with three divisions, was to be secretly concentrated to the north, with the object of striking the north flank of the Delaware Reds.

*b. The Red Forces.*—(1) The Fifth Red Army is closely following up the withdrawal of the Third Army. Its right appears to be along Reisterstown Turnpike. Its order of battle apparently has not changed. It has eight divisions and a cavalry division in line, and four or five divisions in reserve.

(2) Where are the Fifth Red Army reserves and when may they be employed? On the 14th, they appeared to be concentrating in rear of the right of the Fifth Red Army. If that be true, they can hardly reach a position for enveloping the right of the Third Army by the morning of the 18th, even though they move on the night of July 16-17. For the 18th, the front Sykesville—Mount Airy, seems to be the most probable location in which these reserves may be employed. After the 18th, they may be employed in an attempt to envelop the Blue right.

(3) (a) The Delaware Reds, approaching the left of the Third Army, are, apparently, the XII Red Corps with three divisions. The Red columns, approaching Belair and points to the south of Belair, are probably corps troops.

(b) On the 15th, the Delaware Reds were advancing against the left of the Third Army at Baltimore. On the 16th, they are marching against the Blue army left at

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Cronhardt. On the 17th, they were marching against the Blue army left at Dover.

(c) The direction of march of the Delaware Reds, considered together with the location of the right of the Fifth Red Army, indicates, without doubt, that the Delaware Reds intend to strike the Blue army left. With the delay caused by the Blue cavalry, the Delaware Reds hardly will be able to develop the Blue left and deploy for a prepared attack to envelop it today.

(d) If the Delaware Reds carry out their apparent intention of locating and enveloping the Blue left, they will hardly be able to carry out reconnaissance to the north of the Weisburg—Mount Carmel line on the 17th, as their cavalry is very inferior in strength to the Blues. However, if the Third Army withdraws to the Parrs Ridge position on the night of July 17-18, the Delaware Reds undoubtedly would locate the I Blue Corps on the 18th. There is nothing, in their present movements, which indicates that the Delaware Reds are aware of the location of the I Blue Corps.

*c. Our Own Troops.*—(1) The six Blue divisions, holding the front against which the Fifth Red Army is advancing, should have no serious difficulty in holding their position on the 18th against the attack of the eight Red divisions now in line. However, if the reserves of the Fifth Red Army are employed against their front on the 18th, Blue reserves should be available to support them.

(2) The 3d Division should have no difficulty in holding its position today, considering the delay which will be caused to the Red advance by the Blue cavalry. If the Delaware Reds carry out their present apparent intention, the 3d Division will be unable to hold its present position, on the 18th, without assistance.

*d. Plans Open to the Commander.*—The Commander, Third Army considers the following plans:

(1) *To hold the present position, using the I Corps to extend it to the north.* This plan would merely block the advance of the Delaware Reds, and would not take advantage of the present strategic location of the I Corps for

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inflicting severe losses upon them. Nor would this prevent the Fifth Red Army from carrying out an offensive against the Blue army right, which, no doubt, it intends to do in the near future. Furthermore, to meet such a Red offensive, the Blues would have practically all of their divisions in the front line, leaving not more than two divisions available as reserves with which to meet the Red main effort.

(2) *To delay the advance of the Delaware Reds on the 17th, withdraw to the Parrs Ridge position on the night of July 17-18, permit the Reds to advance against that position on the 18th, and launch a counter attack with the I Corps on the 19th.* This plan has the advantage of forestalling any probable attack which may be made with the reserve of the Fifth Red Army on the 18th. However, this reserve could be used against the Blue right on the 19th. The great disadvantage of this plan is the fact that the Delaware Reds undoubtedly would discover the location of the I Corps on the 18th. Although a counter attack, even then, might be launched against the Red right, with a fair chance of inflicting severe losses, still the great value of launching this attack as a surprise would be lost.

(3) *To hold the present position, to permit the Delaware Reds to advance against its left on the 17th, and to crush the Red right by a counter attack launched at daylight on the 18th.* This plan has many advantages. It takes advantage of the present opportunity of launching a surprise attack against the Red right. Furthermore, it undoubtedly will compel the Fifth Red Army to send part of its reserves to assist the Delaware Reds. This will interfere with, and probably delay, the main attack of the Fifth Red Army. The disadvantages of this plan are as follows:

(a) The Fifth Red Army may launch a main attack against the Third Army's right tomorrow. With the 30th Division as reserve, the Blue right should be able to hold, but, if necessary, it could be withdrawn without seriously interfering with the proposed attack against the Red right.

(b) All of the three Red divisions may not cross Gunpowder Falls today. In that case, the Reds remaining east

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of Gunpowder Falls could be held, while the attack is made against those west of Gunpowder Falls.

(c) The Reds may discover the location of the I Corps today, and hence be prepared for the counter attacks tomorrow. This is a possibility. The Blues have little to lose and much to gain by the plan.

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## SECTION III

## *Nineteenth Special Situation*

### (*Third Army, to Include 3:00 PM, July 17*)

| | Paragraph |
|---|---|
| Situation | 5 |
| Requirements | 6 |

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5. NINETEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION (Third Army, to include 3:00 PM July 17).—*a.* To carry out this decision, the Commander, Third Army, sent messages, containing preliminary instructions to all units concerned, at 9:30 AM July 17.

*b.* Developments in the situation, according to reports received by the Commander, Third Army, up to 3:00 PM, are briefly indicated by the following (see Situation Map, Third Army and I Corps, showing situation at 8:00 AM and 2:00 PM 17 July 21).

(1) The Fifth Red Army continued its advance and attacked along its whole front but has made no progress against the Third Army's position. Locations of Fifth Red Army's reserves are still unknown.

(2) The Delaware Reds: (a) Advance guards of the south group, center group, and of the IX Corps cavalry have advanced against the Blue right. At 2:00 PM, they reached the general line, front of the 3d Blue Division—ridge southwest of Berean.

(b) The north group crossed Gunpowder Falls at Monkton and on roads to the south. By 2:00 PM, elements

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of advance and flank guards from this group occupied and apparently are outposting the line, Cedar Grove—Hereford. The XII Red Corps cavalry, which has been covering the right of this group, is northeast of Hereford. Elements of Red cavalry advanced to the ridge east of Berean. No attempt has been made to drive the 2d Blue Cavalry Division north of the line Mount Carmel—Weisburg.

6. REQUIREMENT.—A brief statement of detailed plans for Third Army counter attack on July 18.

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution*

Paragraph

Brief Statement of Detailed Plans for the Third Army Counter Attack, July 18 ---------- 7

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7. A SOLUTION.—A brief statement of detailed plans for the Third Army counter attack on 18 July 21 is as follows (see Operation Map I Corps, to accompany FO No. 14).

*a. The Army.*—The Third Army to hold on the front North Branch Patapsco to the west, and crush the Red right by a counter attack, launched at 5:00 AM July 18, on the front North Branch Patapsco—Gunpowder Falls.

*b. The I Corps.*—The I Corps, reinforced by the 2d Cavalry Division and 1 battalion light tanks (now attached to IV Corps), to make the main effort on the front Piney Run (excl)—Gunpowder Falls (excl) and in the direction Rayville—Hereford—Oregon—Cronhardt. It will crush the Red right, advancing promptly to the line Bosley—Cronhardt—hill 709 (3 miles west of Cronhardt). With its cavalry, it will protect its left, reconnoiter towards the line Belair—Towson, and delay any hostile advance to the west of Belair. Right boundary: Piney Run—hill 709 (3 miles west of Cronhardt) (both exclusive).

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*c. The II Corps.*—The II Corps to contain the enemy on its front, and, in conjunction with the I Corps, advance to the line hill 709 (3 miles west of Cronhardt)—Delight. All guns which can be spared for that purpose will be used to support the attack of the I Corps.

*d. The III and IV Corps.*—III Corps and IV Corps, to hold their present positions.

*e. Army Artillery.*—Groupment B, Army Artillery, and two regiments of 75-mm. guns, portee, from position near Woodbine, to support the I and II Corps. The main effort will be made in support of the I Corps. Groupment A, Army Artillery, to continue present mission.

*f. Army Air Service.*—Observation group, to carry out intensive reconnaissance to locate reserves of the Fifth Red Army and Red movements from Susquehanna; bombardment group, to support the attack of the I Corps by bombing hostile artillery and hostile troops attempting to retreat across Gunpowder Falls or Western Run; attack group to attack Red ground troops in support of attack of I Corps at 6:00 AM.

*g. Reserve.*—30th Division at Taylorsville, the heavy tank battalions at New Windsor, and one regiment 75-mm. guns portee to be held in army reserve.

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## SECTION V

## *Nineteenth Special Situation (I Blue Corps)*

Paragraphs

Situation of the I Corps at 4:30 PM, July 17 ..... 8
Requirements ..... 9

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8. NINETEENTH SPECIAL SITUATION (I CORPS):—*Situation to include 4:30 PM, 17 July 21.*—*a.* At daylight on July 17, the I Corps is concentrated in the area Grave Run—Rayville—Stiltz, as ordered by Field Orders No. 12,

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Third Army, 15 July 21. (See Chapter XVI, and Situation Map, Third Army and I Corps showing situations 8:00 AM and 2:00 PM 17 June 21.) The 2d Cavalry Division (attached to I Corps) and the I Corps cavalry are screening the concentration of the I Corps, locating and delaying the advance of the Delaware Reds, and covering the left of the II Corps.

*b.* Except the cavalry, all units of the I Corps have been carefully concealed in houses or woods. No movements have been allowed during the day.

*c.* At 10:50 AM, the Commander, I Corps, received the preliminary instructions, from the army commander, for the counter attack on the 18th, and transmitted them to the units of the command. Preliminary reconnaissance was reduced to that necessary for command, artillery, and tanks. Officers making these reconnaissances were ordered to keep concealed from hostile aerial observation.

*d.* At 4:30 PM, the Commander, I Corps, received the field orders from the Third Army for the counter attack on the 18th. These orders put into effect the detailed plans given in paragraph 7.

*e.* By 4:30 PM, Red attempts to advance further to the west, around left of the 3d Division, had been repulsed. The north Red group was outposting the line, ridge west of Berean—Cedar Grove—North of Hereford, apparently going into bivouac between Hereford and Western Run. The XII Red Corps cavalry was holding the line east of Hereford.

*f.* At 4:30 PM, the I Corps cavalry was holding the line, Piney Run (excl)—Falls road; the 2d Cavalry Division was extending the line to the east through Weisburg, and screening the concentration of the I Corps.

9. REQUIREMENT.—Field Orders issued by the Commander, I Corps, for the counter attack on the 18th, with reasons, in brief, for action taken.

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## SECTION VI

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

I Corps Field Orders ---------- 10
Reasons in Brief ---------- 11

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10. I CORPS FIELD ORDERS.

I Corps,
HOFFMANVILLE,
17 July 21, 5:30 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 14. }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500.

1. (a) (1) The south and center groups of DELAWARE Reds have advanced against the left of the II Corps, where they have reached the general line, front of 3d Division—ridge southwest of BEREAN. Their attempts to advance beyond that line have been repulsed. The north Red group has crossed GUNPOWDER FALLS, apparently going into bivouac between HEREFORD and WESTERN RUN, with outpost on the general line, ridge west of BEREAN—CEDAR GROVE—1 mile north of HEREFORD. The XII Red Corps cavalry extends the line toward the east. The rear group of DELAWARE Reds, believed to be corps troops, apparently are crossing GUNPOWDER FALLS at BOSLEY and to the north of that place. No other Red columns have been observed advancing from the SUSQUEHANNA.

(2) The Red attacks against the front of the Third Blue Army have been repulsed. The locations of the Fifth Red Army Reserves are still unknown.

(b) The Third Army will hold on its front, NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO to the west, and crush the Red right by counter attack, launched at 5:00 AM tomorrow on the front NORTH BRANCH PATAPSCO —GUNPOWDER FALLS.

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(c) (1) II Corps will contain the Reds on its front, and, in conjunction with the I Corps, advance to the line Hill 709 (3 miles west of CRONHARDT) —DELIGHT. It will employ all available guns to support the attack of the I Corps.

(2) Groupment B, Army Artillery, and two regiments 75 mm guns, portee, from positions near WOODBINE, will support the II and I Corps. Their main effort will be in support of the I Corps.

(3) The army air service will support the attack of the I Corps by bombing Red artillery and Red troops attempting to retreat across GUNPOWDER FALLS or WESTERN RUN, and by attacking Red ground troops in front of the infantry advance at 6:00 AM.

2. The I Corps, reinforced by 2d Cavalry Division and 1 battalion light tanks, will attack at 5:00 AM 18 July 21, crush the Red right, and promptly advance to the line BOSLEY—CRONHARDT—Hill 709 (3 miles west of CRONHARDT).

Right boundary: PINEY RUN—Hill 709 (3 miles west of CRONHARDT) (both excl).

3. (a) 22d Division (less 1 regiment), reinforced by one battalion light tanks, will attack on the left; main effort along BALTIMORE and YORK TURNPIKE. It will promptly turn the Red right and rear, and cut off their retreat across GUNPOWDER FALLS. It will assist the advance of the 35th Division. It will keep in close touch with the 2d Cavalry Division, and be prepared to protect the left of the corps by holding the line of GUNPOWDER FALLS.

Left boundary: GUNPOWDER FALLS.

Right boundary: RAYVILLE—HEREFORD (both incl)—1 mile east of OREGON—CR 615 (1½ miles southwest of TEXAS.

Rear boundary: WALKER—RAYVILLE.

(b) 35th Division will attack in the center. It will make its main effort with its left, promptly turn the Red right and rear, and assist the advance of the 4th Division.

Left boundary: same as right of 22d Division.

Right boundary: HOFFMANVILLE—CEDAR GROVE (both excl)—SHAWAN—CRONHARDT (both incl).

Rear boundary: RAYVILLE—SHAMBURG.

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(c) 4th Division, reinforced by I Corps Cavalry, will attack on the right. It will make its main effort with its left, turning the Red right and rear. The I Corps cavalry will assemble as corps reserve at MOUNT CARMEL as soon as the Reds have been cleared in its front.

Left boundary: Same as right of 35th Division.
Right boundary: same as right of Corps.
Rear boundary: SHAMBURG—HAMPSTEAD.

(d) Corps artillery will support the attack from positions near MOUNT CARMEL. Its main effort will be in support of the 22d and 35th Divisions. Its movements to position will be under control of the 4th Division.

Division artillery will promptly follow up the advance of its infantry. Corps artillery will promptly follow up the division artillery.

Smoke will be used to blind important hostile observations on the CEDAR GROVE—HEREFORD ridge.

Artillery will open fire at 5:00 AM.

(e) Corps air service will carry out intensive reconnaissance to locate Red troops advancing from the SUSQUEHANNA and from BALTIMORE.

(f) The 2d Cavalry Division will advance down the east bank of GUNPOWDER FALLS with the following missions in their order of importance; first, to protect the left of the 22d Division and I Corps; second, to locate and develop hostile strength east of GUNPOWDER FALLS—for this purpose it will reconnoiter towards the line TOWSON—BELAIR; third, to delay any hostile advance to the west of BELAIR; fourth, to cut off retreat of Reds attempting to withdraw to the east of GUNPOWDER FALLS.

(g) One regiment, 22d Division, will be located at RAYVILLE as corps reserve.

(x) (1) The cavalry now holding the front will screen the movements of troops into position. All movements for the attack will be made secretly after dark. Special precautions will be taken in moving tanks into position.

(2) Elements of the 2d Cavalry Division on front to be taken over by divisions will be relieved by midnight tonight.

(3) The attack will be pushed with the greatest determination and efforts must not cease until

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the Reds have been captured or driven south of the line BOSLEY—CRONHARDT.

4. See Administrative Orders No 13 (omitted).

5. (a) Axes of signal communication:

I Corps: HOFFMANVILLE—BECKLEYSVILLE—FALLS ROAD.

22d Division: RAYVILLE—BALTIMORE and YORK TURNPIKE.

35th Division: EKLO—SHAMBURG—CEDAR GROVE —WESTERN RUN.

4th Division: Same as corps.

(b) Command Posts:

I Corps: No change.

22d Division: No change.

35th Division: SHAMBURG after 9:00 PM today.

4th Division: BLACKROCK after 9:00 PM today.

2d Cavalry Division: STABLERSVILLE after 9:00 PM today.

By command of General A;

X,

Chief of Staff.

Distribution (omitted).

11. REASONS IN BRIEF FOR ACTION TAKEN.—*The Mission.*—*a.* The mission of the I Corps is to crush the Red right by surprise attack against their flank.

*b. Plan of Maneuver.*—(1) To carry out the mission a deep and rapid advance should be made to turn the right and rear of the Red forces attacking the left of the II Blue Corps, and to cut off their retreat.

(2) The main effort is made along and just to the west of the Baltimore and York Turnpike, which is more or less favorable for a rapid and deep advance. This direction of attack will envelop the Cedar Grove, the Gentsville, and the Chestnut Ridge strongholds.

*c. Missions Assigned Various Units.*—(1) Two divisions are assigned to the main effort and are placed on comparatively narrow fronts in order that they may be able to make a deep and rapid advance. The division on the left should make the most rapid advance. For that reason the battalion of light tanks is assigned to the left division. The 4th Division, reinforced by I Corps cavalry, attacks on

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a very wide front. It makes its main effort with its left, thus taking advantage of the advance of the division on its left to assist it in enveloping the right of any Reds which it may encounter.

(2) (a) The artillery will make its main effort in support of the 22d and the 35th Divisions. There will be no artillery preparation. It is desired that the attack be a complete surprise, and that no time be given the enemy to make dispositions to meet it.

(b) Division artillery is ordered to follow up promptly the advance of its infantry, and the corps artillery the advance of the division artillery. In this attack a rapid and deep advance is expected and, if it is successful, the infantry will soon advance beyond the support of its artillery.

*d. Screening and Concealing Deployments.*—Divisions are deployed for the attack under cover of the cavalry holding the front. All movements are made at night and every precaution is taken to prevent the enemy discovering the preparations for the attack. It is very important that the attack be launched as a surprise.

*e. Protection for Left Flank.*—Special precautions are taken to protect the left of the 22d Division and the left of the corps. While reports indicate that all Reds within supporting distance have crossed to the west of Gunpowder Falls, this information is by no means certain. To protect the left flank, the natural line of defense of Gunpowder Falls will be utilized, the 22d Division will maintain close contact with the 2d Cavalry Division and be prepared to protect the left of the corps by holding the line of Gunpowder Falls; the corps reserves are taken from the 22d Division in order that a force will be available for this purpose. The 2d Cavalry Division advancing down the east bank of Gunpowder Falls is given the important mission of locating any Red troops which may be east of that stream within striking distance of the Blue left and of protecting the Blue left, and of cutting off retreat of Reds to the east of that stream.

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## SECTION VII

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
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| Object of the Problem | 12 |
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| The Decisive Element in the Counter Offensive | 18 |
| Army Plan of Maneuver | 19 |
| I Corps Attack | 20 |

12. OBJECT OF THE PROBLEM.—The present problem is a continuation of that given in Chapter XVI. In Chapter XVI the general principles governing the conduct of the army to meet the present general situation, and those governing the withdrawal of the army and the various classes of the ambuscade defense, were discussed. The present problem is concerned with the development of the situation for, and the execution of, the ambuscade defense and counter offensive planned in Chapter XVI.

13. MISSION.—The mission of the Third Army has not changed. It still has the mission of holding the two Red forces east and south of the general line, Catoctin Mountains—South Mountains in order to protect the future concentrations of the Second Blue Army in the area Carlisle—Harrisburg, to be completed about August 15th, and of the Fifth Blue Army in the area Harpers Ferry—Hagerstown, to be completed about September 15th.

14. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING PLAN OF ACTION.—The two combined Red forces are greatly superior in strength to the Blue army. The distance over which the Blue army may delay the Red advance, before the line Catoctin Mountains—South Mountains is reached, is not great; yet the Red advance must be delayed for about one month before additional Blues arrive, and for about two months before the two Blue armies have completed their concentration. Under these conditions, a purely passive

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retreat and passive resistance alone may not delay the hostile advance a sufficient length of time to permit the Blue army to accomplish its mission. While conserving its strength and avoiding undue risk of defeat, the Third Army should lose no opportunity to secure additional delay by maneuver and well planned counter blows; thus keeping the enemy in doubt as to the Blue's intentions, inflicting losses upon him, upsetting his plans for pursuit and attack, and forcing him to pursue more cautiously. The ambuscade defense and counter offensive have been planned with these objects in view.

15. LEADING THE ENEMY INTO A TRAP.—As a general principle, a pursuing force should push forward promptly, thus giving the retreating force as little time as possible to reorganize its forces and to organize new positions for defense. In order to follow up the retreating force promptly, the advance must be made less cautiously than under other conditions. The Blues hope to take advantage of this factor to lead the enemy into a trap, or to make the hostile pursuit slower and more cautious. The Blues plan to lead the pursuing Reds into a reckless attempt to envelop the Blue left flank; and, with a concealed Blue force, screened by cavalry, to strike an annihilating blow against the flank of the enveloping Red forces.

16. THE SITUATION AT 9:00 AM.—The situation as it has developed during the withdrawal up to 9:00 AM 17 July 21, seems to offer a very good chance of leading the hostile enveloping force into a trap as planned. The Reds are closely following up the Blue withdrawal and they apparently intend to continue the pursuit and employ the Delaware Reds to envelop the Blue left. Where they will employ the reserves of the Red Fifth Army is not known.

17. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE BLUE PLAN OF ACTION.—In deciding upon the plan of action to meet the situation at 9:00 AM, the following points deserve consideration:

*a.* The entire Delaware Red force should be caught within the trap, if possible. For this reason, they should be permitted and induced to cross Gunpowder Falls. If the

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Blues hold their present position today, the opportunity offered the Reds, to envelop the Blue left, may induce the whole Delaware Red force to cross.

*b.* The Red envelopment must be delayed and be so confined that it cannot accomplish serious results before the counter offensive is launched to crush it. The time and space factor, the delay which may be caused by the cavalry, and the resistance which may be offered by the 3d Division and II Corps, should be sufficient to accomplish this, provided the counter attack be launched not later than daylight on the 18th.

*c.* The location of the units of the I Corps must be kept carefully concealed, else the enemy will not enter the trap. The cavalry and air service, together with proper concealment of the units of the I Corps, should prevent the enemy from locating the I Corps on the 17th at least.

*d.* The Third Army should be able to hold its present position without difficulty against a Red attack on the 17th, and be able to hold in check any attack which may be launched against its present position on the 18th. Some reserves should be available for this purpose.

*e.* As the situation developed up to 9:00 AM, the best plan of action for the counter offensive seems to be the one adopted. The hostile situation, as it developed up to 2:00 PM, confirmed the conclusions as to this plan of action.

18. THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE COUNTER OFFENSIVE.—The decisive element, in the Third Army counter offensive, is a powerful surprise blow against the hostile flank which successively crushes the Red divisions in line before they are able to face to the flank or withdraw.

19. PLAN OF MANEUVER.—The plan of maneuver is as follows:

*a.* The II Corps, army artillery, and army air service hold the enemy in position, thus preventing them from extricating themselves by facing to the flank or withdrawing.

*b.* The I Corps, reinforced by the cavalry, makes the surprise attack against the Red flank. This requires a deep and rapid advance to box in the Red forces, cut off their

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retreat and successfully crush them before they can extricate themselves from their engagement with the II Corps.

*c.* The left of the II Corps advances in conjunction with the I Corps, to assist in holding the enemy in place and to make the crushing blow more complete.

*d.* The details of the maneuver are explained in the detailed plan for the attack, given in the solution.

20. THE I CORPS ATTACK.—*a. Concealment During Development of the Situation.*—During the development of the situation for the counter offensive the units of the I Corps must be carefully concealed and their location kept secret from the enemy. This is essential for the success of the ambuscade defensive. This concealment demands that during the daytime the units should remain in woods or billets and that no movements or fires which might betray the location of the troops should be allowed. Fresh tracks leading into the places of concealment should be obliterated or camouflaged. The cavalry and air service should carefully screen the concentration.

*b. The Mission.*—The mission assigned the I Corps in the counter offensive is to crush the Delaware Reds by a surprise attack against their flank on the front, Piney Run —Gunpowder Falls and in the direction Rayville—Hereford —Oregon—Cronhardt. The corps will promptly carry the line to Bosley—Cronhardt—hill 709.

*c. Decisive Elements in I Corps Attack.*—Decisive elements in the I Corps attack are a powerful surprise blow against the hostile flank accompanied by a deep and rapid advance to box in the Red forces, cut off their retreat across Gunpowder Falls, and successively crush them before they can extricate themselves from their engagement with the II Corps, and face to the flank or retreat.

*d. Plan of Maneuver, I Corps.*—The plan of maneuver employed by the I Corps to accomplish its mission is to make a deep and rapid drive along Baltimore—York Turnpike—Cronhardt, enveloping the Cedar Grove, the Gentsville and the Chestnut Ridge strongholds, boxing in the hostile forces and cutting off their retreat across Gunpowder Falls.

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*e. Missions Assigned Each Unit.*—The manner in which the units of the corps are employed, and the fire power of all arms are combined and coordinated, to carry out the above maneuver, are explained in the field orders and reasons for action taken given in the solution. Important points to be noted are the following:

(1) The two divisions which make the main effort are assigned narrow fronts of attack and given a direction of attack which combines their efforts along the direction of the main effort of the corps. The division which is to make the most rapid advance is reinforced by the tanks.

(2) The main effort of the artillery is in support of the main effort of the corps. There is no artillery preparation. It is desired that the attack be a complete surprise.

(3) The 4th Division, reinforced by I Corps cavalry, attacks on a wide front and makes its main effort with its left to take advantage of the advance of the main effort of the corps and to assist in boxing in the Reds.

(4) The 2d Cavalry Division advances down the east bank of Gunpowder Falls to cut off the retreat of the Reds across same and to develop any Red force which may still be east of that stream.

*f. Screening and Concealing Deployments.*—Special precautions are taken to screen the deployments for the attack to prevent the enemy from finding out that preparations for an attack are being made.

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## SECTION VIII

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 21

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21. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Based on information available at 9:00 AM—Red attacks and pursuits:

(1) The Fifth Red Army—what will it be able to do on

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the 17th and on the 18th? Where will it probably make its main effort and how soon may this attack be expected?

(2) The Delaware Reds.—What were their intentions on the 15th? on the 16th? What are their present intentions? How should they carry out their pursuit? What protection should they furnish for their right flank? Will they locate the I Blue Corps on the 17th? What will they be able to do on the 18th?

*b.* Plans open to the Commander, Third Army (9:00 AM):

(1) Plans given in text.

(2) Other plans.

*c.* Discuss developments in the situation of the Delaware Reds between 9:00 AM and 2:00 PM, also between 2:00 PM and 4:30 PM.

(1) Are the developments in the situation reasonable? Have the Reds taken proper measures to protect their right flank? If not, what should they have done?

(2) What will they do on the 18th?

*d.* Detailed plans for Third Army counter attack.

(1) General plan of maneuver of army for the counter attack as given in the solution.

(2) Other general plans of maneuver which may have been considered.

(3) Mission of each unit for the plan given in the solution.

*e.* The I Corps Attack:

(1) Maneuver of corps as a whole.

(2) Mission of each unit.

(3) Protection of left flank.

(4) Measures for concealing preparation for attack.

*f.* Corps Field Order: form, clearness, brevity, completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, Third Army and I Corps, 17 July 21, following this page.

Operation Map, I Corps, to accompany F.O. No. 14, 17 July, following this page.

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## CHAPTER XIX

# *The Army Retires*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION I. | —Situation and Requirements | 1- 2 |
| SECTION II. | —Solution | 3- 5 |
| SECTION III. | —Discussion of Principles | 6 |
| SECTION IV. | —Topics Suggested for Study | 7 |

Maps following page 325.


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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twentieth Special Situation (Third Army, 27 July, 1921) | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


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1. TWENTIETH SPECIAL SITUATION (Third Blue Army, 27 July, 1921).—*a.* (1) The attack of the I Blue Corps during the 18th and 19th of July was successful in driving back the Red right, capturing several thousand prisoners, and halting the Red attack. However, the results were not sufficiently decisive to prevent the Fifth Red Army from launching a serious attack, beginning July 20th, against the Blue right. After three days' severe fighting the Blue right was forced to retire to the prepared position along Parrs Ridge. At 2:00 PM July 27, the Third Army is holding the general line from Walker (on Little Falls) through Rayville—Beckleysville—Hampstead—Houcksville — Reese — Bird Hill — Gist — Winfield — south of Talbot Branch (see location sheet and situation map herewith).

(2) The Reds pressed the fighting with aggressiveness for several days, but their efforts have slackened considerably since July 24. The Third Army has suffered casualties averaging 20% in this fighting. However, the



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spirit of the army remains good. Sufficient replacements have been received to bring the 11th and 22d Divisions up to full strength. Due to the concentration of the Second and Fifth Armies, no other replacements are expected prior to August 5. All units of the army have been rather constantly engaged since the attack the last of June.

*b.* While many changes occurred during the fighting between July 15 and 24, the best information available up to noon of July 27 indicates Reds' Order of Battle to be (see situation map herewith):

(1) From Little Falls to Baltimore—Hanover Road: XII Corps, with 7th, 6th and 5th Divisions from east to west.

(2) From Baltimore—Hanover road to Deerpark Road: IX Corps, with 22d and 25th Divisions from east to west.

(3) From Deerpark Road to Liberty Turnpike: X Corps, with 21st and 20th Divisions from east to west.

(4) From Liberty Turnpike to South of Linganore: XI Corps with 15th, 23d and 19th Divisions from east to west.

(5) East flank of army: a composite cavalry force equal to a reinforced brigade.

West flank of army: 1st Cavalry Division (less 1 brigade).

Reserves (location unknown): VIII Corps, 17th, 24th, 16th, 40th and 42d Divisions and naval brigades.

*c.* While the Red heavy artillery shows no increase in calibers or numbers, a marked increase in Red air units is apparent, especially in pursuit planes. As a result, the Blue air service is experiencing difficulty in reconnaissance and observation, and its distant bombing operations have to be restricted to night bombardments.

*d.* The Blue intelligence section submitted the following as its general estimate of the Red situation up to noon of July 27:

"The Reds hold present front with four corps and ten divisions. Four of these divisions (23d, 19th, 22d and 6th) are fairly well used up, the rest are in good shape for continuous fighting.

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"In reserve, the Reds are known to have at least one corps and five divisions. These divisions have been out of the line for the following periods: 2, seven days; 2, five days; and 1, three days.

"There are positive indications of Red divisions having crossed the west bank Susquehanna since July 18. Red foot patrols were located during AM July 27 by aerial and cavalry patrols and spies in areas of Belair—Grafton Shops, and Mill Green—Whiteford.

"From close observation of circulation, result of examination of prisoners and a few reports of spies, there is no doubt that the Reds have been moving large bodies of troops to the north of Baltimore for several days. Concentrations were reliably reported at Towson and Jacksonville evening of July 26. On the front of our III and IV Corps, Red rear areas have been abnormally quiet for the last three days. The only Red reserves reliably reported in this area appear to be about Ellicott City and Damascus.

"Since July 20th our XX Corps (east of Susquehanna) has repulsed two Red attacks, one against its front along Octoraro Creek and the other an attempt to cross the Susquehanna near Conowingo. However, on July 26 the Delaware Reds continued their attack, and early July 27 succeeded in crossing to the east bank of the Susquehanna north of Conowingo. The right of the XX Blue is retiring in direction of Lancaster closely followed by Delaware Reds.

"It is believed that the Reds contemplate an early advance along the west bank of the Susquehanna and in preparation therefor will attack the Third Blue Army's left. It appears probable that such an attack will be launched late on the 28th or early on the 29th. This Red attack will no doubt be combined with a wide envelopment made by the Red troops reported in areas of Belair—Grafton Shops and Mill Green—Whiteford. However, the destruction of railroads and roads between the Patapsco and Little Gunpowder Falls has been so extensive that any immediate Red advance must be greatly delayed."

*e.* At 1:30 PM, July 27, the Commander Third Blue Army received the following telegram:

General Headquarters,
ALBANY,
27 July 21, 12:30 PM.

Comdr. Third Army.

In view of the Red advance east of SUSQUEHANNA, Second Army, now concentrating east and southeast of

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HARRISBURG, will be utilized against DELAWARE Reds by an advance east of SUSQUEHANNA. Reinforcements being sent to XX Corps should hold DELAWARE Reds along line of PEQUEA CREEK. Beginning evening August 1st no more supplies for your army can be shipped via railroads passing through YORK. Third Army will prevent Reds west of SUSQUEHANNA operating in force against Second Army's right flank. Expect decisive action east of SUSQUEHANNA about Aug. 27. Acknowledge.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

See table, facing page 316.

2. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—Decision of the Commander, Third Army, with brief reasons.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Orders of Third Army putting the decision into effect.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraphs

Decision with Brief Reasons ---------- 3
Orders to Carry Out Decision ---------- 4
Movement Table, Third Blue Army ---------- 5

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3. DECISION WITH BRIEF REASONS.—*a.* The Third Army will retire gradually to the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover with a three-fold object; first, of avoiding a decisive battle; second, of drawing the Reds in its front away from the Susquehanna; and third, of gaining sufficient time to rest, receive replacements, rearrange supply system, and to regroup the army preparatory to future operations.

*b.* The two main missions of the Third Army are, first, to prevent the Reds west of the Susquehanna from joining in the operations to the east thereof, and second, to cover the concentration of the Fifth Blue Army. The army's dis-

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positions, strength and physical condition, in comparison to the Reds opposing it, do not warrant either an immediate offensive or a stand in its present position. Neither of the above courses of action promises success, and both risk failure with no compensating advantages. Once the Third Army is decisively defeated, its usefulness in the general Blue plan will be lost.

*c.* A retirement at the present time will avoid a decisive battle, and by drawing the Reds to the northwest will keep them out of the main battle to the east. Whereas, a transfer of the Third Army to a position south of York would insure immediate support to the Second Blue Army, problems of supply and cover for the Fifth Army's concentration make such action undesirable.

*d.* As the Third Army cannot accept a serious battle in its present state, steps should be taken without delay to overcome this defect. In view of the destruction of railroads, etc., the Reds, in strength, will not be able to follow the Blues for a great distance. Opportunity should therefore be obtained to resupply, refit, rest and regroup the army and to place it in a position of readiness for future action.

*e.* A position on the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover threatens any Red movement either to the east or to the west, permits the army to act offensively at a later date and insures its supply; whereas a retirement to the west of the Monocacy has many objections such as being confined by the mountains, liability to being cut off from assisting the Blue Second Army, etc. A retirement to the north of Gettysburg may be necessary in the future, but at present such a move might allow the Red Fifth Army to detach large forces to the east or the west. Finally, the pending Red attack against the I Corps, coupled with the direction of the present line of battle, forces a retirement, at least initially, to the northwest.

*f.* In order to insure resupply, regrouping and preparations for future action, the army should endeavor to completely disengage itself, placing distance and rear guards between its main forces and the Reds. A withdrawal will

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not accomplish the foregoing, a rapid retirement is necessary.

4. ORDERS.—*a. Messages.*

Third Army,
TANEYTOWN,
27 July 21, 3:30 PM.

Comdrs I, II, III and
IV Corps and 1st and 2d
Cav Divs.

Copy to Staff.

Orders issue at 5:00 PM directing retirement of army to general line EMMITSBURG—HANOVER. Desire complete disengagement be secured as early as possible. Start retirement after dark this evening. Tomorrow corps will hold in their respective zones on general line GLENVILLE—DUG HILL RIDGE — MANCHESTER ROAD — WESTMINSTER — south of SPRING MILLS and AVONDALE—thence west north of W. M. RR. III Corps Cav and 2d Cav Div cover respectively west and east flanks. 1st Cav Div moves tonight to army's left flank. Right of II and left of IV Corps pivot of movement. Vicinity of WESTMINSTER must be held at all cost. Daylight movements authorized beginning 28th inst. Make necessary arrangements. Acknowledge.

X,
Chief of Staff.

*b. Field Orders.*

Third Army,
TANEYTOWN,
27 July 21, 5:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 25. }

Maps: Operation Map, Third Army, FO No 25.

1. (a) No change in Red situation west of the SUSQUEHANNA (see G2 Report and Situation Map, Third Army, 2:00 PM, 27 July 21). Movements and concentrations of Reds north of BALTIMORE and in the area north of BELAIR indicate Red advance against our left on 28th or 29th inst. East of the SUSQUEHANNA Reds have crossed OCTORARO CREEK and are advancing northeast.

(b) Our Second Army, concentrating east of HARRISBURG, will operate in support of our XX Corps which will hold the line of PEQUEA CREEK.

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2. This army, retiring to general line EMMITSBURG—HANOVER, will contain Reds west of the SUSQUEHANNA. (See Movement Table and Operation Map herewith.)
3. (a) I Corps, while protecting the left flank of the Army, will successively hold the lines of DUG HILL ridge and PENTLAND—WENTZ, to assure retirement of II Corps. Corps Cav reinforced by machine guns will delay Reds on line of LITTLE FALLS—CODORUS CREEK.
   (b) II Corps, in conjunction with IV Corps, will successively hold WESTMINSTER, and ridge north of BIG PIPE CREEK, to assure retirement of army's right wing.
   (c) IV Corps, after assuring the retirement of the III Corps to north of W. M. RR, will transfer command of 2d Division and Corps Cav to III Corps, and then withdraw remainder of corps as per movement table attached.
   (d) III Corps, withdrawing successively to line of W. M. RR and to line north of TANEYTOWN, will hold the latter line to assure withdrawal of II Corps. It will relieve today the 1st Cav Div, and with III and IV Corps Cav cover our right. Early information desired of any Red movement through CATOCTIN MOUNTAINS.
   (e) 1st Cav Div upon being relieved by III Corps Cav will move without delay to east flank of army and operate under CG 2d Cav Div. The 2d Cav Div, reinforced, acting aggressively, will cover the army's east flank, delaying all Red advance between line LITTLE FALLS—CODORUS CREEK, and NORTH BRANCH MUDDY CREEK. Special efforts will be made to learn of Red movements between GUNPOWDER FALLS and the SUSQUEHANNA. Maintain contact with the right of XX Corps.
   (f) Gps A and B Army Artillery will establish themselves in positions designated at once and be prepared by morning of July 29, to support:—Gp A, III and II Corps; Gp B, II and I Corps.
   (g) Army air service will carry out following special missions:
      (1) Obsn Gp will determine extent of Red pursuit on whole front and Red attempts to pass army flanks. Early information is desired of Red activities between the SUSQUEHANNA and GUNPOWDER FALLS and any movements through CATOCTIN MOUNTAINS.

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(2) Bomb Gps will delay Red advance by bombing all main railroads and roads available for Red pursuit. Make special effort on our left.
(3) Atk Gp will support the front of II and IV Corps on July 28 and 29 and II and I Corps on July 30. Plans for employment will be made through G3 these headquarters.
(4) Concentrations of IV Corps will be especially screened.

(x) (1) When sufficiently disengaged corps will contain Reds by use of cavalry and machine guns thereby permitting the mass of the infantry and artillery to be withdrawn well to the rear.
(2) While a complete disengagement of the main body will be sought, corps must maintain contact with Reds by employment of the cavalry at their disposal.
(3) Corps will not withdraw completely from daily lines given in movement table without authority from these headquarters. Special steps will be taken by each corps to assure cooperation with flank units of adjacent corps.
(4) All possible negative measures to delay Red advance will be employed. Gas will be employed at discretion of corps commanders.

4. See Administrative Order No 30.

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
Army: TANEYTOWN ROAD—CARLISLE ROAD.
III Corps: UNION BRIDGE—TANEYTOWN—TANEYTOWN ROAD.
IV Corps: HAHNS MILLS — TYRONE — MARKERS MILL.
II Corps: UNION MILLS — LITTLESTOWN — BONNEAUVILLE—HUNTERSTOWN.
I Corps: GLENVILLE—HANOVER—ABBOTTSTOWN.
2d Cav Div (reinforced): NORRISVILLE—STEWARTSTOWN—SHREWSBERRY—BALTIMORE PIKE.
(b) Command Posts (see Movement Table attached).

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A.

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## 5. MOVEMENT TABLE THIRD ARMY, July 27 to 30, 1921.
## (To accompany F.O. No. 25.)
### (See Operation Map, Third Army, F.O. No. 25.)

| *Unit* 1 | *Location July 28 6:00 AM.* 2 | *Location at July 29 6:00 AM* 3 | *Locatio at July 30 6:00 AM* 4 | *Routes* 5 | *Zones of Action* 6 | *Railhead (see note at end of table)* 7 | *Remarks* 8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AHQ<br>Fwd Ech<br>Rr Ech | TANEYTOWN.<br>GETTYSBURG. | GETTYSBURG.<br>CARLISLE. | GETTYSBURG.<br>CARLISLE. | | | GETTYSBURG.<br>CARLISLE. | |
| AAS<br>Bomb and Pur Gps<br>Obsn and Attack Gps | GETTYSBURG.<br>TANEYTOWN. | ARENDTSVILLE.<br>TABLE ROCK. | ARENDTSVILLE.<br>TABLE ROCK. | Any available.<br>TANEYTOWN—CARLISLE roads. | | SHIPPENSBURG.<br>SHIPPENSBURG. | |
| Hq Tk Bn | Enroute. | WAYNESBORO. | CARLISLE. | By WM RR | | CARLISLE. | |
| Army Tn | Enroute (a) | WAYNESBORO. | CARLISLE. | & CV. | | CARLISLE. | (a) Moving 11th Div and others. |
| 1st Cav Div | FAIRPLAY. | HANOVER. | Covering east flank. | West of MONOCACY FAIRPLAY—BONNEAUVILLE—HANOVER—MENGES MILL. | | MANCHESTER. | 1st Cav Div comes under 2d Cav Div July 29, 6:00 PM. |
| 2d Cav Div | Covering east flank. | Covering east flank. | Covering east flank. | | | MANCHESTER. | |
| Army Arty<br>Gp A<br><br>Gp B | Enroute.<br><br>Enroute. | Vicinity WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL.<br><br>BITTINGER. | WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL.<br><br>BITTINGER. | UNION BRIDGE—TANEYTOWN—TANEYTOWN road.<br>BALTIMORE—HANOVER and CARLISLE—BALTIMORE roads. | | ORRTANNA.<br><br>CENTER MILLS. STA | Gp A leaves WELDON at 10:00 PM 27 July. Gp B leaves SNYDERSBURG at midnight July 27–28. Move at maximum rate. Have priority on roads. |
| IV CORPS<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs<br><br>23d Div<br><br>(See note 2 at end of tables) | Holding line 863—SPRING MILLS N of W M RR. CHQ at MARKERS MILL. | GETTYSBURG.<br><br>(e) | Infantry motor and animal drawn at YORK SPRING. | GETTYSBURG and HARRISBURG road.<br>East of GETTYSBURG and HARRISBURG road. | | DILLSBURG.<br><br>D and M Junction. | IV Corps relieved by III Corps at midnight July 28–29.<br>(e) By 6:00 PM July 29 CHQ, Corps Trs (less Cav) and 23d Div will be assembled ready to move at GETTYSBURG, Two TAVERNS, and north of LITTLES IRON respectively. |

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| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| II Corps<br>CHQ | Littlestown. | Hunterstown. | Hunterstown. | As prescribed by corps. | West boundary: Same as IV and III Corps. | | |
| Corps Trs<br>25th Div<br>3d Div | Holding line Manchester—Cranberry Sta.—Westminster. | Holding line Wentz—Deep Run—Silver Run—Green Valley School (excl). | Holding line Midway—Felty School—585—SE of Germantown. | | East boundary: Extended via Baltimore—Hanover and Carlisle—Baltimore roads (excl) to Conewago. | Biglerville—Gettysburg—Goldenville. | |
| 11th Div | Infantry and motors enroute to East Berlin.<br><br>Animal drawn at Littlestown. | East Berlin.<br><br>East Berlin. | East Berlin.<br><br>East Berlin. | Middleburg—Keymar—Taneytown—Littlestown—Hanover.<br>Union Ch—Markers Mills—Blocks School—roads west of Hanover. | | Dillsburg. | Moves by truck starting at 7:00 PM July 27. Animal drawn give Gp A, AA, right of way. |
| III Corps<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs | Taneytown. | Gettysburg. | Gettysburg. | As prescribed by corps. | West boundary: Millers Ridge—Toms Creek—Middle Creek—Rattling Run.<br>East boundary: No change to midnight July 28–29 then take over IV Corps extended via Kingsdale—Germantown—Barlow Knoll—Texas (all incl). | Fairfield Sta. | |
| 30th Div<br>20th Div<br>2d Div | Holding line north of WM RR. (c) | Holding line Green Valley School (incl)—B. M. 494—Longville—Bridgeport—Toms Creek Ch. | Holding line Germantown—598—478—Hoffman Hill. | | | Fairfield Sta.<br>Seven Stars.<br>Seven Stars. | (c) 2d Div and IV Corps Cav pass to III Corps at midnight July 28–29. |
| 1st Div | (d) | Infantry and motors at Davidsburg<br>Animal drawn at Hunterstown. | Davidsburg. | Movements under army orders via Gettysburg—Hunterstown—Newchester. | | D & M Junction | (d) 1st Div moved by Corps trucks and marching; to be in area Taneytown—Longville—Bridgeport, ready to move, by 6:00 PM July 28. Thereafter moved by army. |
| I Corps<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs<br>4th Div<br>35th Div<br>22d Div | Abbottstown.<br>Covering east flank and holding line Glenville—Blackrock—Manchester. | Abbottstown.<br>Covering east flank and holding line Pentland—Wentz. | Abbottstown.<br>Covering east flank and holding line Porters—Hanover. | As prescribed by corps. | West boundary: Same as east boundary II Corps.<br>East boundary: Extended by Swan (incl). | Idaville.<br>Abbottstown.<br>Abbottstown.<br>East Berlin. | 22d Div passes to I Corps at 6:00 PM July 27. |

Note. (1) During the period 6:00 AM July 28 to 6:00 PM July 29, no issue of any supplies except ammunition, gasoline, and oil will be made. Organizations will use supplies carried in their trains. Railheads given in this table become effective at 6:00 PM July 29.

Note. (2) IV Corps takes command 11th Div, 1st Div and 22d Div, 6:00 PM July 29.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

Paragraph

Discussion ---------- 6

6. DISCUSSION.—*a.* While many of the principles indicated in the "Army Withdraws" are applicable to this situation, there are radical differences in basic plans and execution. While the former was based on avoiding a flank attack and creating an opportunity for a heavy counter attack, the retirement herein depicted is made to forestall a decisive battle, to attract the Reds in a desirable direction, and to gain time for a rehabilitation and regrouping of the army. A retirement to avoid decisive battle has many illustrations in military history. The German retirement on the Somme in 1917 is one of the latest. With the foregoing in view, the plans should be based on four main considerations:

(1) An early and complete disengagement.

(2) A retirement which by direction and depth will so shake off the enemy as to permit such a narrowing of the front that complete units may be entirely withdrawn from the first line.

(3) The occupation of a strong defensive position under cover of which the army may be regrouped, etc. At the same time, the position should facilitate the accomplishment of the army's mission.

(4) The reorganization and preparation of the army for subsequent operations.

*b.* The disengagement and retirement is executed in this case in accordance with the principles indicated in the "Army Withdraws." However, in this situation, two main principles guide in formulating the detailed plans:

(1) The stages of the retirement are arranged to permit each corps to form early its own rear guard, and thus permit larger forces to get away and reorganize.

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(2) The depth of the daily retirements is not uniform on the whole front of the army but varies to meet expected Red blows. Where the Red blows are expected, deep retirements are planned to forestall them; on the other hand, in parts, the line holds as a threat to slow up the Red advance. Such an arrangement, if judiciously employed, should cause the enemy to make frequent deployments, and often, in false directions, thereby gaining time for the Blues.

*c.* The general position selected (Emmitsburg—Hanover) not only fulfills the conditions indicated heretofore, but also has some of the main advantages of a "flank position" in relation to the concentration of the Fifth Blue Army. The Reds can hardly move west with the Third Blue Army threatening their flank. The west flank of the position rests on a natural obstacle and the east flank cannot be turned without exposure of the Fifth Red Army's line of supply. The Reds will at least have to hold strong forces in front of the position.

*d.* In addition to the foregoing, the situation was framed as a basis for a detailed study of troop movements and supply which is to be discussed in the next situation. In studies of map problems a tendency to neglect the difficulties of troop movements and supply is apparent. A few inches on the map represent no practical difficulties. However, success in an operation, such as is depicted in this situation, depends to a great extent on a practical appreciation of logistics. The difficulties to be overcome in this connection will be pointed out in the next chapter.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggesed for Study ---------- 7

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7. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* Discussion of the situation, naturalness, completeness, etc.

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*b.* Discussion of situation of the Red forces, and especially the probable plans of action open to the Fifth Red Army. What do you think of the Blue intelligence estimate of the situation?

*c.* State the principles illustrated and the lessons to be taught by the problem and its solution. What differences do you perceive between this problem and the withdrawal problem?

*d.* Discuss decision of the Blue Army Commander. Discuss all practicable plans of action open to the Blue Army Commander, with pros and cons. Give a sound plan of action different from the one adopted.

*e.* Discuss from army viewpoint the method of executing the decision. Cover especially following points:

(1) Tactical difference between this solution and that given for the withdrawal.

(2) Method of securing a reserve and reasons for reduction of front by withdrawing certain corps and divisions.

(3) Withdrawal lines—their distances apart in general and in various parts of the army front.

(4) Reasons for army's special directions for corps to hold certain areas.

*f.* Discuss employment of corps and army artillery in the retirement.

*g.* Discuss arrangements for supply of the army during the retirement.

*h.* Discuss the employment of the aviation in the situation.

*i.* Give your conception of how the II and IV Corps will carry out the retirement.

*j.* Discuss the army Field Orders, completeness, practicability, etc. Is the movement too complicated and how can it be simplified?

*k.* What prompts the concentration of the army cavalry on the east flank?

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
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## *Maps*

**Situation Map, Third Army, 2:00 PM, 27 July, 1921, following this page.**

**Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany F.O. 25, following this page.**

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# CHAPTER XX

# *Logistics of the Army Retirement*


| | | Paragraphs |
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| SECTION I. | —Special Situation and Requirements | 1- 4 |
| SECTION II. | —A Solution of the First Requirement | 5 |
| SECTION III. | —A Solution of the Second Requirement | 6- 9 |
| SECTION IV. | —A Solution of the Third Requirement | 10-14 |
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| SECTION VII. | —A Solution of the Sixth Requirement | 18 |
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## SECTION I


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twenty-first Special Situation (Third Blue Army) | 1 |
| The General Staff Conference | 2 |
| The Action of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Fourth Section | 3 |
| The Requirements | 4 |


1. TWENTY-FIRST SPECIAL SITUATION (THIRD BLUE ARMY).—The situation is that given in Chapter XIX. By July 25, the organization of the army area was as shown in the G4 Situation Map, Third Army, of July 25. The forward boundary of the army service area is the line Catoctin Mountain—Thurmont — Emmitsburg — Fairplay — Round Top—Wolf Hill—New Oxford—Abbottstown—Labott—Botts—York—Margaretta Furnace.

2. THE GENERAL STAFF CONFERENCE.—Upon the receipt by the Third Army at 1:30 PM, July 27, of the message from general headquarters, a conference of the army general staff was called for 2:00 PM. At this conference, the general decisions of the commander were announced, and the method to be used by the staff in carrying out the retirement was discussed.



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3. ACTION OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SUPPLY.—At 2:30 PM, the army G4 met the heads of the various divisions of his office, the army motor transport officer, and the army provost marshal, in conference, and gave them the following decisions announced at the general staff conference:

*a.* That the army will begin a retirement on the night of July 27 to the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover.

*b.* That daylight movements are authorized from the 28th until the completion of the retirement, but will be kept normal prior to that date.

*c.* That during retirement and until 6:00 PM, July 29, no issues of supplies, except ammunition, gasoline and oil, will be made, and that meanwhile organizations will live off their trains.

*d.* That all organizations will be notified at once by the G3 section of their new positions for July 28.

*e.* That the motor transport of the army and corps trains will be used in a pool of effort to move foot troops according to the following priority schedule:

(1) Night of July 27-28: 11th Division: Union Bridge area to East Berlin.

1st Division: front line to Longville area.

(2) Night of July 28-29: 1st Division: Longville area to Davidsburg.

23d Division: front line to Littles Run area.

(3) Night of July 29-30: 23d Division: Littles Run area to York Springs.

IV Corps troops: Two Taverns area to York Springs.

*f.* That the field orders will issue between 5:00 and 6:00 PM and the administrative order soon thereafter.

*g.* That, due to the complexity of road movements involved in this retirement, the army would, contrary to the normal procedure, prescribe certain troop movements and restrict certain roads for these movements, irrespective of division, corps, or army areas.

4. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—The changes in location of army establishments due to the retirement of the army.

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*b. Second Requirement.*—Plan of the army G4 section for the motor transport movement of troops in the retirement of the army, and considerations affecting same.

*c. Third Requirement.*—Study by the army G4 section on which is based its schedule of troop movements and road priorities.

*d. Fourth Requirement.*—Administrative Orders No. 30, to accompany Field Orders No. 25, Third Blue Army, 27 July 1921.

*e. Fifth Requirement.*—III Corps plan of circulation to carry out the withdrawal and comply with the army administrative orders.

*f. Sixth Requirement.*—Plan of traffic for supply for the 30th Division in the retirement.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution of the First Requirement*

Paragraph

Changes in Establishments Ordered ..... 5

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5. CHANGES IN ESTABLISHMENT ORDERED.—At 4:00 PM, July 27, the following changes in army establishments are ordered to be made at once, using all available railroad facilities:

*a.* Army Veterinary Evacuation Point No. 1 from Keymar to reserve. Establishment of new point at Sabillasville.

*b.* Army Remount Depot No. 1 from Thurmont to Sabillasville.

*c.* Army Advance Ammunition Depot No. 4 from Rocky Ridge to Highfield, consolidating with No. 3 at that place.

*d.* Army Reserve Gasoline and Oil Depot No. 1 and Army Chemical Warfare Depot No. 1, both from Emmitsburg to Highfield.

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*e.* Army Evacuation Point from Taneytown to reserve. Establishment of new point at Virginia Mills.

*f.* Army Chemical Warfare Depot No. 2 from Gettysburg to Highfield.

*g.* Army Medical Depot No. 1 from Taneytown to Virginia Mills.

*h.* Army Advance Ammunition Depot No. 5 at Gettysburg to be turned over to II Corps.

*i.* Army Evacuation Point from Littlestown to reserve. Establishment of new point at Bendersville Station.

*j.* Army Ammunition Depot No. 7 from Hanover to New Oxford, consolidating with No. 8 at that place. No further stocking of No. 8 will take place.

*k.* Army Advance Ammunition Depot No. 7 will open at Dillsburg when stocks at No. 8 so require.

*l.* Army Evacuation Point from Hanover to reserve. Establishment of new point at Dillsburg.

*m.* Army Veterinary Evacuation Point No. 2 from Hanover to reserve. Establishment of new point at Waldheim.

*n.* Army Reserve Gasoline and Oil Depot No. 2 from Hanover to Guldens.

*o.* Army Chemical Warfare Depot No. 3 from Hanover to Brush Run, and Army Medical Depot No. 2 from Hanover to Table Rock.

*p.* In order to prepare for defensive work to be done in area of II and I Corps, advance engineer depots for front line engineer supplies will be opened up at New Oxford and Hanover, effective AM, July 30. Highfield depot (No. 3) will ship to Hanover by rail 300 tons of supplies to arrive by midnight July 29-30.

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## SECTION III

## *A Solution of the Second Requirement*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Assumptions | 6 |
| Plan in General | 7 |
| Movements under Army Control | 8 |
| Certain Conditions Influencing Plans | 9 |

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6. ASSUMPTIONS.—The plan of the Fourth Section in arranging for motor transport movements of troops is based on the following assumptions:—*a.* The divisions having been forced back to the line as of noon July 27, all corps reserve supplies (normal load of the corps train) are well to the rear in corps areas, and for the most part loaded.

*b.* The bivouac of the III Corps Train is assumed to be Bruceville; that of the IV Corps as at Washington School; that of the II Corps as at Sells Station; that of the I Corps as at Valley Junction.

7. THE PLAN IN GENERAL.—*a.* The general plan is as follows: To direct at once the movement of the First Army Train (less troop transport portion) to Gettysburg where a temporary supply and inspection point will be established. This point will operate until all troop movements by motor transport have been completed, when it will be moved to Carlisle.

*b.* To use the army train for the movement of the 11th, 1st, and 23d Divisions as given below.

*c.* To direct at once the assignment of 86 truck tons of the III Corps Train to the army train for the movement of the 11th Division.

*d.* To direct at once the movement of the III Corps Train (less 86 truck tons) with its normal load to Fairfield, the movement to be made with utmost dispatch, the train thereafter to be immediately available for the movement of the 1st Division.

*e.* To direct at once the headquarters and supply sections of the IV Corps Train to move to Littlestown where a temporary supply and inspection point will be established, the train to move with its normal load to York Springs where it will unload and stand available to move the 23d Division.

8. MOVEMENTS UNDER ARMY CONTROL.—The following movements are made under army control:

*a.* On night of July 27-28:

(1) 11th Division, Union Bridge area to East Berlin, 35 miles, by army train, with 86 truck tons of III Corps

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Train attached. Attached transport to return to Fairfield; army train to return to Gettysburg.

(2) 1st Division, New Windsor area to Longville area, 16 miles, by III Corps Train, which will return to Fairfield and revert to corps.

*b.* On night of July 28-29:

(1) 1st Division, Longville area to Davidsburg, 35 miles, by army train, train returning to Gettysburg.

(2) 23d Division, Tyrone area to Littles Run area, 20 miles, by IV Corps Train, train returning to Littlestown.

*c.* On night of July 29-30:

(1) 23d Division, Littles Run area to York Springs, 19 miles, by army train, train returning to Carlisle.

(2) IV Corps troops, Two Taverns area to York Springs, 19 miles, by IV Corps Train, train reverting to Corps on passing north of Gettysburg.

9. CERTAIN CONDITIONS INFLUENCING PLANS.—The plan of G4 for troop movement is influenced by the following:

*a.* The 11th Division is full strength and requires 1166 truck tons.

*b.* Other infantry divisions are about 80% strength and each requires 933 truck tons.

*c.* The IV Corps troops are being withdrawn under marching conditions; 827 truck tons are therefore required for the transportation of foot troops.

*d.* The army train and each of the corps trains has 1080 truck tons available for troop movement.

*e.* Corps trains have normal loads which must be disposed of before they become available for troop movement.

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution of the Third Requirement*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General Considerations | 10 |
| A Tentative Schedule for the Various Trains | 11 |
| Troop Movements Night of 27-28 July | 12 |
| Troop Movements Night of 28-29 July | 13 |
| Troop Movements Night of 29-30 July | 14 |

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10. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—*a.* The assignment of transport for the required troop motor transport movements having been made, G4 takes up the question of the selection of motor routes to be used for such movements in the retirement. The decision as to the routes is based on a consideration of all the various factors entering into supply and evacuation, the routes of the marching columns, and priorities. The routes selected are submitted to G3 for inclusion in the field orders and, as prescribed in this situation, are in column 5 of the Movement Table accompanying Field Orders No. 25, Third Army. For working out details of the movements, the transportation division has at hand the accompanying working table of road spaces and rates of march.

See table, page 333.

11. A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR THE VARIOUS TRAINS.—A schedule for the many trains must be made in order to coordinate all movements, both as to priority, and as to times at which columns pass main road intersections. The troop motor transport movements to carry out the decisions of requirement No. 2 are as follows:

*a.* Army Train: Night of 27-28 July, the headquarters and such vehicles as are not to be used in troop movement, are moved to Gettysburg, there to provide for supply and inspection. The motor transport for personnel of the Army Train, 8.5 miles long, moves via Otterdale Mill—Union Bridge road, distance of 10 miles.

| | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|
| Taneytown | 5:00 PM, 27th | 7:00 PM, 27th |
| Union Bridge | 6:15 PM | 8:15 PM |

Here it is joined by the trucks assigned from the III Corps to make up the additional 86 truck tons necessary. This contingent may consist of 3-ton trucks (1 motor transport company with 5 additional trucks attached) or of 1½-ton trucks (2 motor transport compaines, plus 1 section with 1 additional truck attached), or it may be made up of both 3-ton and 1½-ton trucks. In this problem it is assumed that 3-ton trucks are used for this purpose. The

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## b. Working Table of Road Spaces and Rates of March.

| 1<br>Unit | 2<br>Road Space miles of entrucked foot troops | 3<br>Miles of remaining motor transport | 4<br>Miles per Hour of column 2 and 3 | 5<br>Miles of Mounted Troops | 6<br>Miles per hour of column 5 | 7<br>Miles of remaining animal trains and troops | 8<br>Miles per hour of column 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inf Div, full strength; corps train with attached trucks, army train, with attached trucks | 12.0 | 9.0 | 6 to 8 | | | 17.5 | 2.5 |
| | 9.5 | 9.0 | 6 to 8 | | | 17.5 | 2.5 |
| Inf Div, 80% strength; corps train | 10.0 | 9.0 | 6 to 8 | | | 17.5 | 2.5 |
| Army train | 8.0 | 9.0 | 6 to 8 | | | 17.5 | 2.5 |
| Cavalry division | | 0.6 | 6 to 8 | 6.0 | 3 to 6 | 5.9 | 2.5 |
| Corps troops heavy column | | 5.5 | 2.5 | | | | |
| Rest of corps troops in corps train transportation | 8.5 | | 6 to 8 | | | | |
| Corps troops (less above and motor transportation used for troops) | | 30.0 | 6 to 8 | | | 3.5 | 2.5 |
| Army Art Gp, heavy column | | 3.0 | 2.5 | | | | |
| Rest of Gp, light column | | 11.0 | 6 to 8 | | | | |
| (s) Army train motors | 8.5 | | | | | | |
| (x) Corps train motors | 11.0 | | | | | | |

Note 1. The transportation of columns 2 and 3 cannot average more than 6 miles per hour at night in this area, and 8 miles per hour during the day.
Note (x). The army and corps trains herein given are the troop transportation elements above under road running conditions.

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11th Division is entrucked and moved via Bruceville—Taneytown—Littlestown—Hanover to East Berlin. See 11th Division.

The contingent of corps trucks, followed by the army train, length of column, approximately 10 miles, then returns to Gettysburg, via Hampton—Hunterstown at 6 miles per hour.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| East Berlin | 0 | 2:00 AM 28th | 3:50 AM 28th |
| Gettysburg | 17 | 6:50 AM | 8:40 AM |

The III Corps trucks proceed to Fairfield; the army train, 8.5 miles long, stops at Gettysburg, where trucks are supplied and inspected, and then moves at 8 miles per hour via Emmitsburg Road—Emmitsburg—Bridgeport—Taneytown to entruck the 1st Division.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gettysburg | 0 | 2:45 PM 28th | 4:35 PM 28th |
| Longville | 22 | 5:30 PM | 7:20 PM |

Here it entrucks the 1st Division and moves via Gettysburg—York Pike—Admire to Davidsburg. Train detrucks division and moves via East Berlin—York Pike to Gettysburg.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidsburg | 0 | 4:00 AM 29th | 5:40 AM 29th |
| New Oxford | 14 | 6:20 AM | 8:00 AM |
| Granite Hill | 20 | 7:20 AM | 9:00 AM |
| Gettysburg | 24 | 8:00 AM | 9:40 AM |

Here trucks are inspected and resupplied. The train then moves via Two Taverns to roads east of Round Top, where it entrucks the 23d Division in Littles Run area; thence via Gettysburg to York Springs, where it detrucks division, and then to Carlisle by the Carlisle and Baltimore Turnpike for bivouac.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gettysburg | 0 | 2:45 PM 29th | 4:00 PM 29th |
| Two Taverns | 5 | 3:35 PM | 4:50 PM |
| Round Top | 10 | 4:00 PM | 5:15 PM |

*b.* III Corps Train, motor section, 15 miles long. Night of 27-28 July, 86 truck ton contingent of 3-ton trucks, about

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one-half mile long, leaves Bruceville at 5:30 PM at 8 miles per hour for Union Bridge to join army train for movement of 11th Division; all other motor elements leave Bruceville at 6 miles per hour for Fairfield with the corps reserve supplies, via Millers Bridge—Rocky Ridge—Emmitsburg — Waynesboro Turnpike — Hagerstown Road. Warning message received at 4:30 PM.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bruceville | 0 | 5:00 PM 27th | 7:50 PM 27th |
| Rocky Ridge | 5 | 5:50 PM | 8:40 PM |
| Fairfield | 22 | 8:40 PM | 11:30 PM |

Here loads are parked, and the troop transport part of train, 10 miles long, leaves for New Windsor area via Gettysburg—Union Mills—Westminster for movement of 1st Division.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fairfield | 0 | 9:20 PM 27th | 11:00 PM 27th |
| Gettysburg | 8 | 10:40 PM | 12:20 AM 28th |
| Littlestown | 18 | 12:20 AM 28th | 2:00 AM |
| New Windsor | 37 | 3:30 AM | 5:10 AM |

Here 1st Division is entrucked and moved via Taneytown to Longville area, the III Corps Train returning to Fairfield via Bridgeport—Emmitsburg.

*c.* IV Corps Train, motor section, 15 miles long. Night of 27-28 whole section moves to Littlestown, head leaving Washington School at 5:30 PM. The supply, repair and inspection personnel and vehicles remain at Littlestown, the remainder of the motor section moving via Gettysburg to York Springs where their normal loads are parked.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Washington School | 0 | 5:30 PM 27th | 8:00 PM 27th |
| Littlestown | 5 | 6:20 PM | 8:50 PM |
| Gettysburg | 15 | 8:00 PM | 10:30 PM |
| York Springs | 29 | 10:20 PM | 12:50 AM 28th |

The troop transport part of the train, 10 miles long, returns at 6 miles per hour to Littlestown where the trucks are supplied and inspected.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| York Springs | 0 | 12:00 AM 28th | 2:00 AM 28th |
| Gettysburg | 14 | 2:20 AM | 4:20 AM |
| Littlestown | 24 | 4:00 AM | 6:00 AM |

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The train, 10 miles long, moves to Frizzelburg—Tyrone area via Union Mills—Westminster at 6 miles per hour, to move the 23d Division.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Littlestown | 0 | 7:40 PM 28th | 9:40 PM 28th |
| Union Mills | 8 | 9:00 PM | 11:00 PM |
| Tyrone | 20 | 11:00 PM | 1:00 AM 29th |

Here the 23d Division is entrucked and moved at 6 miles per hour to Littles Run area via Taneytown and roads east of Round Top, the train going to Littlestown area for supply and inspection. The train is in place in the Two Taverns area for entrucking the IV Corps troops at 5:30 PM, July 29, the troops being moved to York Springs via Gettysburg.

*d.* The II Corps Train, motor sections, 15 miles long, leaves Sells Station with normal loads on night of July 27-28, at 6 miles per hour via Hanover—York Pike—Gettysburg—Carlisle Road to Guernsey where train bivouacs.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sells Station | 0 | 7:00 PM 27th | 9:30 PM 27th |
| Hanover | 5 | 7:50 PM | 10:20 PM |
| Gettysburg | 24 | 11:00 PM | 1:30 AM 28th |
| Guernsey | 33 | 12:30 AM 28th | 3:00 AM |

12. TROOP MOVEMENTS NIGHT OF JULY 27-28.—The following troop movements are made on night of July 27-28:

*a. 1st Cavalry Division.*—Walkersville is designated as rendezvous point.

Division marches at 6:00 PM, 27th.

Length of column; troops, 6 miles; trains, 6 miles, motors, 0.6 mile.

Route, Frederick Turnpike—Gettysburg Road.

Rate, 3 miles per hour for troops; 2.5 miles per hour for trains.

The cavalry troop column will not interfere with the III Corps Train motor section; cavalry motor column can be neglected.

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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION TIME TABLE

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troop column, Walkersville | 0 | 7:20 PM 27th | 9:20 PM 27th |
| Troop column, Rocky Ridge | 9 | 10:20 PM | 12:20 AM 28th |
| Troop column, Fairplay | 25 | 3:40 AM 28th | 5:40 AM |
| Animal train column, Walkersville | 0 | 9:20 PM 27th | 11:20 PM 27th |
| Animal train column, Rocky Ridge | 9 | 1:45 AM 28th | 3:45 AM 28th |
| Animal train column, Fairplay | 25 | 7:20 AM | 9:20 AM |

*b. Groupment A, Army Artillery.*

Groupment received warning orders at 3:15 PM, July 27. Quickest possible time regiments can be in march order is 9:30 PM, 27th.

Length of columns; heavy, 3 miles; light, 11 miles.

Route: Welden—Oak Orchard—574—Clemsonville—Union Bridge—Bark Hill—Mt. Union Church—Otterdale Mill—Taneytown—Willow Grove School.

Rate, heavy, 2.5 miles per hour; light, 8 miles per hour.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIGHT COLUMN | | | |
| Weldon | 0 | 10:10 PM 27th | 11:35 PM 27th |
| Union Bridge | | 11:25 PM | 12:50 AM 28th |
| Otterdale Mill | | 11:55 PM | 1:20 AM |
| Taneytown | | 12:25 AM 28th | 1:50 AM |
| Willow Grove School | 26 | 1:25 AM | 2:50 AM |
| HEAVY COLUMN | | | |
| Weldon | 0 | 11:40 PM 27th | 12:55 AM 28th |
| Union Bridge | | 3:40 AM 28th | 4:55 AM |
| Otterdale Mill | | 5:20 AM | 6:35 AM |
| Taneytown | | 7:00 AM | |

The heavy column is held up at Taneytown for 2 hours to allow the passage of the 1st Division motor column north to Longville.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Taneytown | | 9:00 AM | 10:15 AM |
| Willow Grove School | 26 | 12:15 PM 28 | 1:30 PM 28th |

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*c. 11th Division.*

(1) Division ordered to move at 7:00 PM, 27th. As division is in reserve, there is ample time.

Division marches in two columns, motors and troops carried in trains in one column, and animal-drawn vehicles in another column.

Motor column: length 18.5 miles; rate 6 miles per hour. Route, Middleburg—Keymar — Taneytown — Washington School—Littlestown—Hanover—East Berlin.

Animal column: length 17.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour. Route, Mt. Union Church—Otterdale Mill—Copperville—Oregon School—Stumptown—Markers Mill—Blocks School.

Army train arrives from Taneytown, head of column at Union Bridge at 6:15 PM. Attached 86 truck ton contingent of III Corps Train arrives from Bruceville at 6:15 PM.

Time table, 11th Division motor column, entrucked foot troops leading.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Union Bridge | 0 | 7:30 PM 27th | 10:50 PM 27th |
| Bruceville | 5 | 8:40 PM | 12:00 midnight |
| Taneytown | 10 | 9:10 PM | 12:30 AM 28th |
| Crossroads 469 | 11 | 9:20 PM | 12:40 AM |
| Littlestown | 18 | 10:30 PM | 1:50 AM |
| Hanover | 26 | 11:50 PM | 3:10 AM |
| East Berlin | 35 | 1:20 AM 28th | 4:40 AM |

The time of departure of the column from Union Bridge is controlled by the time of clearance of the II Corps Train at Bruceville.

Time table, 11th Division, animal column.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Union Bridge | 0 | 6:00 PM 27th | 1:00 AM 28th |
| Otterdale Mill | 4 | 7:40 PM | 4:30 AM |
| Passage across Union Mills—Taneytown road interrupted from 11:55 PM to 1:20 AM by Group A light column. | | | |
| Oregon School | 8 | 9:15 PM | 5:45 AM |
| Road Junction 456 | 10 | 10:00 PM | 6:30 AM |
| Georgetown | 16 | 12:25 AM 28th | 8:55 AM 28th |
| Littlestown | 18 | 1:15 AM | 9:45 AM |

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This does not interfere with the movement of the 1st Division motor column on Taneytown Road near Oregon School House from 5:30 AM to 8:45 AM.

*d. 1st Division.*

Movement is facilitated by the fact that division is well echeloned in depth; hence division can begin to entruck in III Corps Train by 4:00 AM, trucks arriving by 3:30 AM. Division marches on two roads; motor and troops carried in trains in one column and animal-drawn vehicles in another column.

Motor columns: length 19 miles; rate 8 miles per hour. Route, Westminster—Taneytown—Longville. The division motor column of a length of 9 miles is at the head.

Animal column: length 17.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour. Elements form in two columns as far as the Taneytown Road. (a) On the route, McKinstrys Mill—Priestland School—Linwood—RJ 535—RJ 586—Fairview School, and (b) on the route RJ 606—Priestland—Pipe Creek Church—RJ 475. Thereafter both columns follow the route Mayberry—RJ 456—BM 494—RJ 526—Longville.

1ST DIVISION MOTOR COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| New Windsor | 0 | 4:00 AM 28th | 6:25 AM 28th |
| CR 1 mile N Tyrone | 14 | 5:40 AM | 8:05 AM |
| Oregon School | 16 | 6:00 AM | 8:25 AM |
| Taneytown | 19 | 6:25 AM | 8:50 AM |
| Longville | 21 | 6:40 AM | 9:05 AM |

1ST DIVISION ANIMAL COLUMNS

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Englars Mill | 0 | 1:00 AM 28th | 4:30 AM 28th |
| CR 1 mile N Tyrone | 10 | 5:00 AM | |

Here both columns give priority until 8:50 AM, to allow the passage of the 1st Division motor column.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| CR 1 mile N Tyrone | 10 | 8:50 AM | 3:50 PM |
| RJ 456 | 13 | 10:05 AM | 5:05 PM |
| Taneytown— Littlestown road | 16 | 11:20 AM | 6:20 PM |
| Longville | 18 | 12:00 noon | 7:00 PM |

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There is no interference with the 11th Division animal column which passed RJ 456 at 6:30 AM.

*e. Groupment B, Army Artillery.*

Groupment receives warning orders at 6:00 PM, July 27.

Quickest possible time regiments can be in march order is 9:30 PM, 27th.

Length of columns: heavy, 3 miles; light, 11 miles.

Rate: heavy, 2.5 miles per hour; light, 8 miles per hour.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| LIGHT COLUMN | | | |
| Snydersburg | 0 | 12:00 midnight 27-28th | 1:25 AM 28th |
| Hanover | | 2:15 AM | |

Column must allow passage of 11th Division motor column which is scheduled from 11:50 PM, 27th to 3:10 AM 28th.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hanover | | 3:10 AM | 4:35 AM |
| Bittinger | 23 | 4:50 AM 28th | 6:15 AM 28th |
| HEAVY COLUMN | | | |
| Snydersburg | 0 | 1:30 AM 28th | 2:45 AM 28th |
| Hanover | | 8:45 AM | 10:00 AM |
| Bittinger | 23 | 10:45 AM | 12:00 noon |

13. TROOP MOVEMENTS NIGHT OF JULY 28-29.—The following troop movements are made on night of July 28-29:

*a. 1st Cavalry Division.*

Division marches in two columns; 0.6 miles motors neglected.

Troop column: length, 6 miles; rate, 4 miles per hour; route, 547 — 450 — 491 — Two Taverns — Bonneauville — Brushtown—Hanover.

Train column: length 6 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour; route, 477—482—Barlow—Germantown—Square Corners —Hanover.

1ST CAVALRY TROOP COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fairplay | 0 | 1:00 PM 28th | 2:30 PM 28th |
| RJ 450 | 5 | 2:15 PM | 3:45 PM |
| CR 1½ miles SW Two Taverns | 6 | 2:30 PM | 4:00 PM |
| Two Taverns | 8 | 3:00 PM | 4:30 PM |
| Bonneauville | 11 | 3:45 PM | 5:15 PM |
| Square Corner | 13 | 4:15 PM | 5:45 PM |

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1st Cavalry Train Column

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fairplay | 0 | 1:00 PM 28th | 3:20 PM 28th |
| Barlow | 4 | 2:40 PM | 4:40 PM |
| CR 2 miles SW Two Taverns | 5 | 3:00 PM | 5:20 PM |
| Germantown | 8 | 4:20 PM | 6:40 PM |
| Square Corner | 12 | 6:00 PM | 8:20 PM |

Here it follows the troop column of the 1st Cavalry.

1st Cavalry Troops and Trains

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| CR 537 | 15 | 4:45 PM 28th | 9:00 PM 28th |
| Hanover | 21 | 6:15 PM | 11:35 PM |

*b. 1st Division.*

Division marches in two columns as on 27th. Length of motor column, 17 miles; rate 6 miles per hour; route, Gettysburg—York Pike—Farmers—Admire. Length of animal columns, 17.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour; route, 428—568—Low Dutch Road—562—Granite Hill—Hunterstown.

1st Division Motor Column

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Longville | 0 | 6:00 PM 28th | 9:00 PM 28th |
| Barlow | 5 | 6:50 PM | 9:50 PM |
| Gettysburg | 10 | 7:40 PM | 10:40 PM |
| Granite Hill | 15 | 8:30 PM | 11:30 PM |
| Abbottstown | 25 | 10:10 PM | 1:10 AM 29th |
| Davidsburg | 35 | 12:00 midnight | 3:00 AM |

1st Division Animal Column

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Longville | 0 | 6:10 PM 28th | 1:10 AM 29th |
| CR 2 miles SW Two Taverns | 7 | 9:05 PM | 4:05 AM |
| Granite Hill | 14 | 12:00 midnight | 7:00 AM 29th |
| Hunterstown | 16 | 3:45 AM 29th | 10:45 AM |

*c. 11th Division.*

Animal column: length, 17.5 miles; rate, 2.5 miles per hour; route, Littlestown—608—Felty School—537—519—558—New Oxford—508—582—East Berlin.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Littlestown | 0 | 7:00 PM 28th | 2:00 AM 29th |
| CR 537 | 5 | 9:00 PM | 4:00 AM |
| New Oxford | 10 | 11:00 PM | 6:00 AM |
| East Berlin | 18 | 1:25 AM 29th | 8:25 AM |

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*d. 23d Division.*

Division disengages from enemy, beginning at dusk and marches to Frizzleburg—Tyrone area, entrucking in the IV Corps Train.

Marches in two columns, motor transport in one column, and animal-drawn transport in another.

Motor column: division motor column 9 miles long leading, total length 19 miles; rate 8 miles per hour. Route, Taneytown—Gettysburg—roads east of Round Top.

Animal column: length 17.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour. Route, 553—Markers Mill—Blocks School—Oakgrove School—Germantown.

23D DIVISION MOTOR COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tyrone | 0 | 2:00 AM 29th | 4:30 AM 29th |
| Taneytown | 5 | 2:50 AM | 5:20 AM |
| Round Top | 16 | 4:00 AM | 6:30 AM |

23D DIVISION ANIMAL COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tyrone | 0 | 8:00 PM 28th | 3:00 AM 29th |
| Markers Mill | 5 | 10:00 PM | 5:00 AM |
| Oakgrove School | 10 | 12:00 midnight | 7:00 AM |
| Germantown | 14 | 1:40 AM 29th | 8:40 AM 29th |

14. TROOP MOVEMENTS NIGHT OF 29-30 JULY.—The following troop movements are made on night of July 29-30:

*a. 1st Division.*

Animal column: length 17.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour; route, Hunterstown—Hampton—East Berlin—Davidsburg.

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hunterstown | 0 | 6:00 PM 29th | 1:00 AM 30th |
| Davidsburg | 18 | 1:00 AM 30th | 8:00 AM |

*b. 23d Division.*

Division marches in two columns as on 28th. Length of motor column, division motor column leading, 17 miles; rate, 6 miles per hour; route, Harrisburg Road. Length of animal column, 17.5 miles; rate, 2.5 miles per hour; route, Germantown—CR 516—Granite Hill—Hunterstown—Belmont School—Witts School—York Springs.

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23D DIVISION MOTOR COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Round Top | 0 | 4:50 PM 29th | 7:40 PM 29th |
| Gettysburg | 3 | 5:20 PM | 8:10 PM |
| York Springs | 18 | 7:50 PM | 10:40 PM |

23D DIVISION ANIMAL COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germantown | 0 | 6:00 PM 29th | 1:00 AM 30th |
| York Springs | 20 | 2:00 AM 30th | 9:00 AM |

*c. IV Corps Troops.*

The corps troops march in two columns. Length of light motor column, 41 miles; rate, 6 miles per hour. This is followed by heavy column; length, 5.5 miles; rate 2.5 miles per hour. Route: Harrisburg Road.

Animal column: length, 3.5 miles; rate, 2.5 miles per hour. Route: same as animal column of 23d Division.

IV CORPS LIGHT MOTOR COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two Taverns | 0 | 7:25 PM 29th | 2:40 AM 30th |
| Gettysburg | 5 | 8:15 PM | 3:30 AM |
| York Springs | 20 | 10:45 PM | 6:00 AM |

IV CORPS HEAVY MOTOR COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two Taverns | 0 | 2:40 AM 30th | 4:50 AM 30th |
| Gettysburg | 5 | 4:40 AM | 6:50 AM |
| York Springs | 20 | 10:40 AM | 12:10 PM |

IV CORPS ANIMAL COLUMN

| | *Miles* | *Head* | *Tail* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germantown | 0 | 4:30 PM 29th | 6:00 PM 29th |
| York Springs | 19 | 12:00 midnight 30th | 1:30 AM 30th |

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## SECTION V

## *A Solution to the Fourth Requirement*

Paragraph

The Administrative Order ---------- 15

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15. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER.

Third Army
TANEYTOWN, MD.,
27 July 21, 8:30 PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
No. 30.

To accompany Field Orders No. 25, Third Army.

Maps: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam; Geological Survey, 1:62500.

I. SUPPLY.

During the period 6:00 AM, July 28, to 6:00 PM, July 29, no supplies except ammunition, gasoline and oil will be drawn from railheads. Organizations will use supplies carried in their trains.

A. *Railheads*: Effective at 6:00 PM, July 29.

Army Headquarters, Forward echelon, GETTYSBURG.
Army Headquarters, Rear echelon, CARLISLE.
Army Air Service, SHIPPENSBURG.
1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions, MANCHESTER.
Groupment A, Army Artillery, ORRTANNA.
Groupment B, Army Artillery, CENTER MILLS STA.
Other army troops, CARLISLE.

| | |
|---|---|
| I Corps | IDAVILLE |
| 4th Division | ABBOTTSTOWN |
| 22d Division | EAST BERLIN |
| 35th Division | ABBOTTSTOWN |
| II Corps | BIGLERVILLE |
| 3d Division | GOLDENVILLE |
| 25th Division | GETTYSBURG |
| III Corps | FAIRFIELD STA |
| 2d Division | SEVEN STARS |
| 20th Division | SEVEN STARS |
| 30th Division | FAIRFIELD STA |

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| | |
|---|---|
| IV Corps | DILLSBURG |
| 1st Division | D and M JUNCTION |
| 11th Division | DILLSBURG |
| 23d Division | D and M JUNCTION |

B. *Ammunition*:

| 1. Army Ammunition Depots | Location | Kinds of Am. |
|---|---|---|
| No 1 | HAGERSTOWN | all kinds |
| No 2 | CARLISLE | all kinds |
| No 3 | HIGHFIELD | Infantry and division artillery |
| No 6 | ORRTANNA | Heavy artillery |
| | To open about 1 August | |
| No 7 | DILLSBURG | all kinds |
| No 8 | NEW OXFORD | Infantry and division artillery |

2. Ammunition supply of special units, reports of expenditures and plan of ammunition supply, no change.

C. *Engineer*:

| 1. Army Engineer Depots | Location |
|---|---|
| No. 1 | HAGERSTOWN |
| No 2 | CARLISLE JC |
| No 3 | HIGHFIELD |
| No 4 | GETTYSBURG |
| No 5 | SPRING GROVE |

2. Advance army engineer depots, effective 3:00 AM, July 30.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| No 6 | NEW OXFORD | Front line supplies |
| No 7 | HANOVER | Front line supplies |

D. *Signal*:

Army Signal Depot No 1—SHIPPENSBURG.

E. *Medical*:

Army Medical Depot No 1—TABLE ROCK.

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F. *Ordnance*:

Army Ordnance Depot—CHAMBERSBURG.
Small Arm Repair Center—ORRTANNA.

G. *Quartermaster*:

Army Quartermaster Depot—CHAMBERSBURG.
Motor Transport Depots and Overhaul Shops:
No 1—SHIPPENSBURG.
No 2—WAYNESBORO.
No 3—CARLISLE JC.
Communication Zone Replacement Shop—SHIPPENSBURG.
Reserve Gasoline and Oil Depots:
No 1—HIGHFIELD.
No 2—GULDENS.
Army Remount Depot No 1—SABILLASVILLE.

H. *Chemical Warfare*:

| Army Chemical Warfare Depots | Location | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| No 1 | HIGHFIELD | Offensive and defensive |
| No 3 | BRUSH RUN | Offensive and defensive |

I. *Air Service*:

Army Air Depot—CHAMBERSBURG.

II. EVACUATION.

A. *Men*:

1. Army reserve hospital groups: HAGERSTOWN, WAYNESBORO, CARLISLE.
2. Army convalescent hospital: WAYNESBORO.
3. Army evacuation points: VIRGINIA MILLS, BENDERSVILLE STA, DILLSBURG.

B. *Animals*:

1. Army reserve veterinary hospital: FAIRFIELD.
2. Army convalescent veterinary hospital: FAIRFIELD.
3. Army veterinary evacuation points: SABILLASVILLE, WALDHEIM.

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III. ROADS.

A. *Restrictions*:

1. Army reserved roads:
   (a) CARLISLE — CARLISLE ROAD — TANEYTOWN ROAD—TANEYTOWN to midnight July 28-29. Thereafter CARLISLE to GETTYSBURG.
   (b) HARRISBURG ROAD, from GETTYSBURG north until midnight July 30-31.
   (c) CHAMBERSBURG PIKE, from GETTYSBURG west.
   (d) YORK PIKE, from GETTYSBURG east.
2. Two-way roads restricted to northbound traffic until midnight July 29-30, except as given in priority schedule in par. 3 below:
   (a) BALTIMORE and HANOVER ROAD south of HANOVER.
   (b) BALTIMORE and GETTYSBURG TURNPIKE southeast of GETTYSBURG.
   (c) WESTMINSTER — TANEYTOWN — EMMITSBURG road.
   (d) ENGLARS MILL—UNION BRIDGE—TANEYTOWN—GETTYSBURG ROAD south of GETTYSBURG.
3. Priority schedule:
   (a) WELDON — OAK ORCHARD — CLEMSONVILLE—UNION BRIDGE—BARK HILL—TANEYTOWN road—GETTYSBURG ROAD.

WELDON

| *Organization* | *Direction* | *Time* |
|---|---|---|
| Groupment A, Army Artillery | west | 10:00 PM 27th—1:00 AM 28th. |

UNION BRIDGE

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Army Train | from TANEYTOWN | 6:00—8:30 PM, 27th |
| Groupment A, light column | north | 11:00 PM, 27th 1:00 AM, 28th |
| Groupment A, heavy column | north | 3:30—5:30 AM, 28th |

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TANEYTOWN, *see also* (b), (c)

| *Organization* | *Direction* | *Time* |
|---|---|---|
| Army Train | from TANEYTOWN south | 5:00—7:00 PM, 27th |
| Groupment A, light column | north | 12:30—2:00 AM, 28th |
| 1st Division motor column | WESTMINSTER to LONGVILLE and BRIDGEPORT | 5:30—9:00 AM, 28th |
| Groupment A, heavy column army artillery | north | 7:00—10:30 AM, 28th |
| Army Train | from GETTYSBURG to BRIDGEPORT—LONGVILLE area, for entrucking 1st Division | 5:30—8:00 PM, 28th |
| 23d Division motor column | from WESTMINSTER toward GETTYSBURG | 2:30—5:30 AM, 29th |

The 11th Division motor column from BRUCEVILLE to LITTLESTOWN has priority over Groupment A light column, and 1st Division motor column from WESTMINSTER has priority over Groupment A heavy column. During passage of Groupment A heavy column, road will be closed to other north bound traffic.

GETTYSBURG, *see also* (e), (k)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Division motor column | from south to YORK PIKE | 7:30—1100 PM, 28th |
| 23d Division motor column | from south to HARRISBURG ROAD | 5:00—8:15 PM, 29th |

(b) WESTMINSTER — TANEYTOWN ROAD — EMMITSBURG road.

WESTMINSTER

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | UNION MILLS TO NEW WINDSOR | 2:30—4:30 AM, 28th |
| 1st Division motor column | NEW WINDSOR TO TANEYTOWN | 5:00—7:30 AM, 28th |
| IV Corps Train | UNION MILLS TO TYRONE | 10:00—12:00 PM, 28th |

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TANEYTOWN, *see also* (c)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Division motor column | WESTMINSTER TO LONGVILLE BRIDGEPORT area | 5:30—9:00 AM 28th |
| Army Train | from EMMITSBURG TO LONGVILLE — BRIDGEPORT area | 5:30—8:00 PM, 28th |

The 1st Division motor column has priority over Groupment A heavy column coming from the south.

EMMITSBURG, *see also* (e)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | from TANEYTOWN west | 8:00—11:00 AM, 28th |
| Army Train | GETTYSBURG TO TANEYTOWN | 3:45—5:45 PM, 28th |

(c) KEYMAR — TANEYTOWN — LITTLESTOWN—HANOVER road.

BRUCEVILLE

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 86 truck ton contingent, III Corps Train | BRUCEVILLE south | 5:30—5:45 PM, 27th |
| III Corps Train | BRUCEVILLE west | 5:00—8:00 PM, 27th |
| 11th Division motor column | north | 8:30—12:00 PM, 27th |

TANEYTOWN

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 11th Division motor column | from BRUCEVILLE to LITTLESTOWN | 9:00 PM, 27th—12:30 AM, 28th |

LITTLESTOWN, *see also* (k)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| IV Corps Train | WASHINGTON SCHOOL TO GETTYSBURG | 6:00—9:00 PM, 27th |
| IV Corps Train | from GETTYSBURG | 4:00—8:00 AM, 28th |
| 11th Division motor column | northeast | 10:30 PM, 27th—2:00 AM, 28th. |

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HANOVER, *see also* (j)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| II Corps Train | from SELLS STATION north | 7:30—10:30, 27th |
| 11th Division motor column | from LITTLESTOWN north | 11:00 PM, 27th—3:30 AM, 28th. |

(d) UNION BRIDGE—MIDDLEBURG—BRUCEVILLE road.

UNION BRIDGE

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train (part) | from BRUCEVILLE | 6:00—6:30 PM, 27th |
| 11th Division motor column | to BRUCEVILLE | 7:30—11:00 PM, 27th |

BRUCEVILLE

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train (part) | to UNION BRIDGE | 5:30—6:00 PM, 27th |
| 11th Division motor column | from UNION BRIDGE TO TANEYTOWN | 8:30—12:00 PM, 27th |

(e) ROCKY RIDGE—EMMITSBURG—GETTYSBURG ROAD.

EMMITSBURG

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | to WAYNESBORO TURNPIKE | 7:00—10:00 PM, 27th |
| 1st Cavalry Div troops | north | 1:30—4:00 AM, 28th |
| trains | north | 5:00—7:30 AM, 28th |
| Army Train | GETTYSBURG to TANEYTOWN | 3:45—5:45 PM, 28th |

GETTYSBURG, *see also* (k)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Army Train | GETTYSBURG to EMMITSBURG | 2:45—4:45 PM, 28th |

(f) UNION BRIDGE—MT UNION CHURCH—OTTERDALE MILL—OREGON SCHOOL—MARKERS MILL—BLOCKS SCHOOL—LITTLESTOWN road.

11th Division animal column UNION BRIDGE 7:00 PM, 27th—2:00 AM, 28th; Group A light column has priority at OTTERDALE MILL; 11th Division animal column must clear TANEYTOWN ROAD for 1st Division motor column by 6:30 AM, 28th.

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(g) ENGLARS MILL—MCKINSTRYS MILL—LINWOOD—535—586—WEISHAARS MILL road reserved for 1st Division animal column, at ENGLARS MILL 1:00—4:30 AM, 28th; at TANEYTOWN ROAD until 3:30 PM, 28th.

(h) ENGLARS MILL—606—518—PIPE CREEK—PIPE CREEK CHURCH—659—475 road reserved for 1st Division animal column, at ENGLARS MILL 1:00—4:30 AM, 28th; at TANEYTOWN ROAD until 3:30 PM, 28th.

(i) NEW WINDSOR — MEDFORD — WESTMINSTER road.

NEW WINDSOR

| *Organization* | *Direction* | *Time* |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | from WESTMINSTER | 3:30—5:30 AM, 28th |
| 1st Division motor column | to WESTMINSTER | 4:00—7:00 AM, 28th |

WESTMINSTER

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | UNION MILLS to NEW WINDSOR | 2:30—4:30 AM, 28th |
| 1st Division motor column | NEW WINDSOR to TANEYTOWN | 4:45—7:45 AM, 28th |

(j) BALTIMORE and HANOVER ROAD.

HAMPSTEAD

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Groupment B, army artillery | from SNYDERSBURG west | 12:00 midnight—3:00 AM, 28th. |

HANOVER

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| II Corps Train | SELLS STA to north | 7:30—10:30 AM, 27th |
| Groupment B, army artillery light column | to BITTINGER | 2:15—4:35 AM, 28th |
| heavy column | to BITTINGER | 8:30—10:30 AM, 28th |

11th Division motor column from LITTLESTOWN to ABBOTTSTOWN has priority over Groupment B light column.

(k) BALTIMORE and GETTYSBURG TURNPIKE.

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WESTMINSTER

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| III Corps Train | south to NEW WINDSOR | 2:30—4:30 AM, 28th |
| IV Corps Train | south to TYRONE | 10:00—12:00 PM, 28th |

LITTLESTOWN

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| IV Corps Train | WASHINGTON SCHOOL TO GETTYSBURG | 6:00—9:00 PM, 27th |
| IV Corps Train | from GETTYSBURG | 4:00—8:00 AM, 27th |
| IV Corps Train | to UNION MILLS | 7:30—10:00 PM, 28th |
| IV Corps Train | to LITTLESTOWN | 6:00—9:00 AM, 29th |
| IV Corps Train | to TWO TAVERNS | 4:30—6:30 PM, 29th |

Priority to IV Corps train and motor columns, LITTLESTOWN to GETTYSBURG from 6:30 PM, 29th to 5:00 AM, 30th.

GETTYSBURG

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| IV Corps Train | north to HARRISBURG ROAD | 8:00—10:30 PM, 27th |
| III Corps Train | to LITTLESTOWN | 10:30 PM, 27th—12:30 AM 28th |
| IV Corps Train | from HARRISBURG ROAD south | 2:00—4:30 AM, 28th |
| Army Train | GETTYSBURG southeast | 2:30—4:00 PM, 29th |
| IV Corps Train with light motor column | to HARRISBURG ROAD | 8:00 PM, 29th—3:30 AM, 30th |
| IV Corps heavy column | to HARRISBURG ROAD | 4:30—7:00 AM, 30th |

(l) WEISHAARS MILL—MAYBERRY—BM 494—LONGVILLE road reserved for 1st Division animal column, at TANEYTOWN ROAD 6:00 AM—4:00 PM, 28th; at TANEYTOWN—LITTLESTOWN road 11:00 AM—6:30 PM, 28th.

(m) TYRONE—593—MARKERS MILL road reserved for 23d Division animal column, at TYRONE 8:00 PM, 28th to 3:00 AM, 29th; at MARKERS MILL 10:00 PM, 28th to 5:00 AM, 29th.

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(n) LONGVILLE—528—428—568—CR 2 miles SW TWO TAVERNS—LOW DUTCH ROAD—GRANITE HILL HUNTERSTOWN —BELMONT —WILTS SCHOOL —YORK SPRINGS road.

LONGVILLE

| *Organization* | *Direction* | *Time* |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Division animal column | north | 6:00 PM, 28th—1:30 AM, 29th. |

CROSSROAD 516

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Division animal column | north | 10:00 PM, 28th—4:00 AM, 29th. |
| IV Corps animal column | north | 6:00—7:30 PM, 29th |
| 23d Division animal column | north | 7:30 PM, 29th—2:30 AM, 30th |

HUNTERSTOWN, *see also* (r)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1st Division animal column | from south to bivouac at HUNTERSTOWN | 3:30—11:00 AM, 29th |
| IV Corps animal column | north | 8:30—10:00 PM, 29th |
| 23d Division animal column | north | 10:00 PM—29th 5:00 AM, 30th |

(o) FAIRPLAY—477—482—BARLOW—CR 2 miles SW TWO TAVERNS—GERMANTOWN—SQUARE CORNER —road reserved for 1st Cavalry Division train column at FAIRPLAY 1:00 to 3:30 PM, 28th; at GERMANTOWN 4:00 to 7:00 PM, 28th.

(p) FAIRPLAY—547—450—491—TWO TAVERNS——BONNEAUVILLE—SQUARE CORNER—BRUSHTOWN —HANOVER road reserved for 1st Cavalry Division troop column at FAIRPLAY 1:00 to 2:30 PM, 28th; at TWO TAVERNS 3:00 to 4:30 PM, 28th; at SQUARE CORNER 4:00 to 6:00 PM, 28th.

(q) LITTLESTOWN—608—FELTY SCHOOL—537—519—NEW OXFORD—508—532—EAST BERLIN road reserved for 11th Division animal column at LITTLESTOWN 7:00 PM, 28th to 2:00 AM, 29th; at NEW OXFORD 1:00 to 9:00 AM, 29th.

(r) GETTYSBURG — HUNTERSTOWN — HAMPTON —EAST BERLIN road.

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GETTYSBURG

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Army Train | from east | 6:30—9:00 AM, 28th |

HUNTERSTOWN

| *Organization* | *Direction* | *Time* |
|---|---|---|
| Army Train | west | 5:30—8:00 AM, 28th |
| 1st Division animal column | from south | 3:30—11:00 AM, 29th |
| 1st Division animal column | to east | 6:00 PM, 29th—1:00 AM, 30th |
| 23d Division animal column | north | 10:00 PM, 29th—5:00 AM, 30th |

The 1st Division animal column must be east of HUNTERSTOWN—GRANITE HILL road by 8:30 PM, July 29.

IV. SALVAGE AND BURIAL.

Salvage in empty vehicles to railheads designated in paragraph IA.
Burial by divisions.

V. BOUNDARIES.

Forward boundary army service area effective midnight 28-29 July: ANTIETAM COVE—CASHTOWN — MUMMASBURG — CONEWAGO CREEK—DAVIDSBURG—DOVER—LITTLE CONEWAGO CREEK (all inclusive).

VI. MILITARY POLICE.

A. *Traffic Control*:

1. By army in army service area until midnight July 28-29. Thereafter from HAGERSTOWN ROAD—YORK PIKE (both inclusive) to army rear boundary to midnight July 30-31. Thereafter in army service area.
2. Corps will arrange to relieve all army military police in above areas at times above specified.
3. Officers' traffic control posts will be maintained by army and corps in respective areas to enforce priority schedule at necessary points, including UNION BRIDGE, OTTERDALE MILL, WESTMINSTER, TYRONE, OREGON SCHOOL, TANEYTOWN, LITTLESTOWN, HANOVER, GETTYSBURG, GRANITE HILL, HUNTERSTOWN.

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VII. PRISONERS OF WAR.

Army Prisoner of War Enclosures:
No 1—CASHTOWN.
No 2—HUNTERS RUN.

VIII. The motor transport of III and IV Corps Trains will come under army control for the purposes of above troop movements and upon completion will revert to their respective corps.

By command of General A;

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official,

S
A C of S, G4

Distribution (omitted).

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## SECTION VI

## *A Solution of the Fifth Requirement*

Paragraph

The III Corps Plan of Circulation ..... 16
Discussion of the Plan of Circulation ..... 17

---

16. THE III CORPS PLAN OF CIRCULATION.—The III Corps plan of circulation to carry out the withdrawal and comply with the army administrative orders is as follows:

Southern traffic route until midnight July 29-30, Fairfield—road junction 650—Fairplay—road junction 444—Bridgeport—road junction 507—Keymar—Mt. Union Church road. Corps troops in drawing at Fairfield Station railhead will follow the 30th Division.

17. DISCUSSION OF PLAN.—*a.* The army administrative orders provide two two-way north routes for the corps for through traffic of vehicles to the new railheads as follows:

(1) via Taneytown and Emmitsburg;
(2) via Taneytown and Gettysburg.

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*b.* These routes are not two-way northbound, however, during the following hours and on the sections indicated:

(1) Union Bridge to Taneytown from 5:00 to 8:30 PM, 27th, due to south movement of the army train and from 3:30 to 10:30 AM, 28th, due to north movement of Groupment A army artillery heavy column.

(2) Taneytown to Emmitsburg from 3:30 to 8:00 PM, 28th, due to south movement of army train.

(3) Taneytown to Gettysburg for animal and foot troop columns prior to midnight 28th-29th, due to its being an army reserved road.

*c.* North bound through traffic is well provided for. The corps must, however, provide southbound traffic routes for staff cars, ambulances, ammunition vehicles, and those carrying gasoline and oil. After midnight July 29-30, all roads south of the New Oxford—Gettysburg—Fairfield road will be in division areas.

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## SECTION VII

## *A Solution of the Sixth Requirement*

Paragraph

Traffic Plan for 30th Division ---------- 18

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18. TRAFFIC PLAN FOR 30TH DIVISION SUPPLY.—The trains of the 30th division will operate during period July 27-30 as follows:

*a. Ammunition Train.*—Empty ammunition vehicles proceed to Emmitsburg to refill at Army Ammunition Depot No. 4, now being evacuated. Loaded ammunition motor vehicles to move via Ladiesburg to Sharretts and establish a distributing point on the 27th, to fill combat trains of divisions. On the 28th all vehicles proceed north by the Keysville—Four Points Road, refill at Emmitsburg and bivouac that night in that vicinity. Ammunition motor vehicles to establish distributing point on July 29 at road

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junction 400 yards east of Bollinger School; route, Emmitsburg, Gettysburg Road—Fairplay—Bollinger School.

*b. Motor Section, Division Train.*—The division train completes its daily distribution by 9:00 PM, July 27. It has on hand at its bivouac the reserve field ration. After completing its distribution, the train proceeds via Johnsville—Ladiesburg—Keysville road to Bollinger School where it unloads and establishes a distributing point for the 29th. On the 28th, by 6:00 AM it clears Bollinger School and moves via Harney—Gettysburg—Hagerstown road to railhead where it bivouacs preparatory to receiving one ration after 6:00 PM July 29th.

*c. Animal-drawn Trains of the Division.*—The animal-drawn sections of the division train, the artillery brigade ammunition train, and the consolidated field trains move via Johnsville — Ladiesburg — Keysville — Toms Creek Church—Bollinger School—road junction 419—Greenmount Road, staging each night at the distributing point established by the motor vehicles.

(1) The field trains move with one full and one empty section; the ration for the 28th to be issued to the rolling kitchens after distribution on the night of the 27th. The full sections bivouac in the vicinity of Bruceville on the night of 27-28, and on the 28th they issue and then proceed via Keysville—Emmitsburg—Greenmount road to bivouac in the vicinity of the distributing point at Greenmount. The empty sections proceed via Keysville—Tom Creek Church—Bollinger School road to distributing point established at Bollinger School; after distribution on the 29th they proceed to Greenmount via Centennial Hall School to the bivouac in the Greenmount area.

*d.* The medical evacuation route will conform to that specified in "Restrictions" of the Army Administrative Orders. Drivers should be informed as to return routes and new position of ambulance battalion before their departure to the rear.

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## SECTION VIII

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics ---------- 19

19. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—The following topics are suggested for study:

*a. Army Establishments.*—(1) The sufficiency of the army establishments and the suitability of their locations for the operations just prior to July 25.

(2) The movement of these establishments in order to conform to the retirement of the army.

(3) Suitability of the new locations and their sufficiency as reestablished.

(4) Practicability of using the railroad from Emmitsburg to Rocky Ridge in the evacuation of establishments.

*b. Army and Corps Trains.*—(1) Method of employment in troop movement.

(2) The possible use of I and II Corps trains to assist in these movements.

(3) The advisability of handling all the moves by the army, or of placing the trains at the disposition of corps to which divisions belonged.

*c. Practicability of Movements Scheduled.*—(1) Practicability of getting under way the motor transport movements of troops and the marching movements of the animal columns in the times as given in the solution to requirement No. 3.

(2) Do these movements satisfy the requirements of army orders as to the successive positions of the army?

(3) In the movement of the 1st and 23d Divisions; is it more advisable to make one complete move from front line to final destination, or to introduce a staging area and make the move on two successive nights?

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(4) Practicability of the animal column movements. Taking into consideration the great lengths of the division columns; consider the length of the marches, the elapsed time at bivouacs between stages of journey to final destination, the condition of the animals and the possibility of proper feeding.

*d. Determination of Priorities.*—(1) In the study of determination of priority for the movement of the IV Corps troops on the nights of July 29-30; the correctness of the solution in using the maximum road space for the corps transport as opposed to using a lesser space. Note: This latter involves the justification of a G4 assumption that certain corps troops will have moved north before this time.

(2) Determination of what troops may have left the Two Taverns area before this time.

(3) Practicability of handling the priority schedule in the manner shown in paragraph III A 3 of the administrative orders; clearness, brevity and sufficiency.

(4) Other methods of presenting same data, as in a priority table. Need of this data in the administrative orders.

*e. Road Restrictions.*—Sufficiency of the provisions of the administrative orders other than the priority schedule, particularly the restrictions of paragraph III A 1 and 2 as to its effectiveness in assisting the rapid and uninterrupted retirement of units of the army.

*f. Circulation.*—(1) Circulation plan of the III Corps; is it workable, and does it conform to the army requirements?

(2) Circulation for the 30th Division in its withdrawal; is it workable, are supply features sufficient, and are any changes desired?

## *Maps*

G4 Situation Map, Third Army, 25 July, 1921, following this page.

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# CHAPTER XXI

# *Selection and Occupation of a Defensive Position*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
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| SECTION III.—A Discussion of Principles | 8-10 |
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Maps following page 372.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twenty-second Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirements | 2 |


1. TWENTY-SECOND SPECIAL SITUATION.

*a.* The retirement ordered by F.O. 25 commenced with the movement of rear elements of the 1st Cavalry Division shortly after 6:00 PM July 27.

*b.* By 10:00 PM, portions of the rear elements and trains of all front line divisions were in motion. The III and I Corps began the withdrawal of front line units soon after midnight, followed by the withdrawal of those of the IV and II Corps. By 6:00 AM, on the 28th, the bulk of the infantry and the divisional artillery were established on the new line.

*c.* The withdrawal of the III Corps was executed under difficulties, owing to aggressive raiding and heavy artillery fire which started about the time the 1st Division began to entruck and to the aggressive action on the flank by 1st Red Cavalry Division, commencing at daylight.



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*d.* The withdrawal of the II Corps and left of the IV Corps was followed closely at daylight by the Reds in their front. By 10:00 AM, Reds began to appear in strength on this front, and shortly after noon a determined attack was launched against the front Westminster—Cranberry. The attack lacked adequate artillery support and by 3:00 PM had been repulsed with heavy Red losses.

*e.* By 2:00 PM, the evidences of a general advance of the Red army were unmistakeable.

*f.* Up to 4:00 PM, no change had been reported in the Red situation north of Baltimore and Belair.

*g.* The movements of Blue troops and trains had continued throughout the day, though subjected to interdiction fire on the main roads north and northwest of Westminster in the early forenoon and to severe machine gun and bombing attacks by airplanes.

*h.* At 4:00 PM July 28, General A decides to issue the army field order for the organization and defense of the Emmitsburg—Hanover line.

2. REQUIREMENTS:

*a. First Requirement.*—Location of defensive positions on the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover, with reasons in brief.

*b. Second Requirement.*—Plan of defense, with reasons in brief.

*c. Third Requirement.*—Army Field Order for the occupation and defense of the position.

---

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Location of Defensive Positions | 3 |
| Reasons in Brief—First Requirement | 4 |
| Plan of Defense | 5 |
| Reasons in Brief—Second Requirement | 6 |
| Army Field Order for the Occupation and Defense of the Position | 7 |

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3. LOCATION OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.—The location of defensive positions are as follows:

*a.* A Battle Position with main line of resistance along the line Carrick Knob—Emmitsburg—Hoffman Hill—Ford —hill 600—Germantown—crossroads 633—Mt. Pleasant—crossroads 709 (south of Miller School)—Hahf School—Ironore P.O.

*b.* An outpost area covering the Battle Position, with intrenched line of resistance along the line Mount St. Marys — Longs —Bollinger School —Harney —Ashgrove School—Sells Station—Fairview School—Dubs Church—Valley Junction—Stormy Hill School—Spring Grove.

*d.* A Second Reserve Position, unorganized, main line of resistance: Liberty Mills—Fairplay—Barlow—Two Taverns—Brushtown—Hanover—Gharstown.

*d.* Second Reserve Position ,unorganized, main line of resistance: McKee Knob—McCleary School—Round Top (hill) — Bonneauville — Irishtown — Walnut Grove School.

*e.* Two Switch Positions, unorganized, main lines of resistance: crossroads 633—Centennial—Bittinger—B.M. —Walnut Grove School and Bittinger—road bend 622 (2 miles east of Bittinger)—Gharstown.

4. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a.* While there is no one position of great natural strength along the Emmitsburg—Hanover line, there are several ridges lying between the tributaries of the Monocacy which are capable of strong defensive organization, a fact which, together with the strategical elements of the situation was considered by General A, in selecting that line.

*b.* Considerations of flank protection, observation, and reduction in frontage all indicate Carrick Knob as the logical point on which to rest the west flank of the army.

*c.* There is no such obstacle as that afforded by the combination of the Monocacy River and the Catoctin Mountains to cover the east flank.

(1) Disregarding the Wentz—Pentland Heights line, which would be an unfavorable location for the flank for both strategical and tactical reasons, there are only the

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Pigeon Hills and the Blooming Grove—Ironore P.O. ridge east of Hanover to be considered.

(2) The Pigeon Hills location while tactically the stronger, throws the left of the army close to the Conewago, does not give the frontage necessary to permit of convenient concentration and maneuver of the reserve divisions under cover of the position and uncovers the railroads running northeast from Hanover. The Blooming Grove—Ironore P.O. ridge commands the valleys of the Little Codorus and the heights beyond for some distance, affords fair cover immediately in rear and covers the railroads running into Hanover.

*d.* Between the locations selected for the east and west flanks of the position are several lines capable of strong tactical defensive organizations; the Longville—Littlestown ridge; the Harney—Valley Grove School line, and the 598—Germantown—Mt. Pleasant line.

(1) The Longville—Littlestown line has a greater length than either of the other two, and introduces an objectionable salient at Longville. Both it and the Harney—Valley Grove School line are commanded for a considerable distance by the high ground east and northeast of Littlestown.

(2) The line selected includes Hoffman Hill which commands the entire area west of the Monocacy. East of the Monocacy the Germantown ridge commands the ground in its immediate front, and is from two to three miles distant from the higher ground east of Littlestown. Only in the vicinity of Mt. Pleasant does this line have unfavorable command and observation.

5. PLAN OF DEFENSE.—General A decides: to organize a shallow zone defensive system consisting of a battle position covered by a partially organized outpost; to occupy the battle position in sufficient strength to hold it until the army reserve can reinforce it or can deliver a counter attack; to lay out but not organize, except in two localities, two reserve positions and a switch position; to concentrate the reserve in rear of the center and left where it can support the weak left flank and at the same time be able to rein-

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force within one day any probable dangerous points in the line.

6. REASONS IN BRIEF.—The following considerations influence the selection of the plan of defense:

*a.* In addition to the general mission originally assigned the Third Blue Army of destroying the Reds, General A has two main missions:

(1) To prevent the Reds in his front from joining in the operations to the east of the Susquehanna.

(2) To cover the concentration of the Fifth Blue Army.

*b.* To carry out the first mission it is necessary that, once he has averted the threatened blow on his left and has drawn the Reds away from the Susquehanna by a successful retirement, he be prepared to resume the offensive at the earliest moment with his entire force. This condition is best met by a closely knit rather shallow disposition of front line divisions; by holding the position in such strength and by concentrating reserves in such close proximity that a general attack can be launched with a minimum amount of preliminary shifting of units.

*c.* The second mission, the necessity of covering his communications, and the need for maneuver room all demand that he hold the Reds as far south as possible. This condition will be met by assuming, at first, a passive defensive attitude, merely endeavoring to hold the Reds south of the Emmitsburg—Hanover line, meanwhile preparing either to assume an active defense by counter attacking with the IV Corps or to resume the offensive with his whole force if necessary to prevent the Red Fifth Army from making detachments to assist the Delaware Reds.

*d.* All the above conditions are best fulfilled by a shallow defensive zone based on holding in force a single battle position located as above described. Such a defensive should be successful in definitely stopping the Red advance and in holding the line for the present at least, without undue losses, since it will require some days for the Reds to make new concentrations of troops, artillery, and am-

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munition in sufficient strength to attempt a decisive general attack.

*e.* General A is not confronted with the question of resorting to a passive, delaying defensive to enable distant reserves or reinforcements to reach him. With the exception of replacements due to arrive August 5th, he now has all the forces which will be available to him; the reserves can be located as close at hand as necessary.

*f.* Subsequent developments may make it advisable, or even necessary, to organize a deeper and more flexible defensive system; this contingency is met by the selection of two reserve positions and the initiation of plans for their organization and defense.

7. ARMY FIELD ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION AND DEFENSE OF THE POSITION.

Third Army,
TANEYTOWN,
28 July 21, 6:00 PM

FIELD ORDERS
No. 26.

**Maps: Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO 26. Geological Survey, 1:62500.**

1. The Reds although following up closely along our center and left center have not been able to interfere with our movements. Our retirement is proceeding according to plan, and the army holds the 1st withdrawal line MILLER BRIDGE—WESTMINSTER—GLENVILLE. (See Operation Map, Third Army, accompanying FO 25.)

   No change has been reported in the Red situation north of BALTIMORE and BELAIR and east of the SUSQUEHANNA (see G2 Report and Situation Map, Third Army, 2:00 PM, 27 July, 21).

   No change in situation of our Second Army and XX Corps.

2. (a) This army, continuing the retirement to the general line EMMITSBURG—HANOVER, will organize and hold a defensive zone along that general line.

   (b) Positions: (1) Battle Position: main line of resistance.

   CARRICK KNOB—EMMITSBURG—HOFFMAN HILL—hill 600—GERMANTOWN—CR 633—

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MT PLEASANT—CR 709 (south of MILLER SCHOOL)—HAHF SCHOOL—IRONORE PO.

(2) The Battle Position will be covered by an outpost area with intrenched line of resistance as follows:

MT ST MARYS—LONGS—HARNEY—ASHGROVE SCHOOL—SELLS STATION—FAIRVIEW SCHOOL—DUBS CHURCH—VALLEY JUNCTION —STORMY HILL SCHOOL—SPRING GROVE.

(3) Two reserve positions and a switch position, to be laid out but not organized except as specially directed:

First Reserve Position: Main line of resistance:

LIBERTY MILLS — FAIRPLAY — BARLOW — TWO TAVERNS—WHITEHALL—BRUSHTOWN—HANOVER—GHARSTOWN.

Second Reserve Position: Main line of resistance:

MCKEE KNOB—MCCLEARY SCHOOL—ROUND TOP (hill) —BONNEAUVILLE —IRISHTOWN—WALNUT GROVE SCHOOL.

Switch Positions:

CR 633—CENTENNIAL—BITTINGER—BM—WALNUT GROVE SCHOOL.

BITTINGER—road bend 622 (two miles east BITTINGER)—GHARSTOWN.

(c) Corps Zones of Defense:

I, II, and III Corps: same as corps zones of action prescribed by FO 25 as effective July 29.

(d) 2d and 1st Cavalry Division: covering east flank.

3. (a) The III Corps will organize and defend the outpost and the Battle Position within its zone. It will cover the west flank of the army and the WAYNESBORO pass with the cavalry of III and IV Corps. Early information will be secured of Red movements through the CATOCTIN MOUNTAINS.

(b) The II Corps will organize and defend the outpost and the Battle Position within its zone. Defense plans should contemplate the use of the 23d Div in case of a general hostile attack.

(c) The I Corps will organize and defend the outpost and the Battle Position in its zone. With its cavalry it will cover the east flank of the Corps and will screen the concentration of the IV Corps. Maintain contact with 2d Cav Div. Plans should

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contemplate use of 1st and 11th Divs in case of hostile general attack.

(d) The 2d Cavalry Division, reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Division will delay any Red advance between the line LITTLE FALLS—CODORUS CREEK and NORTH BRANCH MUDDY CREEK. Vigorous reconnaissance will be maintained to discover Red movements between GUNPOWDER FALLS and SUSQUEHANNA RIVER.

(e) Groupment A, Army Artillery, from positions vicinity WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL, will support the III and II Corps.

Groupment B, Army Artillery, from positions vicinity MIDWAY will support the II and I Corps.

The Army Chief of Artillery will insure coordination of artillery missions between adjacent corps. Each corps will designate definite routes from GETTYSBURG and positions for rapid reinforcement by portee 75s. Portee 75s remain on present assignment until further orders.

All artillery will be so disposed as to be able to place effective fire in front of the main line of resistance of the Battle Position.

Persistent gas will be used in area west of the MONOCACY. Non- and semi-persistent gases may be used at discretion of Corps commanders. Gas will be used along corps boundaries only on agreement between corps concerned.

(f) Tanks. The 10th Battalion, Heavy Tanks will await orders in army reserve at CARLISLE.

Light Tank battalion will continue on present assignment.

(g) Army Air Service. Commencing daylight July 30 the army air service will carry out the following missions:

The Observation Group will reconnoiter the whole front and flanks and will gain early information of Red movements between the SUSQUEHANNA and GUNPOWDER FALLS and through CATOCTIN MOUNTAINS. Special effort will be made to observe the Red concentrations north of BALTIMORE and BELAIR and to discover any new concentrations on our front or flanks.

The Bombardment Group will attack enemy troop movements and concentrations and important depots and ammunition dumps.

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The Attack Group will support the II and I Corps.

(h) Army Reserve: IV Corps (1st, 11th and 23d Divisions) and 10th Heavy Tank Battalion and IV Corps, including 1st, 11th and 23d Divisions, will be prepared for rapid movement to the support of the corps on the line.

(x) (1) Unless otherwise specified herein, passage of command of units will be as directed in FO 25, July 27, 21.

(2) Until further orders the scheme of defense will be based on holding the Battle Position. The defense of this position will be based on fire action covering the main line of resistance of the position and local and general counter attacks by divisions and corps.

Not less than one-third of the infantry of each corps will be held in corps and division reserve for counter attacks to maintain the integrity of the Battle Position.

(3) Until further orders positions will have the following missions:

In case of hostile general attack the outpost will be employed to delay and disorganize the attack. Withdrawal from the outpost will be only on orders from corps or division commanders.

The Battle Position will be held at all costs.

The First Reserve Position will be used as an artillery position and line of departure for counter attacks.

The Second Reserve Position is a reserve battle position and line of departure for counter attacks.

(4) Provision will be made for covering the line of resistance of the outpost and the unorganized intervals thereof with protective fire.

(5) Work of organizing the outpost and the Battle Position will be commenced by troops immediately upon arrival on the lines and will be pushed to completion.

(6) Plans will be prepared by the Army Engineer for the organization and defense of the Reserve and Switch positions but no work of organization will be done thereon except that Corps will organize those parts of the First Reserve Position in their respective

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zones covering Group A and B Army Artillery.

(See Organization of the Ground Annex) (omitted).

4. For administrative details see Administrative Order No 30 accompanying FO 25.

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:

(See Signal Communication Map, attached) (omitted).

(b) Command Posts: effective 6:00 AM July 30.

Army: Forward echelon, GETTYSBURG.
Rear echelon, CARLISLE.
III Corps, GETTYSBURG.
II Corps, HUNTERSTOWN.
I Corps, ABBOTTSTOWN.
IV Corps, YORK SPRINGS.
2d Cav Div, YORK.
1st Cav Div, YORK.
Gp A Army Arty, WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL.
Gp B Army Arty, MIDWAY.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution: A.

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## SECTION III

## *A Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General | 8 |
| Purpose and Method of the Defense | 9 |
| Dispositions for the Defense | 10 |

---

8. GENERAL.—In arriving at the decision to hold the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover, and in planning for its defense, General A had to consider the general purpose of his defensive action and the several dispositions suitable for accomplishing that purpose.

9. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF THE DEFENSE.—*a.* The object of his defensive is to hold the enemy in his front with only a portion of his force while resting and reorganizing

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the remainder for future offensive action. While keeping the Reds in his front he must also hold his ground, for as already stated, he cannot permit the enemy to move farther north without endangering his line of communication to the west and impairing his freedom of maneuver.

*b*. He should be able to hold his ground for a short time by a passive defense; at least until the enemy is able to bring new concentrations against him, after which he must conduct an active defense. The retirement, if successful, will have enabled the Blues to avoid the decision sought by the Reds in their attack planned for the 28th or 29th. When that retirement has ceased, General A must consider seeking a decision himself. He must also be prepared to utilize his whole strength to prevent a movement of or a detachment from the Reds towards the Susquehanna.

*c*. The foregoing considerations, and the tactical weakness of his left flank, require that while assuming for the present a passive defensive attitude he be prepared to pass either to an active defense, based on the use of the army reserve, or to initiate a new offensive with his entire force.

10. DISPOSITIONS FOR THE DEFENSE.—*a*. In carrying out the policy indicated in the preceding paragraph, dispositions for a position defense, or for one of the several forms of the zone defense may be made.

*b*. The defense of a deep zone involves dispersion in considerable depth and requires ample room in rear for the maneuver of large reserves. The defense is not dependent on holding any one line in the zone. To a certain extent, the whole zone is a battle position. It is applicable to situations where ground may be sacrificed in order to gain time for the arrival of distant reinforcements, or for the delivery of a counter stroke by a general reserve. It is not well adapted to a quick assumption of a general offensive on the part of the troops occupying the zone. The work of organizing such a zone involves a great amount of time, labor, and material, and would not normally be undertaken if it were expected to remain on the defensive for only a short time. Its organization would normally follow a period of stabilization in a position or shallow zone defensive.

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*c.* A position defense having only one organized position is too weak, and too liable to penetration on a frontage as great as that of the Third Army.

*d.* A defensive system comprising a battle position covered by an organized outpost, with due provision for the organization of additional positions, is well adapted to a determined holding of a shallow zone and to an early resumption of the offensive, when conditions permit its occupation in force and when reserves are near at hand.

*e.* After taking up the position, as time passes and it becomes evident that the enemy is effecting a heavy concentration for a general attack, the defender will proceed to organize the additional positions. In organizing these positions it should be borne in mind that their tactical roles may vary during the course of the attack and plans should permit a voluntary or forced change in the function of a position without disorganizing the system of defense.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 11

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11. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.

*a.* Give the principles of defensive combat applicable to the defensive position and form of defense adopted in this situation.

*b.* Give your conception of the movement of the Red army in following up the Blue retirement; lines of action open to the Reds; influence of these considerations on the plan for defense and organization of the Emmitsburg—Hanover position.

*c.* Compare the Blue situation on July 27 and 28 as given in Chapters XIX and XXI with that on June 29 as

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given in Chapter XIV; give reasons for the difference in the forms of defense adopted in the two situations.

*d.* Discuss the principal strategical and tactical features of the Emmitsburg—Hanover positions; terrain; frontage, depth, etc. Give location for a defensive position other than on the above line.

*e.* Give a statement, illustrated by diagrams, of the general plans recommended by Army G3 for the tactical conduct of the defense under various hypotheses as to Red attacks.

*f.* Discuss the employment of cavalry and air service after position is occupied; their use in case of hostile general attack.

*g.* Give a general plan of defense for III Corps, based on the army order. Show occupation of corps front giving locations of infantry battalions.

*h.* Same for II Corps.

*i.* Same for I Corps.

*j.* Discuss Field Orders No. 26; clearness, completeness, form, time of issuance, etc.

## *Maps*

Operation Map Third Army, accompanying F.O. 26, 28 July 21, follows this page.

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# CHAPTER XXII

# *The Third Army Attacks*


| | Paragraphs |
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| PART A.—The Third Army Attacks | 1-20 |
| PART B.—Army Artillery Plans for the Attack | 21-24 |


## PART A

### THE THIRD ARMY ATTACKS


| | Paragraphs |
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Maps following page 396.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Twenty-third Special Situation | 1 |
| Blue Estimate of the Situation | 2 |
| Blue Situation, August 19th | 3 |
| Situation Table, Third Army | 4 |
| Requirements | 5 |


1. TWENTY-THIRD SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.*—Geological Survey, 1:62500. G3 Situation Map, Third Army, afternoon 19 August 1921.

*b.* The situation given in the Twentieth and Twenty-second special situation, Chapters XIX and XXI, is continued.



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*c.* The Reds followed up the retirement of the Third Army with considerable aggressiveness but did not succeed in interfering materially with the Blue plan. The Third Army has held the general line Emmitsburg—Hanover since the last of July, 1921. During the first part of August, the Reds made several local attacks which seized most of the Blue outpost area and part of the Battle Position about Hanover, and attempted to turn the left of the Third Army. Since then the two forces have been inactive, being engaged in strengthening their respective defensive zones.

2. BLUE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.—*a.* The Third Army estimate of the situation, dated 19 August, 1921, contains confirmed information (for details see Situation Map, Third Army, afternoon 19 August 1921), as follows.

(1) The Reds have hastily intrenched a defensive zone on the front Valley Junction—mountains west of Motters. Four general positions have been located as follows:

(a) A first position, an outpost area, in contact with the Blue front on the general line, south of Porters—Hanover—Midway—Felty School—585—568—Edgegrove School—445—444—415—St. Joseph Academy.

(b) A second position on the general line—Valley Junction—Wildas Chapel—Mt. Pleasant—Sells Station—Littlestown—Oakgrove School—south of Alloway Creek—Toms Creek Church—Longs.

(c) A third position, on the general line—Brodbeck—Bandanna—hills west of 685—hills west of 762—west along ridge south of Silver Run (creek) to Stumptown—west to the south of Piney Creek—Keysville—Franklin School—Appolds—north of Washington School.

(d) A few trenches have been located along northern slopes of Dug Hill Ridge.

(2) Strongly organized areas have been developed about the following localities (see situation map): southwest of Longville; Keysville; Taneytown; Littlestown; Silver Run (village); south of Hanover; Raubenstine; Bandanna; Valley Junction; and Brodbeck. G2 studies indicate

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that against a surprise attack, the Reds will attempt to hold their second position temporarily, but that the intrenched areas along that position will be held at all cost as pivots of maneuver for counter attack.

*b.* The Red order of battle on August 19 is as follows:

(1) On east flank; from Red Lion to Valley Junction; the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced.

(2) From Valley Junction to Mt. Pleasant; the IX Corps with the 24th and 42d Divisions in line from east to west.

(3) From Mt. Pleasant to north and south line through 568—543—523—Taneytown; the VIII Corps with the 16th and 20th Divisions in line from east to west.

(4) From north and south line through 568—543—523—Taneytown to the mountains; the IX Corps with the 15th and 17th Divisions in line from east to west.

(5) Covering west flank: a brigade of cavalry.

(6) Red reserve divisions appear to be located in the areas around Libertytown, Hampstead, and New Freedom.

(7) Fifth Red Army Headquarters is at Westminster.

*c.* Since August 8, no information has been gained of other previously identified Red corps and divisions. However, repeated reports from aerial reconnaissance indicate an extensive movement of Reds to the east of Gunpowder Falls south of Parkton. The Reds have made special aerial and cavalry efforts to prevent Blue reconnaissance east of Gunpowder Falls.

*d.* Reports from the XX Corps and Second Army indicate preparations for a Red attack east of the Susquehanna.

3. BLUE SITUATION, AUGUST 19.—*a.* The Blue situation on the afternoon of August 19, 1921, is given in the attached situation table. See also Situation Map, Third Army, afternoon 19 Aug 21.

*b.* At 5:00 PM, August 19, the Commander, Third Army received the following telegram:

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General Headquarters,
ALBANY, NY.
19 August, 3:00 PM.

(1) Commander, Third Army.

Immediate attack by Reds against Twentieth Corps expected. Red attack will be a combined operation consisting of an attack east of SUSQUEHANNA across PEQUEA CREEK and an attack crossing the SUSQUEHANNA from its west bank beteween PEQUEA CREEK and WASHINGTONBORO. To relieve situation on XX Corps front the Third Army will attack the Reds in its own front not later than August twenty-second.

X,
General.

(2) This telegram is subsequently confirmed by an officer courier.

4. SITUATION TABLE, THIRD ARMY.—*a.* On the afternoon of August 19, 1921, the Third Army is situated as given in the following table:

| 1<br>*Unit* | 2<br>*Location* | 3<br>*Function* | 4<br>*Railhead* | 5<br>*Zone of Action* | 6<br>*Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AHQ | | | | | |
| Fwd Ech | HEIDLERSBURG. | | TABLE ROCK. | | |
| Rr Ech | CARLISLE. | | CARLISLE. | | |
| AAS | | | | | |
| Bomb and Pur Gps. | ARENDTSVILLE. | | SHIPPENSBURG. | | |
| Obsn and Attack Gps. | TABLE ROCK. | | SHIPPENSBURG. | | |
| Hv Tk Bn | CARLISLE. | Army reserve. | CARLISLE. | | |
| Army Tn | YORK SPRINGS. | Army reserve. | MT. HOLLY SPRINGS. | | |
| 1st and 2d Cav Divs (less 1 brig) | South of YORK. | Covering east flank. | MANCHESTER. | East boundary: STILTZ—SPRING GROVE—FORDVILLE (excl). | |
| ARMY ARTY: | | | | | |
| 8 regts 75 mm portee | GETTYSBURG. | Army reserve. | GETTYSBURG. | | |
| Gp A | WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL. | Supporting III and II Corps. | | | |
| Gp B | BITTINGER. | Supporting II and I Corps. | ORTANNA. CENTER MILLS. | | |

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| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| III Corps: | | | | | |
| CHQ | Gettysburg. | Holding line. | Fairfield Sta. | | |
| Corps Trs | On whole front. | Cavalry about Sabillasville covering west flank. | Fairfield Sta. | East boundary: Pleasant Valley—Blocks School—Germantown—Barlow Knoll (all incl). | |
| 30th Div | In front line. | Holding west half of corps sector. | Monterey. | | |
| 20th Div | In front line. | Holding east half of corps sector. | Fairfield Sta. | | |
| II Corps: | | | | | |
| CHQ | Hunterstown. | Holding line. | Biglerville. | West boundary: Same as III Corps. | 1 L Tk bn, attached, in corps reserve at Granite Hill Sta. |
| Corps Trs | On whole front. | | Biglerville. | East boundary: | |
| 25th Div | | Holding west half corps sector. | Gettysburg. | Manchester—Bandanna (excl)— | |
| 3d Div | | Holding east half corps sector. | Goldenville. | Midway—New Oxford—Newchester (incl). | |
| I Corps: | | | | | |
| CHQ | Abbottstown | Holding line. | Mt. Holly Springs. | West boundary: Same as II Corps. | 1 L Tk bn, attached, in corps reserve at Abbottstown. |
| Corps Trs | On whole front. | | Mt. Holly Springs. | East boundary: | Corps cav on east flank south of Spring Grove. |
| 35th Div | In front line. | Holding west half corps sector. | Hunters Run. | Stiltz—Spring Grove. | |
| 22d Div | In front line. | Holding east half corps sector to include Porters. | Mt. Holly Springs. | Fordville (all incl). | |
| Army Reserve: | | | | | |
| IV CHQ and Corps Trs | York Springs. | Reserve | Dillsburg. | | |
| 11th Div | East Berlin. | Reserve. | Dillsburg. | | |
| 1st Div | Davidsburg. | Reserve. | D & M Jc. | | |
| 28d Div | York Springs. | Reserve. | D & M Jc. | | |
| 4th Div | North of Fairview School. | Reserve. | Idaville. | | |
| 2d Div | West of Herr Ridge. | Reserve. | Seven Stars. | | |

(3) The Third Army will have established ammunition and supply dumps adequate to supply three divisions each at Gettysburg and north of New Oxford by the morning of August 20, 1921.

5. Requirements.*—*a. First Requirement.*—Decision of the Commander, Third Army, with reasons in brief.

*NOTE.—(1) Weather—fair. Slight breeze blowing from the west. Forecast for next three days—no change.

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*b. Second Requirement.*—Brief explanation of general plans for the attack and for the concentration for the attack.

*c. Third Requirement.*—Field orders issued to carry out the commander's decision, including a march table showing the concentration and operation map to accompany the field orders.

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## SECTION II

# *A Solution, First Requirement*

## *Decision of the Army Commander—Reasons*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Decision | 6 |
| Reasons in Brief | 7 |

---

6. THE DECISION.—The army commander decides to penetrate the Red center and seize a foothold on the crest of Parrs Ridge. The attack will be launched at 5:00 AM, August 22, 1921.

7. REASONS IN BRIEF.—*a.* The mission of the commander is to attack the Reds on his front not later than August 22 so as to relieve the situation on the front of the XX Corps, east of the Susquehanna. He also has the mission of covering the concentrations of the Second and Fifth Armies.

*b.* To carry out these missions the army commander considers the following plans:

(1) *To Envelop the Red Right.*—The objective in this case should be Deep Run—Dug Hill Ridge. The rugged character of the terrain on the Red right makes the probable progress of such an attack slow and its success doubtful. The direction of the attack exposes the Blue enveloping forces to attack in rear by the Reds from the Susquehanna and also exposes the concentration of the Fifth Blue Army. The railheads available for the Third Army are not favorable to such an attack.

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(2) *To Make the Main Effort Against the Red Right.*—The objective should be Deep Run—Dug Hill Ridge. The rugged character of the terrain on the Red right makes the progress of such an attack slow and its success doubtful.

(3) *To Make the Main Effort Against the Red Left.*—Such an attack has no decisive objective short of Parrs Ridge. The terrain on this front is favorable for a rapid and deep penetration through the Red defensive zone. However, such an attack would be subjected to an annihilating cross fire from the foot hills of Parrs Ridge on the east and the mountains on the west. The attack would be divided by the Monocacy and subject to defeat in detail by Red counter attacks. Even though it succeeded in penetrating the hostile defensive zone, the Reds could still withdraw their left and defend the strong natural defensive line along Parrs Ridge.

(4) *To Envelop the Red Left.*—Such an attack has no decisive objective short of Parrs Ridge. The mountains make such a maneuver difficult, if not impracticable. Even though the envelopment were initially successful, the Reds still have the strong defensive line of the Monocacy and Parrs Ridge on which to hold up the Blue advance.

(5) *To Penetrate the Center of the Red Defensive Zone and Seize a Foothold on the Crest of Parrs Ridge.*

(a) This plan has many advantages. If successful, severe losses may be inflicted upon the Reds and the Third Army is placed in a good position to threaten the Reds on the Susquehanna front, there being no strong defensive position on which the Reds may reorganize and make a stand between Parrs Ridge and Gunpowder Falls, and if the pursuit is pushed vigorously, the Reds have not time to reorganize for the defense of that line.

(b) The ground on the right center of the penetration is favorable for a deep and rapid advance. The attack against the center and left center would be made up the ridges and streams extending toward Parrs Ridge. While the ground on this front is somewhat rough and broken, the direction of the ridges and streams favors attack. The artillery has good observation and, including corps and

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army artillery, is able to support the attack from initial positions until the attack has penetrated the hostile third position.

(c) The enemy holds an extended front. Six Red divisions are occupying a front of about 27 miles. The center Red corps, with only two divisions, is holding a front of about ten miles. It is possible to attack these two divisions with six Blue divisions. The Reds have been defensively organizing their zone for about three weeks. The zone is, therefore, by no means highly organized. If the attack is launched as a surprise and if it is well supported by artillery, tanks, and air service, success is most probable.

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## SECTION III

## *A Solution, Second Requirement*

### *General Plan for the Attack*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Main Effort | 8 |
| The Holding Attacks | 9 |
| Fire Support | 10 |
| The Concentration for the Attack | 11 |

---

8. THE MAIN EFFORT.—*a.* The II and IV Corps make the main effort of the attack on the front hill 598 (SW of Germantown)—Hanover for reasons given in paragraph 7 *b* (5). These two corps are assigned three divisions each and narrow frontages so that sufficient artillery and machine guns will be available to furnish a powerful support for the attack, and so that sufficient infantry will be available as reserves to continue the pressure and to exploit the penetration. The tanks and the 75-mm. portee artillery are assigned to the II Corps. The ground in front of the II Corps is favorable for tank action. With the tanks and the additional artillery, the II Corps should be able to penetrate the hostile positions in the right central part of its

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zone of action and envelop the foothills of Parrs Ridge extending from Littlestown to Silver Run (village).

*b.* The II Corps is ordered to make its main effort in the right central part of its zone, while the IV Corps is ordered to make its main effort in the right central part of its zone so as to assist the II Corps in the reduction of the Littlestown and Silver Run areas and in the seizure of the foot hills of Parrs Ridge.

*c.* The II and IV Corps are given initial objectives beyond the hostile Second or Battle Position, so as to insure the prompt and complete penetration of the Red defensive zone. These corps are ordered to continue and seize the crest of Parrs Ridge. This will assist the attack in breaking down the Red control and morale, it will deprive the Reds of the last strong natural line of defense upon which they can reorganize and make a deliberate stand west of Gunpowder Falls, and it will insure the separation of the Red right and left wings.

9. THE HOLDING ATTACKS.—*a.* The III Corps makes its main effort with its left. This enables it to take advantage of the penetration to be made by the II and IV Corps, so as to turn the right of the Reds in its front. With the III and II Corps holding the foothills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Tyrone, the Reds will be unable to hold their organized zone west of that line. The III Corps should be able to carry the line to Big Pipe Creek and possibly to the crest of Parrs Ridge in its zone of action.

*b.* The I Corps drives hard with its right and assists in enveloping the Red right wing from the west. It must hold out a strong reserve for the protection of its left flank.

10. FIRE SUPPORT.—*a.* A powerful artillery and machine gun support in the form of progressive concentrations and rolling barrages is desirable to cover each of the main efforts. Effective fire support is made possible by the relatively narrow division fronts assigned in the main efforts together with the amount of corps and army artillery which is available. The hostile positions are sufficiently well located to justify the use of a rolling barrage. Such a barrage is carried beyond the hostile second position, after

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which progressive concentrations are employed. Corps and army artillery reinforce the division artillery in this barrage and continue the support after the advance has passed beyond the extreme range of division light artillery, and while the latter are being displaced forward.

*b.* Smoke should be employed in the rolling barrage and on special targets to blind hostile observation along the front, especially Carrick Knob and the foot hills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Silver Run village.

*c.* Gas should be employed to neutralize and demoralize the known Red defensive areas. Persistent gas may be used against the areas west of the Monocacy and also on the Red extreme right. The plan of maneuver of the army contemplates that these latter areas will be turned and passed. Non-persistent gas can be employed as long as it is considered safe on those Red areas which are to be actually attacked by the troops.

11. THE CONCENTRATION FOR THE ATTACK.—*a.* It is essential for the success of the attack that it be launched as a surprise. All preparations for the attack are kept concealed. The normal traffic and the appearance of the front are maintained. All movements for the concentration of the troops and the establishment of new installations are kept concealed. Movements are made at night without lights and troops and equipment kept under cover by day.

*b.* The great mass of troops required for the attack should not be moved into positions for the attack, nor into forward areas, any earlier than necessary. This requires a well arranged schedule. Elements of units already on the front screen the deployment of new and incoming units until the attack is launched. Corps and army artillery precede that of the divisions into position as the former require a longer time for emplacement.

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## SECTION IV

## *A Solution, Third Requirement*

### *Field Order and March Table*

Paragraphs

Field Order ---------- 12
March Table ---------- 13

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12. FIELD ORDER.—The following field order is issued to carry out the commander's decision:

Third Army,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.,
19 Aug 21, 10:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS
No 27.

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500; Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany FO No 27.

1. (a) Reports indicate extensive Red movements from the front of the Third Army to the east of GUNPOWDER FALLS south of PARKTON. The Reds on our front are holding their defensive zone with six divisions in line and three in reserve. See G2 Reports and Situation Maps (omitted).

   (b) Our GHQ reports that the Reds contemplate immediate attacks against our XX Corps both on the PEQUEA CREEK front, and from the west across the SUSQUEHANNA between PEQUEA CREEK and WASHINGTONBORO.

2. (a) The Third Army attacks the Reds on its own front at 5:00 AM, 22 Aug 21, to penetrate the Red center, and seize a foothold on PARRS RIDGE.

   (b) Objectives:

      (1) First objective: EMMITSBURG — PALMER — TANEYTOWN—TYRONE—MT PLEASANT (east of TYRONE)—BANDANNA—YORK ROAD.

      (2) Second objective: PARRS RIDGE from MOUNT AIRY through WARFIELDSBURG — MEXICO — MANCHESTER—GLENVILLE.

      (3) Then pursuit.

   (c) Zones of action, effective 6:00 PM, 20 Aug 21.

      III Corps: East boundary: GOLDENVILLE—BARLOW KNOLL—ROCK CREEK to hill 523 (all incl)

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—GALT—MAYBERRY—TYRONE—JASONVILLE—WARFIELDSBURG (all excl).

II Corps: West boundary: Same as east boundary III Corps.

East boundary: WOODSIDE SCHOOL—GULDENS—SQUARE CORNER—FELTY SCHOOL—LEFEVRE—CHESTNUT HILL SCHOOL—CHERRYTOWN—BM 545—BIXLER—MEXICO (all incl).

IV Corps: West boundary: Same as east boundary II Corps.

East boundary: HAMPTON—HANOVER (excl)—BANDANNA—MANCHESTER (both incl).

I Corps: West boundary: Same as east boundary IV Corps.

East boundary: FARMERS—PORTERS—GLENVILLE—STILTZ (all incl).

3. (a) The III Corps, with 30th and 20th Divisions, will attack on the front MIDDLE CREEK—hill 598 (SW of GERMANTOWN) (excl). It will make its main effort with its left, turn the right of the Reds in its front, and then advance in the direction of PARRS RIDGE.

(b) The II Corps, with the 2d, 25th and 4th Divisions, and reinforced by three regiments of 75-mm portee artillery and three tank battalions, will attack on the front hill 598 (SW of GERMANTOWN)—FELTY SCHOOL (both incl). It will make its main effort opposite its right center and will envelop and seize the foot hills of PARRS RIDGE from LITTLESTOWN to SILVER RUN (village). In conjunction with the IV Corps on its left, it will promptly penetrate the hostile first, second and third positions in its front and carry the line to TYRONE—MT PLEASANT. It will then seize the crest of PARRS RIDGE from WARFIELDSBURG to MEXICO. It will assist the operations of the III Corps by the capturing of the high ground in its own zone of action which overlooks that of the III Corps.

(c) The IV Corps, with the 1st, 23d and 3d Divisions, will attack on the front FELTY SCHOOL (excl)—HANOVER (excl). It will make its main effort with its right center, and thereby assist the II Corps in the reduction of the LITTLESTOWN and SILVER RUN areas and in the seizure of the foot hills of PARRS RIDGE. In conjunction with the II Corps on its right, it will promptly penetrate the hostile first, second and third positions in its

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front, carry the line to MT PLEASANT—BANDANNA, and then seize the crest of PARRS RIDGE from MEXICO to MANCHESTER. It will assist the advance of the I Corps on its left.

(d) The I Corps, with 35th and 22d Divisions, will attack on the front HANOVER (excl)—PORTERS. It will make its main effort with its right, follow up the penetration of the II and IV Corps, turn the Red positions in its front from the west and then drive the enemy southeast of PARRS RIDGE so as to gain the line MANCHESTER—GLENVILLE. It will hold out a strong reserve to protect its left.

(e) The 2d Cavalry Division, reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Division, will attack the Red cavalry in its front and protect the left of the I Corps and the Third Army. Any Red movement against the left flank of the Third Army will be promptly reported. It will be prepared to carry out a vigorous pursuit.

(f) Groupment A, Army Artillery, from positions southeast of BARLOW and Groupment B, Army Artillery, from positions south of MT ROCK SCHOOL, will support the general attack. Their main effort will be in support of the II and IV Corps.

(1) There will be no artillery preparation. Artillery will open fire at 5:00 AM.

(2) The attack on the front of the II and IV Corps will be supported by a rolling barrage in front of the main efforts and carried through the hostile second position. Such guns of corps and army artillery as are not needed for counter battery and distant interdiction fire will be used to reinforce the barrages and to carry the support to the extreme range of army artillery. For details see Annex No 1, Artillery.

(3) Smoke will be used in the rolling barrage and to blind important hostile observation stations along the front, on CARRICK KNOB, and along western edge of foot hills of PARRS RIDGE from LITTLESTOWN to SILVER RUN village.

(4) Persistent gas will be employed on CARRICK KNOB and on the hostile defenses west of the MONOCACY and east of line PENN GROVE—MARBURG. Non-persistent gas will be employed on the defensive areas about KEYSVILLE,

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SW of LONGVILLE, TANEYTOWN, SILVER RUN (village), RAUBENSTINE and BANDANNA until two hours prior to the time scheduled for the arrival of our infantry, see Annex No 1, Artillery. Corps may make such additional use of gas and smoke desired except on targets within 2000 yards of their eastern boundary, for which there will be agreement between the respective corps concerned.

(g) The Army Air Service will carry out the following missions:

(1) The bombardment group will bomb hostile artillery and prevent Red army reserves from reinforcing the front.

(2) The attack group will assist the main efforts of the II and IV Corps. In cooperation with the artillery, it will assist in counter battery and in attacking Red reserves. From 6:15 AM to 6:30 AM, it will attack enemy ground troops in the Red second position in front of the main effort of the II and IV Corps. Later, in advance of the close artillery support of the infantry, it will attack enemy ground troops in the Red third position. On signal from the infantry, it will assist in overcoming hostile strong points.

(3) The observation group will ascertain and report any movements of Red army reserves prior to and during the attack, any attempts of the Reds to withdraw, and any Red movement against the Third Army's left.

(4) The pursuit group will screen the concentration and the attack.

See Annex No 2, Air Service (omitted).

(x) (1) The concentration for the attack will be made in accordance with the attached March Table.

(2) The preparations for the attack must be kept concealed from the enemy. The normal traffic of the front must not be changed. All movements for the concentration and in preparation for the attack must be made at night. Troops and equipment must be kept concealed by day. No lights will be allowed at night nor any camp fires which will cause smoke by day. Elements of units now in line will screen the deployment of units entering the line until the attack is launched.

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(3) The attack will be pushed with the greatest determination. All units will be prepared to carry out a vigorous pursuit should the enemy attempt to withdraw.

4. See Administrative Order No 27 (omitted).

5. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
Army: HEIDLERSBURG — HUNTERSTOWN — BONNEAUVILLE—LITTLETOWN.
III Corps: GETTYSBURG—HARNEY—TANEYTOWN—UNION BRIDGE.
II Corps: HUNTERSTOWN—BONNEAUVILLE—LITTLESTOWN—UNION MILLS.
IV Corps: NEWCHESTER—NEW OXFORD—MIDWAY—DEEP RUN.
I Corps: ABBOTTSTOWN—HANOVER and BALTIMORE ROAD.
2d Cav Div: BALTIMORE and YORK TURNPIKE.

(b) Command Posts:
No change except as follows:
IV Corps: to NEWCHESTER at 9:00 PM, 20 Aug 21.
11th Div: to FARMERS at 9:00 PM, 21 Aug 21.

By command of General A,

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A
and to XX Corps.

13. MARCH TABLE.—*a.* The following march table is issued with the field order:

See table, page 388.

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## SECTION V

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Mission of the Third Army | 14 |
| Minimum Results Required | 15 |
| Necessary Risk Avoided | 16 |
| Character of Attack and Results Required for a Decision | 17 |
| Plans of Attack | 18 |
| Missions Assigned Each Unit | 19 |

14. MISSION OF THE THIRD ARMY.—The mission of the Third Army is to attack the enemy on its front not later

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# MARCH TABLE

## (To accompany FO No 27, Third Army, 19 Aug 21.)

| 1<br>*Unit* | 2<br>*Present Location* | 3<br>*Night of 21–22 Aug 21 to* | 4<br>*Night of 21–22 Aug 21 to* | 5<br>*Routes* | 6<br>*Railheads* | 7<br>*Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARMY ARTY:<br>Gp A | WILLOW GROVE SCHOOL. | SE of BARLOW. | | Prescribed by III Corps. | No change. | |
| Gp B | BITTINGER. | S of MT. ROCK SCHOOL. | | Prescribed by IV Corps. | No change. | |
| Three regts 75 mm portee arty | GETTYSBURG. | Positions prescribed by II Corps. | | Prescribed by II Corps. | No change. | |
| Hv Tk Bn | CARLISLE. | GETTYSBURG and to II Corps. | Positions prescribed by II Corps. | By rail to GETTYSBURG, thence as prescribed by II Corps. | BIGLERVILLE after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | |
| 1st L Tk Bn | II Corps. | Prescribed by II Corps. | Position for attack. | | | |
| IV CHQ and Corps Trs | YORK SPRINGS. | Corps Arty to positions. | Remainder of corps troops into corps area. | Prescribed by IV Corps. | GOLDENVILLE after 6:00 AM 21 Aug 21. | |
| 4th Div | FAIRVIEW SCHOOL. | No change. | To position for attack. | Prescribed by II Corps. | GETTYSBURG after 6:00 AM 21 Aug 21. | |
| 2d Div | HERRS RIDGE. | No change. | To position for attack. | Prescribed by II Corps. | | Arrangements made with III Corps. |
| 23d Div | YORK SPRINGS. | Area between NEWCHESTER and GULDENS. | To position for attack. | Prescribed by II Corps. | N of NEW OXFORD after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | |
| 1st Div | DAVIDSBURG. | Area between WALDHEIM and NEW OXFORD. | To position for attack. | Roads north of DAVIDSBURG—EAST BERLIN road and MONOCACY to IV Corps area, then by corps. | | |
| 11th Div | EAST BERLIN. | No change. | FARMERS. | Prescribed by I Corps. | | |

* Railhead 3d Div changed to NEW OXFORD 6:00 AM, 20 Aug 21.

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than August 22, 1921, so as to relieve the situation on the front of the XX Corps. At the same time, the Third Army must continue to protect the separate concentrations of the Second and Fifth Armies.

15. MINIMUM RESULTS REQUIRED.—A large number of Red troops have apparently been recently withdrawn from the Fifth Red Army by the Red General Headquarters for operations on other fronts. In order that these Red troops may be recalled to the Fifth Red Army, it is necessary to convince the Red General Headquarters that there is urgent need for increasing the troops on that front. No demonstration or minor attack will cause their return. As a minimum, the attack of the Third Army should threaten to drive the Fifth Red Army from the latter's defensive zone. The more decisive the attack, the better will the Third Army accomplish its mission. It may be possible for the Third Army, on account of its present superiority in strength and on account of the very extended front now held by the Fifth Red Army, to gain a decision over the Fifth Red Army.

16. UNNECESSARY RISK AVOIDED.—While making the attack as decisive as possible, the Third Army should not, at the present time, unnecessarily subject itself to decisive defeat. Of two or more plans which offer equal results, that plan which involves the least risk should be employed.

17. CHARACTER OF ATTACK AND RESULTS REQUIRED FOR A DECISION.—*a.* To obtain a decision over the Fifth Red Army the attack should be launched as a surprise blow, which by reason of its location, direction, objective, intensity, and rapidity of attack, will overrun a part at least of the hostile front and place the attacking troops in force, in such a position that they may break down the hostile control, fire power, discipline, and morale, and render the enemy incapable of offering further resistance as an organized team. Furthermore, the attack should be so planned and executed that the enemy may be destroyed by pursuit before he has time to withdraw and reorganize for further effective or organized resistance.

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*b.* To obtain the necessary density to overrun the hostile front and continue the pressure until the decisive objective is reached, the main effort should be made against only a part of the front. On the remainder of the front the enemy is held in place by holding attacks to prevent him from withdrawing unmolested, sending reinforcements, or employing fire power to assist in checking or repulsing the main attacks. The extensive front at present held by the Reds make it possible to effect an overpowering concentration against any part of the front, provided the terrain and other factors are favorable thereto.

18. PLANS OF ATTACK.—*a.* With the mission of the Third Blue Army and with the object to be accomplished by the attack in mind, various plans of maneuver for the attack will be analyzed.

*b.* An envelopment of the Red right, or an attack against the Red right, or a combination of the two, should plan to seize the general area Dug Hill Ridge—Cherrytown. No envelopment of the Red right, or attack against the Red right, which does not seize this general area will drive the enemy out of the defensive zone.* If this is accomplished, the Red defensive zone to the west becomes untenable, and our troops will be in a position to break down the hostile control, development of fire, discipline, and morale. As a counter measure to an envelopment or attack against the Red right, the Reds may refuse their right flank and hold one of the natural defensive lines facing northeast, together with the remainder of their defensive zone, and thus expose the Third Army to defeat by an attack in flank and rear. This danger is removed if the above objective is promptly seized.

(1) There are no intermediate objectives which, if seized, render a large part of the hostile zone untenable and thereby assist in reaching the final decisive objective. The drive must go all the way before important results can be obtained.

(2) A complete envelopment of the Red right would encounter very difficult terrain which would make the pro-

*Reference, Culp's Hill, battle of Gettysburg.

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gress of the main effort slow. This, together with the distance involved, and the favorable location of two of the Red reserve divisions, makes it doubtful whether the decisive objective, Dug Hill Ridge—Cherrytown, can be reached befort the Reds could prepare to meet and repulse the main effort of the attack.

(3) An envelopment of the Red right, combined with an attack against the Red right, would also encounter difficult terrain but not so difficult as that encountered by a complete envelopment while the distance to the decisive objective would be less. An attack against the Red right with a slight envelopment still passes over difficult terrain, while in the Red right center it has terrain more or less favorable to a deep and rapid advance and the distance to the decisive objective is less.

(4) Consequently, an envelopment of the Red right, or an attack against the Red right, or a combination of the two, depending upon the form of maneuver employed, have the following disadvantages:

(a) They are handicapped as to rapidity of execution, and promptness with which the decisive objectives may be reached,—both important factors in a surprise blow.

(b) They have no decisive intermediate objective which, when seized, will assist the attainment of the final objective.

(c) The hostile reserves are favorably located for meeting, checking, or repulsing such an attack.

(d) If the attack is slow in reaching the decisive objective, and especially should it fail to reach the decisive objective, the Blue army is exposed to attack in flank and rear.

*c.* An envelopment of the Red left, or an attack against the Red left, or a combination of the two, would have to continue on and seize a foothold on Parrs Ridge about Westminster, before decisive results are assured. On account of the distance and terrain involved, this operation would have little chance of success. A rapid envelopment of the Red left is impracticable on account of the mountains and the Monocacy.

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(1) An attack against the Red left passes over terrain, favorable for a deep and rapid advance. Local successes could be obtained. Such an attack would, however, be separated or interfered with by the Monocacy, and would be subjected to a cross fire controlled by observation from the foot hills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Silver Run (village) and from the mountains and its foot hills.

(2) Consequently, an envelopment of the Red left, or an attack against the Red left, or a combination of the two, lacks an accessible decisive objective which can be seized promptly. This is vital to the success of a surprise blow. The mountains and the Monocacy tend to reduce the rapidity of the blow and to interfere with the ability to maneuver. An attack against the Red left is also subject to severe cross fire.

*d.* A penetration of the Red center, to seize the foot hills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Silver Run (village), will render the Red defensive zone to the west thereof untenable as the attack progresses. This advance will assist in the reduction of a great part of the Red front and will insure the successful progress of the main effort itself.

(1) If the advance reaches a position south of Arters Mill, it places our troops in position to break down the control, fire power, discipline, and morale of the left wing of the Red army. If advantage is taken of this partial success to continue on promptly and seize a foothold on Parrs Ridge, from Westminster to Mexico, the attack will separate the Red right and left, break down the control and teamplay of the Red army as a whole, leave no strong defensive positions for Reds between Parrs Ridge and Gunpowder Falls, and thus open the way for a pursuit seeking to destroy the two wings of the Fifth Red Army.

(2) If the maneuver is well planned, an attack against the Red center does not expose the Blue army to attack in flank and rear. The terrain in the Red center, especially that in the Red right center, is favorable for a deep and rapid advance. This, together with the extensive fronts held by Red divisions in the center, makes it possible for a powerful surprise attack to penetrate the Red defensive

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zone, and reach a position about Mayberry—Deep Run;* thence to continue and seize a foothold on Parrs Ridge.

(3) The general plan of maneuver to penetrate the Red zone should provide for seizing promptly the foot hills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Silver Run (village). On account of the hostile organized areas about Littlestown and Silver Run and the character of the terrain between those two towns, these objectives may be secured best by a strong blow in the direction Germantown—Arters Mill which envelops the intrenched areas and foot hills from the west, combined with another strong blow in the direction Brushtown—Deep Run which passes over terrain favorable for a deep and rapid advance and permits the envelopment of those areas and foot hills from the east.

(4) The details of the maneuver, for the advance from the Line Arters Mill—Deep Run to the crest of Parrs Ridge, and for the destruction of the Red east and west wings depend upon the situation after the defensive zone is broken through. The advance after the hostile zone is broken through, therefore, will be an attack of opportunity; while from the army viewpoint, that employed for breaking through the hostile zone may be considered as a systematic attack. However, it can be foreseen that a foothold on Parrs Ridge, somewhere between Westminster and Dug Hill Ridge, should be seized promptly; hence, in the initial order for the attack, troops making the main effort should be directed upon it, so as to insure continuity in the advance. It also can be foreseen that the Red west wing should be enveloped from the east while an envelopment of the Red east wing from the west, combined with an envelopment of same from the east, may be desirable.

19. MISSIONS ASSIGNED EACH UNIT.—The missions assigned each arm and unit and the manner in which the cooperation, teamplay, and fire power of all elements are developed to execute the plan of maneuver of the army as a whole are explained in detail in the field orders and in the general plans for the attack and concentration.

*Reference: St. Mihiel, September 12; Meuse-Argonne, September 26, and November 1.

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## SECTION VI

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 20

20. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation, including:

(1) The Red defensive zone; the several defensive positions and intrenched areas, the distance between positions.

(2) The state of organization of the zone and the protection of its flanks.

(3) The probable tactical function of the positions and areas, the distribution of troops, the extent of front held, and the probable hostile strength occupying each position.

(4) If the Reds obtain timely warning of the time and location of the Blue attack, what changes in their dispositions may they make to meet the attack?

*b.* The mission of the Third Blue Army and general character of attack required to accomplish same.

(1) The specific mission and the general missions under which the army is operating.

(2) The minimum results which should be obtained by the attack to accomplish the mission, together with the maximum results desired. Precautions which should be taken to be able to still carry out the general missions under which the army is operating should the attack fail.

(3) To obtain a decision over the Fifth Red Army, what should be the character of the attack employed; what, in general terms, should it seek to accomplish; and how, in general terms, should it be executed?

*c.* In an envelopment of the Red right, an attack against the Red right, or a combination of the two, discuss for each plan the following:

(1) Location.
(2) Direction.
(3) Decisive objectives.

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(4) Rapidity of execution and promptness with which the decisive objective may be reached in force.

(5) Chances of securing decisive objectives before Reds make dispositions to meet it.

(6) Results which may be obtained after the decisive objectives are reached.

*d.* In an envelopment of the Red left, an attack against the Red left, or a combination of the two, discuss for each plan the following:

Same as *c* (1) to (6), above.

*e.* An attack against the Red center. Discuss the following.

Same as *c* (1) to (6), above.

*f.* The mission of each arm and unit, and the manner in which the cooperation, teamplay, and fire power of all are developed in the execution of an attack against the Red center.

(1) For the main effort:

(a) II Corps.

(b) IV Corps.

(2) For the holding attacks:

(a) III Corps.

(b) I Corps.

(c) Cavalry.

(3) Supporting units:

(a) Army Artillery—Groupments A and B, the 75-mm. portee artillery, the barrage, gas, smoke.

(b) Army Tanks.

(c) Army Air Service.

(d) With respect to their intensity, compare the supporting fires and concentrations in the main effort, with the means, namely, machine guns, artillery, and tanks, that are probably immediately available to the enemy to meet such fire and concentrations.

*g.* Concentrations for the attack:

(1) The importance of concealing from the enemy the movements and preparations for the attack, the time of

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attack, the location of the main effort, together with the general and special measures which are employed to accomplish the same.

(2) Details of the movements. Present location and location desired for all units, the application of the measures mentioned under *a* (1), above, to the movements, zones, and routes employed,—time of movements, and screening of developments for attack.

*h.* Field orders for the attack. Time of issue, form, brevity, clearness, and completeness.

## *Maps*

| | |
|---|---|
| Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany F.O. No. 27. | following this page. |
| Situation Map, Third Army, afternoon of August 19. | |

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Part B

# ARMY ARTILLERY PLANS FOR THE ATTACK


| | Paragraphs |
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Maps following page 408.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
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| Situation Continued to 3:30 PM | 21 |
| Requirement | 22 |


21. THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO 3:30 PM.—At 3:30 PM, 19 August 21, General E, Chief of Artillery, Third Army, was called to a conference of the army staff. The attack planned for August 22, was discussed and the decisions of the army commander upon which Field Order No. 27 is based, were announced. At the conclusion of the conference, the chief of staff stated that the army field order would be issued before midnight and directed that the annexes therefor be prepared at once.

22. REQUIREMENT.—The artillery annex to Field Order No. 27, Third Army.

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*


| | Paragraph |
|---|---|
| The Artillery Annex | 23 |


23. THE ARTILLERY ANNEX.—The Chief of Artillery caused the following artillery annex to be prepared for approval:



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## ANNEX No 1 to FIELD ORDER No 27, THIRD ARMY

## ARTILLERY

Third Army,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.,
19 Aug 21, 10:00 PM.

**Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500.**

1. (a) Enemy situation as in situation map, current G2 Reports, and artillery information service bulletin (all omitted).
   (b) Our army attacks at 5:00 AM, 22 Aug 21. For army objectives and zones of action, see FO No 27 and Operation Map, attached.
2. All artillery with the army will support the attack.
3. (a) Division Artillery:
      (1) Division artillery of II and IV Corps will support the attacks of their respective corps by rolling barrages and progressive concentrations over such portions of their fronts as decided upon by the corps commanders concerned. Rate of advance of these fires along boundary between these two corps will be as agreed upon by corps commanders.
      (2) Division artillery of III and I Corps will support attacks of their respective corps by progressive concentrations. Rate of advance of these fires within 500 yards of interior corps boundaries will be same as rate of advance of accompanying fires of adjacent corps along those boundaries.
   (b) Corps Artillery:
      (1) For corps artillery normal and contingent zones for counter battery and fires on targets of opportunity only, see Map No 1, Appendix 1.
      (2) Special objectives for neutralization:
         I Corps:—Organized area south of HANOVER, assisting IV Corps.
         —Organized area near BANDANNA, assisting IV Corps.
         —Important areas east of line PENN GROVE—MARBURG with persistent gas.
         II Corps:—Organized areas near LITTLESTOWN and SILVER RUN, assisted by Groupment A, Army Artillery.

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III Corps:—EAGLE MOUNTAIN and CARRICK KNOB with smoke and persistent gas.
—Hostile defenses west of MONOCACY RIVER with persistent gas.
—Crossings of MONOCACY RIVER between BRIDGEPORT and mouth of DOUBLE PIPE CREEK with persistent gas.
—Organized area near LONGVILLE.
—Organized area near TANEYTOWN (assisted by Groupment A, Army Artillery).

IV Corps:—Strongly organized areas south of HANOVER and near BANDANNA (assisted by I Corps and Groupment B, Army Artillery).
—Organized area near RAUBENSTINE (assisted by Groupment A, Army Artillery).

(3) Corps Chiefs of Artillery will submit schedules or maps, showing all prearranged fires, to these headquarters by 10:00 AM, 21 Aug 21.

(c) Army Artillery:

(1) Groupment A, from positions southeast of BARLOW, will support the attack of II Corps and that part of the attack of III Corps east of the MONOCACY RIVER. Groupment B, from positions south of MT ROCK SCHOOL, will support the attack of IV Corps and assist the attack of I Corps west of the line PENN GROVE —MARBURG.

The 810th, 811th, and 812th FA are attached to the II Corps, effective 12:00 noon, 20 Aug 21.

(2) The army artillery will undertake counter battery missions beyond the limits of the corps normal zones (see Appendix 1).

(3) Special objectives for neutralization:

Groupment A; centers of resistance near LITTLESTOWN, MT PLEASANT SCHOOL, ridge ½ mile south of MT PLEASANT SCHOOL, SILVER RUN (village), TANEYTOWN, and the hostile third position north of SILVER RUN (village).

Groupment B; centers of resistance near RJ 767, RJ 790, PINEGROVE SCHOOL, RAUBENSTINE, RJ 776, RJ 816.

(4) Between H hour and hour scheduled for arrival of infantry on line TANEYTOWN—SILVER —RUN—BANDANNA, important roads leading

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to the Red third position, along line DOUBLE PIPE CREEK—BIG PIPE CREEK—UNION MILLS —DEEP RUN—WENTZ—BLACKROCK, will be interdicted.

(5) Army artillery will assist the corps artillery in blinding important observation posts on the foot hills of PARRS RIDGE from LITTLESTOWN to SILVER RUN.

(6) Detailed schedules of fire will be issued later.

(x) (1) There will be no artillery preparation. All fires prior to H hour will be limited to those authorized by these headquarters in the daily schedules of fire, and from present battery positions.

(2) Movement into position for attack will be concealed from hostile observation.

(3) Rate of fire:—Maximum hourly rate for all guns.

(4) Smoke will be used freely in accompanying fires.

(5) Non-persistent gas may be used on orders of corps commanders. The use of this gas near corps boundaries will be coordinated by the corps commanders concerned.

(6) All corps and army artillery not employed on other missions, will be used to thicken and extend, by means of concentrations, the accompanying fires of II and IV Corps.

(7) Division and corps artillery will be advanced promptly in support of the attack.

4. (a) Axes of Signal Communication:
Groupment A: Same as II Corps.
Groupment B: BONNEAUVILLE—SQUARE CORNER—McSHERRYTOWN—MT PLEASANT.

(b) Command Posts:
Army Artillery: No change.
Groupment A: TWO TAVERNS.
Groupment B: MT ROCK SCHOOL.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
E,
Major General,
Chief of Artillery.
Appendices: No 1—Corps and army artillery zones.
Distribution: Same as FO No 27.

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## SECTION III

# *Discussion of the Employment of Army Artillery*

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| Concentration of Effort | 26 |
| Division Artillery Missions | 27 |
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| Army Artillery Missions | 29 |
| Barrage Support | 30 |

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24. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—*a.* The army attack in this situation is a more deliberate attack and is directed against a more highly organized defensive system than the attack presented in Chapter VIII. For this reason the artillery plans are given in more detail and in an artillery annex. In order that all of the artillery of the Third Army may be used to the greatest advantage in supporting the attack, it is not only necessary that its employment be carefully considered and fitted into the army plan for the attack, as given in the army field order, but the division of work between the division, corps, and army artillery must be carefully coordinated in order that there shall be no overlapping on some portions of the front and neglect on other portions.

*b.* In this situation, if the front and depth of the attack are considered alone, the amount of artillery available would appear inadequate. The same thing is true, however, of the infantry and all the other branches at the disposal of the army commander. But it must also be borne in mind that the Reds have greatly weakened their force in front of the Third Army. Therefore, the army commander, by concentrating his efforts against the center, expects to break through this thinly held defensive zone. The tasks assigned the artillery are extensive and difficult. For this reason it is essential that special care be exercised to

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coordinate and to secure the best possible use of the available artillery.

25. METHODS OF SUPPORTING THE ATTACK.—*a.* Artillery plans may be prepared in one of two general ways.

(1) When time is available for detailed consideration of projected operations, the lower units may be required to forward their plans to the higher units for approval and coordination before issuing the field orders for the operation.

(2) When the situation is such that the foregoing method is not practicable or desirable, higher commanders issue field orders defining the missions of lower units, which contain the basis for the plans for the employment of the artillery of such subordinate units. Field orders defining such missions usually contain specific directions to insure coordination between commands and to carry out special tasks.

*b.* The method followed in this solution is, in general, the second method given above, but with some modifications. The missions assigned the army artillery are given in sufficient detail to permit those units to select and occupy positions and to assign sectors or areas of fire to lower units. In the case of the neutralizing concentrations, by means of which the corps and army artillery deepen and thicken the accompanying fire of the II and IV Corps, definite targets or times cannot well be given until the schedules of the fires of division and corps artillery are received, since these fires of the army artillery must be fitted to or superimposed over those of the corps and divisions. For this purpose, the corps are directed to submit schedules of prearranged fires within thirty-six hours. This also enables the army chief of artillery to coordinate the fires along the corps boundaries.

*c.* The division of duties between the corps and army artillery may be based strictly on missions by assigning units of General Headquarters Reserve artillery to the corps and divisions to carry out those missions throughout the depth of the attack, or the division may be based on the assignment of zones of responsibility such as corps and

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army artillery normal and contingent zones, as has been done in this solution. The former method is the one most frequently used. In this situation, however, although units of the heavy artillery are assigned missions requiring the greater part of their efforts in support of the two interior corps, they must also assist the two corps on the flank of the attack. In the absence of any heavier and longer range guns, it seems best to continue to employ these units as army artillery.

26. CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT.—The primary principles governing the employment of the artillery are, first, agreement with the plan of maneuver of the attacking infantry and, second, concentration of effort. The plan of maneuver for the army is given in Field Order No. 27, in this chapter, and for the II Corps, in detail, in Chapter XXIII. By concentration of effort is meant the concentration of the power of the artillery fire on the most important parts of the front, and on the most important objectives within those parts, resisting at the same time the tendency to attempt the impossible by endeavoring to cover all parts equally. There are, however, a number of things which the artillery must do, and, considering the extended front, some dispersion seems unavoidable.

27. DIVISION ARTILLERY MISSIONS.—The missions of the division artillery are normal. The army commander has ordered that the principal thrusts, those of the II and IV Corps, be preceded by rolling barrages or progressive concentrations, and that all corps and army artillery not otherwise employed be used to thicken the accompanying fires, and carry them to the limit of their range. The army chief of artillery is interested in the division artillery to the extent of coordinating the fires along the corps boundaries and in ordering the army artillery to undertake the necessary measures to assist and extend those fires.

28. CORPS ARTILLERY MISSIONS—COUNTER BATTERY.—*a.* To fix responsibility for counter battery and for fires on such targets of opportunity as may appear, corps normal and contingent zones are prescribed in the artillery annex. Other fires in conformity with the general missions as-

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signed, are covered by the prearranged schedules of division, corps, and army artillery.

*b.* In fixing the boundaries of the corps artillery zones, the number and location of the hostile batteries, as well as the missions to be performed by the corps artillery must be considered.

(1) The Third Army is opposed by a Red force of three corps of two divisions each. It may be assumed that the normal division and corps artillery is present with these units. In addition, all or a part of the artillery of the reserve divisions near Libertytown, Hampstead, and New Freedom, may now be emplaced to assist in the defense. However, considering the missions of these reserve divisions, it is more probable that their artillery is with them and will not become active until the reserve divisions themselves are thrown into action. There may also be some army artillery in position. The need for such artillery in the attack against the XX Blue Corps, east of the Susquehanna River, would tend to decrease the amount employed against the Third Army. On the other hand, the weakened strength of the Reds and their extended front increases the need for army artillery in the defensive zone.

(2) The number of hostile batteries and their locations would have been determined, so far as possible, by the army intelligence service and the artillery information service. On the basis of the preceding discussion and of the Red order of battle, the following tabulation of hostile batteries is assumed:

| Opposite the front of the III Corps | | | II Corps | | IV Corps | | I Corps | | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Caliber | Located | Suspected | Located | Suspected | Located | Suspected | Located | Suspected | |
| 75 mm gun | 18 | 6 | 14 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 13 | 5 | 72 |
| 155 mm how | 12 | 6 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 54 |
| 155 mm gun | 6 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 30 |
| Heavy How | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| Totals | 38 | 17 | 29 | 12 | 20 | 11 | 29 | 12 | 168 |
| Aggregate | | 55 | | 41 | | 31 | | 41 | |

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(3) It is not probable that many of these batteries would be found in advance of the hostile second position. For the purpose of this discussion it has been further assumed that the information obtained indicates that the hostile batteries are located approximately as follows:

(a) In front of the second position—5%.

(b) Between the second and third position—70%.

(c) Between the third position and the line Catoctin —Detour—Uniontown—Manchester—25%.

*c.* In order that the II and IV Corps may have as much artillery as is possible for use in accompanying the attack, the exterior limit of the corps normal zone has been placed to include approximately 30% of the hostile artillery opposite the front of those two corps. Opposite the III and I Corps the limit of the normal zone has been extended to include between 50% and 60% of the hostile artillery. For the purpose of easy identification by aerial observers this exterior limit is made to follow well marked topographical features, such as roads and streams. The limit of the corps contingent zone is placed at the approximate extreme range of all guns and serves as a guide in locating the positions for corps and army artillery units. The corps artillery normal zones are given lateral boundaries following terrain features which nearly coincide with the corps zones of action for the purpose of tactical control. The contingent zone lateral boundaries are so fixed as to secure mutual assistance over the entire front and flanks of the penetration.

*d.* Considering the II and IV Corps, it appears that on a basis of two guns to neutralize one hostile battery, the II Corps will require about six batteries for counter battery work and the IV Corps, five batteries. Therefore, each is able to assign one regiment of 155-mm. howitzers to counter battery missions and still have two regiments of howitzers and one regiment of 155-mm. guns to thicken and deepen the accompanying fire, for neutralization, and to fire on targets of opportunity. If the enemy's artillery reaction is less than expected, additional howitzers will be available for missions other than counter battery. On the other

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hand, it may be found necessary to divert the additional howitzers and guns to counter battery missions or to call on the army heavy howitzers for assistance.

*e.* The III and I Corps having a much smaller advance to make, their artillery is given less assistance by the army artillery in neutralizing organized areas and in counter battery missions than are the other two corps.

29. ARMY ARTILLERY MISSIONS.—*a.* The army artillery has the missions of:

(1) Counter battery fire beyond the exterior limit of corps normal zones.

(2) Blinding hostile observation. It is assisted in this mission by the division and corps artillery by mixing smoke shell with the high explosive shell used in accompanying fires and neutralization.

(3) Assisting in the neutralization of strongly organized localities.

(4) Thickening and extending the accompanying fires.

(5) Distant interdiction.

*b.* It appears probable that Groupment A, Army Artillery, will be required to assign the 8″ howitzer regiment and two or three batteries of 155-mm. guns to counter battery missions. Groupment B will probably have to assign one 8″ howitzer regiment to this duty.

30. BARRAGE SUPPORT.—*a.* The barrage support is based on the plan of attack of the infantry. Rolling barrages are here prescribed to illustrate a possible case for such an employment of the division artillery. However, progressive concentrations in varying densities might well be used over the entire front of the army.

*b.* The number of 75-mm. guns available is not sufficient to fire a rolling barrage of effective density over the entire front of the II Corps. Therefore, only barrages to cover the main efforts are directed. When the infantry has advanced about 3500 yards, or at H plus 1 hour and 15 minutes, it will be necessary to begin the forward displacement of the division artillery. This will reduce the density of the barrage. It is desirable that by this time some of

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the guns and howitzers engaged in counter battery and on other missions be available to assist the barrage fires. The units which move forward first cannot be expected to again take up the rolling barrage, but they will be able to support the advance by concentrations.

*c.* When the infantry has advanced about 6500 yards it will have reached the limit of the 75-mm. gun barrage and the barrage can only be extended by longer range guns. This is best done by placing the accompanying fires of the long range guns in concentrations on vital points, rather than to attempt to cover the front with a real rolling barrage.

*d.* Those portions of the front not covered by barrages are covered by progressive concentrations. Smoke to blind hostile observation is ordered to be used in the barrage, and in the concentrations of the 75-mm. guns, 155-mm. howitzers, and 155-mm. guns. The important observation posts on the foothills of Parrs Ridge, between Littlestown and Silver Run, are generally well covered by the concentrations of the corps and army 155-mm. guns. If other posts are known, special smoke concentrations can be provided.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 31

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31. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The general missions assigned to the corps and army artillery. Suggest other allotments of missions.

*b.* The positions assigned the army artillery. Suggest other positions and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each.

*c.* Criticize the schedule of fires of the corps and army artillery in support of the attack of the II Corps, as shown

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in Maps No. 3 and 4. Suggest changes which will improve the support given to the attack.

*d.* Does the artillery annex carry out the provisions of Field Order No. 27?

*e.* Criticize the form and completeness of the artillery annex.

*f.* Under the missions for the division artillery of the III Corps, assume a plan of attack for this corps, based on Field Order No. 27, and discuss the employment of the division artillery in the plan assumed.

*g.* Under the missions assigned the corps artillery of the III Corps, discuss the division of these missions among the regiments of the corps artillery and the adequacy of the available artillery for the missions.

*h.* Same as *f* for IV Corps.

*i.* Same as *g* for IV Corps.

*j.* Same as *f* for I Corps.

*k.* Same as *g* for I Corps.

*l.* Criticize the schedule of fires for the army artillery in the zone of the III Corps, as shown on Map No. 4.

*m.* Discuss the ammunition requirements and the supply thereof.

## *Maps**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Map No. 1. | Corps artillery zones | following page. |
| Map No. 2. | II Corps rolling barrage | |
| Map No. 3. | II Corps neutralizing fires | |
| Map No. 4. | Groupment A neutralizing fires | |
| Map No. 5. | Consolidation of Maps Nos. 2, 3 and 4 | |

*These maps do not form a part of the Artillery Annex, but are inserted to show the possibilities of the artillery fires and the need for coordination thereof.

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# CHAPTER XXIII

# *The II Corps in the Penetration*


| | | Paragraphs |
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| SECTION II. | —A Solution | 3- 4 |
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Maps following page 421.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twenty-fourth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. TWENTY-FOURTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a. Maps.*—Geological Survey, 1:62500. Situation Map, II Corps, afternoon 19 August, 1921.

*b.* The situation given in the Twenty-third Special Situation, Chapter XXII, is continued.

*c.* On the afternoon of 19 August 21, the units of the II Corps are as shown on the Situation Map, II Corps, attached. See also Chapter XXII. One regiment of howitzers and one battalion chemical ammunition train are attached to each of the 3d and 25th Divisions.

*d.* The hostile situation on the Third Army front is explained in Chapter XXII. Detailed information of the enemy on the front of the II Corps as compiled by the intelligence section of corps headquarters indicates the following (see Situation Map, II Corps, afternoon 19 August, 1921):

(1) The 20th Red Division holds the front from Longville (excl) to Littlestown (incl), with apparently four



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regiments in line, each with one battalion occupying the outpost position, one battalion the second position, and one battalion the third position.

(2) The 16th Red Division holds the front from Littlestown (excl) to Mt. Pleasant (incl), with apparently three regiments in line. The left regiment has one battalion occupying the first position (outpost), one battalion the second position, and one battalion the third position. The center and right regiments each have two battalions occupying the second position and one battalion the third position, while the outpost in front of these two regiments consists of companies sent forward from front line battalions. The fourth regiment is in reserve near Deep Run.

(3) The bulk of the hostile artillery seems to be located along the line Piney Creek—Barts Church and especially in rear of the Littlestown area. Other artillery is located farther to the rear along Silver Run and in rear of the third position.

(4) G2 studies indicate, that against a surprise attack the enemy will attempt to hold the second position, temporarily at least, and that the Longville and Littlestown areas and the area south of Hanover will be held at all cost as pivots of maneuver for counter attack to expel penetrations.

*e.* At 10:00 PM., 19 August 1921, in conference at Army headquarters, see Chapter XXII, Field Orders No. 27, Third Army, was delivered and explained to the various corps commanders. Earlier in the evening warning messages had been sent to the several corps commanders informing them that a general attack would be launched at daylight, 22 August, 1921, and explaining to them the general manner in which the attack would be executed.

2. REQUIREMENT.—The field order as issued by the commander, II Corps to carry out Field Orders No. 27, Third Army.

NOTE.—Weather—fair. Slight breeze blowing from the west. Forecast for next three days—no change.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Field Order | 3 |
| March Table | 4 |

---

3. FIELD ORDER.—The Commander, II Corps issued the following field order:

II Corps,
HUNTERSTOWN, PA.
20 Aug 21, 12:30 AM.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 35.

**Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500, and Operation Map, II Corps, attached.**

1. (a) Reports indicate that an extensive Red movement is taking place from the front of the Third Army toward the northeast. A Red attack against our XX Corps is imminent. The Fifth Red Army is at present holding its defensive zone with six divisions in line and apparently three in reserve. The latter are located one each at LIBERTYTOWN, HAMPSTEAD and NEW FREEDOM. For Red dispositions on II Corps Front, see G2 Reports and Situation Maps (omitted).

(b) (1) The Third Army attacks at 5:00 AM, 22 Aug 21, to penetrate the center of the Red defensive zone by a surprise blow. It will continue its attack to seize a foothold on the crest of PARRS RIDGE and then pursue to destroy the Red army.

(2) The III Corps attacks on the right of the II Corps, making its main effort with its left. The IV Corps attacks on the left of the II Corps from the present front of the 3d Div, making its main effort along the line BRUSHTOWN—DEEP RUN, thereby assisting the II Corps in the reduction of the LITTLESTOWN and SILVER RUN (village) areas and in seizing the foot hills of PARRS RIDGE along the general line of those two towns.

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(3) Gp A, AA, from positions southeast of BARLOW, and Gp B, AA, from positions south of MT ROCK SCHOOL, support the attack. Their main effort will be in support of the II and IV Corps.

(4) The Bomb Gp, AAS, bombs hostile artillery and prevents Red army reserves from reinforcing the front. The Attack Gp assists in counter battery tasks and in attacking Red reserves. From 6:15 to 6:30 PM it attacks the hostile ground troops in the second position in front of the main efforts of the II and IV Corps. Later, operating in advance of the artillery accompanying fires, it attacks the third position. Attack airplanes on signal from the infantry, will assist in overcoming hostile strong points.

2. (a) The II Corps, reinforced by three regiments 75 mm portee artillery and three Army Tk Bns, will make its main effort in the direction GERMANTOWN —ARTERS MILLS, penetrate the Red defensive zone, and seize the high ground from LITTLESTOWN to SILVER RUN. It will then seize a foothold on the crest of PARRS RIDGE and take up the pursuit.

(b) Line of departure: present front line trenches from RJ 598 (SW of GERMANTOWN) to FELTY SCHOOL.

(c) First objective: TYRONE—MT PLEASANT (E of TYRONE). Second objective: WARFIELDSBURG— —MEXICO.

(d) Zones of Action, effective 6:00 PM, 20 Aug 21.

II Corps: *Right boundary*: GOLDENVILLE—BARLOW KNOLL—ROCK CREEK to hill 523 (all excl) — GALT — MAYBERRY— TYRONE— JASONTOWN—WARFIELDSBURG (all incl).

*Left boundary*: WOODSIDE SCHOOL—GULDENS —SQUARE CORNER—FELTY SCHOOL—LEFEVRE—CHESTNUT HILL SCHOOL—CHERRYTOWN—BM 545—BIXLER—MEXICO (all incl).

2d Div: *Right boundary*: Same as right boundary II Corps.

*Left boundary*: ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL— GERMANTOWN (both incl)—BM 559 (W of KINGSDALE)—ARTERS MILL—FOUNTAIN VALLEY—SPRING MILLS (all excl).

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25th Div: *Right boundary*: Same as left boundary 2d Div.

*Left boundary*: GRANITE HILL—BONNEAUVILLE—LITTLESTOWN (all excl)—SILVER RUN (village)—MT. PLEASANT—CRANBERRY STA (all excl).

4th Div: *Right boundary*: Same as left boundary 25th Div.

*Left boundary*: Same as left boundary II Corps. Rear boundary of divisions: WOLF HILL—CEDAR RIDGE.

3. (a) The 2d Div, reinforced by 1st Bn 201st FA, 903d FA (75 mm portee), 1st L Tk Bn and 3d Bn 902d Cml Am Tn, will make its main effort with its left in cooperation with the 25th Div, and seize the high ground south of ARTERS MILLS. It will then be prepared to continue towards PARRS RIDGE and take up the pursuit.

(b) The 25th Div, reinforced by the 202d FA, 902d FA (75 mm portee), 2d L Tk Bn, 1 Hv Tk Co and 2d Bn, 902d Cml Am Tn, will make its main effort with its right in cooperation with the 2d Div, and seize the high ground southeast of ARTERS MILL. In cooperation with the 4th Div, it will envelop the LITTLESTOWN and the SILVER RUN areas from the west and seize the high ground at PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL and south of SILVER RUN. It will then be prepared to continue to PARRS RIDGE and take up the pursuit. It will screen the front of the II Corps, except on the front of the 20th Div, until the attack is launched.

(c) The 4th Div, reinforced by 201st FA (less 1 bn) 901st FA (75 mm portee), one Hv Tk Bn (less 1 co), and 1st Bn, 902d Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co), will make its main effort with its left in cooperation with the 25th Div and the 1st Div, envelop the LITTLESTOWN and the SILVER RUN areas from the east and seize the high ground about PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL and south of SILVER RUN. It will then be prepared to continue on toward PARRS RIDGE and take up the pursuit.

(d) (1) The 203d FA from positions near WHITEHALL and the 204th FA from positions near TWO TAVERNS, will support the attack. Their main effort will be in support of the main efforts of the corps.

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(2) There will be no artillery preparation. Artillery will open fire at 5:00 AM.

(3) The attack on the fronts of the main efforts of the corps will be supported by a rolling barrage which will be carried through the Red second position. Rate of advance on boundary between divisions, 100 yards in four minutes until hostile second position is approached, then 100 yards in six minutes to crest of ridge, and then 100 yards in four minutes. Such guns of the corps and army artillery as may not be needed for counter battery and distant interdiction fire will be used to reinforce the barrage and carry on the support to the extreme ranges.

(4) Smoke will be used in the rolling barrage and to neutralize hostile observation on the high ground from LITTLESTOWN to south of ARTERS MILL. Non-persistent gas will be used to neutralize the LITTLESTOWN area, the high ground about PLEASANT GROVE SCHOOL, and the SILVER RUN area until two hours before the infantry is scheduled to arrive at those points. Divisions may make such additional use of non-persistent gas and smoke as desired. For gas employed within 2000 yards of their eastern boundary, arrangements will be made with the division on their left.

(5) For details, see Annex No 1, Artillery (omitted).

(e) (1) The Corps AS will cover the zone to WESTMINSTER and will especially observe for movements of hostile division, corps, and army reserves.

(2) For details, see Annex No 2, Air Service (omitted), and paragraph 1 (b), (4) above.

(f) For anti-aircraft, see Annex No 3, Anti-Aircraft Defense (omitted).

(g) Corps reserves: The 902d Cav, at HUNTERSTOWN, will be in readiness to move after 5:00 AM, 22 Aug 21.

(x) (1) The concentration for the attack will be made in accordance with the march table attached.

(2) Preparations for the attack will be kept concealed from the enemy. The normal traffic of the front must not be changed. All movements for the concentration and in prepara-

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tion for the attack must be made at night. Troops and equipment must be kept concealed by day. No lights will be allowed at night and no fires which will cause smoke by day. Elements of units now on line will screen the deployment of units entering the line until the attack is launched. After 6:00 PM, 20 Aug 21, our Battle Position must be held.

(3) The attack will be pushed with the greatest determination. All elements will be prepared to carry out a vigorous pursuit should the enemy attempt to withdraw.

4. See Adm O No 32 (omitted).

5. (a) Ax Sig Com:

II Corps: HUNTERSTOWN—BONNEAUVILLE—LITTLESTOWN—UNION MILLS.

2d Div: TWO TAVERNS—GERMANTOWN—PINEY CREEK (village)—MARKERS MILL—TYRONE.

25th Div: BONNEAUVILLE—OAK GROVE SCHOOL—ARTERS MILL—PLEASANT VALLEY.

4th Div: SQUARE CORNER—CHESTNUT HILL SCHOOL—CHERRYTOWN—MT PLEASANT.

(b) CPs:

IV Corps: NEWCHESTER after 9:00 PM 20 Aug 21.

II Corps: No change.

2d Div: TWO TAVERNS after 9:00 PM, 21 Aug 21.

25th Div: BONNEAUVILLE after 9:00 PM, 21 Aug 21.

4th Div: SQUARE CORNER after 9:00 PM, 21 Aug 21.

By command of General A,
X
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A.

4. MARCH TABLE.—The following march table accompanied the field order:

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## MARCH TABLE

(To accompany FO No 35, II Corps)

| 1<br>*Unit* | 2<br>*Present Location* | 3<br>*Night of August 20–21* | 4<br>*Night of August 21–22* | 5<br>*Routes* | 6<br>*Railhead* | 7<br>*Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2d Div | HERRS RIDGE. | No change. | To position for attack. | Via GETTYSBURG and via PITZER SCHOOL—POWERS HILL to zone. | GETTYSBURG, after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21 | Arrange with 20th and 25th Divs for screening front. |
| 25th Div | Holding front GERMANTOWN—FELTY SCHOOL. | No change. | To position for attack. | Arrange with 2d and 4th Divs for relief of units on their fronts. | GETTYSBURG. | Screen present front until attack is launched. |
| 4th Div | FAIRVIEW SCHOOL. | No change. | To position for attack. | Any north of GETTYSBURG—MT. VERNON SCHOOL to zone. | GETTYSBURG after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | Arrange with 25th Div to screen front until attack is launched. |
| 901st FA (75 mm portee) | GETTYSBURG. | To position for attack ordered by 4th Div. | No change. | GETTYSBURG—SQUARE CORNER, to 4th Div zone. | GETTYSBURG. | Move at 7:30 PM. Clear SQUARE CORNER at 8:30 PM. |
| 902d FA (75 mm portee) | GETTYSBURG. | To position for attack ordered by 25th Div. | No change. | GETTYSBURG—MT. VERNON SCHOOL, to 25th Div Zone. | GETTYSBURG. | Follow 901st FA. Clear MT. VERNON SCHOOL at 8:10 PM. |
| 903d FA (75 mm portee) | GETTYSBURG. | To position for attack ordered by 2d Div. | No change. | GETTYSBURG—BENNER HILL to 2d Div Zone. | GETTYSBURG. | Follow 902d FA.—Clear BENNER HILL at 8:00 PM. |
| Hv Tk Bn | CARLISLE. | To GETTYSBURG then Bn (less 1 co) to 4th Div; and 1 co to 25th Div. | To position for attack. | GETTYSBURG by rail, then via GETTYSBURG—BONNEAUVILLE to divisions. | BIGLERVILLE after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | Follow 903d FA. Clear BONNEAUVILLE at 10:00 PM. |
| 1st L Tk Bn | CEDAR RIDGE. | To 2d Div. | To position for attack. | RJ 570—LOW DUTCH ROAD to division zone. | BIGLERVILLE, after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | Move at 8:00 PM. Clear CR 530 (near MT. VERNON SCHOOL) at 8:30 PM. |
| 2d L Tk Bn | ABBOTTSTOWN. | To 25th Div. | To position for attack. | NEW OXFORD—GULDENS—LOW DUTCH ROAD to 25th Div zone. | BIGLERVILLE, after 6:00 AM, 21 Aug 21. | Move at 8:00 PM. Clear CR 530 (near MT. VERNON SCHOOL) at 9:00 PM. |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 201st FA (how), (less 1st Bn) | With 3d Div. | To 4th Div and position for attack. | No change. | Via SQUARE CORNER to division zone. | Same as 4th Div. | Follow 203d FA. Clear SQUARE CORNER at 10:00 PM. |
| 1st Bn 201st FA (how) | With 3d Div. | To 2d Div and position for attack. | No change. | Via 593 (S of CEDAR RIDGE)—570—530 and division zone. | Same as 2d Div. | Move begins at 6:30 PM. Clear CR 530 (near MT. VERNON SCHOOL), at 10:00 PM. |
| 202d FA (how) | With 25th Div. | To position for attack. | No change. | Under 25th Div. | Same as 25th Div. | |
| 203d FA (how) | N of CENTENNIAL. | To position for attack in vicinity of WHITEHALL. | No change. | Via SQUARE CORNER. | BIGLERVILLE. | Move at 8:00 PM. Clear SQUARE CORNER at 9:30 PM. |
| 204th FA (gun) | TWO TAVERNS. | Position for attack near 204th FA. | No change. | Regulated by 2d Div. | BIGLERVILLE. | |
| 205th A-AA | Covering present II Corps front. | To new II Corps front. | No change. | By arrangement with divisions. | BIGLERVILLE. | |
| 1st Bn, 902d Cml Am Tn (less 4th Co) | With 3d Div at NEW OXFORD. | To 4th Div. | No change. | Via GULDENS. | BIGLERVILLE. | Move at 8:30 PM. Clear GULDENS at 9:10 PM. |
| 2d Bn 902d Cml Am Tn | With 25th Div. | No change. | No change. | | | |
| 3d Bn, 902d Cml Am Tn | GOODINTENT SCHOOL. | To 2d Div. | No change. | FAIRVIEW SCHOOL—ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL to 2d Div zone. | BIGLERVILLE. | Move at 10:00 PM. Clear ROCKY GROVE SCHOOL at 10:40 PM. |
| 1st Bln Co, 201st Bln Gp | With 3d Div. | To 4th Div and position for attack. | No change. | Via SQUARE CORNER. | BIGLERVILLE. | Move at 10:00 PM. Clear SQUARE CORNER at 10:30 PM. |
| 2d Bln Co, 201st Bln Gp | With 25th Div. | To position for attack. | No change. | Under 25th Div. | BIGLERVILLE. | |
| 3d Bln Co, 201st Bln Gp | TWO TAVERNS. | To 2d Div and position for attack. | No change. | Under 2d Div. | BIGLERVILLE. | |
| 4th Bln Co, 201st Bln Gp | BONNEAUVILLE. | To position for attack. | No change. | By assignments with 25th Div. | BIGLERVILLE. | |
| Other Corps Trs | In Corps Area. | No change, except as in Adm O No 37. | | | BIGLERVILLE. | |

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## SECTION IV

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Mission and Character of Action Required | 5 |
| Troops Assigned for the Attack | 6 |
| Red Positions, Dispositions, and Probable Intentions | 7 |
| The Decisive Element in the II Corps Attack | 8 |
| Plan of Maneuver | 9 |
| Missions Assigned Each Unit | 10 |

5. MISSION AND CHARACTER OF ACTION REQUIRED.—The mission of the II Corps is to take part in the main effort of the surprise blow of the army. In cooperation with the IV Corps on its left it penetrates the Red defensive zone and carries the line to Tyrone—Mt. Pleasant, and then continues on to seize the crest of Parrs Ridge from Warfieldsburg to Mexico and take up the pursuit. The attack to penetrate the Red defensive zone may be called a systematic attack. The II Corps is ordered to make its main effort in the direction Germantown—Arters Mill, and envelop and seize the foot hills of Parrs Ridge from Littlestown to Silver Run (village). In the latter operation, it will be assisted by the main effort of the IV Corps in the direction Brushtown—Deep Run (village). It will assist the advance of the III Corps on its right. The advance from the line Tyrone—Mt. Pleasant to the crest of Parrs Ridge will be an attack of opportunity, hence the exact maneuver depends upon the situation at the time the Red defensive zone is penetrated.

6. TROOPS ASSIGNED FOR THE ATTACK.—To carry out this mission, the II Corps is assigned three divisions, three regiments of 75-mm. gun portee artillery, and one heavy and two light tank battalions. Its zone of action is changed to conform to its mission.

7. RED POSITION, DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.—In the zone of action assigned the II Corps the enemy is holding an extended front with divisions each on a 9000 to 10000-yard front. The defensive zone contains

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three positions and is about 12000 yards in depth. The third position is too far in rear of the second position to furnish effective support. While the Reds are at present occupying the three positions, G2 studies indicate that, against a surprise blow, the enemy will attempt to hold temporarily at least the second position, and that he will hold at all cost the Longville and the Littlestown areas as pivots of maneuver for counter attack. The enemy will no doubt employ the natural defensive line Littlestown—Markers Mill as a switch position and the ridge Pleasant Grove School—Blocks School—Kump P.O. as a delaying position to support the second position and as a base for counter attack.

8. THE DECISIVE ELEMENTS IN THE II CORPS ATTACK. —*a.* What are the decisive elements in the II Corps attack and what should be the plan of maneuver employed by the II Corps to secure the decisive elements?

*b.* The decisive elements in the II Corps attack comprise a surprise blow which seeks, first, to penetrate the entire Red defensive zone and, second, to seize the high ground from Littlestown to Silver Run. The II Corps must also continue on towards Parrs Ridge and take up the pursuit.

9. PLAN OF MANEUVER.—*a.* In considering the plan of maneuver necessary to secure decisive results the following factors are to be considered:

(1) The width of the II Corps zone of action is about 10,000 yards. The depth of advance necessary to penetrate the Red defensive zone is about 15,000 yards. To obtain sufficient fire power and troops to overcome the hostile resistance and to continue the pressure, the II Corps, even with the reinforcements available, should make its main efforts on those parts of its front which will produce decisive results.

(2) The terrain along the line Germantown—Arters Mill is favorable for making a deep and rapid advance, while the terrain in the eastern part of the zone, together with the hostile resistance expected, will prevent a *rapid* advance in that part of the corps zone. A rapid advance

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in the direction Germantown—Arters Mill must be protected from hostile observation, fire, and counter attacks from the high ground along the line Littlestown—Markers Mill.

*b.* It seems advisable, therefore, that the plan of maneuver provide for the following:

(1) A rapid advance in the direction Germantown—Arters Mill, to penetrate promptly the entire defensive zone and seize the high ground south of Arters Mill.

(2) The neutralization of hostile observation along the line Littlestown—Markers Mill.

(3) The envelopment of the Littlestown area from the east and west, and the seizure of the high ground about Pleasant Grove School; followed by a further advance to envelop the Silver Run area from the east and west and to seize the high ground south thereof.

10. MISSIONS ASSIGNED EACH UNIT.—The manner in which all units and all arms are employed and their cooperation and teamplay secured for carrying out the foregoing plan of maneuver, and the manner in which the movements are made for the concentration are explained in the field orders for the attack. General principles governing concentrations for a surprise blow are discussed in Chapter XXII.

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## SECTION V

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ..... 11

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11. TOPICS SEGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation on the Third Army front and in detail for the II Corps front:

(1) The Red defensive zone positions, areas, depth. Other natural defensive positions or areas which may be employed.

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(2) The disposition of hostile troops on II Corps front. Their strength, composition, disposition, frontage, and probable plans of defense.

*b.* The mission of the II Corps and plan of maneuver to carry out mission.

(1) Mission.

(2) Decisive elements in II Corps attack.

(3) Best plan of maneuver to secure decisive elements.

(4) Cooperation with adjacent corps.

*c.* Mission assigned each unit and branch, and the cooperation and teamplay of all in executing the plan of maneuver of the II Corps.

(1) 2d Division.

(2) 25th Division.

(3) 4th Division.

(4) Artillery, including the use of gas and smoke.

(5) Air service, army, corps, division.

(6) Tanks.

*d.* Concentration for the attack.

(1) The importance of keeping preparations and movements for the attack concealed. The general measures employed to secure concealment.

(2) Details of movements—order, time, and routes of movement of the several units.

(3) Screening missions and the protection of the mass of artillery placed in position.

*e.* In the field orders for the attack and concentration, consider the time of issue, form, brevity, clearness, and completeness.

## *Maps*

Situation Map, II Corps, PM, 16 Aug.

Operation Map, II Corps, to accompany FO No. 37, following this page.

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# CHAPTER XXIV

# *The Army Pursues*


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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twenty-fifth Special Situation | 1 |
| Third Army Location Table | 2 |
| Requirements | 3 |


1. TWENTY-FIFTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The Third Army attacked at daylight on August 22, 1921, as given in Chapter XXIII. The attack struck the Red forces as a tactical surprise, resulting in considerable success, as hereinafter indicated.

*b.* By 1:30 PM, August 22, 1921, the Commander of the Third Army has received the following information, see G3 Situation Map, Third Army, 22 Aug 21:

(1) From Blue General Headquarters:

"Reds attacked this morning east of Susquehanna and crossed Susquehanna in force in vicinity of Turkey Hill and Safe Harbor. Our XX Corps is withdrawing its right to south and west of Lancaster."

(2) From G2, Third Army:

(a) "Reds, greatly surprised by our attack, have been thrown back in considerable disorder and confusion. Red 16th and 20th Divisions are especially disorganized as in-



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dicated by our captures from these divisions, estimated at 9000 men and 50 guns.

(b) "Red cavalry, between Red Lion and Valley Junction, while holding defensively, is reconnoitering aggressively in the direction of East Berlin.

(c) "Red Air Service is active on our center and right.

(d) "Red IX Corps is on Red second position from Valley Junction to south of York Road. Its line then turns southwest to north of Raubenstine. Columns of troops, guns, and vehicles are observed to be moving rapidly in the general direction of Glenville—New Freedom and Lineboro—Hoffmanville.

(e) "Red VIII Corps has been driven back in disorder to south of Big Pipe Creek and Deep Run. This corps has been reinforced, units of two new Red divisions having appeared on its front as follows:

"5th Division, northeast of Union Mills, between the Red 42d and 16th Divisions.

"21st Division, southeast of Union Mills, between the Red 16th and 20th Divisions.

(f) "While the right and center of the VIII Red Corps seems to be holding, its left continues to fall back rapidly. Columns of troops, guns, and vehicles observed moving in direction of Bandanna—Melrose—Millers; Deep Run—Bachman Mills—Manchester; Union Mills—Bixley—Mexico—Hampstead; and Pleasant Valley—Westminster.

(g) "In the zone of the IX Red Corps, its 15th Division, on the right, seems to have suffered considerably and is falling back. This division still holds the area of Taneytown, but its resistance on the rest of front seems to be weakening. During the forenoon, the 17th Red Division, on the left, withdrew to the second position. Present information indicates immediate withdrawal farther south. Columns of troops, guns, and vehicles observed moving in direction of Taneytown—Uniontown—New Windsor; Taneytown—Middlesburg; Toms Creek Church—Keysville—Detour; and Motters—Appolds—Rocky Ridge.

(h) "Red cavalry on the west—no change.

(i) "Movement of Reds by trucks and marching, estimated to be a division, has been observed since 8:00 AM from near Libertytown towards Union Bridge and New Windsor.

(j) "Conclusion as to the Red situation: Although reinforced by two divisions on their right center, the Reds appear to be in full retreat. Our attack appears to have created an opening in the Red defense east of Taneytown. Red troops to the east thereof are retreating generally east,

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while those west of Taneytown seem to be falling back more to the south. Red reserves are advancing from near Libertytown and probably will attempt to fill this gap. Although Reds will attempt to hold, temporarily, along Dug Hill Ridge and Little Pipe Creek, it is believed that our attack will force a continuation of the retreat. In this retreat, the Reds will make every effort to cover Baltimore and their forces to the east."

*c.* From Corps and Cavalry Commanders, reports dated between 12:00 noon and 12:30 PM, were received as follows:

(1) From the 2d Cavalry Division:

"Red cavalry holds strongly from Red Lion to Valley Junction. Unable to get patrols to the south or east of that line."

(2) From the I Corps:

"So far unable to penetrate Red second position except on my right, where slight advance was made in conjunction IV Corps left. Red cavalry blocks advance to the east."

(3) From the IV Corps:

"Attack continues but is meeting resistance, especially on the line Deep Run. My light artillery is advancing according to schedule."

(4) From the II Corps:

"My left is meeting stronger resistance, especially south of Big Pipe Creek. My center and right continue to advance and are on ridge overlooking Mayberry. The forward displacement of my light guns is not entirely up to schedule, but should be by evening."

(5) From the III Corps:

"The 20th Division, while meeting strong resistance at Taneytown and southwest of Longville, continues to advance on rest of front. The 30th Division reports enemy is withdrawing in its front and is south of Ballinger School —St. Joseph Academy."

(6) From the III Corps Cavalry:

"Red cavalry in my front continues to hold all roads. Can observe Reds retreating southwest of Monocacy. Will attack Red cavalry and endeavor to take up pursuit."

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2. THIRD ARMY LOCATION TABLE.—The location of the elements of the Third Army is as given in the following table:

See table, pages 426 and 427.

3. REQUIREMENTS.—*a. First Requirement.*—The decision of the Commander, Third Blue Army.

*b. Second Requirement.*—The orders issued by Third Blue Army to carry out this decision.

---

## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Commander's Decision | 4 |
| Messages | 5 |
| Field Orders | 6 |

---

4. THE COMMANDER'S DECISION.—*a.* The Third Army, continuing the attack tonight, will take up the pursuit without delay with the object:

(1) Of inflicting further losses on the Reds,

(2) Of capturing or destroying the Red west wing, and

(3) Of capturing or destroying the Red east wing.

*b.* The III Corps will be assigned the mission of destroying the Red west wing, and the I and IV Corps the Red east wing; while the II Corps drives the Red center to the southeast. Pursuit directions will be assigned and the cavalry and army reserves employed with the foregoing in mind.

5. MESSAGES.—To carry into effect the decision, the following messages are sent:

*a.* To corps commanders by telephone and officer courier.

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## LOCATION TABLE, THIRD ARMY

### 22 Aug 21, 1:30 PM

### (See G3 Situation Map, Third Army, 1:30 PM; 22 Aug 21)

| 1<br>*Unit* | 2<br>*Function* | 3<br>*Formation* | 4<br>*Location at Start of Attack* | 5<br>*Front Line Located at 1:00 PM* | 6<br>*Zones of Action* | 7<br>*Railhead* | 8<br>*Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AHQ<br>Fwd Ech<br>Rr Ech | | | HEIDLERSBURG—CARLISLE. | No change.<br>No change. | | TABLE ROCK.<br>CARLISLE. | |
| AAS | | | Same as given in Chapter XXIII. | | | SHIPPENSBURG. | |
| Army Tn | | | EAST BERLIN. | EAST BERLIN. | | | |
| 1st and 2d Cav Divs | | | Same as given in Chapter XXIII. | | | MANCHESTER. | |
| ARMY ARTY:<br>Gp A<br><br>Gp B | Supporting attack.<br>Supporting attack. | | East of BARLOW.<br><br>South of MT. ROCK SCHOOL. | No change.<br><br>No change. | Supporting IV Corps.<br><br>Supporting II Corps. | ORTANNA.<br><br>CENTER MILLS. | |
| III CORPS<br>CHQ<br>Corps Trs | Supporting corps. | | GETTYSBURG. On whole front with weight of corps arty on the east flank. Corps Cav covering right flank in the mountains about SABILLASVILLE. | No change.<br>No change. | East boundary: GOLDENVILLE—BARLOW KNOLL—ROCK CREEK to hill 523 (all incl)—hill 598—492—GALT—MAYBERRY—TYRONE—JASONTOWN—WARFIELDBURG (all excl). | FAIRFIELD STA. | |
| 30th Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between MONOCACY and MIDDLE CREEK on front line. | PALMER FORD—BALLINGER SCHOOL—north of 422. | West boundary: MARSHALL—FAIRFIELD STA—LIBERTY HALL SCHOOL—MIDDLE CREEK—TOMS CREEK. | FAIRFIELD STA. | |
| 20th Div | Front line. | Brigades abreast. | Between MONOCACY and east boundary of corps. | South of STUMPTOWN—east and north of TANEYTOWN—436—491—PALMER. | MONOCACY RIVER. | SEVEN STARS. | |
| II CORPS:<br>CHQ<br><br>Corps Trs Includes Hv Tk Bns, and 2 Regts 75 mm portee | <br><br>Supporting Corps. | | HUNTERSTOWN.<br><br>On whole front, heavy tanks on front of 4th and 25th Divs. Corps Cav in reserve near GERMANTOWN. | HUNTERSTOWN.<br><br>No change except heavy tanks in battle zone of 4th and 25th Divs. | West boundary: Same as west boundary III Corps. East boundary: WOODSIDE SCHOOL—GULDENS—SQUARE CORNER—FELTY SCHOOL—LEFEVRE—CHESTNUT HILL SCHOOL. | BIGLERVILLE. | |

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| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2d Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between 598 and BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. | South of BIG PIPE CREEK on line STUMPTOWN—hill 638—RJ 691. | CHERRYTOWN—BM 645—BIXLER—MEXICO (all incl). | GETTYSBURG. |
| 25th Div, 1 L Tk Bn attached | | Column of brigades. | Between BALTIMORE TURNPIKE and 593—608 road. | RJ 691—ARTERS MILL—hill 646. | | GETTYSBURG. |
| 4th Div 1 L Tk Bn attached | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between 593—608 road and east boundary. | Between hill 646 and CR 799, on ridge overlooking BIG PIPE CREEK and DEEP RUN. | | GETTYSBURG. |
| IV CORPS | | | | | | |
| CHQ Corps Tr | Supporting corps. | | NEWCHESTER. On whole front. Corps Cav in reserve near NEW OXFORD. | NEWCHESTER. No change. | West boundary: Same as east boundary II Corps. East boundary: HAMPTON—HANOVER—(excl)—BANDANNA—MANCHESTER (all incl). | GOLDENVILLE. |
| 23d Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between FELTY SCHOOL and BRUSHTOWN. | Between CR 799 and cross roads 1 mile SE of RJ 816, holding hill east of 665. | | North of NEW OXFORD. |
| 1st Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between BRUSHTOWN and BM 571. | From left of 1st Div via 661 to 653 incl. | | North of NEW OXFORD. |
| 3d Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between BM 571 and HANOVER. | From left of 23d Div joining right of 35th Div on BALTIMORE and HANOVER ROAD west of MARBURG. | | North of NEW OXFORD. |
| I CORPS: CHQ Corps Tr | Supporting corps. | | ABBOTTSTOWN. On whole front. Corps Cav south of SPRING GROVE. | ABBOTTSTOWN. No change. | West boundary: Same as east boundary IV Corps. East boundary: For attack: PORTERS VALLEY JUNCTION—GLENVILLE—STILTZ. | MOUNT HOLLY SPRINGS. |
| 35th Div | Front line. | Brigades abreast. | Between HANOVER and JACOBS MILLS—PENN GROVE Road. | Same except right has advanced and holds YORK ROAD. | | HUNTERS RUN. |
| 22d Div | Front line. | Column of brigades. | Between JACOBS MILL—PENN GROVE road and PORTERS. | No change. | | MOUNT HOLLY SPRINGS. |
| 11th Div | Army reserve. | | FARMERS. | No change. | | DILLSBURG. |

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Third Army,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.
22 Aug 21, 2:00 PM.

Commanders
I, II, III and IV Corps:

Enemy is overwhelmed and in full retreat. He is endeavoring to hold temporarily south of BIG PIPE CREEK and DEEP RUN. Red reserves observed moving from LIBERTYTOWN towards UNION BRIDGE and NEW WINDSOR. Corps will continue aggressive attacks tonight with all available forces. Employ fresh brigades when needed. Take up pursuit without delay. Maneuvering to cut off and to destroy Red's east and west wings, corps will pursue in the following directions: I Corps reinforced by 11th Division towards NEW FREEDOM—LINEBORO, turning Red right and keeping north and east of GUNPOWDER FALLS; IV Corps breaking through Red center, towards HOFFMANVILLE—MOUNT CARMEL, keeping north of BACHMAN MILLS—HAMPSTEAD; II Corps, by advancing its left rapidly and to east of UNION MILLS, will drive Reds south through WESTMINSTER; III Corps, with main forces east of MONOCACY, will drive Reds towards LIBERTYTOWN and WOODSBORO. All corps will maintain close contact with each other. Zones of action are modified as indicated above. Acknowledge.

A,
General.

*b*. To the 2d Cavalry Division by telephone and officer courier:

Third Army,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.
22 Aug 21, 2:15 PM.

Commander, 2d Cav Div.

Enemy overwhelmed and in full retreat. Army pursues vigorously. I Corps, reinforced by 11th Division pursues in direction NEW FREEDOM—LINEBORO. Drive in Red cavalry and join pursuit with object of cutting off Red right. Learn early of and delay any advance against our east flank. Acknowledge.

A,
General.

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6. FIELD ORDERS.—The following field order is issued.

Third Army,
HEIDLERSBURG, PA.
22 Aug 21, 3:15 PM.

FIELD ORDERS)
No. 30. )

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500 and Operation Map, Third Army, FO No 30.

1. Our attack overwhelmed Reds, capturing several thousand prisoners, many guns, and other valuable material. Reds in full retreat, right towards NEW FREEDOM—HOFFMANVILLE, center towards WESTMINSTER and north thereof, and left to the south. Red reserves, estimated one division, this morning approaching UNION BRIDGE—NEW WINDSOR. See G2 Report. Red cavalry holds on flanks.
2. This army, attacking tonight, will pursue vigorously with the object of destroying Red east and west wings. See Operation Map, attached.
3. (a) I Corps, turning Red right early tomorrow, will pursue to line NEW FREEDOM—LINEBORO in close cooperation with IV Corps. 11th Div with army truck train is at the disposal of I Corps. Maintain contact with 2d Cav Div observing to the east. Upon reaching above line, assemble one division at the disposal of the army.
Zone of action:
West boundary: changed to HANOVER—BLACKROCK — LINEBORO — GUNPOWDER FALLS (all incl).

(b) IV Corps will break through Red center, and, in cooperation with I Corps, destroy Red right wing. Pursue in direction HOFFMANVILLE—MOUNT CARMEL, maintaining contact with II Corps. After passing WM RR, assemble one division at the disposal of the army.
Zone of action changed to:
East boundary: same as west boundary I Corps.
West boundary: DEEP RUN—BACHMANS MILL—HAMPSTEAD—MOUNT CARMEL (all incl).

(c) II Corps will drive Reds south through WESTMINSTER, making special effort with its left to pierce

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Red lines east of UNION MILLS. Utilize corps cavalry to observe closely Reds reported approaching NEW WINDSOR.

Zone of action changed to:

East boundary: same as west boundary IV Corps.

West boundary: to include UNIONTOWN and NEW WINDSOR.

(d) III Corps, while pursuing with its main forces east of the MONOCACY and in direction of LIBERTYTOWN and WOODSBORO, will destroy Red west wing. Maintain contact with II Corps.

Zone of action: No change except as indicated for II Corps.

(e) 2d Cav Div, reinforced, while driving in Red Cavalry and cutting off retreat of Red right, will immediately seek information of and delay any Red advance against our left.

(f) AAS, while determining Red movements west of SUSQUEHANNA, will maintain close observation of direction of Red retreat. Hostile columns and bridges, on main highways available to Reds center and right, will be bombed. Attack group will assist right and left of IV and II Corps, respectively, by attacking Red holding troops.

(g) Gps A and B, AA, are attached to II and IV Corps, respectively.

(h) The Hv Tk Bn reverts to army control and will assemble at TANEYTOWN.

(x) Corps Commanders personally, will see that the pursuit is pushed with utmost vigor. Fresh brigades will be utilized where necessary to secure this end.

The opportunity presented to the Third Army to crush the Red Fifth Army must not be lost. Rapid and strong blows, especially by the adjacent units of the II and IV Corps and the left of the I Corps, will insure these results and give us the full benefits of our victory.

4. See Adm O No— (omitted).

5. Ax Sig Com:

Army.—HUNTERSTOWN — BONNEAUVILLE — LITTLESTOWN.

2d Cav Div.—BALTIMORE and YORK TURNPIKE.

I Corps.—VALLEY JUNCTION—GLENVILLE.

IV Corps.—MT PLEASANT—BANDANNA—MANCHESTER.

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III Corps.—TANEYTOWN ROAD.
II Corps.—LITTLESTOWN—ARTERS MILL—PLEASANT VALLEY—WESTMINSTER.

By command of General A.

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A.

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## SECTION III

## *Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Problem Presented by the Situation | 7 |
| Salient Considerations Affecting Plan of Action | 8 |
| Grasping Tactical Opportunity | 9 |
| Night Attacks | 10 |
| Convergency in Double Envelopment | 11 |

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7. PROBLEM PRESENTED BY THE SITUATION.—The situation presents a basis for discussion of a break through and a pursuit as well as many incidental topics. The Third Army apparently has penetrated the center of the Red defensive system. An immediate decision and the execution thereof are essential to secure the full benefits of success.

8. SALIENT CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING PLAN OF ACTION.—*a.* The decision may tend toward one of two courses of action, as follows:

(1) To widen the gap by pushing troops through the same, expecting, eventually to turn the hostile interior flanks, or

(2) To change the direction of the attack without delay, so as to envelop and crush the hostile wings involved in the defense.

*b.* (1) The availability of hostile reserves has a deciding influence on the plan of action. If the enemy is known to have available sufficient reserves with which to make an organized counter attack, it is generally better to follow the first course of action, with the intention of preventing such a counter attack. By driving through the gap, and

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turning the interior flanks, the hostile reserves will have to be utilized to prevent any widening of the penetration, and, generally, will be thrown into the fight piecemeal.

(2) In the present case, practically all hostile reserves are known to have been thrown into the line. Therefore, further efforts should seek to complete the attack and destroy the enemy forces. There appears to be only one Red division available for a counter blow. This division is headed for the gap in the line.

*c.* While guarding against the danger from hostile reserves, the Blues should make every effort to destroy the Reds. By aggressive and energetic action, it seems very probable that the Red right wing may be destroyed. The double envelopment by the IV Corps and left of the I Corps, assisted by the cavalry action, should accomplish the foregoing, if pushed to a conclusion before additional Red forces arrive.

*d.* Although gaining ground is important, the main desire is to grasp the tactical opportunity to gain a decisive victory which will result in destroying the Reds rather than in forcing them to retreat. Destruction of the Reds will affect the situation along the Susquehanna more seriously than any other plan.

9. GRASPING TACTICAL OPPORTUNITY.—*a.* To be able to grasp a tactical opportunity, such as represented in this situation, an army commander continually must consider, and be prepared for, contingencies and future action. He must look ahead, and, as a result of careful analysis of conditions, decide on future general courses of action. His decisions should be in the hands of the combat units sufficiently in advance to guide them. Otherwise, unfortunate delays and working at cross-purposes will result. Then again, army authorities must realize the impracticability of radical and immediate changes in plans. An army headquarters seldom can carry out any radical change in its combat plans in less than twelve hours. It is better that its plans be broad and provide for operations covering several days. This can be done by assigning main tactical missions to corps, the accomplishment of which will extend well into the future.

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*b.* Under such circumstances, the army commander decides to combine, with the attack instructions, the orders for a pursuit. While the pursuit is not a certainty, the opportunity therefor may occur at any moment. The combat units should have at hand, at that time, sufficient instructions to insure coordination and cohesion. In the Meuse-Argonne battle, the First Army issued a pursuit order, about October 25, to take effect in case of a hostile retreat. When the First Army penetrated the German lines, on November 1 and 2, the only order issued to the troops was a telegram to each corps to carry out the pursuit order.

10. NIGHT ATTACKS.—The army specifies that the advance will be carried on by night attacks. In future wars, night attacks will be undertaken to avoid serious losses from intense artillery fire and bombing. This course of action must be accepted and troops should be trained therefor. In the case under discussion, the moral effects of the success won by the attack must not be lost. The Reds cannot be given the opportunity to reorganize and regain their morale. Night attacks by small units, such as companies and battalions, promise success, and, at least, will harass the enemy and prevent his organizing an orderly retreat. Good infantry must be prepared to make such attacks.

11. CONVERGENCY IN DOUBLE ENVELOPMENT.—In a double envelopment, such as is planned for the IV and I Corps, care must be taken to avoid such a convergency as will disorganize one's own forces. The zones of action and the objectives assigned these corps were selected with the foregoing in mind.

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## SECTION IV

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 12

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12. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR DUTY.—*a.* Discuss the situation as to naturalness. Indicate any improvements.

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*b.* On the assumption that Fifth Red Army was tactically surprised by the Blue attack, and that there were available to the Fifth Red Army three reserve divisions located at Libertytown, Hampstead and New Freedom; discuss the various courses of action open to the Fifth Red Army and give conclusions thereon. Assume that all the Red reserve divisions can be moved by truck on short notice.

*c.* From the Red information in the hands of the Blue G2, and from his knowledge of the Blue situation, what do you think of his conclusions? Does the Red situation, as pictured in the problem, lead you to any different conclusions and to any more detailed views as to Reds' plan?

*d.* Consider the location table and the various messages received at Army Headquarters from Corps and Cavalry Commanders. What do you think of the practicability of securing such information eight hours after the attack starts? What preliminary arrangements should corps and armies make to insure the receipt of this information?

*e.* Discuss the plans of action open to the Third Blue Army. What plan other than the one ordered do you suggest?

*f.* Considering the plan of action adopted by the Third Blue Army:

(1) What are the salient considerations involved therein?

(2) What does the Blue Commander expect to accomplish by the plan adopted and what relation exists between this plan and the considerations referred to in "(1)" above?

(3) What effect will the attack have on the Susquehanna Reds?

*g.* Discuss the orders of the Third Blue Army.

*h.* Discuss the plans of action of the I Corps to carry out the army orders.

*i.* Discuss the Third Army Field Order No. 12, as to completeness, practicability, detail, and clarity.

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## *Maps*

Situation Map, Third Army, 1:30 PM, 22 Aug 21 } following this page.

Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany F.O. No. 30. }

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# CHAPTER XXV

# *The IV Corps Pursuit*


| | | Paragraphs |
|---|---|---|
| SECTION I. | —Situation and Requirement | 1- 2 |
| SECTION II. | —A Solution | 3 |
| SECTION III. | —Situation and Requirement, continued | 4- 5 |
| SECTION IV. | —A Solution | 6 |
| SECTION V. | —Discussion of Principles | 7-12 |
| SECTION VI. | —Topics Suggested for Study | 13 |

Map following page 445.


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Twenty-sixth Special Situation | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. TWENTY-SIXTH SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* The situation given in Chapter XXIV is continued.

*b.* The situation of the IV Corps at 1:00 PM, August 22, is explained in Chapter XXIV.

*c.* The situation, as of 2:20 PM, August 22 (see Situation Map, Third Army, 1:30 PM, 22 Aug 21, accompanying Chapter XXIV) is briefly as follows:

(1) The 23d Division carried its attack to the south of Deep Run (creek) where it met with stubborn resistance.

(2) The 1st Division enveloped the intrenched area about Raubenstine from the west, captured the greater part of that area, and advanced south, encountering strong resistance.

(3) The right of the 3d Division, advancing in conjunction with the 1st Division, is approaching the intrenched area about Bandanna. Its left has made no further progress.



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(4) The artillery brigades of the 23d and 1st Divisions are being advanced by echelon. The corps artillery is still in position northeast of Felty School.

(5) Zones of action of divisions:

(a) Left boundary 23d Division: Brush Run—Brushtown—CR 1 mile NE of Deep Run (village)—Bachman Mills (all incl).

(b) Left boundary 1st Division: New Oxford (excl)—B.M. 571 (in Midway)—RJ 653—(2 miles W of Bandanna) Ebbvale (incl)—Manchester (incl).

(c) Rear boundaries of divisions: Guldens—New Oxford (both excl).

(6) The corps cavalry is near New Oxford.

(7) The I Corps has made no further progress.

(8) The 4th Division of the II Corps has carried its attack south of Big Pipe Creek but has met stubborn resistance.

(9) The IV Corps air service has reported columns of Red troops, guns and vehicles moving in the direction Bandanna—Melrose—Millers; Deep Run (village)—Bachman Mills—Manchester; Union Mills—Bixley—Mexico—Hampstead; and Pleasant Valley—Westminster. These are the columns mentioned in Chapter XXIV.

*d.* At 2:20 PM, the commander IV Corps received the message, Third Army, dated 22 August 21, 2:00 PM, see paragraph 5a, Chapter XXIV.

2. REQUIREMENT.—The orders as actually issued by the Commander, IV Corps, to carry out the instructions contained in the message from the army.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution*

Paragraph

Warning Message ---------- 3

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3. WARNING MESSAGE.—*a.* The chief of staff calls up G3 of the army by telephone and is informed that the army

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will issue a field order for the pursuit shortly after 3:00 PM. A warning message is prepared, and, at the same time, the corps field orders for the pursuit are drafted. The corps field order will be issued as soon as practicable after the receipt of the army field order.

*b.* In order that the preliminary instructions contained in the army message may be transmitted to the troops for immediate action, the Commander, IV Corps, sends a message at once, to all units concerned as follows:

IV Corps,
NEWCHESTER, PA.,
22 Aug 21, 2:40 PM.

Commanders:
23d, 1st and 3d Divisions
Corps Artillery, Corps Cavalry
Corps Air Service.

Enemy while holding south of BIG PIPE CREEK and DEEP RUN is in full retreat.

Our army continues attack tonight with all available forces; I Corps towards NEW FREEDOM—LINEBORO, turning Red right; II Corps, advancing its left rapidly to east of UNION MILLS, and driving Reds south through WESTMINSTER.

IV Corps, continuing attack tonight, will break through Red center and drive hard towards HOFFMANVILLE—MOUNT CARMEL.

23d Division, keeping north and east of DEEP RUN village—BACHMAN MILLS—HAMPSTEAD, will turn DUG HILL RIDGE from southwest and drive hard towards GREENMOUNT and MOUNT CARMEL. 1st Division, keeping north of MANCHESTER and BECKLEYVILLE, will drive hard in the direction EBBVALE—MILLERS—HOFFMANVILLE. 3d Division will seize BANDANNA and WENTZ and be prepared to continue in the direction of LINEBORO. The pursuit must be pushed with greatest determination throughout the night. Employ fresh brigades when needed. Artillery must be advanced promptly. Corps field orders will be issued about 3:30 PM. Acknowledge.

A,
Major General.

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## SECTION III

## *Situation and Requirement, Continued*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Situation Continued to 3:30 PM | 4 |
| Requirement | 5 |

4. SITUATION CONTINUED TO 3:30 PM.—*a.* At 3:30 PM. August 22, the Commander, IV Corps, received Field Orders No. 30, Third Army, dated 22 August 21, 3:15 PM, see F.O. No. 30 and Operation Map, Third Army, to accompany same—Chapter XXIV.

*b.* Further developments in the situation to include 3:30 PM, are briefly as follows:

(1) The 23d Division of the IV Corps, and the 4th Division of the II Corps, have made no progress south of Deep Run (creek) and Big Pipe Creek.

(2) The 1st Division has advanced to the line CR 1 mile NE of Deep Run (village)—CR 685 (1½ miles W of Bandanna), where it encountered stubborn resistance.

(3) The right of the 3d Division has been stopped at the intrenched area about Bandanna. The left of the 3d Division, and the 35th Division of the I Corps, have made no further progress.

5. REQUIREMENT.—Field orders issued by the Commander, IV Corps for the pursuit.

## SECTION IV

## *A Solution*

| | Paragraph |
|---|---|
| Field Order | 6 |

6. FIELD ORDER.—The following field order was issued for the pursuit:

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IV Corps,
NEWCHESTER, PA.,
22 Aug 21, 3:50 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No 30. }

1. (a) The attack of our army overwhelmed the Reds, capturing several thousand prisoners, many guns and other valuable material. Reds are in full retreat, right towards NEW FREEDOM — HOFFMANVILLE, center towards WESTMINSTER and north thereof, and left to the south. Red cavalry holds on flanks. See G2 Report.

(b) Our army, continuing its attack tonight, pursues vigorously with object of destroying Red east and west wings. I Corps, turning the Red right early tomorrow, pursues to line NEW FREEDOM—LINEBORO. II Corps drives Reds south of WESTMINSTER, making special effort with its left to pierce Red line east of UNION MILLS. Army Air Service bombs hostile columns and bridges in rear of Red center and right, and attack group assists right and left of IV Corps and II Corps, respectively, by attacking Red holding troops. Gp B, AA, is attached to IV Corps.

2. (a) The IV Corps, continuing its attack tonight, will break through the Red center and destroy the Red right wing. DUG HILL RIDGE will be enveloped from the west, and the pursuit continued in the direction HOFFMANVILLE—MOUNT CARMEL.

(b) Zone of Action:

Corps:

West boundary: Changed to DEEP RUN (village)—BACHMAN MILLS—HAMPSTEAD—MOUNT CARMEL (all incl).

East boundary: Changed to HANOVER—BLACKROCK — LINEBORO — GUNPOWDER FALLS (all excl).

23d Div:

West boundary: Same as west boundary IV Corps.

East boundary: Changed to EBBVALE (excl)—MANCHESTER—BIGLERVILLE (both incl).

1st Div:

West boundary: Same as east boundary 23d Div.

East boundary: Changed to WENTZ—LINEBORO (both incl).

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3d Div:
West boundary: Same as east boundary 1st Div.
East boundary: Same as east boundary IV Corps.

3. (a) 23d Div, enveloping DUG HILL RIDGE from the southwest, will pursue in the direction BACHMAN MILLS —GREENMOUNT—MOUNT CARMEL.
(b) 1st Div will drive hard in the direction EBBVALE—MILLERS—HOFFMANVILLE.
(c) 3d Div will turn BANDANNA, from the west, and pursue in the direction of BLACKROCK. When its area has been cleared of the enemy, it will assemble at BANDANNA as army reserve.
(d) (1) The artillery will be echeloned forward promptly in support of the pursuit. Movements of corps artillery will be regulated by 23d Div. Movements of Gp B, AA, will be regulated by 1st Div. Should the enemy attempt to hold DUG HILL RIDGE, all guns will be in position to support the attack against that position at daylight tomorrow.
(2) The corps artillery, and Gp B, AA, will interdict hostile columns attempting to withdraw and will assist division artillery.
(e) The corps cavalry will move, at 10:00 PM tonight, via BRUSHTOWN, to BARTS CHURCH as corps reserve.
(f) The corps air service will carry out intensive reconnaissance of Red columns that are withdrawing, and will keep the corps and army artillery informed of their movements.
(g) The corps train (MT) will be in readiness for troop transport at NEW OXFORD.
(x) (1) The pursuit must be pushed with the greatest determination throughout the night. Fresh brigades will be utilized where necessary.
(2) Special arrangements will be made by adjacent units to maintain contact and to render each other mutual assistance in overcoming such resistance as may be encountered. This applies not only to adjacent divisions in the IV Corps, but also to arrangements with adjacent divisions of adjacent corps.

4. See Adm O No— (omitted).

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5. (a) Ax Sig Com:
IV Corps: MT PLEASANT — BANDANNA — MANCHESTER.
23d Div: FELTY SCHOOL—SELLS STATION—BARTS CHURCH — DEEP RUN (village) — BACHMAN MILLS.
1st Div: BRUSHTOWN—RAUBENSTINE—EBBVALE.
3d Div: MIDWAY—BANDANNA.

(b) CPs:
(1) IV Corps: No change.
23d Div: HUMBERT SCHOOL after 9:00 PM tonight.
1st Div: PINE GROVE SCHOOL after 9:00 PM tonight.
3d Div: MT. PLEASANT after 9:00 PM tonight.
(2) Division commanders will reconnoiter for and recommend advanced locations for the subsequent movement of their respective command posts.

By command of Maj Gen A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution A:

Copies to I Corps.
II Corps.
Gp B, AA.

---

## SECTION V

## *Discussion of Principles*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Mission of the IV Corps | 7 |
| Probable Enemy Actions | 8 |
| Decisive Elements of the Attack | 9 |
| Objectives | 10 |
| Type of Attack | 11 |
| Detailed Instructions | 12 |


---

7. MISSION OF THE IV CORPS.—The mission of the IV Corps is to destroy the Red right wing in cooperation with an envelopment of the Red right by the I Corps.

8. PROBABLE ENEMY ACTIONS.—*a.* The enemy, embarrassed by the surprise blow of the Blue army, is appar-

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ently withdrawing, except on the front of the IV Corps. The object of the Red resistance in this portion of the front is to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the Red army. Under these circumstances, the Reds in front of the IV Corps will continue to hold today and probably withdraw tonight as far as Dug Hill Ridge and the crest of Parrs Ridge.

*b.* If the Reds can hold in the center for several hours, they will be able to extricate their east and west wings and put a rear guard between their main forces and the Blue army. This rear guard will attempt to hold until the main body has taken up an orderly withdrawal, and then will attempt to withdraw at night, leaving only weak detachments behind, so as to avoid the necessity of withdrawing large forces during actual combat.

*c.* However, they may attempt to hold Dug Hill Ridge and the crest of Parrs Ridge tomorrow so as to cover the withdrawal of their left wing. This is a reasonable assumption, as there is no strong natural defensive position between Dug Hill Ridge and Gunpowder Falls. If that position is given up, the Fifth Red Army either must be driven to the south, or have its wings separated.

9. DECISIVE ELEMENTS OF THE ATTACK.—*a.* The decisive elements in the IV Corps attack are a prompt and determined effort to break through the remaining Red resistance in its front before the Reds can prepare to make an organized stand; to prevent the Reds from extricating their east and west wings and placing a rear guard between their main body and the Blue army; to attack in such a direction that, together with the attack of the I Corps, the Red east wing will be destroyed; and to prevent the Reds from utilizing the cover of night to withdraw their rear guards and thus place distance between the Red main body and the Blue army.

*b.* The IV Corps should make every effort to break through the remaining Red resistance in its front; seize Dug Hill Ridge, thus separating the Red right from the Red center and left; and then pursue vigorously, to destroy the Red right. The attacks should continue throughout night,

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in order that the Reds may be given no opportunity to withdraw or reorganize.

10. OBJECTIVES.—The IV Corps should make its main effort with its right, enveloping the Dug Hill Ridge position on the southwest, and thus continue the pursuit along the ridges from Bachman Mills towards Mount Carmel and from Ebbvale towards Hoffmanville. This attack, combined with the envelopment of the Red right by the I Corps in the direction Lineboro—New Freedom, should cut off and destroy the Red right wing if executed with promptness and vigor.

11. TYPE OF ATTACK.—The maneuver required, to carry out this attack, is that for an attack of opportunity rather than a systematic attack. Units push forward against weak points thus enveloping the remaining resistance, and supporting and assisting adjacent commands. The general direction of the main effort of the various units should be prescribed so as to coordinate their efforts, to direct them along the line required for the corps as a whole, and to insure the destruction of the Red east wing.

12. DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS.—*a.* The mission of divisions are as given in the field order.

*b.* Artillery is ordered to follow the advance closely. The movements of corps and army artillery are regulated by the divisions through whose zones they will advance. It is contemplated that this artillery will follow the division artillery. No positions are assigned, as the location of the front line, when these units will be echeloned forward, is uncertain. All guns, however, are ordered to be in position to support an attack against the Dug Hill Ridge position at daylight tomorrow, should the enemy attempt to hold that position. Special instructions are given to the artillery for interdicting Red columns attempting to withdraw, and to the air service for keeping the artillery informed of such movements.

*c.* Special instructions are issued so as to insure contact and mutual support between adjacent commands. In a pursuit, when troops are advancing rapidly and the resistance encountered is often local, such coordination is essential.

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## SECTION VI

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 13

13. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.—*a.* The hostile situation, in general for the Third Army front, and in detail for the IV Corps front.

(1) Movements, points where Reds are still holding, and probable intentions.

(2) If withdrawing, how will the enemy attempt to carry out the withdrawal?

*b.* Mission assigned the IV Corps, and the general plan of maneuver for carrying out the mission assigned:

(1) Mission.
(2) Decisive elements in carrying out the mission.
(3) General character of action required.
(4) General plan of maneuver.
(5) Cooperation between adjacent units.

*c.* Mission assigned to each unit. Arrangements to insure cooperation and teamplay on the part of all units to carry out the maneuver of the corps.

(1) 23d Division.
(2) 1st Division.
(3) 3d Division.
(4) Artillery.
(5) Air service—army, corps.
(6) Corps cavalry.

*d.* Field orders: Time of issue, form, brevity, clearness, and completeness.

## *Map*

Operation Map, IV Corps, to accompany F.O. No. 30, follows this page.

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# CHAPTER XXVI

# *Army Signal Communication*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| SECTION I.—Situation and Requirement | 1- 2 |
| SECTION II.—General Considerations for a Solution | 3- 5 |
| SECTION III.—Plan of Signal Communication | 6-12 |
| SECTION IV.—Orders for Signal Troops | 13-15 |


## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirement*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Situation | 1 |
| Requirement | 2 |


1. SITUATION.—The general and special situation of the Third Blue Army and the plan of campaign are as given in Chapter I, the plan of organization and concentration as given in Chapter II, the army advance as given in Chapter IV, and the army attack as given in Chapter VIII.

2. REQUIREMENT.—A discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the Signal Officer of the Third Army as applied to this campaign, and his decisions and orders in the different situations.

## SECTION II

## *General Considerations for a Solution*


| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Situation | 3 |
| Duties and Responsibilities of Army Signal Officer | 4 |
| Signal Personnel | 5 |


3. SITUATION.—On 8 June 1921, the Commanding General of the Third Army, at his temporary headquarters at



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Harrisburg, received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief directing him to destroy the Red forces concentrating around Washington and Baltimore. At this time, the Third Blue Army had just been organized and its various elements were beginning to arrive in the Harrisburg—Lebanon—York—Charlestown—McConnelsburg area. As a preliminary step in the accomplishment of his mission, the army commander decided to concentrate his command in the Monocacy Valley under cover of Parr's Ridge.

4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMY SIGNAL OFFICER.—The duties and responsibilities which devolve upon the army signal officer during the coming campaign may be classified as follows:

*a.* Army Signal Plans and Orders:
(1) Army Plan of Signal Communication.
(2) Army Plan of Signal Supply.
(3) Signal Operation Orders.

*b.* Army Signal Communication Agencies:
(1) Army Message Center.
(2) Army Courier System.
(3) Army Wire System.
(4) Army Radio System.

*c.* Army Signal Supply Service:
(1) Procurement.
(2) Storage.
(3) Distribution.
(4) Salvage.

*d.* Army Radio Intelligence Service.
*e.* Army Meterological Service.
*f.* Army Photographic Service.
*g.* Signal Training.
*h.* Signal Personnel within Army.
(1) Assignments.
(2) Replacements.
(3) Promotions.

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Although all of the duties enumerated would devolve upon the signal officer of the Third Army, this discussion deals only with the army signal communication agencies and the plans and orders affecting them.

5. SIGNAL PERSONNEL.—The organization assigned to an army and the particular duties performed by each unit are as follows:

Headquarters Army Signal Service.—*a.-c.-f.-g.-h.*
2 Signal Battalions—*b.*
1 Radio Company—*d.*
1 Meterological Company—*e.*

NOTE.—The letters in italics refer to the duties as enumerated thereunder in paragraph 4. The pigeon service has been omitted from the enumeration of duties and the army pigeon company from the enumeration of personnel, due to the fact that in this campaign pigeon service could hardly be employed within the army.

## SECTION III

## *Plan of Signal Communication*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Special Considerations | 6 |
| General Plan of Signal Communication | 7 |
| Appendix A, Wire Systems | 8 |
| Appendix C, Pyrotechnic and Panel Signals | 9 |
| Appendix D, Code Names and Special Codes | 10 |
| Discussion of Plan of Signal Communication | 11 |

6. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS.—By 9 June 21, the army signal officer, at army headquarters at Harrisburg, knew what elements would compose the Third Army, and was informed by the army chief of staff of the general plan of the coming campaign. In order to coordinate the work of the various signal communication agencies and systems of all the elements within the army during the campaign it was necessary for him to get out the army plan of signal communication which follows:

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## 7. General Plan of Signal Communication.

### ANNEX NO 5 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 1, THIRD ARMY

### SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Third Army,
Harrisburg, Pa.,
9 June 21, 12:00 Noon.

### GENERAL PLAN

1. General.—*a.* This plan is effective immediately.
   *b.* Any necessary regulation of communication between observation airplanes and front lines will be arranged by corps commanders. Army contact airplanes will carry no distinguishing mark other than the air service emblem. Airplanes employed in the regulation of artillery fire will carry one red streamer on the right wing.
2. Wire Systems.—*a.* Commercial wire systems within the army area will be under the control of the army commander. The army signal officer will arrange that only such lines of commercial systems as are necessary for military service will be utilized; that unused lines are left at the disposal of commercial companies for employment under his supervision; and that lines leading from the army area into territory occupied by hostile forces are discontinued.
   *b.* Under the supervision of the army signal officer, commercial wire systems may be utilized whenever practicable within the divisions not in active contact with the enemy. After contact with the enemy has been gained by a division, such division will habitually employ field lines for wire communication to subordinate units.
   *c.* Cavalry units operating in front or on the flank of the army will take over all telephone and telegraph offices; interrupt all wire lines leading toward territory occupied by hostile forces, and make all possible use of these communications to the rear, and turn over the systems to the signal troops of advancing units.
   *d.* For code names of units, individuals, and localities, for use over telephone and telegraph lines, see Appendix D.

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3. RADIO SYSTEMS.—*a.* For the technical details of radio operation, see Appendix B (omitted).
   *b.* Time signals will be broadcast by XMY daily, at 12:00 noon.
   *a.* Meteorological data will be broadcast by the Army station daily, at 4:00 AM, and at 1:00 PM.
   *d.* For call letters and wave lengths, see Appendix B.
   *e.* Press will be received by army and corps stations. Press summaries will be sent by courier from corps to divisions and other subordinate units.
4. PANELS.—*a.* For the designation of identification panels for units of corps and divisions, see Signal Communication for All Arms, Appendix. Divisions of a corps will assume identification panels in accordance with their position in line. Corps and division commanders will designate identification panels for units of corps and division artillery respectively.
   *b.* Artillery panels, Table 13, Series 6 and 7, with the addition, when necessary of one finger (see Table 14), are assigned the right and left corps.
   *c.* Artillery panels, Table 13, Series 8 and 9, with the addition, when necessary, of one finger (see Table 14), are assigned the center corps.
   *d.* Army artillery panels are designated as follows:
   901st Arty—Series 6 with two fingers.
   902d Arty—Series 7 with two fingers.
   903d Arty—Series 6 with three fingers.
   *e.* For the prescribed panel signals made from infantry command posts to observation airplane, see paragraph 3, Appendix C hereof.
5. VISUAL SIGNALLING.—For call letters, see Appendix B, Par 3 hereof.
6. PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS.—For the code of pyrotechnic signals, see Appendix C, par 1, hereof.
7. PIGEONS.—Pigeons are not available for use within this army at this time.
8. CODES.—The following codes will be used until further orders:
   *a.* Army Tactical Code: Employed in accordance with instructions issued with each code book.
   *b.* Army Field Code: No 1 for immediate use; No 2 in reserve.
   *c.* Map Coordinate Code: No 224, see Appendix D.
   *d.* Airplane Code: T, See Appendix D.
   *e.* Code Names: See Appendix D.

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9. REPORTS.—The report of technical systems will be submitted by signal officers of each unit to signal officers of the next higher unit at 9:00 PM daily, to cover work as of 6:00 PM.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
SO
Signal Officer.
Distribution: (omitted).

8. APPENDIX A, WIRE SYSTEMS.

ANNEX NO 5 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 1, THIRD ARMY

## SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Third Army,
HARRISBURG, PA.,
9 June 21, 12:00 Noon.

### Appendix A

### WIRE SYSTEMS

1. Installation and maintenance, normal.

(NOTE: Any special technical instructions concerning the installation, operation, or maintenance of wire systems is given here. In this problem it is considered that the usual normal practice will be followed.)

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
SO
Signal Officer.
Distribution: (omitted).

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9. APPENDIX C, RADIO AND PANEL SIGNALS.

ANNEX NO 5 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 1, THIRD ARMY

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Third Army,
HARRISBURG, PA.,
9 June 21, 12:00 noon.

**Appendix C**

PYROTECHNIC AND PANEL SIGNALS

1. PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS FROM THE GROUND.

| | |
|---|---|
| (a) Request artillery counter preparation fire in my front. | (a) One (1) red caterpillar rocket from rocket posts established by supporting artillery. |
| (b) Request artillery barrage fire in my front. | (b) One (1) red star rocket from rocket posts established by supporting artillery. |
| (c) Friendly artillery fire falling short. | (c) Three (3) red star rocket or V B cartridge from bn or regtl command post or artillery rocket posts; Very pistol from command posts of lower units. |
| (d) Lengthen artillery fire. I wish to advance. | (d) One red streamer rocket or V B cartridge from bn or regtl command post or artillery rocket posts. |
| (e) Am unable to advance. | (e) One (1) white star rocket or V B cartridge from bn or regtl command post; Very pistol from command post of lower units. |

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| | |
|---|---|
| (f) Enemy in retreat here. | (f) Green streamer rocket or V B cartridge from bn or regtl command post. One (1) green star Very pistol cartridge from command posts of lower units. |
| (g) I am here (marking front lines in mist, smoke, woods or at night). | (g) Red position lights (Bengal flares) made by extreme front lines only. |

2. PYROTECHNIC SIGNALS FROM AIRPLANE.

| | |
|---|---|
| (a) Where are you (call for marking front lines). | (a) Six (6) white stars. |
| (b) Understood. | (b) Three (3) white stars. |
| (c) Enemy concentration here (call for artillery fire). | (c) Red caterpillar. |
| (d) Enemy battery here. | (d) Smoke, bomb or grenade. |
| (e) Enemy in retreat here. | (e) Green streamer. |

3. PANEL SIGNALS FROM INFANTRY COMMAND POSTS.—(See Signal Communication for All Arms. Appendix Table 10, Code A.)

No 1 Where are my front lines?
No 2 Where are the command posts of my units?
No 3 What do you see on my right?
No 4 What do you see on my left?
No 5 What do you see in my front?
No 6 Report to the next higher unit that I am ready to advance.
No 7 Report to next higher unit that I am unable to advance.
No 8 } Significance to be designated as circumstances
No 9 } dictate, during the campaign at option of division commanders.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
SO
Signal Officer.
Distribution: (omitted).

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10. APPENDIX D, CODE NAMES AND SPECIAL CODES.

ANNEX NO 5 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 1, THIRD ARMY

## SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Third Army,
HARRISBURG, PA.,
9 June 21, 12:00 Noon.

**Appendix D**

### CODE NAMES AND SPECIAL CODES

1. CODE NAMES.

The following code names for units, individuals and localities are prescribed.

*a. Code Names for Units.*—Under this head are tabulated code names for all units within the army. This list is voluminous and is omitted here.

*b. Code Names for Individuals.*—Code designations for individuals consist of the code name of the unit of which the individual is a member followed by the numbers in the following list. This number list will be employed within corps.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commanding Gen (Officer) | No 1 | Inspector | No 12 |
| | | Judge Advocate | No 13 |
| Aide | No 2 | Quartermaster | No 14 |
| Chief of Staff | No 3 | Surgeon | No 15 |
| Deputy Chief of Staff | No 4 | Engineer | No 16 |
| | | Finance Officer | No 17 |
| Secy Gen Staff | No 5 | Chemical Officer | No 18 |
| G1 | No 6 | Ordnance Officer | No 19 |
| G2 | No 7 | Chief Air Service | No 20 |
| G3 | No 8 | Provost Marshal | No 21 |
| G4 | No 9 | Machine Gun Officer | No 22 |
| Signal Officer | No 10 | Postal Officer | No 23 |
| Adjutant | No 11 | Message Center | No 24 |

*c. Code Names for Localities.*—Under this head are tabulated the code names for all important towns and localities in the area in which the army is or will soon be operating (omitted).

2. SPECIAL CODES.—The following special codes are prescribed until changed by subsequent orders:

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*a.* Airplane Code, "T" — attached (omitted).
(In addition to conventional codes prescribed by Air Service, Artillery, and Signal Corps Manuals.)
*b.* Map Coordinate Code: No 224—attached (omitted).

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
SO
Signal Officer.
Distribution: (omitted).

11. DISCUSSION OF PLAN OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATION. —*a.* In analyzing the plan of signal communication as given above, it is evident that the various instructions contained therein are general and that their application will continue throughout the campaign, whether the phase of action be that of concentration, advance, attack, defense, or withdrawal. Therefore, this plan is published as an annex to Army Field Orders No. 1, and continues in force until changed by subsequent changes or additions, which will be published as annexes to field orders issued at the time of their adoption.

*b.* When this plan is once published, its detailed application, with reference to the employment of the different communication agencies within the army, becomes routine.

*c.* The formulation of the plan of signal communication, excepting the general plan as drawn up with reference to wire systems, is practically independent of the tactical features of the campaign. The general plan for the installation and employment of wire communication, however, depends mainly upon the existence or non-existence of commercial wire systems in the combat area. In the situation as presented by this problem, it is assumed that commercial wire lines exist, since the territory is friendly and enemy activity has been reported only close to Baltimore and Washington. No doubt the enemy has taken over the commercial systems as far forward as the general line Reisterstown—Gaithersburg, has interrupted their use east of this line, and is making use of them to the rear. Should the Blue army commander be successful in his mis-

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sion, he will occupy Baltimore. In the fighting between Reisterstown and Baltimore the wire lines, without doubt, will be destroyed. During the fighting, the divisions install their own field wire lines, which will be taken over and employed by corps as the divisions advance, until the corps can substitute their normal overhead bare wire construction for the field wire lines. Hence the instructions given in the general plan with reference to wire systems. Should the situation have been such that the existence of commercial wire systems could not be assumed, a different plan with reference to the wire system would necessarily have been formulated.

## SECTION IV

## *Orders for Signal Troops*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| General Considerations | 12 |
| Signal Orders for the Concentration | 13 |
| Signal Orders for the Advance | 14 |

12. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.—*a*. The plan of signal communication does not contain instructions applying particularly to single operations, but to all operations of the campaign. Further instructions with reference to signal communication agencies for each operation of the campaign are necessary. These instructions are drawn up by the army signal officer, and under the caption "Signal Orders" are published as annexes to the army field orders for the operation.

*b*. Therefore, as soon as the army headquarters was established at Harrisburg, the army signal officer published signal orders for the operation and maintenance of the army signal agencies in that area, and attached thereto line route maps of the existing commercial system and a circuit diagram showing its rearrangement into the army system. It should be borne in mind that these orders referred to the signal agencies in this situation only, and should

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not be confused with the plan of signal communication for this campaign, which has been previously discussed.

*c.* It is evident that the establishment of the message center, courier and radio systems is quite automatic and requires little special arrangement.

*d.* The wire system, however, presents a different aspect, and requires a careful rearrangement of the existing commercial system to meet the requirements of the army. Circuits must be re-routed (i.e., lines joined to other lines or cut at certain points) and additional central exchanges established, in order to give as efficient wire communication as possible.

*e.* When the army headquarters is established at Harrisburg two courses with reference to the establishment of wire communications are open to the army signal officer, viz., to construct an army wire system or to take over and rearrange the commercial system existing in the area. The army commander intended to move out of that area in a few days and to concentrate the army in the Monocacy Valley. The army signal officer, therefore, decided to take over the existing commercial system and to rearrange it for use during the short period of time that the army remains in the Harrisburg area. On account of this short period only a small amount of rearrangement can be accomplished. This probably will consist merely in taking over and operating the commercial central exchanges as they exist in the area and making certain rearrangement of circuits.

*f.* After establishing the army signal communication agencies in the Harrisburg — Lebanon — York — Charlestown—McConnelsburg area, the next problem that confronts the army signal officer, with respect to these agencies, is their establishment in the area of the Monocacy Valley, where the concentration of the Third Army is to take place as ordered in Field Orders No. 1, Third Army, 9 June 21, and the accompanying Organization and Concentration Table.

*g.* Under the provisions of this order, army headquarters is to close at Harrisburg and open at Emmitsburg

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(forward echelon) and at Chambersburg (rear echelon) on June 11. The headquarters of the army cavalry divisions do not open in the new area until June 13, of the II, III and IV Corps June 15, and of the I Corps June 16. Therefore by 11 June signal communication must be established from army headquarters to army cavalry and corps headquarters remaining in the old area until June 13, 15 and 16, respectively, and upon these dates signal communications must be established from army headquarters to army cavalry and corps headquarters in the new area. This also applies to signal communication from army headquarters to the headquarters of the army reserve divisions as the change from the old to the new is made.

*h.* Therefore the necessary instructions for the movement of the army signal communication agencies from the old area to the new area would be included in the signal orders mentioned in paragraph *b* above.

*i.* The wire charts mentioned in the following signal order are Line Route Map No 1, the chart of the existing commercial system in the Harrisburg—Lebanon—York—Charlestown—McConnelsbuurg area; Circuit Diagram No. 1, showing the desired rearrangement of the commercial system into the army system in that area; Line Route Map No. 2, showing the existing commercial system in the Monocacy Valley area; Circuit Diagram No. 2, showing the desired rearrangement of the commercial system into the army system in that area and the necessary connecting trunk lines from the first to the second area.

13. SIGNAL ORDERS FOR THE CONCENTRATION.—The signal order appears as follows:

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## ANNEX NO 5 TO FIELD ORDERS NO 1, THIRD ARMY

## SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Third Army,
HARRISBURG, PA.,
9 June 21, 12:00 noon.

### SIGNAL ORDERS

**Maps: General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam; Geological Survey, 1:62500; Operation Maps No 1A and 1B, Third Army, accompanying FO No 1.**

1. (a) Red forces have landed on west shore CHESAPEAKE BAY, seizing BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON. Red advance detachments reported on general line GUNPOWDER FALLS—REISTERSTOWN — COOKSVILLE — ROCKVILLE—MANASSAS—RAPPHANNOCK RIVER.

(b) The Third Blue Army is at present located as shown in Table of Troops and Railroad Concentration, Third Army appended hereto (omitted, see Chapter I). It will be organized and concentrated in the MONOCACY VALLEY area as per Organization and Concentration Table, Third Army appended hereto (omitted, see Chapter II) for the purpose of attacking the Reds indicated above.

(c) Command Posts will change from their present location as follows:

Third Army (a) Forward Echelon after 11:00 AM, 11 June 21: EMMITSBURG.
(b) Rear Echelon after 11:00 AM, 11 June 21: CHAMBERSBURG.

2d Cavalry Division—after 12:00 noon, 13 June: UNION MILLS.

1st Cavalry Division—after 6:00 PM, 13 June: NEW MARKET.

III Corps—after 8:00 AM, 16 June: FREDERICK.

IV Corps—after 8:00 PM, 16 June: TANEYTOWN.

II Corps—after 8:00 PM, 16 June: LITTLESTOWN.

I Corps—after 11:00 PM, 15 June: HANOVER.

4th Division, army reserve—after 8:00 AM, 17 June: FAIRPLAY.

25th Division, army reserve—after 10:00 AM, 14 June: GETTYSBURG.

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(d) Administrative establishments in accordance with Administrative Orders No 2, Third Army, extracts attached hereto (omitted).

2. Army signal troops will install and operate army signal communication systems in the present area and in the MONOCACY VALLEY area as the movements to the latter area occur.

3. (a) *The 701st Signal Battalion* (less message center and one radio section) will take station at HARRISBURG until further orders. It will immediately begin to take over, rearrange, and operate the commercial wire system in the HARRISBURG—LEBANON—YORK —CHARLESTOWN—MCCONNELSBURG area in accordance with Circuit Diagram No 1 appended hereto (omitted), and will establish and operate such additional lines or central exchanges as may be designated later.

(b) *The 702d Signal Battalion* (less message center and one radio section) will proceed immediately to EMMITSBURG and will take station at that place until further orders, movement by battalion motor transportation via GETTYSBURG JUNCTION—GETTYSBURG. Upon arrival at EMMITSBURG the battalion will take over, rearrange, and operate the wire system in the MONOCACY VALLEY area in accordance with Circuit Diagram No 2 appended hereto (omitted), and will establish and operate as may be designated later. Army central exchanges at EMMITSBURG, CHAMBERSBURG, and GETTYSBURG, and connecting trunk lines from GETTYSBURG to HARRISBURG as indicated on Circuit Diagram No 2 will be in operation by 11:00 AM, 11 June. Wire lines from EMMITSBURG (AHQ) to headquarters of corps, cavalry division, army reserve division, and army administrative establishments, will be in operation at such times as indicated for the opening of the headquarters of these units and establishments in the MONOCACY VALLEY area.

(c) *The Message Center (Section) 701st Signal Battalion* will operate the army message center at HARRISBURG until the army headquarters ceases to function at that station, at which time it will report to the army signal officer at EMMITSBURG.

(d) *The Message Center (Section) 702d Signal Battalion* will proceed with the 702d Signal Battalion

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to EMMITSBURG and will open the army message center at EMMITSBURG and the message center of the rear echelon of army headquarters at CHAMBERSBURG at 11:00 AM, 11 June.

(e) *The Radio Section 701st Signal Battalion* will operate the army stations at HARRISBURG until the army headquarters ceases to function at that station, at which time it will report to the army radio officer at EMMITSBURG.

(f) *The Radio Section 702d Signal Battalion* will proceed with the 702d Signal Battalion to EMMITSBURG and will open the army radio stations at that place at 11:00 AM, 11 June.

(g) The 701st Radio Company (omitted. The radio intelligence service is not considered in this discussion).

(h) The 701st Meteorological Company (omitted. The meteorological service is not considered in this discussion).

(x) Railroad wire lines will not be employed in the normal communication system but will be left at the disposition of the transportation service.

4. Army Signal Depot No 1—HARRISBURG.
   After 11:00 AM 11 June—GETTYSBURG.

5. Army Signal Office—HARRISBURG.
   After 11:00 AM 11 June—EMMITSBURG.

By command of General A:

X,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
SO
Signal Officer.

Distribution: (omitted).

14. SIGNAL ORDERS FOR THE ADVANCE.—*a.* On 22 June 21 the army is located in the Monocacy Valley area indicated by the Location Table, Third Army of 22 June 21, 4:00 PM, as given in Chapter IV. The army signal communication systems have been established in accordance with the signal orders given above. The 702d Signal Battalion is operating the signal communication systems in the concentration area, and the 701st Signal Battalion is held in reserve at Emmitsburg. Advanced elements of the Third Army have been pushing forward toward Baltimore and have located

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Red forces in position on the general line Dayton—Reisterstown.

*b.* General A decides to advance and attack the Red forces where found. He issues Field Orders No. 5, Third Army, Emmitsburg, 22 June 21, 10:00 PM, accompanied by March Table Third Army 23 to 25 June 21, as given in Chapter IV. The army signal officer issues the usual signal orders as an annex to Field Orders No. 5, Third Army (omitted).

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# CHAPTER XXVII

# *Army Plan of Campaign and Concentration*


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| SECTION II. | —A Solution to First Requirement | 8-13 |
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## SECTION I

## *Situation and Requirements*


| | Paragraphs |
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| General Situation | 1 |
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| Requirements | 3 |
| Economic Statistics of the Blue State | 4 |
| Economic Statistics of the Red State | 5 |
| Organizations and Mobilization Centers of the Blue Army | 6 |
| Organizations and Mobilization Centers of the Red Army | 7 |


1. GENERAL SITUATION.

*a. Maps.*—Attached General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, which shows counties. Geological Survey, 1:62500, of same area.

*b.* The Maryland—Pennsylvania line is the boundary between two small independent states, Blues to the north, Reds to the south. There is a threat of war between the two states, but neither state has shown any outward signs of preparing for war.

*c.* The territory of the Blue state corresponds exactly with the area shown on the General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam north of the Maryland—Pennsylvania State line.



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*d.* The territory of the Red state embraces all the territory shown on the General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam south of the Maryland—Pennsylvania State line, except the territory east of Chesapeake Bay, that south of the Potomac River, and the District of Columbia.

*e.* Harrisburg is the capital of the Blue state, and Baltimore is the capital of the Red state. The political subdivisions of the two states into counties are shown on the attached General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam.

*f.* The economic statistics of the two states for the year 1919-1920 are shown in attached tables (Note: The data are taken from 1910 census).

*g.* Treaty rights keep the Chesapeake Bay open to the Reds during peace and war, except for certain limitations designed to preserve the neutrality of the state to the east. (Note: The Potomac river is not navigable above Washington.)

*h.* Both states have a National Army comprising all men, between the ages of 18 and 48, fit for military service. These men have been trained for war under a system of universal military training. The regular army of both states consists only of a training cadre for conducting the personnel of the National armies, plus certain technical and supply personnel to care for equipment and supplies.

*i.* Both states have attempted to keep the organization and mobilization centers of their national armies secret. It is generally known, however, that the Blues have a National Army of 200,000 to 250,000 men, organized into a cavalry division and two corps, with 5 to 7 divisions and the necessary army troops; and that the Reds have a National Army of some 150,000 to 200,000 men, with an organization corresponding to a reinforced corps comprising a reinforced cavalry brigade, four or five divisions, the normal corps troops, and certain additional army troops. Both states are prepared to mobilize their respective national armies promptly.

*j.* Both states are well equipped with all munitions of war and are prepared to continue manufacture during war.

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Factories for the manufacture of munitions of war are located at the industrial centers.

*k.* No attempt has been made by either state to fortify its frontiers.

*l.* Neither state has a navy.

2. SPECIAL SITUATION.—*a.* On April 5, 1921, the commander of the Blue army is informed that, without doubt, war will be declared between the Blue and Red states about May 1, 1921, so he is directed to recommend at once a plan of campaign against the Red state.

*b.* The commander of the Blue army has the secret information in attached tables showing the organization and mobilization centers of the Blue army and the estimated organizations and mobilization centers of the Red army. The data on the Red army have been compiled from reliable secret service information and other reliable sources.

*c.* All Blue divisions, except the 4th Division, can be mobilized and prepared to march within 36 hours after orders are received at division headquarters. The 4th Division, and corps and army troops, require 48 hours. If mobilization orders are marked "Rush," the assembly of the divisions proceeds continuously night and day.

*d.* Reliable information indicates that all Red divisions, except the 5th, may be mobilized and prepared to march within 36 hours, and that the 5th Red Division, and Red corps and army troops, require about 48 hours.

3. REQUIREMENTS.

*a. First Requirement.*—A brief discussion of the situation with respect to a plan of campaign for the Blue army. This to include a brief discussion of the salient points of the following subjects:

(1) Military geography.

(2) Lines of movement and supply.

(3) Economics (consider data given in attached tables only).

(4) The military situation.

(5) Plans open to the Commander.

(6) The Decision.

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*b. Second Requirement.*—Field Orders for the organization and concentration of the Blue army to carry out the plan of campaign decided upon. Include concentration tables and operation map showing location of troops after concentration is completed. Omit all annexes and Administrative Order.

NOTE (1) Use General Map Gettysburg-Antietam, and Geological Survey Map, 1:62500, covering part of same area, for discussion of the situation and draft of field orders.

NOTE (2) Assume that both nations have sufficient railway rolling stock to make any rail troop movements desired.

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(All figures given in thousands except as is otherwise apparent.)

| | Franklin | Adams | Cumberland | York | Lancaster | Chester | Berks | Lebanon | Dauphin | Schuylkill | Perry | Juniata | Huntington | Fulton | Mifflin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total population | 59 | 34 | 54 | 136 | 167 | 21 | 125 | 59 | 136 | 51 | 24 | 15 | 19 | 3 | 18 |
| No. of inhabitants per sq. mi. | 45–90 | 45–90 | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 90 and over | 18–45 | 18–45 | 18–45 | 18–45 | 45–90 |
| Total land area, acres | 480 | 338 | 338 | 378 | 602 | 99 | 184 | 230 | 333 | 124 | 360 | 250 | 294 | 85 | 127 |
| Percent of land area in farms | 80.2 | 83.4 | 77.9 | 92.1 | 91.4 | 85.2 | 82.8 | 75.3 | 64.3 | 43.5 | 69.3 | 69 | 58 | 76.5 | 56.4 |
| Percent of farm land improved | 76.7 | 80.8 | 86.8 | 81.5 | 85.9 | 82.9 | 83.2 | 85.7 | 79.5 | 65.8 | 58.7 | 59.7 | 50.1 | 54.4 | 65.7 |
| Cattle, No. | 29 | 24 | 23 | 45 | 66 | 13 | 15 | 18 | 20 | 3 | 14 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 5 |
| Horses, No. | 16 | 9 | 10 | 16 | 24 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Mules, No. | 1 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 7 | ..... | 1 | 2 | 1 | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Swine, No. | 34 | 22 | 24 | 48 | 47 | 4 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 2 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 4 |
| Sheep, No. | 21 | 7 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 1 | ..... | ..... | 1 | ..... | 4 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 2 |
| Cereals, bu. | 3,211 | 2,748 | 2,551 | 5,224 | 192 | 723 | 1,271 | 1,645 | 1,611 | 209 | 1,377 | 952 | 622 | 210 | 452 |
| Hay and forage, tons | 75 | 60 | 53 | 101 | 35 | 28 | 36 | 43 | 48 | 10 | 32 | 20 | 16 | 5 | 10 |
| Potatoes, bushels | 218 | 170 | 203 | 732 | 253 | 147 | 219 | 162 | 188 | 496 | 109 | 89 | 87 | 25 | 41 |
| Males of military age | 16 | 9 | 15 | 38 | 47 | 7 | 32 | 17 | 42 | 15 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 8 |

All industries combined in Blue cities of 10,000 and more inhabitants.

(Money Values in Thousands of Dollars)

| | Harrisburg | Reading | Carlisle | Chambersburg | Columbia | Lancaster | Lebanon | York |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population | 64,186 | 96,071 | 10,303 | 11,500 | 11,454 | 47,227 | 19,240 | 44,750 |
| No. of establishments | 199 | 482 | 50 | 57 | 47 | 306 | 109 | 218 |
| Value of products | 22,725 | 51,135 | 2,496 | 2,456 | 4,807 | 15,979 | 11,429 | 18,622 |

Note: There is a very important anthracite coal mining region in the northern part of Dauphin County. No other important mineral production in any other part of the Blue State.

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## 5. Economic Statistics of the Red State.

**(All figures given in thousands except as is otherwise apparent.)**

| | *Cecil* | *Harford* | *Baltimore* | *Carroll* | *Frederick* | *Washington* | *Howard* | *Montgomery* | *Anne Arundel* | *Prince George* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total population | 12 | 28 | 681 | 34 | 53 | 40 | 16 | 32 | 39 | 24 |
| No. of inhabitants per sq. mi. | 45–90 | 45–90 | 90 and over | 45–90 | 45–90 | 90 and over | 45–90 | 45–90 | 90 and over | 45–90 |
| Total land area, acres | 120 | 282 | 419 | 286 | 424 | 236 | 160 | 333 | 276 | 206 |
| Percent of land area in farms | 81.1 | 87.4 | 78.5 | 96.6 | 88.3 | 78.7 | 93.2 | 82 | 75.3 | 77.8 |
| Percent of farm land improved | 72.1 | 69.4 | 70.6 | 81.6 | 80.5 | 83.0 | 76.5 | 76.8 | 66.8 | 64.3 |
| Cattle, No. | 8 | 21 | 26 | 22 | 34 | 17 | 8 | 18 | 7 | 6 |
| Horses, No. | 4 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 17 | 11 | 5 | 11 | 5 | 4 |
| Mules, No. | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | | | 1 | |
| Swine, No. | 6 | 17 | 21 | 26 | 31 | 26 | 6 | 16 | 8 | 3 |
| Sheep, No. | 2 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 10 | 17 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 3 |
| Cereals, bu. | 707 | 1,569 | 1,996 | 2,714 | 3,539 | 1,995 | 1,103 | 2,215 | 503 | 532 |
| Hay and forage tons | 14 | 39 | 63 | 49 | 65 | 24 | 19 | 30 | 9 | 88 |
| Potatoes, bushels | 62 | 181 | 468 | 261 | 218 | 201 | 91 | 194 | 77 | 184 |
| Males of military age | 3 | 8 | 97 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 4 | 8 | 11 | 6 |

**All industries combined in Red cities of 10,000 and more inhabitants.**

**(Money Values in Thousands of Dollars)**

| | *Baltimore* | *Frederick* | *Hagerstown* |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Population** | 558,485 | 11,531 | 16,507 |
| **No. of establishments** | 2,502 | 55 | 76 |
| **Value of products** | 186,988 | 2,911 | 3,197 |

Note: The above statistics of the Blue and Red States were approximated from the 1910 Census statistics, those of the 1920 Census not being available. Attention is invited to the fact that by no means all the economic factors that enter into a real situation of this kind are given. This is partly due to an inability to segregate certain of these factors for the area appearing on the map from those [illegible] and partly to a desire [illegible]

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## 6. Organizations and Mobilization Centers of the Blue Army.

| *Units* | *Counties from which drawn* | *Mobilization Centers* |
|---|---|---|
| Army Headquarters. | Various counties. | Harrisburg. |
| Army Troops: | Various counties. | |
| (1) Air service: | | |
| 2 Obsn Sq | | Harrisburg. |
| 1 Atk Gp | | Harrisburg. |
| 1 Bln Gp | | Lebanon. |
| 1 Bomb Gp. | | Lebanon. |
| 1 Pur Gp. | | Carlisle. |
| (2) Army Artillery: | Lebanon and Dauphin. | Lebanon. |
| 1 Regt. 155-mm guns | | |
| 1 Regt. 8" howitzers | | |
| 1 Regt. A-AA | | |
| 1 Army Arty Park | | |
| (3) 2 Bns L Tks | Dauphin and Lancaster. | Harrisburg. |
| (4) Army Tn | Dauphin and Lancaster. | Harrisburg. |
| (A number of other supply and technical troops omitted as they do not effect the problem.) | | |
| 1st Cav Div. | Franklin, Adams, York, Dauphin and Lancaster. | York Springs. |
| I CHQ | Counties west of Susquehanna. | Carlisle. |
| I Corps Trs (see note). | Counties west of Susquehanna. | Carlisle. |
| II CHQ | Counties east of Susquehanna. | Lebanon. |
| II Corps Trs (See note). | Counties east of Susquehanna. | Lebanon. |
| 1st Div. | Fulton, Franklin, Cumberland and Huntington. | Shippensburg. |
| 2d Div. | York and Lancaster. | York. |
| 3d Div. | Lancaster and Chester. | Lancaster. |
| 4th Div. | Huntington, Mifflin, Juniata, Perry and Dauphin. | New Port. |
| 5th Div. | Dauphin and Lebanon. | Harrisburg. |
| 6th Div. | Berks and Schuylkill. | Reading. |

Note: Blue organizations are the same as those used at our General Service Schools except that corps troops have one cavalry regiment and one chemical ammunition train attached, and a great many of the army troops are not provided for. All army troops affecting the problem are given above.

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## 7. Organizations and Mobilization Centers of the Red Army.

### (A reinforced corps)

Organizations and mobilization centers as indicated by reliable information.

| *Units* | *Counties from which Drawn* | *Mobilization Centers* |
|---|---|---|
| Army Headquarters. | Various counties. | Baltimore. |
| Army Troops: | Various counties but principally from Baltimore Co. | Baltimore. |
| (1) Normal Corps Troops plus Chemical Ammunition Tn. | | |
| (2) Additional army troops: | | |
| a. Air Service: | | Baltimore. |
| 1 Obsn Sq. | | |
| 1 Atk Gp. | | |
| 1 Bomb Gp. | | |
| 1 Bln Gp. | | |
| 1 Pur Gp | | |
| b. Army Arty: | | Baltimore. |
| 1 Regt 155-mm guns | | |
| 1 Bn 8" howitzers. | | |
| 1 Regt A—AA. | | |
| 1 AA Prk | | |
| c. Army Tn | | Baltimore. |
| d. 2 Bns L Tks. | | Baltimore. |
| 1st Cav Brig (reinforced to equal ½ division) | Washington, Carrol, Frederick, and Baltimore. | Westminster. |
| 1st Div. | Cecil, Harford, Baltimore. | Belair. |
| 2d Div. | Baltimore. | Baltimore. |
| 3d Div. | Baltimore. | Baltimore. |
| 4th Div. | Montgomery, Howard, Prince George, Anne Arundel and Baltimore. | Laurel. |
| 5th Div. | Frederick, Montgomery, Washington and Carrol. | Frederick. |

Note: The Red organizations are the same as those used at our General Service Schools. The Red army is a reinforced corps, with the reinforced cavalry brigade, and the additional army troops, as given above, plus certain other technical and supply troops not given, as they do not affect the problem.

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## SECTION II

## *A Solution to First Requirement*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Military Geography | 8 |
| Lines of Movement and Supply | 9 |
| Economics | 10 |
| Military Situation | 11 |
| Plans Open to the Commander | 12 |
| The Decision | 13 |

8. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.—*a.* The boundary between the Blue and Red states is a straight line located without respect to natural features of the terrain, hence its location gives no strategical advantages to either side. In general, the geographical features of one state extend into the other. The territory of both states will be considered as a whole.

*b.* The main ridges and mountain ranges of this territory extend from the southwest to northeast. They are Parrs Ridge (which, in fact, continues on from Westminster towards the northeast and crosses the Susquehanna east of Red Lion); the Catoctin Mountains, Blue Ridge Mountains, and South Mountain chain; and the series of five parallel mountain ranges in the northwestern part of the area, the first of which crosses the Susquehanna above Harrisburg, continuing on and crossing the Schuylkill River at Port Clinton. These ridges are separated by broad valleys. From Parrs Ridge (and its extension to the Susquehanna) a broken plane slopes towards the southeast to Chesapeake Bay.

*c.* The main streams of the area are the Potomac, the Susquehanna, with its tributary the Juniata, and the Schuylkill Rivers, which break through the above ridges and mountain ranges and flow in a general direction from the northwest towards the southeast. Between the Potomac and the Susquehanna, the Monocacy, the Conewago, and other secondary streams, which drain the valleys between

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the parallel ridges and mountain ranges, flow in a general northeasterly or southwesterly direction, as do also the minor streams east of the Susquehanna. Minor streams flowing into the above secondary streams, and the minor streams draining the plane between Parrs Ridge (and its extension to the Susquehanna) and Chesapeake Bay, flow in a general southeasterly or northwesterly direction.

*d.* The geographical features show: (1) That, should an army attempt to advance west of the Susquehanna from the southeast towards the northwest, or from the northwest towards the southeast, it would encounter, between the Susquehanna and the Potomac, the strong natural defensive lines of the main ridges and mountain ranges, and the secondary streams between them. The mountain ranges are very strong barriers, while Parrs Ridge, and its extension to the Susquehanna, and the secondary streams draining the valleys between the ridges and mountain ranges, are strong natural defensive lines. An advance from Parrs Ridge toward Chesapeake Bay would encounter practically no strong natural defensive lines, except that of the North Branch Patapsco.

(2) An advance from the southwest towards the northeast, or from the northeast towards the southwest, between the main ridges and mountain ranges, would be comparatively easy until the line of the Susquehanna is reached, for the only natural lines of defense encountered are those found along the minor streams. On the plane between Parrs Ridge (and its extension to the Susquehanna) and Chesapeake Bay, these minor streams offer fairly strong natural lines of defense. The Susquehanna is a strong natural defensive line.

(3) An advance from the north to the south, or from the south to the north, would encounter all of the above defensive lines, but at an oblique angle.

(4) East of the Susquehanna, an advance from the southeast towards the northwest, or from the northwest towards the southeast, would encounter the natural lines of defense of the minor streams in the southern and cen-

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tral part, and the strong natural barriers of the mountains in the northern part.

*e.* The above study of the geographical features of the two states shows: (1) That that part of the Blue state west of the Susquehanna is open to attack from the southwest, especially from the direction of Hagerstown towards Shippensburg and Carlisle, and from Taneytown and Ebbvale towards Dillsburg and York, while it is protected from attacks from the southeast, to a greater or less extent, by the extension of Parrs Ridge to the Susquehanna and by the mountain ranges and the secondary streams draining the valleys between them. The mountain ranges form strong natural barriers, thus making the northwestern part of the Blue state practically free from invasion.

(2) The Blue territory, east of the Susquehanna, is protected from attack from the south and southwest, to a great extent, by the strong natural defensive line of the Susquehanna. This part of the Blue territory, east of the Susquehanna, is protected from attack from the southeast, to a small extent, by the natural defensive lines offered by the minor streams flowing into the Susquehanna; and, to a much greater extent, by the location of the Susquehanna, which subjects a Red force, operating from the southeast, to the danger of being cut off from its own country and source of supply.

(3) The Red territory, west of Parrs Ridge, is open to attack from the northeast, especially from Chambersburg towards Hagerstown, and from Gettysburg—Hanover towards Frederick—Mount Airy.

(4) The Red territory, between Parrs Ridge, Chesapeake Bay and the Susquehanna, is protected from attack from the northwest, to a great extent, by the natural defensive line of Parrs Ridge. Should this defensive line be lost, however, there is no strong natural defensive line between Parrs Ridge and Chesapeake Bay (except the minor one of North Branch Patapsco) for defense against attack from the northwest. This part of the Red territory is protected from attack from the northeast by the Susquehanna River, and, to a greater or less extent, by the natural lines of de-

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fense along the streams flowing from Parrs Ridge (and its extension) towards the southeast. It is protected from attack from the north, to a less extent, by the oblique lines of Parrs Ridge and the small streams flowing southeast from same; also by the ridges south of Western Run and Green Spring Valley.

(5) Cecil County, Red territory east of the Susquehanna, is open to attack from the northeast. From a defensive standpoint, this part of the Red territory is an element of weakness. From an offensive standpoint, this territory offers a bridgehead to the Reds for invasion of Blue territory east of the Susquehanna. The Reds cannot afford to take advantage of this bridgehead, however, before they have seized the extension of Parrs Ridge southeast of York.

9. LINES OF MOVEMENT AND SUPPLY.—The lines of movement and supply of the two states also are considered as a whole, since those of one state extend into the other. Hence, together, they form a complete system.

*a.* Important railroad lines are as follows: (1) Those extending from the southwest to the northeast; running from Hagerstown through Shippensburg, Harrisburg, Lebanon and Reading; from Point of Rocks through Frederick, York and Lancaster; and from Washington through Baltimore and Havre de Grace.

(2) Those extending from the southeast towards the northwest on both sides of the Susquehanna; those from Baltimore through Keymar, Highfield and Chambersburg; and those from Washington along the Potomac.

(3) Railroad centers, with railroads radiating in several directions, are Reading, Lancaster, Lebanon, Harrisburg, York, Gettysburg, Carlisle, and Chambersburg, in the Blue state; and Baltimore, Keymar, Frederick, and Hagerstown, in the Red state.

(4) An important point to note, in connection with the railroad net, is that there are no railroad lines crossing the Catoctin and South Mountains between Hunters Run and Highfield, and between Highfield and Point of Rocks; also, that only one line of railroads, with its branches

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is available to the northwestern part of the Blue territory. An electric railway, however, runs from Frederick to Hagerstown.

*b.* The greater part of the main highways follow, in general, the routes mentioned above for the railroads. Main highways from York and Lancaster, extending southeast on either side of the Susquehanna to Chesapeake Bay, appear to be limited. Main highway centers are Harrisburg, York, Hanover, Gettysburg, Carlisle, Shippensburg, Chambersburg and Greencastle, in the Blue state; and Baltimore, Westminster, Frederick, Thurmont and Hagerstown, in the Red state.

*c.* The above study indicates that the lines of movement and supply favor an advance as follows: (1) Against the Blue state, from Hagerstown towards Shippensburg and Carlisle; from Emmitsburg—Ebbvale towards Dillsburg—York; and from Baltimore toward Gettysburg, York and Dillsburg.

(2) Against that part of the Red state west of Parrs Ridge, the lines of movement and supply favor an advance from Chambersburg toward Hagerstown, and from Gettysburg—Hanover towards Frederick—Mount Airy.

(3) Against that part of the Red state east of Parrs Ridge, the lines of movement and supply favor an advance from Frederick—Hanover towards Baltimore, and from Hanover—Stewartstown towards Baltimore.

(4) An advance from Stewartstown—Delta towards Baltimore, or from Delta—Havre de Grace towards Baltimore, is less favored by lines of movement and supply.

10. ECONOMICS.—*a.* The first objective of an offensive campaign is the main hostile army. When the power of resistance of the hostile armed forces has been broken, the victor is able to go where he wills. If the strength of the opposing forces is approximately equal, and both nations are able to maintain the strength and supply of their armies, the campaign may be long drawn out. Even should the power of resistance of the hostile armed forces be destroyed, a nation still may not come to terms unless the industries and sources of supply, upon which it subsists, are seized

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and controlled. It is in the solution of this phase of the problem that the study of economics is of value. Such a study indicates the important sources of man-power, munitions, and supplies, which, if seized, will reduce the power of resistance of the opposing army, by interfering with its maintenance and supply. After the power of resistance of the hostile army has been destroyed, it indicates the ultimate objective or objectives of the campaign.

*b.* (1) A study of the economic statistics of the Red state indicates that about 60% of the population, and practically all of the industries of the state, are located in Baltimore. Baltimore is located on Chesapeake Bay, open to the commerce of all nations. So long as the Reds hold Baltimore, they are able to continue to supply their army.

(2) Next in importance, from an economic point of view, is the group of Carroll, Frederick, and Washington Counties, which supply a great part of the stock and cereals of the state, and in which are located the remaining industries.

*c.* (1) Any campaign against the Red state should contemplate the seizure of Baltimore at the earliest practicable moment, for he who holds Baltimore controls the Red state. For the same reason, the Reds will so plan their campaign, whether offensive or defensive, that they will insure the defense of Baltimore so far as their strength permits. At the same time, the Reds cannot profitably evacuate the remainder of their territory. While they will attempt to hold Baltimore to the last, with all of their strength, if necessary, it must be ascertained what else they will attempt to hold.

(2) The country south of the line Patapsco, South Branch Patapsco to Mount Airy, thence southwest along Parrs Ridge, may be eliminated, at least for the early stages of the campaign. While this section is important as a source of supply, its man power is not great and its military value is not such that Baltimore would be passed to seize it. It will hardly be an early objective of the Blues. There remains the northern tier of counties—Washington, Frederick, Carroll, Baltimore, Harford, and Cecil. Cecil is

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a special case, standing somewhat by itself. The others are all productive and valuable, and, if possible, should be defended. To attempt to defend all of them, however, would require a greater dispersion of force than the Reds can prudently make. It may be assumed, with a fair degree of reason, that the enemy's defense will be concentrated; first, for the defense of Baltimore, Harford, and that part of Carroll County east of Parrs Ridge; second, for the defense of that part of Carroll County west of Parrs Ridge and Frederick County; and, third, for the defense of Washington County.

(3) It is apparent that the Reds cannot include Cecil County in any passive system of defense. It can be defended effectively only by invading the Blue territory, east of the Susquehanna, from the direction of Cecil County.

*d.* A study of the economic statistics of the Blue state shows no such example of concentration as that of the Reds. The Blue state may be considered by grouping the counties as follows:

1st Group: Perry, Juniata, Huntington, Fulton, and Mifflin.

2d Group: Franklin, Adams, Cumberland, and York.

3d Group: All those counties east of the Susquehanna.

(1) It is perhaps unfortunate that the easiest of these groups to defend, the 1st group, is relatively of the least importance. Although valuable, on account of its agricultural products, it is relatively low in population, and of little industrial importance.

(2) The 3d group stands first in population, first in industries, and second in agriculture. Reading, Harrisburg, Lancaster, and Lebanon, all lying within the 3d group, occupy four of the first five places industrially. The fortunate location of the Susquehanna River makes this area comparatively easy to defend against the Reds.

(3) It is in the 2d group, especially in Adams and York Counties, that the greatest economic vulnerability of the Blues lies. It also lies opposite the Red's most vulnerable area, which they may defend by attacking that of the Blue's. York County, particularly, is second in population,

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second in size, considerably ahead of the others in food supply, and well up in the live stock industry. In addition, York City ranks high in importance as an industrial center.

11. THE MILITARY SITUATION.—*a. Blue Mission.*—The mission of the Blue army is to meet and destroy the power of resistance of the Red army and seize the industries and sources of supply of the Red state.

*b. Red Situation.*—(1) The probable organizations and mobilization centers of the Reds are shown in the attached tables. Just before, or, at the latest, immediately after the outbreak of war, the Red units will be mobilized. This can be accomplished in 36 to 48 hours.

(2) The Red plan of operation, whether offensive or defensive, will be such that it will insure the defense of Baltimore.

(a) They may adopt the strategic defensive until the plan of operation of the Blues is disclosed. This, however, would surrender the initiative to the Blues, thus permitting the Blues to mobilize and concentrate unmolested.

(b) They may use part of their force for the defense of Baltimore, and, with the remainder, undertake an offensive from Hagerstown towards Shippensburg, or from Perryville towards Lancaster. The Red strength is not sufficient for both purposes.

(c) They may concentrate their entire force and attempt a vigorous offensive towards York and Dillsburg, in the hope of crushing the Blue forces west of the Susquehanna before those east of that river have joined them. This plan of operation is the one which would be most embarrassing to the Blues. For this plan of operation, the Reds probably would concentrate along Reisterstown—Western Run, protected by their cavalry, and some infantry, on the line Westminster—Ebbvale—Parkton. The Reds could complete their concentration in one day (except for the 5th Division which could join later). On the second day, they could appear along the border, and, on the third day, if not resisted, they could reach the line Heidlersburg—York.

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*c. Blue Situation.*—(1) The organizations and mobilization centers of the Blues are shown in attached tables. They can be mobilized in about the same time as the Reds.

(2) The mobilization centers of the Blues are much more dispersed than those of the Reds. The Blues, however, with the aid of their army train, can concentrate three divisions in the vicinity of York Springs, York, or Lancaster, within one day, and have two additional divisions within supporting distance within the second day, and the last within three days.

(3) The Blues are stronger than the Reds; in cavalry, about three to two; in infantry divisions, six to five; and in corps artillery, two to one. In other respects, the opposing forces are about equal.

12. PLANS OPEN TO THE COMMANDER.—*a.* The above discussion has limited the plans of operation to be considered. It has shown that the initial operation should take place between the Susquehanna and South Mountains. It has designated Baltimore as the economic objective of the Blues. The following plans may be considered:

(1) Concentrate on the line Heidlersburg—York and assume the strategic defensive until the Red plan of operation is disclosed. This would surrender the initiative to the Reds, permit them to concentrate unmolested, and permit them to seize the extension of Parrs Ridge south of York. The Blues have a superiority in strength, hence they should assume the strategic offensive. As the Blues are more dispersed than the Reds, the Blue covering force may have to assume the defensive temporarily, to cover the concentration, but the Blue plan of operation should not be defensive.

(2) Concentrate on the line Center Mills—East Berlin and advance in the direction of Frederick. This probably would not meet the Red army; it would permit the Reds to seize Parrs Ridge and its extension; it would expose York and the Blue lines of communications to attack from the southwest; and it does not fulfill the economic requirements of the campaign.

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(3) Send the cavalry forward to cover the concentration by seizing and holding the line Blackrock—New Freedom; then to concentrate towards East Berlin and York, and advance on Baltimore via Blackrock—New Freedom. This plan has many advantages. It probably will meet the Red army, or if the Reds are planning an operation in another area, it will compel them to return for the defense of Baltimore. It fulfills the economic requirements of the campaign. It is favored by the lines of movement and supply. The direction of advance turns Parrs Ridge and its extension, and it is the most favorable route of advance against Baltimore, so far as topographical features are concerned.

13. THE DECISION.—The commander decides to send the cavalry forward to seize and hold the general line Blackrock—New Freedom and cover the concentration; to concentrate towards East Berlin—York, and advance on Baltimore via Blackrock—New Freedom.

For details see draft of field orders.

## SECTION III

## *A Solution to Second Requirement*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| Field Orders for Organization and Concentration of First Army | 14 |
| Organization and Concentration Tables, First Army | 15 |

14. FIELD ORDERS FOR ORGANIZATION AND CONCENTRATION OF BLUE ARMY.

SECRET

First Army,
HARRISBURG,
7 April 21, 6:00 PM.

FIELD ORDERS }
No. 1. }

Maps: Geological Survey, 1:62500.

1. An early declaration of war is probable between Red and Blue. The Red army consists of five infantry divi-

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sions, a reinforced cavalry brigade, and a number of corps and army troops. Red mobilization centers are located at BELAIR, BALTIMORE, LAUREL, and FREDERICK, with cavalry at WESTMINSTER. (See G2 Report [omitted]).

2. (a) The First Blue Army, will be organized and will concentrate towards the line EAST BERLIN—YORK, as directed in attached tables, and advance on BLACKROCK—NEW FREEDOM. Movements for the concentration will begin on D day.

   (b) Boundary between Corps: MIDDLETOWN—WEIGELSTOWN—HANOVER JC—STILTZ—MT CARMEL, all to II Corps.

3. (a) The 1st Cavalry, seizing the line BLACKROCK—NEW FREEDOM on D day, and holding it until relieved by I and II Corps, will screen the concentration. The frontier, from the SUSQUEHANNA to the western border of the state, will be covered by patrols. As soon as authorized to cross the frontier, it will locate the movements of the Red infantry divisions from their mobilization centers. When relieved of the defense of the line BLACKROCK—NEW FREEDOM, it will operate on the right of the army.

   (b) The army air service will screen the concentration and locate the movements of Red infantry divisions from their mobilization centers.

   (c) I Corps, on the night of D day—D plus 1 day will concentrate on EAST BERLIN. On the night of D plus 1 day—D plus 2 days it will advance in column of divisions on BLACKROCK and relieve the 1st Cavalry in its front of the defense of the line BLACKROCK—STILTZ.

   (d) II Corps on the night D day—D plus 1 day will concentrate on YORK. On the night D plus 1 day —D plus 2 days, it will advance in column of divisions on NEW FREEDOM and relieve the 1st Cavalry Division in its front of the defense of the line STILTZ—NEW FREEDOM and patrolling the border from NEW FREEDOM to the SUSQUEHANNA. On D day and D plus 1 day it will support the 1st Cavalry Division in the defense of the line BLACKROCK—NEW FREEDOM.

   (e) Army reserves. The 4th Division will advance on YORK SPRINGS and the 6th Division on LANCASTER. The 6th Division will reconnoiter towards the frontier east of the SUSQUEHANNA and be prepared to meet a Red advance from that direction.

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(f) Other troops, see organization and concentration tables and Administrative Orders No 1.

(x) (1) All movements, except those made by cavalry, will be made at night and with the greatest secrecy.

(2) All units will be prepared to continue the march on BALTIMORE at 6:00 AM on D plus 2 days.

(3) No troops will cross the Red frontier until authorized by these headquarters.

4. See Administrative Orders No 1.

5. (a) Plan of Signal Communication: See Annex No 1.

(b) Axes of Signal Communication:

First Army: HARRISBURG—NEW CUMBERLAND—LEWIS BERRY—BULL ROAD—YORK.

I Corps: CARLISLE—MOUNT HOLLY SPRINGS—YORK SPRINGS—EAST BERLIN.

II Corps: LEBANON—MANHEIM—COLUMBIA—YORK.

(c) Command Posts:

First Army—No change.

I Corps—to EAST BERLIN, 9:00 PM, D plus 1 day.

II Corps—to YORK, 9:00 PM, D plus 1 day.

1st Cavalry Division to PORTERS at 4:00 PM, D day.

By command of General A.

X,

Chief of Staff.

Distribution A.

15. ORGANIZATION AND CONCENTRATION TABLE, FIRST ARMY.

See table, pages 484 and 485.

## SECTION IV

## *A Discussion of Principles*

| | Paragraphs |
|---|---|
| The Mission | 16 |
| Probable Red Actions | 17 |
| Important Principles and Considerations Affecting Plan of Operations | 18 |

16. THE MISSION.—The mission of the Blue Army is to meet and destroy the power of resistance of the Red

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Army and seize the important industrial centers and sources of supply of the Red state. At the same time the important Blue industrial centers and sources of supply should be protected from Red invasion.

17. PROBABLE RED ACTION.—*a. General.*—The Red Army, whether it assumes the offensive or defensive, will so plan its operations that it will insure the defense of Baltimore.

*b. Defensive.*—If the Red Army assumes the defensive it will no doubt attempt to stop the Blue advance on the line Deer Creek—Parrs Ridge. For this purpose, it may attempt to seize and hold a position in the area, New Freedom—Bandanna—Dug Hill Ridge, from which it can block a direct advance south from York—East Berlin, or take in flank any advance of the Blue Army, to the east or west of that position, between the Susquehanna and South Mountains.

*c. Offensive.*—If the Red Army assumes the offensive, it may attempt to seize promptly the area, New Freedom —Bandanna, and march on York, with the view of crushing the Blue Army before it has completed its concentration and of seizing the important industrial center of York. The Red Army may have its entire force ready to cross the border at the end of the second day after it begins its concentration. On the third day, if not checked, it may reach the vicinity of York—East Berlin. There is a possibility that the Red Army may cross the border before the Blues become aware of the fact that the Reds have begun their concentration, but this is not very probable if the Blues' intelligence service is efficient.

18. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING PLAN OF OPERATIONS.—*a. Objective.*—The most important economic objective for a Blue campaign is Baltimore. The most probable economic objective for a Red campaign is York. The Red Army probably will be encountered between Baltimore and York.

*b. Location of Operation.*—(1) A study of the military geography, lines of movement and supply, economics, and the military situation, indicates that the initial opera-

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## 15. ORGANIZATION AND CONCENTRATION TABLE, FIRST ARMY

To accompany FO No 1.

| *Unit* | *Assignment* | *Mobilization Center* | *On D Day Move to* | *On night D day—D plus 1 Day move to:* | *On night D plus 1 Day—D plus 2 days move to:* | *Route* | *Remarks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army Headquarters | | HARRISBURG. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| 1st Cav Div | Army Cavalry. | YORK SPRINGS. | BLACKROCK—NEW FREEDOM. | No change. | Relieved of defense of line by corps; move to right of army. | EAST BERLIN—HANOVER JC, and roads to west. | |
| I CORPS: | Right front. | CARLISLE. | No change. | No change. | EAST BERLIN. | Any routes in zone not prescribed for other troops. | |
| CHQ | I Corps. | | | [As ordered by] Corps. | [As ordered by] Corps. | | |
| Corps Trs | I Corps. | | | | | | |
| 5th Div | I Corps. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | EAST BERLIN. Foot troops by truck; remainder marching. | BLACKROCK—STILTZ; relieve 1st Cav Div. | Truck via DILLSBURG; remainder as ordered by corps. | |
| 1st Div | I Corps. | SHIPPENSBURG. | No change. | ARENDTSVILLE. | NEW OXFORD. | ARENDTSVILLE—HUNTERSTOWN—NEW OXFORD. | |
| II CORPS: | Left front. | | | | | | |
| CHQ | II Corps. | LEBANON. | No change. | No change. | YORK. | Any routes in zone not prescribed for other troops. | |
| Corps Trs | II Corps. | LEBANON. | No change. | As ordered by Corps. | As ordered by Corps. | | |
| 2d Div | II Corps. | YORK. | No change. Support cavalry. | No change. Support cavalry. | STILTZ—NEW FREEDOM relieve 1st Cav Div. | As prescribed by corps. | |
| 3d Div | II Corps. | LANCASTER. | No change. | WRIGHTSVILLE. | DALLASTOWN. | WRIGHTSVILLE, then as ordered by corps. | |
| ARMY RESERVES: | Army reserve. | NEWPORT. | No change. | Artillery and transport to CARLISLE. | YORK SPRINGS. Foot troops by truck, remainder marching. | CARLISLE—then truck via CARLISLE JC. remainder via DILLSBURG. | |
| 4th Div | | | | | | | |
| 6th Div | Army reserve. | READING. | No change. | 5 mi NE of EPHRATA. | LANCASTER. | Via EPHRATA. | |

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| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARMY TROOPS: | | | | | | | |
| Air Service. | | | | | | | |
| 2 Obs Sq. | Army troops. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | 2 Cos to army arty. |
| 1 Atk Gp | Army troops. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| 1 Bln Gp | Army troops. | LEBANON. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| 1 Bomb Gp | Army troops. | LEBANON. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| 1 Pur Gp | Army troops. | CARLISLE. | No change. | No change. | No change. | | |
| ARMY ARTILLERY: | | | | | | | |
| AA HQ | Army troops. | LEBANON. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | No change. | Via LITITZ. | 2 balloon cos attached. |
| 1 regt 155-mm guns | Army artillery. | LEBANON. | No change. | LITITZ. | MOUNTVILLE. | Via LITITZ. | |
| 1 regt 8" how | Army artillery. | LEBANON. | No change. | LITITZ. | MOUNTVILLE. | Via LITITZ. | |
| AA Prk | Army artillery. | LEBANON. | No change. | LITITZ. | MOUNTVILLE. | Via LITITZ. | |
| 1 Regt A-AA | Army troops. | LEBANON. | No change. | YORK. | No change. | LITITZ—WRIGHTSVILLE. | Precede 3d Div across SUSQUEHANNA. |
| Army Tn | Army troops. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | 5th Div foot troops to EAST BERLIN. | 4th Div foot troops to YORK SPRINGS. | 5th Div via DILLSBURG<br>4th Div via CARLISLE. | |
| A Tks | Army troops. | HARRISBURG. | No change. | YORK. | No change. | By train. | |

For other troops see Administrative Order No. 1.

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tion of the Blues should take place between the Susquehanna and the South Mountains.

(2) To concentrate part of the Blue army east of the Susquehanna and part west thereof subjects the army to defeat in detail.

*c. Offensive or Defensive.*—The superiority in strength of the Blues permits them to undertake an offensive campaign. They should make this offensive aggressive, in order that they may forestall the Reds and gain the initiative. It may be possible to strike the Reds a decisive blow before the latter are completely concentrated or prepared. If practicable, it seems desirable for the Blues to be prepared to cross the border on the date war is declared.

*d. Formations.*—(1) For the reasons already stated, the Blues should plan to concentrate promptly their whole force and no detachments should be made which may not be recalled in time to take part in the decisive engagement.

(2) The uncertainty as to where the Red forces may be met, and the possibility and probability that the entire Red army may be encountered in the area, New Freedom —Bandanna, or between that area and York, make it very undesirable for the Blues to approach the border, or to concentrate near the border, on a broad front. Such a disposition would permit the Reds to penetrate the Blue center, and, in turn, destroy each wing; or to crush one wing while the other is held.

(3) For the foregoing reasons, it seems desirable for the Blue Army to employ a strategic advance guard to develop the Red forces, while the greater part of the Blue Army is held as a mass for maneuver. In this problem the strategic advance guard may also be used to support the cavalry and seize and hold the important position, New Freedom—Black Rock, until the remainder of the army is prepared to advance.

*e. Direction of Advance.*—(1) Any plan of operations of the Blues between the Susquehanna and South Mountain should contemplate seizing a foothold on Parrs Ridge (and its extension to the northeast), somewhere in the area, New Freedom — Black Rock — Bandanna — Dug

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Hill. It is improbable that Dug Hill Ridge can be seized by the Blues before it is seized by the Reds. The position, New Freedom—Black Rock (Intersection), seems to be the most desirable, for it may be secretly occupied before war is declared. If this position is seized it will forestall the Red plan of operations whether offensive or defensive; it will block or threaten the flank of any Red advance between the Susquehanna and South Mountain, and it will turn Parrs Ridge.

(2) The most favorable route of advance for the Blue Army seems to be from the direction of York—East Berlin towards Baltimore via New Freedom—Black Rock.

(3) An advance east of the Baltimore and York turnpike will encounter the natural defensive lines of the streams flowing southeast from Parrs Ridge (and its extension). If the area about New Freedom be not seized, such an advance will probably expose its right flank, its communications, and York, to Red attack.

(4) An advance from west of Hanover will encounter the strong natural defensive position of Parrs Ridge. If the area about Bandanna be not seized such an advance will probably expose the left of the Blue Army, its communications, and York, to Red attack.

*f. The Concentration.*—(1) It is desirable that the Blues begin, and if possible complete, their mobilization and concentration before the Reds. On the other hand, any such steps on the part of the Blues, if known to the Reds, will certainly be followed by corresponding steps on the part of the latter. If the Blues concentrate too soon it may precipitate an avoidable declaration of war. The Blues, therefore, should not begin their mobilization and concentration any earlier than necessary, and, when once begun, both should be carried out promptly and secretly. To prevent the Reds getting a start on the Blues, the Blues must have an efficient service of information to keep them in close touch with the situation.

(2) It is important that the operation be planned as a surprise. The Blue strength employed, the area in which it is concentrated, and the location and direction of the Blue

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advance, should be kept secret from the Reds as long as possible. The Blue concentration when once begun should be carried out promptly and secretly, and the advance should be started as soon as the units arrive within supporting distance. It seems desirable that the concentration be so planned that the Blue Army, with its strategic advance guard, will be able to cross the border on the date war is declared.

(3) The Blues should so plan their concentration that it may not be interfered with by the Reds. At the same time the important Blue industrial centers and sources of supply should be protected. If the Red Army should cross the border before the Blues begin their concentration (possible but not very probable), the Blues will be unable to assemble sufficient strength in time to stop the Red advance south of the Line, York—East Berlin—Conewago Creek. Since practically no time will be lost by concentrating on or towards that line, and since troops may be sent forward to seize and hold important points in advance of that line, and since the advance can be taken up as soon as troops arrive within supporting distance, it seems undesirable for the Blues to plan their concentration south of that line.

(4) It seems desirable that all movements for the concentration (including truck and train movements) be made at night, with every precaution taken to keep those movements secret and concealed from the Reds. The orders for the concentration should contain instructions covering this subject.

(5) A covering force should be employed to protect the concentration. The cavalry supported by infantry may be employed for this purpose.

(6) For any operations between the Susquehanna and South Mountains, the cavalry should be ordered to seize promptly and hold until relieved by the infantry, a foothold on the crest of Parrs Ridge, in the area, New Freedom—Bandanna—Dug Hill Ridge, and preferably the position New Freedom—Black Rock.

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(7) No troops should be ordered to cross the border before war is declared. Such an act constitutes an act of war and is beyond the authority of a military commander.

*g. Time of Issue of Order.*—From the above it is seen that the proper time to begin mobilization and concentration will depend upon future events. In order that suitable preparation may be made and that the concentration may be promptly carried out when the proper time arrives, it seems desirable that the army orders for concentration be issued as soon as practicable, and that the orders be so worded that the date upon which movements are to begin may be fixed later. The expression D day is very convenient for this purpose.

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## SECTION V

## *Topics Suggested for Study*

Paragraph

Topics Suggested for Study ---------- 19

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19. TOPICS SUGGESTED FOR STUDY.

*a.* Military geography of both Blue and Red states:

(1) Main topographical features affecting the advance of an army.

(2) Routes favorable for Red invasion of Blue territory.

(3) Routes favorable for Blue invasion of Red territory.

*b.* Lines of movement and supply of both states:

(1) Location and direction of railroads and main highways.

(2) Lines of Red invasion of Blue state most favored by lines of movement and supply.

(3) Lines of Blue invasion of Red state most favored by lines of movement and supply.

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*c.* Economics of both states:

(1) Important economic areas or centers of the Red state.

(2) What part of their state will the Reds defend?

(3) Important economic area or centers of the Blue state.

(4) What part of their state should the Blues attempt to defend?

*d.* Under the Military Situation:

(1) What will be the Red plan of campaign?

(2) If they assume a vigorous offensive, how soon can they concentrate, and how soon and in what strength can they invade Blue territory?

*e.* Plans open to the Blue Commander:

Various plans of campaign, with advantages and disadvantages of each.

*f.* Plan of organization and concentration of Blue Army for plan of campaign given in the approved solution.

(1) Points upon which units are concentrated; covering detachment.

(2) Formation in which units are concentrated.

(3) Use of strategic advance guard.

(4) When should troops cross the border? Discuss general plans of organization and concentration other than those given in the approved solution.

*g.* Missions assigned various units for the concentration:

(1) The cavalry.

(2) The air service.

(3) The I Corps.

(4) The II Corps.

(5) The army reserve.

(6) Importance of keeping movements secret.

*h.* Field Orders:

Form, brevity, clearness, completeness.

## *Maps*

General Map, Gettysburg-Antietam, showing counties.

Operation Map, First Army, D to D plus 2 days.

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